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  • SECTION 5 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • Sections 114(a) and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 114(a) and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • SECTION 8 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT 1920
  • Sections 120-B, I.P.C 302 read with 34 and 394, I.P.C
  • Sections 120-B, 302 read with 34, I.P.C and 394, I.P.C
  • Sections 120-B, 302 read with 34 and 394, I.P.C, A-2
  • SECTION 4 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • S. 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920
  • S. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act,
  • S. 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act,
  • Sections 120-B and 302 read with 34, I.P.C,
  • Section 114(a) of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Sections 120-B, 302 and 394, I.P.C and A-4
  • Section 120-B and 302 read with 34, I.P.C
  • Section 114(n) of the Indian Evidene Act
  • Sections 120-B, 302 and 394, I.P.C
  • Section 313, Cr.P.C statement.36.
  • Sections 120- B and 302, I.P.C
  • Sections 302 and 394, I.P.C,
  • Section 302 or 394, I.P.C
  • Section 411, I.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 5 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • Sections 114(a) and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Section 114(a) and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act
  • SECTION 8 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT 1920
  • Sections 120-B, I.P.C 302 read with 34 and 394, I.P.C
  • Sections 120-B, 302 read with 34, I.P.C and 394, I.P.C
  • Sections 120-B, 302 read with 34 and 394, I.P.C, A-2
  • SECTION 4 IDENTIFICATION OF PRISONERS ACT
  • S. 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920
  • S. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act,
  • S. 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act,
  • Sections 120-B and 302 read with 34, I.P.C,
  • Section 114(a) of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • Sections 120-B, 302 and 394, I.P.C and A-4
  • Section 120-B and 302 read with 34, I.P.C
  • Section 114(n) of the Indian Evidene Act
  • Sections 120-B, 302 and 394, I.P.C
  • Section 313, Cr.P.C statement.36.
  • Sections 120- B and 302, I.P.C
  • Sections 302 and 394, I.P.C,
  • Section 302 or 394, I.P.C
  • Section 411, I.P.C
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — M. Karpagavinayagam, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On the morning of 23-6-1992, Latha (the deceased), alone at home, was threatened by four appellants (A-1 to A-4) to part with her jewels. When she refused, she was stabbed and killed; the attackers took away jewels including the Mangalya Sutra. A complaint was lodged the same day and investigation followed.

A-1 to A-4 were tried for offences including Sections 120-B, 302 read with 34, and 394 I.P.C. After trial, A-1, A-2 and A-3 were convicted and sentenced (life imprisonment for the murder-related charges and ten years rigorous imprisonment for the robbery charge, where applicable). A-4 was also convicted for offences under Sections 120-B and 302 read with 34. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. The appellants filed this common criminal appeal challenging conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the recovery of jewels and a knife from A-1 to A-3 (after an interval of one month) and identification of those articles by the deceased's husband justified drawing a presumption under the Indian Evidence Act (Sections cited in the judgment) that the accused committed the murder and robbery, or whether recovery alone would at best sustain a conviction under Section 411 I.P.C.;
  2. Whether the finger-print evidence connecting A-4 to the scene (chance prints on a betel nut box compared with impressions taken after arrest) was admissible when the procedure under the Identification of Prisoners Act and relevant Police Standing Orders had not been shown to have been followed;
  3. Whether the statements and recovery mahazars and the testimony of investigating officers and other witnesses were reliable despite some witnesses turning hostile.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (A-1 to A-4)

  • The recovery of jewels and other incriminating articles occurred on 23-7-1992 — one month after the offence — and the delay undermines the reliability of the recovery evidence.
  • Witnesses who attested the mahazar for arrest and recovery (P.W.5 and P.W.11) turned hostile; P.W.6 also turned hostile; therefore the recovery evidence cannot be accepted.
  • Mere recovery of jewels, particularly after a long gap, would not conclusively prove the accused committed the murder; at most, it supports conviction under Section 411 I.P.C.
  • As regards A-4, there was no physical recovery from him; conviction rests on the fingerprint expert's opinion. The fingerprint report was not obtained following the procedure under the Identification of Prisoners Act or Police Standing Orders and hence is not admissible; A-4 should be acquitted.

