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  • section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter referred
  • Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947,
  • sub-section (2). Clause (vii) of sub-section (2)
  • section 10 (2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act,
  • sub-section (5) of section 10
  • provisions of section 10 (2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter referred
  • Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947,
  • sub-section (2). Clause (vii) of sub-section (2)
  • section 10 (2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act,
  • sub-section (5) of section 10
  • provisions of section 10 (2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.N. Andley, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from two questions referred to the Court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Delhi Bench ‘B’) under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The reference relates to the assessment year 1958-59.

The assessee is a firm carrying on business as forest contractors. Prior to formation of the firm, the same business was carried on by a Hindu undivided family (HUF). The HUF was disrupted on 22 March 1956 and on that date the assessee firm came into existence. On disruption the assessee firm took over all the assets and liabilities of the HUF as standing in the books of the HUF "as a running concern." The Tribunal recorded that “the business was taken over by the assessee firm as a running concern from the Hindu undivided family.”

Two specific questions were referred by the Tribunal: (1) whether a sum of Rs. 5,556 is an admissible charge against the income of the previous year; and (2) whether a sum of Rs. 24,252 realised by sale of three trucks is an item taxable in the previous year under the provisions of section 10(2)(vii) of the Act.

The first question arises from a claim by the assessee firm to deduct legal and professional expenses totaling Rs. 5,556 (composed of three specified payments). The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal disallowed that deduction under section 10(2)(xv).

The second question arises from the sale proceeds of three trucks (total Rs. 24,252) which had belonged to the HUF and became property of the assessee firm when the firm took over the business. The written down value of those trucks had been exhausted while they belonged to the HUF; the Tribunal treated the entire sale proceeds as taxable profit in the assessee's hands under section 10(2)(vii).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sum of Rs. 5,556 is an admissible charge against the income of the previous year (i.e., deductible under section 10(2)(xv) as expenditure wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business)?
  2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 24,252 realised by sale of three trucks is an item taxable in the previous year under the provisions of section 10(2)(vii)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee firm claimed legal expenses and professional fees totalling Rs. 5,556 comprising:
    • Rs. 2,483 paid to M/s. P.R. Mehta and Co. for representation to the Central Board of Revenue and other appeal expenses;
    • Rs. 2,758 paid to M/s. Khanna and Annadhanam in connection with settlement of old assessment with the Directorate of Inspection (Investigation);
    • Rs. 315 paid to Sh. K.N. Rajagopal Shastri.
  • With respect to the three trucks sold for Rs. 24,252, the assessee contended that because it took over the business as a running concern, the cost of the trucks to it in the assessment year was the same as the written down value in the HUF's books (which was zero); therefore the proviso to section 10(2)(vii) would not bring any part of the sale price to tax as profits of the previous year.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal disallowed the Rs. 5,556 deduction under section 10(2)(xv) on the view that such legal and accountancy expenses incurred to satisfy tax authorities are not expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business.
  • Mr. Sharma for the Revenue contended that the Supreme Court in the cited Birla Cotton case did not take into consideration certain points, namely:
    1. The requirement that the purpose of the expenditure must have a direct nexus with carrying on the business, since business would be carried on even if an income-tax demand were contested.
    2. The proposition that income, after being earned, becomes capital and income-tax merely depletes capital; therefore income-tax paid is not deductible in computing taxable income.
    3. That expenditure to reduce levy of income-tax preserves capital assets and is therefore capital expenditure, which section 10(2)(xv) prohibits as a revenue deduction.
    4. That the expenditure was incurred by the assessee in the capacity of owner of capital and not in his capacity as a trader.
    5. That allowing such expenditure as a revenue deduction for persons carrying on business, but denying it to persons with other heads of income (e.g., salary or property), would lead to discrimination between taxpayers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
J. K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. (reported 46 I.T.R. 1970) Holds that legal and accountancy expenses incurred with a view to satisfying tax authorities with regard to statements and accounts is not expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business. The Tribunal had felt bound to follow this decision and disallowed the deduction; the Court noted the Tribunal followed it (erroneously, as explained later in the opinion).
Binodiram Bal Chand v. Commissioner of Income-tax, M.P. (reported 48 I.T.R. 548) Holds that sums paid by an assessee by way of professional fees to an income-tax adviser for services rendered during and for the conduct of assessment proceedings before the Income-tax authorities are deductible under section 10(2)(xv). The Tribunal did not follow this decision; the Court records the existence of this contrary authority but relies on the Supreme Court decision discussed below.
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (reported 82 I.T.R. 166) Holds that legal expenses incurred to preserve and protect the assessee's business from proceedings which might reduce its income and profits, or which are incidental and justified by commercial expediency to safeguard the business (including opposing coercive government action), are allowable under section 10(2)(xv). The Court treated this Supreme Court decision as settling the controversy and relied on its principle to hold the Rs. 5,556 legal expenses admissible as business expenditure; the Court answered the first question in the affirmative on this basis.
Decision of the Calcutta High Court (reported 64 I.T.R. 568) Was the decision from which the Birla Cotton case reached the Supreme Court (exact principle in this summary is the subject of appeal to the Supreme Court). The Court notes that the Supreme Court decision was on appeal from this Calcutta High Court decision; the Supreme Court's ruling was treated as authoritative for the issues in question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court dealt with the two referred questions separately.

