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  • provisions of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules. Parties
  • Central Excises and Salt Act (hereinafter referred
  • Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
  • Rule 173-B(2A) read with Rule 9B of the Rules.
  • Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Exicse Rules.
  • provisions of sub-rule(1) of Rule 96-W
  • sub-section (4) (b) (i) read as under:4 (1)
  • Rule 9 and 49 of the Excise Rules.
  • Rule 9 of the Excise Rules.
  • Rule 9 of the said Rules
  • Rule 173-B of the Rules
  • Rule 9 read with Rules
  • FINANCE ACT 1979
  • Rule 47:Rule 49,
  • Section 4(1) (a),
  • Rule 9 and 49
  • Section 2(e)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules. Parties
  • Central Excises and Salt Act (hereinafter referred
  • Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
  • Rule 173-B(2A) read with Rule 9B of the Rules.
  • Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Exicse Rules.
  • provisions of sub-rule(1) of Rule 96-W
  • sub-section (4) (b) (i) read as under:4 (1)
  • Rule 9 and 49 of the Excise Rules.
  • Rule 9 of the Excise Rules.
  • Rule 9 of the said Rules
  • Rule 173-B of the Rules
  • Rule 9 read with Rules
  • FINANCE ACT 1979
  • Rule 47:Rule 49,
  • Section 4(1) (a),
  • Rule 9 and 49
  • Section 2(e)
Smart Summary

Summary of Legal Opinion (B.N. Kirpal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are a company engaged in manufacture of woollen yarn. During their manufacturing process they obtain an intermediate product described as "Sliver" (a cylindrical collection of loosely held, carded wool fibres with no twist), which is then further processed within the factory to make semi-worsted yarn used in carpet weaving. Prior to 1979 excise duty was charged on "wool tops" and not on the petitioners' product. The Finance Act, 1979 amended Item No. 43 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act to add the words "Carded Gilled Sliver" to the entry that taxed wool tops and certain slivers containing more than 50% wool by weight.

Following the amendment, the Range Officer wrote to the petitioners (1 March 1979) asking them to apply for a licence and file a classification list under Rule 173-B in respect of carded gilled sliver said to be manufactured by them. The petitioners contended they were not liable for excise duty because (inter alia) sliver is not a marketable commodity, there was no manufacture of goods known to the market, and there was no "removal" within the meaning of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules. The petitioners nevertheless applied for a licence under protest and sought provisional assessment; the Range Officer and Assistant Collector directed them not to clear the goods except on payment of duty and rejected provisional assessment requests. The petitioners made representations which were pending when they filed this writ petition.

