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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner instituted a suit seeking specific performance of a contract of agreement to sell a residential plot located in Gurgaon. The agreement was entered on 14th August 1985 with defendant No. 1, who allotted the property and received payment from the petitioner. Subsequently, the defendant allegedly cancelled the contract, which led to the filing of the suit. Initially, no issue regarding territorial jurisdiction was raised. Later, an amended written statement prompted the court to frame an issue on whether the Delhi Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The Additional District Judge held that the Delhi Court lacked jurisdiction and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation in the proper court. This revision petition challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi Civil Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit for specific performance of the contract relating to the property situated in Gurgaon?
  2. Whether an agreement clause conferring jurisdiction on Delhi Courts is valid and enforceable when the property concerned lies outside Delhi?
  3. Whether parties can confer jurisdiction by agreement on a court that otherwise lacks territorial jurisdiction?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The contract was entered into in Delhi, and payments were made there, establishing a connection to Delhi.
  • Clause 28 of the agreement explicitly provides that the Delhi High Court and subordinate courts shall have jurisdiction over disputes arising from the contract.
  • Parties are competent to agree on jurisdiction even if the cause of action arises in different places.
  • Relied on Section 16(d) and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to support jurisdiction in Delhi.
  • Invoked Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and cited precedents including A.B.C Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P Agencies, Prakash Kaur v. Everest Construction Co., and State Bank of India v. Sanjeev Malik.
  • Argued waiver and estoppel, noting that the respondents did not raise jurisdictional objections for nine years.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Denied the Delhi Court's jurisdiction to try the suit.
  • Relied on the decision in Sheela Agarwal v. Infocom Digital Systems Ltd. to argue that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court lacking initial jurisdiction.
  • Asserted that mutual consent or conduct cannot vest jurisdiction where none exists initially.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.B.C Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. A.P Agencies, AIR 1989 SC 1239 Validity of parties agreeing on jurisdiction where multiple courts have jurisdiction; distinction between ousting jurisdiction and conferring jurisdiction. Confirmed that parties may validly agree on a court's jurisdiction if that court has jurisdiction over part of the cause of action; an agreement ousting all jurisdiction is void.
Prakash Kaur v. Everest Construction Co., 1990 RLR 506 Support for jurisdictional arguments related to contract disputes. Referred to in support of petitioner's contention on jurisdiction.
State Bank Of India v. Sanjeev Malik, 1996 (2) AD 522 Support for jurisdictional claims and contractual obligations. Used to bolster petitioner's argument on jurisdiction.
Sheela Agarwal v. Infocom Digital Systems Ltd., 1998 (3) AD 636 : 72 (1998) DLT 622 Parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that does not have initial jurisdiction. Relied upon by respondents to oppose jurisdiction of Delhi Courts.
Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company, JT 1991 (3) SC 337 Jurisdiction cannot be conferred solely by agreement if the court lacks jurisdiction otherwise. Applied to hold clause 28 void as against public policy since Delhi Court lacked jurisdiction over the property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the jurisdictional clause (Clause 28) in the agreement and recognized the principle from A.B.C Laminart that parties may validly agree on jurisdiction where multiple competent courts exist. However, the Court emphasized that if a court has no jurisdiction at all—meaning no part of the cause of action arises within its territory—then parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement, as such a clause would be void and against public policy.

The Court noted that under Section 16 of the CPC, the suit must be instituted where the property is situated, which in this case is Gurgaon, outside Delhi’s jurisdiction. Since the suit seeks specific performance and possession delivery, enforcement must occur at the property's location, further negating Delhi Court’s jurisdiction.

The proviso to Section 16 CPC was found inapplicable because the relief sought cannot be fully enforced through personal obedience alone; physical possession must be delivered at Gurgaon.

The plea of waiver and estoppel was rejected as settled law precludes vesting jurisdiction by agreement where none exists initially. The Court relied on Patel Roadways Limited to reinforce that jurisdiction cannot be conferred solely by agreement.

Consequently, the Court held the jurisdiction clause void and upheld the trial court's decision dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed.

The direct effect is that the Delhi Court lacks jurisdiction to try the suit for specific performance concerning property situated in Gurgaon. The plaint must be returned to the petitioner for presentation in the proper territorial court. No new precedent is established; the judgment reaffirms established principles that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement where no initial jurisdiction exists.

    Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F Universal Limited & Another.

    Dr. M.K Sharma, J.— The present revision petition is directed against the order dated 25.5.1998 passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi in Suit No. 1036/94 holding that the Delhi Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and directing for return of the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation in the proper Court.

    2. The petitioner, as plaintiff, instituted a suit praying for decree for specific performance of the contract of agreement to sell entered into between the petitioner and the respondents. In the said suit it was stated that the plaintiff entered into a plot buyer's agreement in the prescribed form on 14th August, 1985 with defendant No. 1 pursuant to which the plaintiff was allotted a residential plot of land measuring 264 sq. mtrs. in the residential colony of DLF Qutab Enclave Complex, Gurgaon, by the defendant No. 1. It is also alleged that in terms of the aforesaid allotment the petitioner/plaintiff also paid a sum of Rs. 12,974/- to the defendant No. 1. It was also alleged that subsequently, however, defendant No. 1 willfully cancelled/withdrew the contract dated 14.8.1995 and the validity of the said action was challenged in the suit.

    3. The suit was contested by the defendants and on the basis of the pleadings of the parties five issues were framed. At the stage, however, no issue with regard to want of territorial jurisdiction was raised or framed. Subsequently, however, an amended written statement was taken on record which an issue relating to territorial jurisdiction was also framed by the Court in the following manner:

    1. Whether Delhi Civil Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit? OPD

    4. The aforesaid issue was taken up as a preliminary issue and on the said issue parties were heard. The Additional District Judge held that the Delhi Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the aforesaid suit and issued a direction for return of the plaint to the plaintiff to enable him to file the same before the proper Court. The aforesaid findings and the decision of the trial Court are challenged in this revision petition on which I have heard the Counsel appearing for the parties.