Respondent's Arguments (State / Public Prosecutor)

  • A-1 to A-3 were arrested on 23-7-1992 and jewels were recovered and identified by P.W.1 and P.W.2 as those of the deceased; a knife used for the murder was also recovered.
  • The one-month gap between offence and recovery does not automatically invalidate recovery evidence, particularly where a presumption arises under Sections cited in the Indian Evidence Act (the judgment refers to Sections 114(a) and 106 and also to Section 114(n) in submissions) in the absence of any explanation from the accused for possession of the stolen articles.
  • As regards A-4, the fingerprint evidence (P.W.12's opinion) indicates his presence at the scene; since a competent police officer took the prints, it was unnecessary to obtain a Magistrate's order under Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act if rules/procedures under Section 4 or State rules existed.
  • Therefore, the conviction and sentence should be confirmed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rambilas v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1997 SCC (Cri) 1222; AIR 1997 SC 3954) Cited by appellants to support the proposition that mere recovery of incriminating articles at the instance of accused cannot by itself form the basis for conviction for murder. The Court acknowledged the point but treated it as part of a body of authorities requiring consideration of all facts; it did not rely solely on this precedent to acquit where other factors (identification, lack of explanation) supported a presumption.
Raju v. State ((2000) 3 CTC 151) Cited by appellants to challenge reliance on recovery alone for conviction. Used as part of appellants' authorities; the Court considered such authorities but evaluated the facts to decide whether the presumption could be drawn.
Union Territory Goa v. Beaventura D'Souza (1993 SCC (Cri) 999) Cited by appellants in support of the proposition that recovery alone does not necessarily connect accused to murder (tending only to Section 411). The Court treated this decision among authorities showing recovery is not automatically conclusive; applied the overarching principle that each case depends on its facts.
Nagappa Dondiba Kalal v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1980 SC 1753) Cited by appellants to show limits of recovery evidence in proving murder. Referred to as authority for the proposition that, absent other evidence, recovery may only sustain a conviction under Section 411; Court considered it when assessing the totality of evidence.
Amar Singh v. State of M.P. ((1982) 3 SCC 214; AIR 1982 SC 129) Cited by appellants on the principle that recovery by itself may not prove commission of murder. Considered as part of the line of authority delineating when recovery gives rise to presumption; Court evaluated applicability against facts here.
Manish Dixit v. State of Rajasthan (2001 SCC (Cri) 235) Cited by appellants for the same general limitation on recovery evidence. Referenced as supporting the appellants' submission; Court examined whether facts here permitted drawing of a presumption despite recovery delay.
A. Devendran v. State of Tamil Nadu (1998 SCC (Cri) 220) Cited by the prosecution to support the drawing of a presumption under provisions of the Evidence Act when accused are found in unexplained possession of stolen property. Court relied on this line of authority to conclude that a presumption could arise (subject to facts) and that such presumption can extend to holding the accused committed the murder if justified.
Ezhil v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002 AIR SCW 2060) Cited by the prosecution for the proposition that presumption under Evidence Act may be drawn when accused are found with stolen property. Applied as part of the reasoning that possession of the identified jewels, without explanation, allowed a presumption linking A-1 to A-3 with the robbery and murder.
Sanjay alias Kaka v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2001 SCC (Cri) 449; (2001) 3 SCC 190) Cited regarding principles as to the relevance of the time-gap between offence and recovery and circumstances in which possession may still be treated as recent. Court relied on principles that no fixed time-limit exists and that even a long gap may not be fatal depending on facts; used to justify that one month gap did not preclude presumption in this case.
Mahmood v. State of U.P. ((1976) 1 SCC 542; AIR 1976 SC 69) Cited for the proposition that the order of the Magistrate under Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act is mandatory before obtaining finger-prints, affecting admissibility. Cited by the Court when considering admissibility of fingerprint evidence; the Court noted the principle but examined whether Section 4 and State rules or Police Standing Orders permitted police action without Magistrate's order.
Paramasivam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) (as cited in the judgment) Cited alongside Mahmood to show precedents holding Magistrate's order is mandatory in absence of rules. Used by the Court in analyzing the legality and admissibility of fingerprints obtained and whether procedures required by law or standing orders were followed.
Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan ((1978) 3 SCC 435; AIR 1978 SC 1248) Cited to show that where State rules exist (e.g., Rajasthan), police may be competent under Section 4 to take specimens without Magistrate's order. The Court relied on this distinction: if State rules exist prescribing procedure, police action may be valid; but where no rules exist and Standing Orders are not followed, evidence may be inadmissible.
Ravanan v. State (Division Bench decision referred to — (1994) (1) Mad LW (Cri) 58) Referenced for the view that in absence of State rules under Section 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, police must follow Police Standing Orders and that Ss.4 & 5 operate in different fields. Court relied on this Division Bench view to require compliance with Police Standing Orders (or Magistrate's order) where State rules are not framed; used to evaluate whether fingerprints were taken in the prescribed manner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the prosecution case and the evidence methodically.

