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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal against an ad-interim injunction order made in a partition suit. The plaintiff (Nathu Singh) filed a suit for partition claiming to be a co-sharer of land (Khasra No. 837, 7 biswas / 350 sq. yards, Village Munirka) and applied for ad-interim injunction to restrain the defendants from raising further constructions and alienating the property. The defendants contested both the suit and the injunction application, alleging that the plaintiff had relinquished rights and that they were in exclusive possession as sole owners, having become owners by ouster/adverse possession; they also asserted constructions were under municipal sanction.

The Additional District Judge appointed a Local Commissioner, whose inspection found two shops with roofs and three more under construction. The trial court held, prima facie, that the plaintiff was a co-owner and that defendants had no right to raise constructions or change user. The trial court restrained most construction as likely to cause irreparable loss to the plaintiff but allowed the defendants to complete the shops marked X, Y, Z subject to conditions (disclosure of tenants, account of rents, and prohibition on parting with or further constructing pending final disposal). The defendants appealed against the partial injunction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's rights in the suit property had been relinquished (as claimed by the appellants), thereby defeating his status as a co-sharer.
  2. Whether the appellants had acquired exclusive ownership by ouster/adverse possession, preventing the grant of an injunction in favour of the plaintiff.
  3. Whether the trial court's order granting an ad-interim injunction (subject to conditions and permitting completion of certain constructions) was correct in law and ought to be interfered with on appeal.
  4. Whether, even if the plaintiff remained a co-sharer, the appellants' proposed undertakings (not to create third-party interests or to demolish constructions on court direction) would render any injunction unnecessary.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The respondent (plaintiff) had relinquished his rights in the suit property and thus could not claim to be a co-sharer.
  • The appellants had become exclusive owners due to ouster and by way of adverse possession.
  • Even if the respondent were a co-sharer, he would not be prejudiced by the proposed construction because the appellants offered undertakings: (a) not to part with the newly constructed portions or create third-party interests, and (b) to demolish the construction at their own cost if directed by the court. It was submitted that the respondent initially accepted this during the appeal proceedings.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent denied any relinquishment of rights and denied making any application or statement of relinquishment before the Land Acquisition Collector.
  • The respondent denied any ouster and contested the appellants' claim of exclusive ownership by adverse possession.
  • The respondent explained that any apparent agreement during the appeal proceedings was based on a misrepresentation by the appellants as to the nature and extent of the proposed construction; upon realising the misrepresentation, the respondent refused to be misled.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 As authority on the requirement for ouster to be proved by evidence of open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession to the knowledge of the other co-sharers. Grouped with other authorities to state the legal standard that ouster/adverse possession between co-sharers requires proof of hostile assertion and exclusive possession; used to reject appellants' plea of ouster prima facie.
Mohammad Bagar v. Naimun-Nisa Bibi, AIR 1956 SC 548 Supports the principle that ouster requires demonstration of hostile title and exclusive possession. Relied upon as part of the jurisprudence establishing the high threshold for proving ouster among co-sharers; contributed to the court's conclusion that mere exclusive enjoyment does not establish ouster.
Shambhu Prasad v. Mst. Phool Kumari, AIR 1971 SC 1337 Another Supreme Court authority cited for the rule on ouster and adverse possession among co-sharers. Used with the other cases to explain the legal requirements for ouster; supported the court's view that appellants had not established ouster prima facie.
Prescott v. Novero (1827) 4 Masen 326 Illustrates that acts of ownership by a co-owner which against a stranger would be disseisin may be explicable within joint ownership and not amount to ouster. Quoted to explain why the test of ouster is more exacting between co-owners; used to support the proposition that sole occupation by a co-owner is not, by itself, evidence of ouster.
Hardit Singh v. Gurmukh Singh, AIR 1918 PC 1 Explains that "exclusive possession" in the context of joint estate is equivocal; sole occupation alone does not show exclusion of others. Relied upon to underline that uninterrupted sole possession without more is consistent with joint title and not an assertion of separate hostile title; used to reject the appellants' adverse possession claim at the interim stage.
Lachneswar Singh v. Monowar Hossain, ILR 19 Cal. 253 (P.C) Authority in the same vein as Hardit Singh on the limits of interpreting sole occupation as exclusion. Cited to reinforce the proposition that sole possession by a co-sharer is not sufficient to establish ouster.
Cor v. Appurhamy (1912) A.C. 230 Another authority referenced regarding the meaning of exclusive possession in joint holdings. Used to support the court's analysis that exclusive occupation by a co-sharer does not ipso facto amount to adverse possession.
Midnapur Co. v. Naresh Narain, AIR 1924 Privy Council 144 Supports the conclusion that mere exclusive enjoyment does not, of itself, amount to ouster of co-sharers. Relied on to emphasize that the appellants' exclusive enjoyment does not per se establish ouster; contributed to the court's refusal to accept adverse possession prima facie.
Najjukhan v. Imtiaz-ud-Din (1895) ILR 18 All. 115; based on Full Bench decision in Shadi v. Anup Singh (1890) ILR 12 All 436 Holds that one of several joint owners cannot erect a building on joint property without consent of other joint owners even if the erection may cause no direct loss to others. Applied to support the position that a co-owner cannot appropriate a portion of joint land by erecting buildings without consent; informed the court's view on the propriety of restraining further construction.
Gouri v. C.H. Ibrahim, AIR 1980 Kerala 94 (Kerala High Court) Relied upon by respondent; reproduces principles from Woodroffe's Law of Injunction regarding interference with possession and enjoyment of joint property and the circumstances for granting injunctions. The court observed that the trial judge's approach aligned with the principles set out in this authority and the Woodroffe excerpt; reinforced the cautious approach to interfering with joint property and factors for injunctive relief.
Prabhoo v. Soodh Nath, AIR 1978 Allahabad 178 Expresses that high-handed action by one co-owner cannot be encouraged by courts of law. Quoted to support the proposition that courts should prevent unilateral appropriation of joint property by a co-owner; used in confirming the trial court's injunction order.
Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal, AIR 1951 Allahabad 199 States that in exercising discretion in injunction matters the court must be guided by justice, equity and good conscience and that no inflexible rule applies. Applied to justify the discretionary nature of the trial court's interim order and to show that the appellate court should not interfere absent infirmity; supported disposition of the appeal.
Woodroffe's Law of Injunction (1964) — excerpt Sets out several principles: caution in interfering with joint property possession; no cause of action if one co-sharer profits without damage to others; court discretion where injury remediable by damages or partition; injunction may be granted for substantial exclusion or material alteration not remediable by damages/partition. The court noted that the trial judge followed the path indicated by these principles and used them to evaluate whether an injunction should issue; these principles framed the court's approach to balancing remedies and discretion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a stepwise analysis, adhering closely to established principles concerning co-sharers, ouster, adverse possession and the grant of injunctions:

  1. Factual assessment: The Local Commissioner's report and parties' admissions established that three shops (1, 2, 3) had roofs and three adjacent shops (X, Y, Z) were under construction. The trial court considered these facts when making the ad-interim order.
  2. Prima facie title: On the materials before it, the trial judge found prima facie that the plaintiff was a co-owner and that defendants had no right to change user or raise constructions detrimental to the plaintiff's interest.
  3. Weighing relinquishment allegations: The appellants' claim that the respondent had relinquished rights (allegedly before the Land Acquisition Collector) was met with categorical denial by the respondent. The appellate court held that, in view of these denials, relinquishment could not be taken as established at this interim stage and required evidence.
  4. Legal standard for ouster/adverse possession: The court reiterated the settled law that possession by one co-sharer is ordinarily possession for all; to constitute ouster/adverse possession there must be evidence of open and hostile assertion of title with exclusive possession to the knowledge of the other co-sharer(s). The court relied on multiple authorities to underline that mere exclusive enjoyment is insufficient to establish ouster between co-sharers.
  5. Application to facts: Applying these principles, the court concluded that the appellants had not established ouster or adverse possession prima facie. Consequently, the trial judge was justified in treating the respondent as a co-sharer at this stage and in preventing unilateral appropriation of the joint property.
  6. Approach to injunctions on joint property: The court considered the cautious approach required when interfering with possession of joint property (as reflected in Woodroffe and case law). It found the trial judge's order — which allowed completion of specified shops subject to conditions (disclosure of tenants, accounts of rents, prohibition on transfer, and exclusion of new construction pending final disposal) — to be consistent with those principles, balancing the protection of the co-sharer's rights and the practical realities of the constructions already underway.
  7. On the purported interim agreement: The court examined documents suggesting the respondent agreed to some construction during the appeal proceedings but accepted the respondent's explanation that any apparent consent was based on misrepresentation of the proposed works; the court therefore placed limited weight on that supposed agreement and refused to allow it to undermine the trial court's order.
  8. Discretion and equity: The court reiterated that injunction relief in partition/co-owner disputes requires the exercise of discretion guided by justice, equity and good conscience. Considering the facts and legal principles, the appellate court found no infirmity calling for interference with the interim order except insofar as it remained subject to prior modification orders (the May 31, 1991 order).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is disposed of — the impugned ad-interim order of the trial court is not interfered with and stands subject to the modification effected by this Court's order dated May 31, 1991.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The trial court's interim directions restraining the defendants from raising further construction or parting with newly constructed portions (except as permitted and subject to conditions) remain in force as upheld by the appellate court.
  • The defendants were permitted by the trial court (and this position was not disturbed on appeal) to complete the shops marked X, Y, Z subject to specified conditions (placing names of tenants on record, accounting for rents, not alienating newly constructed portions, and not raising further construction pending disposal of the suit).
  • The appellate court expressly left open the merits of the partition suit and stated that nothing in the order should be read as an expression of opinion on the merits; thus final rights remain to be determined on evidence at trial.
  • No order as to costs was made by the court.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles (regarding ouster, adverse possession, and injunctions between co-sharers) to the facts and does not purport to lay down any new precedent; the decision addresses the correctness of an interim order and preserves the parties' positions pending final adjudication.