First question — Rs. 5,556 legal and professional expenses

The Court observed that the Tribunal disallowed the deduction under section 10(2)(xv) and had relied upon the Allahabad High Court decision in J.K. Cotton. The Court held that the controversy was settled by the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (82 I.T.R. 166). The Supreme Court had held that such legal expenses were incurred for the preservation and protection of the assessee's business from processes or proceedings that might reduce income and profits, and that the expenditure was incidental to business and justified by commercial expediency. The Supreme Court had stated that steps taken to reduce tax liability, when reasonably and honestly incurred to promote business interest, are laid out for the purpose of trade and are therefore deductible under section 10(2)(xv).

The Court noted that Mr. Sharma for the Revenue raised several contentions as to why the Supreme Court decision had not considered particular points (listed in the Arguments section). The Court declined to call on the assessee's counsel to reply to those points because it assumed the Supreme Court had considered all aspects when giving its judgment. On the basis of the Supreme Court's reasoning, the Court answered the first question in the affirmative (i.e., the Rs. 5,556 was admissible).

Second question — Rs. 24,252 realised on sale of three trucks

The Court set out the facts: three trucks sold for Rs. 24,252; the written down values of the trucks had been exhausted while they were the property of the HUF (zero written down value). The Income-tax Officer had treated the entire sale proceeds as profit under section 10(2)(vii). The Tribunal held that because the business was taken over by the firm as a running concern, the written down value in the hands of the firm must be taken as that in the hands of the HUF, and the surplus realised on sale over written down value was rightly subjected to tax in the firm's hands.

The Court reviewed the statutory provision: clause (vii) of sub-section (2) of section 10 provides for an allowance in respect of building, machinery or plant sold, equal to the amount by which written down value exceeds sale price; the second proviso deals with the case where sale price exceeds written down value, deeming so much of the excess as does not exceed the difference between the original cost and the written down value to be profits of the previous year in which the sale took place. The Court also referred to the definition of written down value in sub-section (5) of section 10 (in the case of assets acquired before the previous year, written down value means the actual cost to the assessee less all depreciation actually allowed to him).

The Court observed (from the assessment order for 1956-57 annexure 'D') that although disruption occurred on 22 March 1956, accounts for the full year up to 31-3-56 were examined and income was allocated proportionately between the HUF and the newly formed firm. The Court concluded that there was merely a change in the style and nature of the business; the same persons continued to carry on the same business but with defined shares after forming the firm. Given the Tribunal's finding that the business was taken over as a running concern, the Court held that the original cost of the trucks to the firm would be the same as in the hands of the HUF (i.e., not zero for the purpose of applying the proviso). Therefore the Tribunal was correct to treat the surplus realised on sale as taxable under section 10(2)(vii).

On this basis, the Court answered the second question in the affirmative.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both referred questions are answered in the affirmative.