  1. The Court accepted the basic facts: the deceased was found murdered on 23-6-1992, with the thali and gold jewels missing (evidence from P.W.1, P.W.2 and post-mortem P.W.7).
  2. On recovery evidence relating to A-1 to A-3:
    • The investigating officer P.W.15 arrested A-1 to A-3 on 23-7-1992 and recorded separate confession statements; in pursuance of those confessions, the thali (M.O.1), kerchief (M.O.16), and various sets of gold bangles (M.O.2 to M.O.4) were recovered, and M.O.17 (knife) was recovered from a graveyard as pointed out by A-2.
    • P.W.2 (husband) identified M.Os 1–4 as the jewels the deceased was wearing on the date of occurrence; this identification was not challenged in evidence.
    • Although some mahazar witnesses (P.W.5, P.W.11 and P.W.6) turned hostile, the Court held that the hostility of those witnesses did not automatically render P.W.15's testimony unreliable. The Court found P.W.15's evidence to be clear and cogent and noted that nothing in his cross-examination suggested falsehood.
    • Given the lack of any explanation from the accused regarding possession of the recovered jewels (both in cross-examination and in their Section 313 Cr.P.C. statements), the Court found the prosecution's case established for the purposes of drawing a presumption.
  3. On legal effect of recovery and the time gap:
    • The Court reviewed authorities showing that recovery alone may not conclusively prove commission of murder, but also recognized authorities that permit drawing of a presumption of guilt where accused are found in unexplained possession of stolen articles and the facts justify such inference.
    • The Court emphasized that whether a presumption under Section 114(a) (and Section 106) of the Indian Evidence Act arises depends on the totality of evidence — nature of articles, identification by owner, circumstances of recovery, intervening period, and any explanation offered by those in possession.
    • The Court held that a lapse of one month is not automatically fatal; no rigid time limit applies and each case turns on its facts. The Court found the jewels (notably the thali/Mangalya Sutra and bangles) were not the sort easily passed from hand to hand and that at least M.O.2 series had been pledged by A-1 within the relevant period — strengthening the link to the accused.
    • Consequently, the Court concluded that a presumption under Evidence Act provisions could be drawn against A-1 to A-3 and that such presumption had not been rebutted on the evidence; thus the convictions of A-1 to A-3 were sustainable for murder and robbery offences (Sections 302 and 394 I.P.C).
  4. On fingerprint evidence and A-4:
    • The fingerprint chance prints (M.O.13) found on the betel nut box (M.O.15) were photographed at the scene on 23-6-1992. A-4 was arrested on 24-7-1992 and a specimen fingerprint (M.O.14) was taken; P.W.12 (expert) opined that M.O.13 tallied with M.O.14.
    • The Court scrutinized the statutory scheme under the Identification of Prisoners Act: Section 4 permits police to require measurements "in the prescribed manner"; Section 5 contemplates Magistrate's order. The Court observed that where State rules under Section 8 exist, a State may prescribe procedures enabling police to take prints under Section 4 without a Magistrate's order (as in Shankaria / Rajasthan); but where no rules have been framed, police must follow Police Standing Orders or obtain a Magistrate's order under Section 5.
    • In this case, Tamil Nadu had not framed rules under Section 8. The Court found no evidence that the fingerprints of A-4 were taken in the "prescribed manner" — there was no evidence that the person who took impressions was declared competent (as required by Police Standing Order 836) or that Form No.141 or the Standing Orders' prescribed method was followed. The Head Constable mentioned in documents was not examined and P.W.15 did not state compliance with the Police Standing Orders.
    • Further, there was an unexplained delay in sending M.O.15 to Court (the Court clerk said it was received on 23-7-1992 though claimed sent on 03-07-1992) and no mahazar was made at the time of initial recovery of M.O.15. Considering these procedural lapses, the Court found the fingerprint opinion (Ex.P-26 / Ex.P-45 as referenced) unreliable/admissible in the present facts.
    • Accordingly, the Court held it could not act upon the fingerprint opinion to sustain A-4's conviction and set aside his conviction and sentence.
  5. Orders and directions concerning procedure:
    • The Court noted the recurring problem of absence of State rules under Section 8 and directed the State Government to frame rules under Section 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act prescribing the "prescribed manner" for taking fingerprint measurements, or otherwise ensure compliance with Police Standing Orders to preserve the sanctity of scientific evidence.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Convictions and sentences of A-1 to A-3 are confirmed. Conviction and sentence of A-4 are set aside.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • A-1 to A-3: Their convictions for the offences charged (including Sections 302 and 394 I.P.C) and sentences were upheld by the appellate court on the basis of recovery, identification of articles, and absence of any explanation from the accused.
  • A-4: Conviction based principally on fingerprint expert opinion was set aside due to procedural deficiencies in obtaining fingerprint evidence (no evidence of compliance with Police Standing Orders or of a rule under Section 8 permitting the police procedure); A-4 is to be released forthwith unless detained in connection with some other case.
  • The appeal is accordingly partly allowed (convictions of A-1 to A-3 confirmed; A-4 acquitted on the present facts).
  • The Court directed the learned Public Prosecutor to send a copy of the judgment to the State Government to enable framing of rules under Section 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, stressing the necessity of prescribed procedures so that scientific evidence retains its sanctity.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content and reasoning present in the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the judgment has been added.