    Karam Singh & Qrs. v. Nathu Singh.

    Jaspal Singh, J.— In his suit for partition the plaintiff Nathu Singh also applied for an ad-interim injunction order. Though the learned Additional District Judged allowed it only partly, the defendants still found the order unpalatable. Hence this appeal.

    2. Before I proceed to deal with the arguments advanced, let me first provide a thumb-nail description of the facts.

    3. The plaintiff claiming to be the co-sharer alongwith the defendants of property bearing Khasra No. 837 measuring 7 biswas (350 Sq. yards) in the revenue estate of Village Munirka filed a suit for partition and claiming that defendants 1 to 3 having already raised some construction were out to raise further constructions and to part with the same to the detriment of plaintiff's interest, sought ad-interim injunction restraining them from doing so. It need hardly be mentioned that the defendants contested the suit and so also the application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2. They alleged that the plaintiff's rights in the land stood relinquished and that they were in exclusive possession of the suit property as sole owners. Defendants 1 to 3 further took the plea that, in any case, they had become exclusive owners on account of ouster and by way of adverse possession and that constructions were raised as per the plans sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation.

    4. It appears that the learned Additional District Judge appointed a Local Commissioner who, on' inspection of the site, reported the existence of two shops alongwith a tinshed and the construction of a few more. Anyhow, it was admitted case of the parties before the learned trial judge that shops numbered by him as 1, 2 and 3 (shown yellow in the site plan) had got roofs while three shops (Marked X, Y, Z) adjacent there to were under construction.

    5. The over-all survey of the material led the learned Additional District Judge to hold that prima facie the plaintiff was a co-owner of the suit property and that the defendants had no right to raise constructions and to change user of the property. He felt that raising of further construction was likely to cause irreparable loss to the plaintiff but allowed the defendants to complete the construction of shops marked by him as X Y Z with the following observations:

    “Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, I, therefore, allow the defendants to complete the shops XYZ. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, I, therefore, allow the defendants to complete the shops XY & Z provided the defendants place on record the names of all the tenants in respect of these shops as well as the shops shown in yellow colour, the rent being realised from each of the transferee's in case the shops are transferred and to maintain and submit periodical accounts in respect of these 8 shops and one godown. The defendants No. 1 to 8 shall not construct either on the first floor of these shops marked as 1 to 3 and XYZ or on the shops shown in yellow colour nor shall raise further construction anywhere in the suit land till the disposal of the suit. It is also directed that in case the suit is ultimately decreed and at the time of final decree, the portion of the shops marked XYZ in the site plan placed on record, falls to the share of the plaintiff, the construction of these shops shall not be taken into account for the purpose of partition of the suit land. With these directions the application stands disposed of.”