The writ petition was admitted in part because the petitioners relied on a prior decision of this Court (Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.) that had decided a point on "removal" in the petitioners' favour.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amendment to Item No. 43 of the First Schedule (adding "Carded Gilled Sliver") is ultra vires Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act.
  2. Whether Parliament had competence under Entry 84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to amend Item No. 43 so as to include an item that is not "goods" and which is not "manufactured" (i.e., whether sliver, as an in-process material not known to the market, is taxable).
  3. Whether excise duty can be charged and collected in the absence of a "removal" of the product from the place of manufacture within the meaning of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (specifically, whether in-process material consumed within the same factory constitutes removal attracting excise duty).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The sliver obtained in their factory is an in-process, uncombed product that is not traded in the market and therefore is not a marketable commodity or "goods" known to the market.
  • The amended Item No. 43 could not be validly extended to tax sliver because excise can be levied only on manufactured goods that are marketable; if the product is not a marketable commodity, Parliament lacked competence (Entry 84, List I) and the amendment is ultra vires Section 3.
  • No "removal" within the meaning of Rules 9 and 49 took place because the sliver was consumed within the spinning section of the same factory; therefore, no excise duty could be levied or collected.
  • They relied on earlier Supreme Court and this Court decisions (not all named in the opinion) establishing that excise duty is leviable only on manufactured goods known to the market and that value is to be determined at the time of removal.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (represented by Mr. Chopra) relied on decisions construing Rule 9 to support levy of excise where goods are used or consumed and where material is transferred from one plant to another even within the same factory; specifically they relied on Caltex Oil Refining (India) Ltd. v. Union of India and Maneklal Harilal Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India.
  • It was argued that Rule 9 contemplates removal either outside the factory premises or within the premises if the product is sent from one plant to another for further processing, and that consumption within the place of manufacture can amount to removal if the product is consumed (subject to qualifications in the case law).
  • The respondents also referred to Rule 173-G(1) (first proviso) regarding maintenance of account-current and payment of duty at the end of the factory day for goods consumed within the factory in a continuous process, asserting that this provision governs manner or time of payment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. & Another v. The Joint Secretary, Govt. of India & Another, ILR (1978) II Delhi 216(1) Held that the value for excise is to be determined at the time of removal from the factory; collection of excise duty cannot arise unless and until goods are removed from the factory (definition of "factory" covers whole premises). The Court relied on and was "fortified" by this decision to conclude that because the sliver was not removed from the factory (it was consumed within the spinning section), excise duty could not be levied; this precedent was central to the Court's reasoning and final conclusion.
Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited v. Union of India and others, 1979 E.L.T (J) 581 (Civil Writ No. 357 of 1970, decided 3-4-1972) Construes Rule 9: no removal of product within a plant while it is in the process of manufacture; removal can occur if product moves from one stream/plant to another or is issued out for consumption or export; consumption within the place of manufacture can amount to removal depending on context. The Court reviewed this decision but held it of no assistance to the respondents. The Court interpreted the decision as not supporting the respondents' position that excise duty could be levied in the present facts where the intermediate product remained within the continuous process inside the same factory.
Maneklal Harilal Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad and others v. Union of India and others, 1978 E.L.T (J) 618 Held that duty must be paid before removal from the place where goods are produced; if place is specified in a licence, that specified place is the place for Rule 9 purposes. The Court noted this decision but disagreed with the Gujarat High Court's contrary interpretation of Delhi Cloth & General Mills. The Court held that where the place of manufacture is not specified separately in the licence (as here), the place of manufacture is the factory and the observations in Delhi Cloth & General Mills are binding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed its analysis by examining the statutory scheme (Section 3 and Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act) together with Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944:

  • Section 3 levies duties of excise "in such manner as may be prescribed" on excisable goods produced or manufactured in India, as set out in the First Schedule.
  • Section 4(1)(a) ties assessable value to the "normal price" at which goods are ordinarily sold for delivery "at the time and place of removal." Section 4(4)(b)(i) defines "place of removal" to include a factory or any other place or premises of production or manufacture of the excisable good.
  • Rule 9(1) prohibits removal of excisable goods from the place of production or specified premises without payment of duty and permission; Rule 49(1) provides that payment of duty is not required in respect of excisable goods made in a factory until they are about to be issued out of the place specified under Rule 9 or removed from approved storage.
  • The Collector has power under Rule 9 to specify the place (which may be the whole factory or a part of it) as the place of manufacture; in this case the parties admitted the Collector had not specified any particular part of the factory, hence the place of manufacture is the factory as a whole.
  • Given these provisions read together, the Court concluded that levy and collection of excise duty depend on removal from the place of manufacture (the factory) and assessment/value determination occurs at the time of such removal.
  • Applying the facts: the sliver produced by the petitioners was consumed within the spinning section of the same factory (i.e., it was used in a continuous in-house process and not removed from the place of manufacture). Therefore, there was no "removal" from the factory as contemplated by Rules 9 and 49 and consequently no occasion to levy or collect excise duty on the sliver.
  • The Court relied on the Delhi Cloth & General Mills decision where a similar question arose (calcium carbide used within the same factory to produce acetylene gas) and where it was held that no duty arises because there was no removal from the factory; the Court treated that authority as correctly stating the law and binding for present purposes.
  • The respondents' reliance on Caltex and Maneklal Harilal was considered: the Court analysed the passages relied upon but found they did not assist the respondents' position in the present factual matrix (and the Court disagreed with the Gujarat High Court's contrary treatment of Delhi Cloth when place of manufacture is not separately specified).
  • The Court also considered Rule 173-G(1) proviso (allowing payment at the end of the factory day for goods consumed within a continuous process) but held that this rule deals only with manner and time of payment and presupposes the leviability of duty; since there was no removal, there was no leviable duty and Rule 173-G provided no support for the respondents.
  • The Court expressly declined to decide the alternative contention whether sliver is "manufactured goods" or not within the meaning of Rule 9, because it allowed the petition on the ground there was no removal.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition is allowed.