    Thavaraj Pandian And Others v. State .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    M. Karpagavinayagam, J.:— Latha, a young house wife was alone in her house in the morning hours of 23-6-1992, after sending her husband to his shop for attending his business. The appellants/A-1 to A-4 gained entry into her house knowing that she was alone, threatened her to part with her jewels and when she refused, the accused stabbed her causing death and took away the jewels including Mangalya Sutra from her body and sped away with the booty.

    2. With the abovesaid allegations, the first appellant/A-1 and the third appellant/A-3 were convicted for the offences under Sections 120-B, I.P.C 302 read with 34 and 394, I.P.C and each sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the offences under Sections 120-B and 302 read with 34, I.P.C, and rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence under S. 394, I.P.C, the second appellant/A-2 was convicted for the of fences under Sections 120-B, 302 and 394, I.P.C and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the offences under Sections 120- B and 302, I.P.C and rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence under Section. 394, I.P.C and the fourth appellant/A-4 was convicted for the offences under Sections 120-B and 302 read with 34, I.P.C and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for each offence. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, the appellants/A-1 to A- 4 have preferred this criminal appeal.

    3. The case of the prosecution in brief is as follows:—

    “(a) The deceased Latha is the wife of P.W 2 Ganesh. P.W.I Vijayaraghavan is the son of P.W 2's sister. The deceased and P.W 2 were residing in No. 81, Thanappa Mudali Street, Madurai. P.W.I along with his parents, was staying in the house situated in the neighbouring street.

    (b) On 23-6-1992, at about 10 a.m, P.W 2 Ganesh, the husband of the deceased went to his jewellery shop to attend his business. At about 10.30 a.m, A-1 to A-4 entered into the house of the deceased and murdered the deceased with the knife and took away the thali chain and gold Jewels from her body and went away after locking the door.

    (c) P.W 1 Vijayaraghavan, at about 2 p.m, came to the house of the deceased to hand over the ever-silver box containing fish sambhar sent by his mother. When he knocked the door, there was no response. Then, he found that the door was locked from outside. So, he opened the lock and entered into the house. To his shock, he found that the deceased Latha died with injuries. Jewels were found missing. P.W 1 telephoned and informed this to P.W 2, the husband of the deceased. P.W 2 rushed to the scene and found the dead body of his wife in a pool of blood and thali and gold bangles were missing.