    6. Mr. V.P Singh, Advocate who put in appearance on behalf of the appellants had three submissions to make in support of the appeal. His first contention was that the respondent having relinquished his rights in the suit property, he could not claim to be a co-sharer. Secondly, in any case, the appellants had, on account of ouster of the respondent, become owners by adverse possession and thirdly the respondent, even if taken to be a co-sharer, would not be prejudiced in any way by the proposed construction as the appellants were prepared to give an undertaking not to part with the same or to create third party interest and as they were further prepared to give an undertaking to demolish the construction at their own expense, if so directed by the court. It was submitted that the respondent had even accepted such a proposal during the proceedings of the appeal.

    7. The respondent has denied any relinquishment. He has also denied the factum of any statement/application of relinquishment having been made before the Land Acquisition Collector or his having been ousted.

    8. What is important to note is that the appellants do admit that the respondent was a co-sharer. Even otherwise the Jamabandi of 1950-1951 establishes it to be so. Their claim is that the respondent had relinquished his rights before the Land Acquisition Collector. The respondent, however, denies there being any application or statement to that effect. This being the position, the matter needs evidence to be recoded and measured. For the present, and more so in view of the categorical denial of the respondent, his rights as a co-sharer cannot be taken, at least at this stage, to have been relinquished.

    9. As regards the plea of ouster, we need to remember that as between co-sharers, possession of one co-sharer is in law the possession of all co-sharers. Therefore, to constitute adverse possession, ouster of the non-possessing co-sharer has to be made out. There must be evidence of open assertion of a hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other (See P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 Mohammad Bagar v. Naimun-Nisa Bibi, AIR 1956 SC 548, & Shambhu Prasad v. Mst. Phool Kumari, AIR 1971 SC 1337).

    10. In the case of co-owners, the test of ouster is more exacting than in the case of strangers. The reason is that in the case of co-owners the possession of one is held to be for the benefit of all. In Prescott v. Novero (1827) 4 Masen 326, it was said that:

    “The only difference between the possession of a co-owner and other cases is that, acts which, if done by a stranger would per se be a disseisin, are in the case of tenancies in common perceptible of explanation consistently with the real title, acts of ownership are not, in tenancies in common, acts of disseisin.”

    11. As observed by the Privy Council in Hardit Singh v. Gurmukh Singh (AIR 1918 PC 1) the phrase “exclusive possession” has an equivocal meaning. If by exclusive possession of joint estate is meant that one member of the joint family alone occupies it, that by itself affords no evidence of exclusion of other interested members of the family. Uninterrupted sole possession of such property, without more must be referred to the lawful title possessed by the joint holder to use the joint estate, and cannot be regarded as an assertion of a right to hold it as separate, so as to assert an adverse claim against other interested members.(See also Lachneswar Singh v. Monowar Hossain ILR 19 Cal. 253 (P.C) and Cor v. Appurhamy (1912) A.C 230.

    12. The law being as discussed above, the mere fact that the appellants have been in exclusive enjoyment of the suit property cannot per se amount to ouster of respondent's proprietory rights as a co-sharer (See also: Midnapur Co. v. Naresh Narain AIR 1924 Privy Council 144).

    13. It was held in the case of Najjukhan v. Imtiaz-ud-Din (1895) ILR 18 All. 115 which was based upon a decision of a Full Bench in the case of Shadi v. Anup Singh (1890) ILR 12 All 436, that one of several joint owners of land is not entitled to erect a building upon the joint property without the consent of the other joint owners, notwithstanding that the erection of such building may cause no direct loss to the other joint owners.

    14. During arguments Mr. V.P Singh did not refer to any precedent while Dr. Sidhu who argued on behalf of the respondent placed reliance only on a judgment of Kerala High Court in I. Gouri v. C.H Ibrahim AIR 1980 Kerala 94 and more particularly to that portion of paragraph 5 of the judgment which reproduces the following from Woodroffe's Law of Injunction (1964):

    “(1) The Courts will, in all cases be cautious of interference with the possession and enjoyment of joint property.

    (2) If one co-sharer uses the joint property to the greater profits of himself, but without damage to the co-sharers, there is no cause of action.