The Court ordered that the respondents are restrained from levying excise duty on the sliver obtained by the petitioners as an in-process material used in the manufacture of semi-woollen worsted yarn, because the proposed levy and collection was not in accordance with the provisions of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules (i.e., there was no removal from the place of manufacture to attract duty). The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications: The direct effect is that the petitioners are protected from the proposed excise levy on the in-process sliver under the facts found (sliver consumed within the same factory). The Court did not decide the separate constitutional and manufacturing-status questions (ultra vires/marketability) because resolution on the "removal" point was dispositive. The opinion applies and follows the existing precedent (Delhi Cloth & General Mills) and does not purport to lay down a new broader precedent beyond affirming that, where no removal from the factory occurs, excise duty does not arise under Rules 9 and 49.


End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.

    M/S. Modi Carpets Limited & Anothers Petitioners v. Union Of India And Others S

    B.N Kirpal, J. (Oral):— In this writ petition the petitioners are challenging the validity and levy of excise duty in respect of ‘Sliver’ which is obtained by them as an in process material in the manufacture of woollen yarn in its factory premises.

    2. The petitioner-Company manufactures, inter alia, woollen yarn from raw-wool the writ petition sets out the entire process of manufacture of woollen yearn from raw-wool.

    3. Briefly stated, according to the petition, the raw-wool purchased from the market is first of all opened in a cleaning machine and loose dirt, grease and vegetable matter is removed. This opened wool is thereafter cleaned and washed. The washed wool is dried and there-after the partially dried wool is opened in a machine called the preparatory willow. This machine separates the wool fibres and further removes the dirt and vegetable matter which may have remained in it. Thereafter different types of wool are blended. At this stage, the wool is conveyed to the spinning department in the factory. In the said department humid conditions are maintained as the same are necessary and essential for further processing. The wool is then put on a carding machine consists of cylindrical speed rollers with pins mounted on their surface. Rolling on this machine straightens the fibres and opens the wool. The web of wool emerging from these rollers is pulled by a drawing head. This reduces the width of the carded web of wool and gives it the appearance of a cylindrical form being a mere collection of loosely held fibres. However, this cylindrical form consists of fibres of varying lengths which have been carded. There is no twist in these fibres. This form of wool, which is still in its fibre form, is described by the petitioner as ‘Sliver’.

    4. This Sliver is then processed through three stages to make it more uniform in diameter and to further reduce the weight per meter and to make it suitable for feeding into ring frames for spinning yarn. These machines are called ‘Draft-O-Matic Machine, Inter Draw Frame and Finisher Draw Frame’. It is essential to note that his product is not combed. The processing of wool through the Draft-O-Matic is called gilling. The process or gilling has to be completed prior to combing. Combing is a separate operation which is done in order to remove the short fibres. Thereafter the combed sliver is given a false twist and rolled into balls to form wool tops which are used in the manufacture of worsted yarn the contention of the petitioners is that combing of sliver is not done by it. The uncombed sliver which is obtained by the petitioners is used in the manufacture of semi-worsted yarn which in turn is used in weaving carpets. It is contended by the petitioners that this sliver which is not processed by combing, false twisting or winding into balls is not traded in the market and, in other words, is not a marketable commodity.

    5. Prior to 1979 excise duty was being reviewed and charged, inter alia, on wool tops. In view of the fact that petitioners do not produce wool tops, they were not subjected to levy of excise duty. But the Finance Act, 1979, however, Item No. 43 of the 1st Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’)

    “Wool tops and carded gilled sliver containing in either case, more than 50 per cent by weight of wool calculated on the total fibre contents.”

    By this amendment the words ‘Carded Gilled Sliver’ were added to the old entry.