Specifically:

  • The sum of Rs. 5,556 was held to be an admissible charge against the income of the previous year (deductible under section 10(2)(xv) on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd.).
  • The sum of Rs. 24,252 realised by sale of the three trucks was held to be taxable in the previous year under the provisions of section 10(2)(vii), because the firm had taken over the business as a running concern and the original cost in the hands of the firm is to be taken as that in the hands of the Hindu undivided family.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the assessee is allowed the Rs. 5,556 deduction for legal/professional expenses, and the sale proceeds of Rs. 24,252 are taxable in the assessee's hands under section 10(2)(vii) as held by the Tribunal and affirmed by this Court.
  • The Court applied existing Supreme Court authority (the Birla Cotton decision) to resolve the first issue; the opinion does not purport to create a new precedent beyond the application of that authority.
  • Costs: in view of the partial success of the assessee, there was no order as to costs of the reference.

Order accordingly.

    D.S Bist & Sons Petitioner v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, New Delhi

    S.N Andley, J.:— The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Delhi Bench ‘B’) has referred the following two questions to this Court under section 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”:—

    “1. Whether the sum of Rs. 5,556/- is an admissible charge against the income of the previous year?
    2. Whether on the facts and in circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 24,252/- is an item taxable in the previous year under the provisions of section 10 (2) (vii)?”
    The assessee is a firm which carries on business as forest contractors and has several branches. The business which the assessee is carrying on was previously being carried on by the Hindu undivided family. The Hindu undivided family was disrupted on March 22, 1956 and on this very date the assessee firm came into existence. On such disruption, all the assets and liabilities of the Hindu undivided family had been taken over by the assessee firm as standing in the books of the Hindu Undivided family as a running concern. According to the Tribunal “the business was taken over by the assessee firm as a running concern from the Hindu undivided family.” This reference relates to the assessment year 1958-59.
    We will deal with the first question first. The assessee firm claimed legal expenses and professional fees aggregating Rs. 5,556/- as follows:—

    (i) Expenses in connection with the representation to the Central Board of Revenue & other appeal expenses paid to M/s. P.R Mehta and Co. . . Rs. 2,483/- (ii) Expenses in connection with the settlement of old assessment with the Directorate of Inspection (Investigation) paid to M/s. Khanna and Annadhanam. . . Rs. 2,758/- (iii) Expenses in connection with the above to Sh. K.N Rajagopal Shastri. . . Rs. 315/- Total . . Rs. 5,556/-