    (d) At about 4.15 p.m, on 23-6-1992, P.W 1 came to the Police Station and gave a complaint to P.W 10, the Sub-Inspector of Police. He registered a case and sent the complaint and F.I.R to the Court and in formed the message to the Inspector of Po lice.

    (e) P.W 13 Inspector of Police, came to the scene and prepared Ex.P-2 observation mahazar and Ex.P-27 rough sketch. He conducted inquest. The inquest report is Ex. P-28. He recovered the blood stained sticks which contained cotton, spectacles and blood stained swabs (M.Os 10 to 12).

    (f) P.W 16, the finger print expert came to the scene as per. the order in Ex.P-37. He visited the scene at about 5 p.m and found out the chance prints in betel nut box (M.O 15) P.W 14 photographer of forensic laboratory took photos of chance prints found on the betel nut box M.O 15. The finger print photo is M.O 13 and photo negatives are Ex.P-29 series. The report of the finger print expert is Ex.P-38.

    (g) The intimations regarding the finger print expert are Exs. P-39 and P. 40. They sent the betel nut box to the Court on 3-7-1992, along with the letter Ex.P-44.

    (h) On 1-7-1992, P.W 13 handed over the investigation to P.W 15, another Inspector of Police. On 23-7-1992, P.W 15 arrested A-1 to A-3 and on the confession of A-1, M.O.I thali and M.O 16 kerchief were recovered from him. In pursuance of the confession of A-2, M.O 4 gold bangles were recovered. From A-3, M.O 3 gold jewels were recovered. A-1 then took the police and pointed out one Sivawami P.W 6 alleging that M.O 2 gold bangles were handed over to him. Accordingly, M.O 2 series were recovered from P.W 6. A-2 took the Police to a graveyard and took out M.O 17 knife buried under the earth.

    (i) On 24-7-1992 at about 2 p.m, P.W 15 arrested A-4 Packianathan and after obtaining his finger print M.O 14, he was sent for remand.

    (j) P.W 12 another finger print expert, compared the finger prints of A-4 Packianathan and found that M.O 13, the chance prints in M.O 15 betel nut box got tallied with M.O 14, the finger print photo of A-4. Ex.P-45 is the report of the finger print expert P.W 12.

    (k) After finishing investigation, P.W 15 filed charge-sheet on 12-10-1992.”

    4. A-1 to A-4 were tried for the offences under Sections 120-B, 302 read with 34, I.P.C and 394, I.P.C The defence of the accused is one of total denial. On conclusion of trial, the trial Court convicted A-1 and A-3 for the offences under Sections 120-B, 302 read with 34 and 394, I.P.C, A-2 was convicted for the offences under Sections 120-B, 302 and 394, I.P.C and A-4 was convicted for the offence under Section 120-B and 302 read with 34, I.P.C Aggrieved by the said conviction, the appellants/A-1 to A-4 have filed this common appeal.

    5. Mr. Gopinath, learned senior counsel appearing for A-3 and A-4 and Mr. Ramu, learned counsel appearing for A-1 and A-2, while assailing the judgment of the trial Court, would make the following contentions:—

    Though the occurrence took place on 23-6-1992, A-1 to A-3 were arrested only on 23-7-1992, after one month and recovered the jewels worn by the deceased. The witnesses who attested the mahazar for arrest and recovery, turned hostile. As such, the evidence relating to recovery of jewels cannot be accepted and at any rate, mere recovery of jewels would not conclusively prove that the accused committed murder of the deceased, especially when the jewels have been recovered after a long gap of one month and at the most, A-1 to A-3 could be convicted for the offence under Section 411, I.P.C”

    6. While arguing on behalf of A-4, learned senior counsel would contend that there is no recovery from A-4 and only on the basis of the finger print expert's report, A-4 has been convicted and since the finger print report has not been obtained by following the procedure under the Identification of Prisoners Act or under the Police Standing Orders, the same is not admissible and consequently, A-4 is liable to be acquitted.