    6. On the 1st of March, 1979 the Range Officer, Central Excise, Range II (Respondent No. 4) wrote to the petitioners asking them to apply for grant of a licence and for filing of a classification list under Rule 173-B of the Rules in respect of carded gilled sliver stated to have been manufactured in the petitioners' factory thereafter correspondence was exchanged between the petitioners and the respondents. The contention of the petitioners being that they were not liable to pay any excise duty, inter alia, for the reason that sliver could not be described as being goods which are known to the market and there was no manufacture in respect thereof. It was also contended that there was no removal of the goods within the meaning of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Exicse Rules. Nevertheless, the petitioners did apply for licence under protest and further requested that they should be granted provisional assessment thereafter under Rule 173-B(2A) read with Rule 9B of the Rules. The petitioners received letter dated 20th March, 1979 from the Range Officer Central Excise directing the petitioners not to clear the goods except on payment of excise duty. But the said letter, as also by the letter dated 21-3-1979 of the Assistant Collector, the petitioners' request for grant of provisional assessment under Rule 9B was also rejected. Petitioners made representation against the said rejections but before any final decision could be taken or the representation disposed of, the present writ petition was filed.

    7. The writ petition was admitted primarily for the reason that one of the contentions of the petitioners was that a point in issue regarding the removal of the goods have been decided in favour of the petitioners by this Court in the case of the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. & Another v. The Joint Secretary, Govt. of India & Another, ILR (1978) II Delhi 216(1).

    8. Before us three contentions have been raised on behalf of the petitioners. It is first of all contended that the aforesaid amended Item No. 43 is ultra vires Section 3 of the Act. The second contention is that the Parliament was not competent under Entry 84 of List 1 of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution to amend Item No. 43, so as to include therein an item which is not ‘goods’ and which is not ‘manufactured’. The third contention is that before duty of excise can be charged and collected there must be removal of the product within the meaning of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. It is contended that if the product is not removed from the factory and is only obtained at an intermediary stage within a process in the factory, there is no removal and there can be no liability for the payment of excise duty.

    9. With regard to the first two contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a number of decisions of Supreme Court and contended that it has been laid down that the excise duty can be levied on manufactured goods which are known to the market. If the product which is sought to be taxed is not ‘goods’ as known to the market and in fact are not marketable then under the aforesaid entrv 84 of list 1 and also under Section 3 of the Act, no excise duty can be levied. It is contended that it is only such a marketable commodity which is produced as a result of manufacturing process which can be subjected to excise duty. We, however, feel that it is not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter because in our opinion the writ petition is liable to be allowed on the third contention raised by the petitioner.

    10. Before dealing with the third contention it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Section 3(1) of the Act reads as under :—

    “There shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods other than salt which are produced or manufactured in India and a duty on salt manufactured in, or imported by land into, any part of India as, and at the rates, set forth in the First Schedule.”

    It will be seen that it is only in the prescribed manner that the duty of excise is levied and collected. Section 4 of the said Act prescribes the mode of computing the value of the excisable goods. Section 4(1) (a), which is relevant to this case, as well as sub-section (4) (b) (i) read as under:—

    “4 (1) Where under this Act, the duty of excise in chargeable on any excisable goods with reference to value, such value shall subject to the other provisions of this section, be deemed to be—

    (a) the normal price thereof, that is to say, the price at which such goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer in the course of wholesale trade for delivery at the time and place of removal, where the buyer is not a related person and the price is the sole consideration for the sale:

    4(4) For the purposes of this section,—

    (a) ....................................................

    (b) “place of removal' means—

    (i) “a factory or any other place or premises of production or manufacture of the excisable good;”

    It will thus be seen that reading Section 3 and 4 together the duty of excise is levied with reference to the value of the goods at the time and place of the removal and is to be collected in the manner which is prescribed in the Rules. The relevant Rules in this behalf are Rules 9 and 49, the relevant portions of which read as under :—

    “9(1) No excisable goods shall be removed from the place where they are produced, cured or manufactured or any premises appurtenant thereto, which may be specified by the Collector in this behalf, whether for consumption, export, or manufacture of any other commodity in or outside such place, until the excise duty leviable thereon has been paid at such place and in such manner as is prescribed in these Rules or as the Collector may require and except on presentation of an application in the proper form and on obtaining the permission of the proper officer on the form:

    49(1) Payment of duty shall not be required in respect of excisable goods made in a factory until they are about to be issued out of the place or premises specified under Rule 9 or are about to be removed from a store-room or other place of storage approved by the collector under Rule 47:”