    (3) In as much as each co-sharer is entitled to a portion of every part of the joint property, the Court will not, as a general rule, enforce merely strict rights and will not interpose where the user is slightly in excess of the right.

    (4) Where there is an infringement of a character which is sufficiently substantial to entitle to some relief, the Courts will, in the determination of the question whether an injunction should be granted, have to consider whether the injury is adequately remediable by damages and partition. If that be the case, an injunction will be refused.

    (5) In the particular case of alleged injury through cultivation in the or dinary course by a co-sharer in actual occupation and sole use of the property, damages and not an injunction will ordinarily be granted even though the cultivation has the effect of excluding a co-sharer, unless such exclusion is in denial of that co-sharer's title, in which case an injunction will be granted, such a rule being necessitated by the climate, soil and other peculiar circumstances of this country in which the lands are ordinarily cultivated in common.

    (6) In all other cases, an injunction may be granted where act complained of involves the exclusion of the co-sharer, or some other material and substantial injury not remediable by partition or damages, such as the material and injurious alteration of the nature and condition of the property to which the parties are jointly entitled.”

    15. The law is thus clear and when we examine the impugned order in its light we find that the learned trial judge has treaded a path no different from the one paved by it.

    16. A few words more before lowering the curtain. It was contended that during the proceedings of this appeal the respondent had agreed to the raising of further construction by the appellants and in support my attention was drawn to C.M 1535 of 1991 arid to the reply filed by the respondent in answer to it. Of course, the reading of the two does lead to an impression that the respondent had agreed to the raising of some further construction by the appellants, but it was explained by Dr. Sidhu that the appellants had misrepresented about the nature and extent of the construction sought to be raised and soon upon realising it, the respondent had refused to be misled and it was on account of this that the court had also refused to modify its order of May 31, 1991 which is in following terms:

    “Counsel for the respondent seeks further time to file reply to the application. Let the reply be filed within a week. Rejoinder, if any, be filed before the next date of hearing. Parties agree that in the meantime further construction of shops identified by the Trial Court as Nos. 1, 2, 3 and X, Y, Z may go oh, but the petitioner will not part with possession of the newly constructed portion of these shops or otherwise alienate or encumber this portion in any way till the next date of hearing.

    To come up on 8th August, 1991.”

    17. The order of November 25, 1993 by which the Court refused to modify its order of May 31, 1991 may also be profitably reproduced. It is as follows:

    “By this application, the appellants seek modification of the order made on 31st May 1991 to the effect that they be permitted to carry out further construction in the premises in question.

    I have heard learned counsel for the parties arid I am of the view that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the controversy involved, it would neither be proper nor expedient to make any further orders in this application. It would, however, be desirable that the main appeal is set down for final disposal. Ordered accordingly.”

    18. As the court refused to modify its order of May 31, 1991 and as it is claimed by the respondent that true facts had not been represented but rather suppressed, I do not think much can be allowed to be made out of the so-called agreement.

    19. The respondent having prima facie established himself to be a co-owner and the pleas of ouster and adverse possession having not been established prima facie, the impugned order cannot be faulted more so when the respondent had approached the court without much loss of time. A co-owner has not in law any right to appropriate land to himself out of a joint land against the consent of his co-owner. As observed in Prabhoo v. Soodh Nath AIR 1978 Allahabad 178: “Highhanded action by one co-owner cannot be encouraged by courts of law.” Of-course, each case is to be decided upon its own peculiar facts and it will be left to the court to exercise its discretion upon proof of circumstances showing which side the balance of convenience lies. As laid down by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Chhedi Lal v. Chhotey Lal AIR 1951 Allahabad 199, the court in the exercise of its discretion has to be guided by considerations of justice, equity and good conscience and that no inflexible rule can be laid down as to the circumstances in which the relief for injunction should be granted or refused. However, I do feel that in the case in hand, the impugned order, having taken care of all the facts and circumstances of the case and the principles governing the law of injunctions, suffers from no such infirmity as may call for interference. The order thus stands subject, however, to modification regarding construction, if any, brought about by the order of this court dated May 31, 1991. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

    20. Nothing said in this order shall be read as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

    No order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Karam Singh & Qrs. v. Nathu Singh.
    (Aug 8, 1994)