    7. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, in reply to the above submissions, would contend that A-1 to A-3 were arrested on 23-7-1992 and the jewels which were identified by P.Ws 1 and 2 as that of the deceased and the knife which was used for commit ting the murder of the deceased, have been recovered. As such, the gap of one month, cannot be a ground to reject the said evidence in respect of the offences under Sections 302 and 394, I.P.C, especially when a presumption would arise under Sections 114(a) and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, in the absence of any explanation for the possession of jewels by A-1 to A-3. He would further submit that as far as A-4 is concerned, the evidence of the finger print expert, namely, P.W 12 clearly indicates that A-4 also came to the scene of occurrence and participated in the occurrence and since competent Police Officer has taken the finger print, there is no necessity for obtaining the order of the Magistrate concerned for taking finger print of A-4 as pro vided under the Identification of Prisoners Act. As such, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants/accused are liable to be confirmed.

    8. Both the learned counsel for the appellants and learned Additional Public Prosecutor cited number of authorities in support of their contentions.

    9. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.

    10. There is no dispute in the fact that the deceased was found murdered on 23-6-1992-at about 11 a.m, while she was alone in her house and the murder was committed for gain, as the thali chain and gold jewels totalling about 23 sovereigns were found missing from the body, as seen from the evidence of P.W.I Vijayaraghavan, the nephew of the deceased and P.W 2, the husband of the deceased and post mortem Doctor P.W 7.

    11. According to the prosecution, P.W 1 Vijayaraghavan who is the relative of the deceased, came to the house of the deceased on 23-6-1992 at about 2 p.m to hand over the eversilver box containing fish sambhar given by his mother. Then, he opened the door as there was no response and found that the deceased was dead lying in a pool of blood with the injuries on the neck and hands: On receipt of information from P.W 1, P.W 2 husband rushed to the scene of occurrence and found that the thali and other gold bangles were missing.

    12. P.W 13 Inspector of Police came to the scene and observed all formalities. He also requested P.W 14 photographer and P.W 16 finger print expert to come to the scene of occurrence. P.W 16 finger print expert found out the chance prints M.O 13 in the betel nut box M.O 15. Accordingly, P.W 14 photographer took photo of the chance prints. Till that stage, the investigating agency was not able to know the identity of the culprits who participated in the occurrence.

    13. P.W 15, another Inspector of Police, who took up further investigation, arrested A-1 to A-3 on 23-7-1992 when they were standing near Thiruparangundram. In the presence of witnesses, namely, P.W 5 Dharmaraj and P.W 11 Selvaraj, the confession statements of the accused were recorded separately. In pursuance of the confession from A-1, M.O.I thali and M.O 16 kerchief were recovered under mahazar Ex.P-31. A-2 also gave confession and in pursuance of the same, M.O 4 gold bangles were recovered under Ex.P-33. On recording confession from A-3, M.O 3 another set of gold jewels were recovered from him under Ex.P-34.

    14. On the same day, i.e, on 23-7-1992, A-1 took P.W 15 Inspector of Police to P.W 6 Sivasami with whom he pleadged the other two bangles, namely, M.O 2 series. When A-1 pointed out P.W-6, P.W 15 interrogated and recovered M.O 2 series from P.W 6 under Ex.P-35. Besides this, A-2 took P.W 15 to Manikuravan Graveyard and took out M.O 17 the knife, the weapon of the offence and handed over the same to P.W 15. This was recovered under Ex.P-36.

    15. Next day, i.e on 24-7-1992, P.W 15 arrested A-4 and no recovery was made from him. However, he obtained the finger print of A-4 and sent him for judicial remand.

    16. The said finger print M.O 14 was compared by P.W 12 finger print expert with M.O 13, the chance prints found on the betel nut box M.O 15 and gave a report Ex.P-26, stating that the chance prints found on the betel nut box tallied with the finger prints of A-4.

    17. Thus, it is clear that the evidence against A-1 to A-3 is the recovery of jewels belonging to the deceased from them and the evidence against A-4 is the presence of his finger prints at the scene.

    18. Let us now deal with the evidence relating to the recovery of jewels and knife from A-1 to A-3.

    19. In the complaint given by P.W 1 on the date of occurrence on 23-6-1992, it has been specifically stated that the thali chain of 15 sovereigns and 4 gold bangles of 8 sovereigns were found missing from the body of the deceased. After recovery of the jewels on 23-7-1992, P.W 2 identified the jewels in the Police Station that those jewels were worn by the deceased on the date of occurrence. The thali chain which was recovered from A-1 was marked as M.O.I and gold bangles which were recovered from P.W 6 at the instance of A-1 were marked as M.O 2 series and another set of gold bangles which were recovered from A-3 were marked as M.O 3 series and another set of bangles which were recovered from A-2 were marked as M.O 4. P.W 2 would specifically identify these jewels marked as M.Os 1 to 4, as that of the jewels of the deceased. This has not been challenged.