    Rule 49, it will be seen, makes it clear that payment of duty is required to be made only when the goods are removed from the place or premises specified under Rule 9 or from an approved place of storage. Rule 9, inter alia, enables the Collector to specify the place where the goods can be said to be produced, cured or manufactured from which they cannot be removed without payment of duty. The Collector may specify the place of manufacture to be not only the entire factory but a part of the factory in which the actual manufacturing process is carried out, under the said Rule 9. It is admitted between the parties that in the present case the Collector has not specified any part of the factory as the place of manufacture. In the absence of any place having been so specified the place of manufacture is necessarily to be the factory in which the manufacturing process take place.

    11. Reading the aforesaid provisions together it is evident that duty can be charged only when excisable goods are removed from the place of manufacture, in this case the factory, and at the value which it may have at the time of removal from the place of manufacture. The question which now arises is whether any duty can be levied when there is no removal from the place of manufacture. It is an admitted case of the parties that the sliver which is obtained by the petitioners is consumed within the very premises in which it is manufactured, namely, within the spinning section of the factory. We are of the opinion that in this view of the matter as there is no removal from the place of manufacture, no duty of excise can be levied and recovered. In coming to this conclusion we are fortified by the decision of this Court in The Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co's case (supra). Dealing with the question as to whether the assessable value of the product could be determined under Section 4, this Court observed that the crucial requisite of Section 4 was that the value has to be determined at the time of the removal of the article chargeable with duty from the factory. In that case there were two plants, both situated in the same factory. One plant manufactured Calcium Carbide which was used in the manufacture of acetylene gas in their acteylene gas plant. It was alleged therein that the Calcium Carbide manufactured by it was not removed from the factory but was straightway used to generate acetylene gas by the transfer of the article from one plant to another in the same factory. It was held by this court that as Calcium Carbide is not removed from the factory the point of time at which the value of the product has to be determined under Section 4 was not reached and consequently the question of levy and collection of duty did not arise. This Court further observed that “The expression “factory” is defined in Section 2(e) to mean any premises including the precincts thereof, wherein or in any part of which excisable goods are manufactured. The definition covers the present case because the calcium carbide is manufactured in one part of the factory while the acetylene gas is manufactured in another part thereof. The definition of “factory” makes it clear that the meaning of factory is not restricted to only the part in which the excisable goods are manufactured. On the other hand, it includes the whole of the premises in a part of which such goods are manufactured. At any rate the case of the petitioner is that the whole of the premises which comprise both the plants making calcium carbide and acetylene gas are its factory. It is not contended by the respondents that the calcium carbide plant constitutes a separate factory and the acetylene gas plant constitutes another factory. It cannot be said, therefore, that the so-called calcium carbide made by the petitioner is removed from the factory in which it is made. A perusal of Rules 9 and 49 makes it clear that the question of collection of any excise duty cannot arise unless and until the goods are removed from the factory”. (emphasis added).

    12. Mr. Chopra on behalf of the respondents has referred to two decisions. The first decision relied upon by him is the case reported as Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited v. Union of India and others, 1979 E.L.T (J 581) (2) (Civil Writ No. 357 of 1970 decided on 3-4-1972). In that case the Court was concerned with the question of removal of goods under Rule 9. While construing Rule 9 it was observed as follows:—

    “Rule 9, which we have read earlier, in terms lays down that no excisable goods shall be removed from any place where they are produced, or any specified premises appurtenant thereto, whether for consumption, export or manufacture of any other commodity in or outside such place until the excise duty leviable has been paid. The Rule thus contemplates the citus on manufacture as the place from where removal has to take place whether for consumption, export or manufacture of any other commodity. It obviously makes no reference to the plant or equipment. But where there are two distinct plants within the same factory premises removal can take place either outside the factory premises or within the factory premises if the product obtained by working of one plant is sent to another plant for obtaining another product. There can be no removal of a product within the plant itself so long as the product is in the process of manufacture. There can be removal only it the product goes out of one stream of production into another stream of production or if the product is issued out or taken out or consumed if no further processing of that product is to be done. The Rule also contemplates that consumption within the place of manufacture would also amount to removal. The consumption of the product contemplated by Rule 9 is consumption of the product by itself and not for converting it into another product, an in the case of Polymer Chips. The integrated continuous process contemplated by Rule 9 read with Rules in Chapter 7A comes to an end when no further processing is to be done of that particular product and thereafter it such product is utilised for consumption or what in excise parlance in know as “home consumption” or exported or used for manufacture of any other commodity in or outside the place of manufacture the excise levy is attracted.”