    The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal disallowed the deduction which was claimed under section 10 (2) (xv) of the Act as being expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee.
    On the erroneous ground that the reference in the present case lay to the Allahabad High Court, the Tribunal felt bound to follow the decision of that Court reported in 46 I.T.R 1970 in re: J. K. Cotton Manufacturers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P and V.P (1) holding that legal and accountancy expenses incurred with a view to satisfying tax authorities with regard to statements and accounts is not expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business. The Tribunal did not follow the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in 48 I.T.R 548 in, re: Binodiram Bal Chand v. Commissioner of Income-tax, M.P (2) holding that the sums paid by an assessee by way of professional fees to an income-tax adviser for services rendered during and for the conduct of assessment proceedings before the Income-tax authorities are deductible under the aforesaid section.
    In our opinion, the controversy is now set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 82 I.T.R 166 in re: Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. (3). This decision was on appeal from a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in 64 I.T.R 568. In this case, the assessee company had expended considerable sums of money in engaging lawyers for making representations before the Income-tax Investigation Commission to whom its case had been referred and also for challenging the validity of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, and claimed to deduct these sums as business expenditure. The Supreme Court held, —
    “that the law charges were expenses incurred for the preservation and protection of the assessee's business from any process or proceedings which might have resulted in the reduction of its income and profits. Even otherwise the expenditure was incidental to the business and was necessitated or justified by commercial expediency. The expenditure which was incurred by the assessee in opposing a coercive Government action with the object of saving taxation and safeguarding business was justified by commercial expediency and was therefore allowable under section 10 (2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.”
    In holding this, the Supreme Court observed:—
    “The earning of profits and the payment of taxes are not isolated and independent activities of a business. These activities are continuous and take place from year to year during the whole period for which the business continues. If the assessee takes any steps for reducing its liability to tax which resulted in more funds being left for the purpose of carrying on the business there is always the possibility of higher profits.
    If a trader considers that the revenue seeks to take too large a share and to leave him with too little, the expenditure which the trader incurs in endeavouring to correct the mistake is a disbursement laid out for the purpose of his trade.”
    The Supreme Court further observed that however wrong headed, ill-advised, unduly optimistic or over-confident in his convictions, the assessee might appear in the light of the ultimate decision, expenditure in prosecuting a civil proceeding cannot be denied as a permissible deduction if it is reasonably and honestly incurred to promote the interest of the business. The proposition that emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court is that if the assessee incurs expenditure reasonably and honestly to promote the interest of the business and takes any steps for reducing its liability or in endeavouring to correct a mistake, such expenditure must be held to be laid out the purpose of his trade and, therefore, admissible as a deduction under section 10 (2) (xv) of the Act.
    Mr. Sharma for the Revenue has contended that the Supreme Court did not take into consideration the following points:—
    (1) The purpose of the expenditure in question must have a direct connection or nexus with the carrying on of the business. Business would be carried on even if the demand of income-tax was contested. On the other hand, income-tax would be payable whatever be the head of income — ‘business’ or ‘salary’ or ‘property’. Therefore, any expenditure incurred for the purpose of reducing levy of income-tax is not an expenditure incurred for the purpose of carrying on the business.
    (2) All income after it has been earned becomes capital. Income-tax being the tax levied after income has been earned merely depletes the capital of the subject. This is so with respect to every person whether he is carrying on business or not and, therefore, income-tax paid is not allowed as a deduction in computing the taxable income.
    (3) Any expenditure incurred to reduce the levy of income-tax is for the preservation and protection of capital assets and is, therefore, in the nature of capital expenditure, against the allowance of which there is express, prohibition in section 10 (2) (xv) of the Act.
    (4) The expenditure in question was incurred by the assessee in the capacity of owner of capital and not in his capacity as a trader.
    (5) Recognition of such expenditure as revenue expenditure only in the case of persons carrying on business in contra-distinction to persons who earn income under other heads, say, ‘salary’ or ‘property’, where it cannot be allowed, would lead to discrimination between the tax-payers.
    We have not called upon Mr. Karkhanis who appears for the assessee to reply to these points because we must assume that all aspects of the question must have been taken into consideration when the Supreme Court gave its judgment and we do not, therefore, consider it necessary to discuss any of these points
    The answer to the first question must, therefore, be in the affirmative.
    The second question relates to the dispute with regard to the taxability of a sum of Rs. 24,152/- realised by the assessee by sale of three trucks. These three trucks belonged to the Hindu undivided family and become the property of the assessee when the assessee took over all the assets and liabilities of the Hindu undivided family as standing in its books as a running concern. The amount of Rs. 24,252/- was computed by the Income-tax Officer as follows:—

    1. Sale price of Truck No. USR 979 Rs. 5,500/- 2. Sale price of Truck No. USR 980 Rs. 6,500/- 3. Sale price of Truck No. USR 1746 Rs. 12,252/- Total: Rs. 24,252/-