    20. It is true that P.W 5 and P.W 11 who attested the mahazar for arrest and recovery of these jewels from the accused turned hostile. But merely because the mahazar witnesses turned hostile, it cannot be straightaway held that the evidence relating to the arrest and recovery is false. It is equally true that P.W 6, from whom M.O 2 series were recovered at the instance of A-1 also turned hostile. In this case, we have got the evidence of P.W 15, the investigating officer who speaks about the arrest and recovery of the jewels from the accused as well as from P.W 6. Apart from that, P.W 15 recovered M.O 17 knife in pursuance of the confession given by A-2 from the graveyard.

    21. The fact that P.Ws 5, 6 and 11 turned hostile would not automatically make the evidence of P.W 15 unreliable. If the evidence adduced by P.W 15 is otherwise reliable, there is no difficulty in holding that the prosecution has proved the arrest and recovery of articles from the accused persons.

    22. On going through the evidence of P.W 15, it is clear that A-1 to A-3 were arrested on the same day in the same place and on their separate confessions, M.Os 1 to 4 and 17 were recovered. His evidence is clear and cogent and in the cross-examination; nothing was elicited from him that he was speaking falsehood against A-1 to A-3. As such, there is no reason to reject the evidence of P.W 15 who arrested the accused and recovered the jewels which were identified by P.W 2, the husband of the deceased that those jewels were worn by the deceased on the date of occurrence.

    23. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that mere recovery of jewels and belongings of the deceased would not be enough to fasten the liability on the accused for the offences of murder and robbery under Sections 302 and 394, I.P.C, especially, when there is one month gap between the date of occurrence and the date of recovery of the M.Os

    24. Citing a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1997 SCC (Cri) 1222 : AIR 1997 SC 3954 : (1997 Cri LJ 4649) (Rambilas v. State of Madhya Pradesh) and a decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in (2000) 3 CTC 151 (Raju v. State), it is contended on behalf of the accused A-1 to A-3 that mere recovery of certain incriminating articles at the instance of the accused, cannot form the basis for conviction.

    25. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in 1993 SCC (Cri) 999 : (1993 Cri LJ 181) (Union Territory Goa v. Beaventura D'Souza), 1980 Cri LJ 1270 : 1980 Supp SCC 336 : AIR 1980 SC 1753 (Nagappa Dondiba Kalal v. State Of Karnataka .) and 1982 Cri LJ 610 : (1982) 3 SCC 214 : AIR 1982 SC 129 (Amar Singh v. State of M.P), it is argued by learned senior counsel for the appellants 3 and 4 that in the absence of any other evidence except recovery to connect the accused with the murder, the accused would be liable to be convicted only under Section 411, I.P.C and not under Section 302 or 394, I.P.C Learned Senior Counsel for A-3 and A-4 also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2001 SCC (Cri) 235 : (2001 Cri LJ 133) (Manish Dixit v. State of Rajasthan) in support of his submissions.

    26. On the other hand, on the strength of the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in 1998 SCC (Cri) 220 : (1998 Cri LJ 814) (A. Devendran v. State of Tamil Nadu) and 2002 AIR SCW 2060 : (2002 Cri LJ 2799) (Ezhil v. State of Tamil Nadu), it is contended by learned Additional Public Prosecutor that in the facts and circumstances of the case, in so far as the recovery of the jewels from A-1 to A-3 is concerned, a presumption under Section 114(n) of the Indian Evidene Act would arise and as such, a presumption can be drawn not only for the fact that the accused were in possession of the stolen articles after committing robbery, but also committed the murder of the deceased in the absence of any explanation from the accused.