    5. Mr. Rajiv Nayyar, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the aforesaid agreement in respect of which decree for specific performance of the contract has been sought for was arrived at Delhi. He also relied upon the various clauses of the said agreement which in specific terms state that the aforesaid agreement has been entered at Delhi and that the payment of the instalment towards the sale consideration had also to be made at Delhi. He strongly relied upon clause 28 of the said agreement which stipulates that the Delhi High Court or Courts subordinate to it alone shall have jurisdiction in all matters arising out of, touching and/or concerning that transaction. Relying on the aforesaid clause, Counsel submitted that the Delhi Court, therefore, has jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit. He submitted that the parties are competent to place jurisdiction to try a particular case in one Court although cause of action for a particular suit could arise at different places. In support of his contention, Counsel relied upon the ratio of the decision in A.B.C Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. A.P Agencies, Sales, AIR 1989 SC 1239. He also submitted that the provisions of Section 16(d.), CPC read with proviso thereof alongwith the provisions of section 20, cpc make it abundantly clear that in the present case the petitioner could file the suit in Delhi Courts also. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel also drew my attention to the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and also to the reliefs sought for in the suit. Counsel also relied upon the ratio of the decisions in Prakash Kaur v. Everest Construction Co., 1990 RLR 506 : State Bank Of India. v. Sanjeev Malik., 1996 (2) AD 522. He also took up the plea of waiver and estoppel to prove his point that Delhi Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit.

    6. In support of the aforesaid contention he relied upon the conduct of the respondent, for the respondent agreed that the Delhi Court shall have jurisdiction to try and decide the present case by inserting Clause 28 in the agreement. He submitted that the respondent did not take up the aforesaid issue of territorial jurisdiction for nine long years and even in the written statement filed by it and the same was raised only at a later stage.

    7. Mr Chhabra appearing for the respondents, however, refuted all the allegations and submitted that the Delhi Court has no jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit and in support of his submission he relied upon the decision of this Court in Sheela Agarwal…Plaintiff; v. Infocom Digital Systems Ltd.…Defendant., 1998 (3) AD 636 : 72 (1998) DLT 622. He also submitted that if the Court does not have initial jurisdiction to try and decide the suit, the parties by their mutual conduct and consent cannot vest jurisdiction in a Court which does not have jurisdiction to try the suit.

    8. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, let me consider the issues raised. It is not doubt true that clause 28 of the agreement stipulates that the Courts in Delhi shall have jurisdiction to try and decide the disputes connected with the aforesaid agreement. Where two or more Courts have jurisdiction under the Code of Civil Procedure to try the suit or proceedings, an agreement between the parties that the disputes between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to or violative of the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act. In ABC Limanart's case (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that where there might be two or more competent Courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therein, if the parties to the contract agree to vest jurisdiction in one such Court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, the agreement would be valid. It was further held that there would be no doubt that in an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the Court would be unlawful and void being against the public policy, however, if on the other hand it is found that the jurisdiction agreed would also be a proper jurisdiction in the matter of the contract it could not be said that it ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. From the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court it is abundantly clear that where the parties to a contract agreed to vest jurisdiction to a particular Court although cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of different Courts including that particular Court, the same cannot be said to be void or to be against the public policy. It was also made clear in the said decision that if, however, a particular Court does not have any jurisdiction to deal with the matter and no part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court, the parties by their consent and mutual agreement cannot vest jurisdiction in the said Court. Therefore, a clause vesting jurisdiction on a Court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to decide the matter, would be void as being against the public policy.

    9. The provision of section 16, cpc are also very clear. It provides that a Court within the limits of whose jurisdiction the properties situate for the determination of right of which a suit is instituted, would be the place where the suit is to be instituted. In other words, the location of institution of a suit would be guided by the location of the property in respect of which and for determination of any right or interest whereof the suit is instituted.

    10. In the present case, admittedly the property in respect of which the agreement was entered into and for specific performance of which the suit is instituted is located at Gurgaon (Haryana). Admittedly, the suit is for specific performance of the contract for agreement to sell of a property located at Gurgaon. In the plaint, apart from seeking a declaration the petitioner has also sought for decree for delivery of possession as well. Therefore, the Court in addition to passing a decree shall also be called upon to deliver possession of the property to the petitioner. That can be done only by sending the concerned person responsible for delivery of possession, to Gurgaon. Under such circumstances, in my considered opinion, Delhi Courts shall have no jurisdiction to get the aforesaid decree enforced, for the property is situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The proviso to Section 16, CPC is also not applicable, for the relief sought for cannot be entirely granted or obtained through the personal obedience of the respondent, for enforcing the relief if granted in respect of delivery of possession, a representative will have to go to the place where the property is located and deliver possession at site where the property is located. The plea of waiver and estoppel, as raised by the petitioner, is also without any merit, for it is settled law that a Court cannot derive jurisdiction in respect of a matter in respect of which otherwise the said Court does not have jurisdiction merely because the parties have agreed to vest jurisdiction on the said Court. It would be appropriate to refer to the decision of Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay v. Prasad Trading Company., JT 1991 (3) SC 337, laying down the proposition that by agreement alone jurisdiction could not be conferred on any Court. The aforesaid clause 28 is, therefore, void being against the public policy. The petition, thus has no merit and is dismissed accordingly.

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    Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F Universal Limited & Another.
    (Nov 1, 1999)