    The written down value of the trucks at items Nos. 1 and 2 above was exhausted in the assessment year 1952-53 while the written down value of the truck at item No. 3 was exhausted in the assessment year 1956-57 when they belonged to the Hindu undivided family and, therefore, the whole of the sale price was taken as profit under section 10 (2) (vii) of the Act. The Tribunal held that “since the business was taken over by the assessee firm as a running concern from the Hindu undivided family, the written down value in the hands of the assessee firm is to be taken as that in the hands of the Hindu undivided family. The surplus realised on the sale of these assets representing the sale price over the written down value was, therefore, rightly subjected to tax in the assessee's hands.”
    It may be restated that the written down value of all the three trucks, had been exhausted while they were still the property of the Hindu undivided family and in the assessment year 1957-58, no depreciation was allowed to the assessee firm with respect to any of these trucks whose written down value in the books of the Hindu undivided family was zero. The question is whether the written down value of these trucks in the hands of the assessee firm is to be taken, as found by the Tribunal, as that in the hands of the Hindu undivided family. The contention of the assessee firm is that the cost of these trucks to it in the assessment year 1957-58 was the same as their written down value in the books of the Hindu undivided family which was zero.
    Now, the tax payable by an assessee in respect of the profits or gains of any business, profession or vocation carried on by him under sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Act is to be computed after making the allowances enumerated in sub-section (2). Clause (vii) of sub-section (2) provides for an allowance in respect of building, machinery or plant used for the purposes of the business, profession or vocation which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed which is equal to the amount by which the written down value thereof exceeds the amount for which the building, machinery or plant, as the case may be, is actually sold or its scrap value. The case where the sale price is in excess of the written down value is dealt with by the second proviso to clause (vii). This proviso is in these terms:—
    “Provided further that where the amount for which any such building, machinery or plant is sold . . . . . exceeds the written down value, so much of the excess as does not exceed the difference between the original cost and the written down value shall be deemed to be profits of the previous year in which the sale took place.”
    Written down value has been defined in sub-section (5) of section 10 in the case of assets acquired in the previous year and in the case of assets acquired before the previous year. In the case of assets acquired before the previous year as in the present case, the written down value means the actual cost to the assessee less all depreciation actually allowed to him under the Act or any of the other Acts mentioned in sub-section (5).
    It is not disputed by the assessee that if the Hindu undivided family had continued the business and had sold these trucks, the entire sale proceeds would have been subjected to tax as revenue income under the aforesaid second proviso as the written down value in its books was zero. It cannot also be disputed that if the Hindu undivided family had sold the trucks to a stranger, the “original cost” to the stranger would be the price for which he purchased the trucks and on which he, in his turn, would be entitled to claim depreciation.
    The contention of the assessee is that since it took over the business of the Hindu undivided family as a running concern, the original cost of the trucks to it would be zero and since the written down value of the trucks is also zero, the excess cannot be brought to tax as only such excess can be brought to tax as does not exceed the difference between the original cost and the written down value. In other words, the original cost being zero and the written down value being zero, the difference between the two must also be zero and, therefore, there is no question of the difference of the excess between the original cost and the written down value being brought to tax as profits of the previous year in which the sales took place. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the original cost to the assessee firm in this case is zero as contended by it or it is the original cost as entered in the books of the Hindu undivided family.
    It is true that the relation of partnership arises from contract and not from status and that the members of a Hindu undivided family carrying a family business as such are not partners in such business. But it appears to us that in the present case there was merely a change in the style and nature of the Hindu undivided family on March 22, 1956.
    It is clear from the order of assessment of the Income-tax Officer for the assessment year 1956-57 (annexure ‘D’) of the Hindu undivided family that although disruption had taken place on March 22, 1956, “the accounts for the full year up to 31-3-56 have been examined and on proportionate time basis the income is allocated between the Hindu undivided family and the firm which came into existence as a result of partition of the family.” It, therefore, follows that the business of the Hindu undivided family continued to be the business of the assessee firm. All that happened on March 22, 1956, was that instead of having undivided shares in the business of the Hindu undivided family, the coparceners defined their shares by forming into a firm. It was, therefore, a case of the same persons continuing to carry on the same business with merely a change in the name and style of the business and with defined shares. The Tribunal has also found, as stated earlier, that the business of the Hindu undivided family was taken over by the assessee firm as a running concern. In these circumstances, the original cost of the trucks to the assessee firm would be the same as to the Hindu undivided family. It was not disputed that in such a case the entire sale price of the trucks had been rightly subjected to tax deeming it to be profits of the previous year in which the sales took place. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention that the original cost of the assessee is zero.
    In this view of the matter, the answer to the second question must be in the affirmative.
    In view of the partial success of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs of this reference.
    Order accordingly.
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    D.S Bist & Sons Petitioner v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, New Delhi
    (Dec 8, 1971)