    It will be seen that the Court laid importance to the fact that there can be no removal of a product within the plant so long as the product is in the process of manufacture. We understand the expression of the removal of the product from one stream of production into another stream of production as having reference to the place of manufacture or production as specified under Rule 9 of the said Rules s would be evident from the judgment itself when it was observed by the Court that “excise duty is attracted on all excisable goods which are produced as and when the same are removed within the meaning of Rule 9 and 49 of the Excise Rules”. We are accordingly of the opinion that this judgment can be of no assistance to the respondents. The other judgment relied upon by Mr. Choptra is the case of Maneklal Harilal Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad and others v. Union of India and others, 1978 E.L.T (J. 618) (3). In the said case it was held that under Rule 9 excise duty must be paid before the goods are removed from the place where they are produced or manufactured. It was, however, observed that “unless the place was specified in the licence, it was not open to the manufacturer of any excisable goods to carry on manufacturing activity, and for the purpose of Rule 9, it is the place specified in the licence concerned that is the place where the goods are produced or manufactured and it is the removal from the place thus specified in the licence in question that is the place referred to in Rule 9”. In the present case, we have been informed that in the licence which had been applied for by the petitioners the respondents have specified the place of manufacture as the factory and not any particular part of the factory. The Gujarat High Court, however, did not agree with the following observations of this Court in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills (supra):—

    “A perusal or Rules 9 and 49 makes it clear the question of collection of any excise duty cannot arise unless and until the goods are removed from the factory.”

    With respect we are of the opinion that the observations of this Court in the case of Delhi Cloth & General Mills lay down the correct law and we are unable to agree with the contrary view expressed by the Gujarat High Court, particularly when the place of manufacture is not specified.

    13. Mr. Chopra also referred to Rule 173-G, first proviso which reads as under:—

    “173-G(1) Every assessee shall keep an account-current, with the Collector separately for each excisable goods falling under different items of the First Schedule to the Act, in such form and manner as the Collector may require, of the duties payable on the excisable goods and in particular such account (and also the account in Form R.G 23, if the assessee is availing of the procedure prescribed in Rule 173-K) shall be maintained in triplicate by using indelible pencil and doublesided carbon, and the assessee shall periodically make credit in such account-current, by cash payment into the treasury so as to keep the balances, in such accounts current sufficient to cover the duty due on the goods intended to be removed at any time; and every such assessee shall pay the duty determined by him for each consignment by debit to such account-current before removal of the goods:

    Provided that—

    (i) the duty on the goods consumed within the factory in a continuous process may be so paid at the end of the factory day, except that in the case of cotton yarn in respect of which duty is payable in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule(1) of Rule 96-W the duty due may be paid by the manufacturer in accordance with the provisions of the said rule.”

    This provision can be of no assistance to the respondents. The said provision only provides or the manner or time of the payment of the duty. It postulates that duty is leviable. We have, however, held that the duty can be collected only if the goods are removed from the place of manufacture specified under Rule 9. Inasmuch as the sliver obtained by the petitioners is not removed from the said place of manufacture and is used in a continuous process within the same place the question of any payment of duty cannot arise.

    14. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the sliver which is obtained by them are not goods which are manufactured by them within the meaning of Rule 9 of the Excise Rules. We are, however, not inclined to go into the question as the petition is being allowed, as we have already indicated above, on the ground that the excise duty is not leviable because there has been no removal of the goods as contemplated by Rule 9 and 49 of the said Rules.

    15. The result is that the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are restrained from levying excise duty on the sliver, obtained by the petitioners as an inprocess material used in the manufacture of semi-woollen worsted yarn, as the proposed levy and collection was not in accordance with the provisions of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules. Parties to bear their own costs.

    S.VWrite Petition allowed.
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    M/S. Modi Carpets Limited & Anothers Petitioners v. Union Of India And Others S
    (Apr 16, 1980)