    27. It is true as pointed by the learned counsel for the accused that the Supreme Court would hold in several decisions that the recovery of articles which were found stolen from the body of the deceased, would make out only the offence under Section 411, I.P.C But, it is to be noted that in the very same decisions, it is observed that in the absence of any explanation from the accused for the possession of jewels stolen from the deceased, then a presumption can be drawn and even that depends upon the facts and circumstances, of each case. It is also observed in some given cases, the presumption is further extended to the extent of holding that such a person committed the offence of murder also.

    28. In this case, admittedly, the recovery of articles and arrest of the accused is after one month. But, mere lapse of one month will not compel the Court to come to a conclusion that the presumption cannot be drawn and as such, the accused had not committed the murder.

    29. Whether a presumption under Section 114(a) of the Indian Evidence Act, is drawn in a given situation, is a matter which depends on the evidence and the circumstances of each case. The nature of the stolen articles, the nature of its identification by the owner, the places and circumstances and its recovery, the intervening period between the date of offence and date of recovery, the, explanation of the person from whom the recovery is made, are all factors which are to be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision of this Court.

    30. When the prosecution in proving beyond any doubt that the commission of murder and robbery formed part of the transaction and the unexplained possession of the stolen property by the accused, would certainly justify the presumption that it was the accused and no one else had committed the murder and robbery.

    31. Though, the time factor, namely the intervening period is important, it is settled law that no standard time limit can be fixed to determine whether the possession is recent or otherwise. Each case must be judged on its own facts. In a case where there is no possible explanation by the accused for the lawful possession of articles belonging to the deceased, the Courts cannot be held to be in error in considering that the murder and robbery were integral parts of the same transaction giving rise to the presumption that the appellants not only committed the murder of the deceased, but also committed robbery of articles found in possession of the deceased.

    32. The question as to what amounts to recent possession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies, as the stolen articles are or are not calculated to pass readily from hand to hand. As held by the Supreme Court, the stolen articles were such, as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, even the period of one year that lapsed cannot be said to be too long, particularly when the accused had been absconding during that period.

    33. The abovesaid principles have been laid down in the following decisions:—

    (a) 2001 SCC (Cri) 449 : (2001) 3 SCC 190 : AIR 2001 SC 979 : (2001 Cri LJ 1231) (Sanjay Alias Kaka v. State (Nct Of Delhi).);

    (b) 2002 AIR SCW 2060 : (2002 Cri LJ 2799) (supra) and

    (c) 1998 SCC (Cri) 220 : (1998 Cri LJ 814) (supra).

    34. As laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decisions, the time factor would not mean a particular time limit. It varies according to the facts and circumstances of each case.

    35. In this case, A-1 to A-3 have committed the murder and the jewels have been distributed among themselves. From A-1, one thali chain and bangles were recovered and from A-2 and A-3, the other gold bangles were recovered which were identified by P.W 2, the husband of the deceased. Admittedly, there is no explanation for the possession from the accused either in the cross-examination of witnesses or in Section 313, Cr.P.C statement.

    36. As rightly pointed out by the Supreme Court, the jewels like thali chain with identifiable features, cannot be passed from hand to hand readily and immediately, be cause, the accused would apprehend that they would be caught if those jewels were passed on to third party. Furthermore, in this case, M.O 2 series were pledged by A-1 to P.W 6 in between the period of one month. When once it is established that the jewels like thali (Mangalya Sutra) and gold bangles belonging to the deceased were recovered from the accused, then, the accused who had the special knowledge as to how they came into possession, has to explain and rebut the presumption.

    37. Under those circumstances, in our view, the presumption both under Section 114(a) and Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act drawn against A-1 to A-3 from whom the jewels of the deceased identified by P.W 2 and also the knife used for committing the offence were recovered, has not been rebutted. Consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed on A-1 to A-3 are liable to be confirmed and accordingly confirmed.

    38. With regard to A-4, the contention urged by learned senior counsel is that the opinion given by P.W 12 finger print expert that the chance prints M.O 13 found on the betel nut box recovered from the scene of occurrence would tally with M.O 14 finger prints of A-4, is not admissible, in view of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Mahmood v. State Of U.P (1976 Cri LJ 10 : (1976) 1 SCC 542 : AIR 1976 SC 69) and Paramasivam v. State Of Tamil Nadu, (Supreme Court) (2002) 2 Mad LW (Cri) 836), wherein, it is held that the order of the Magistrate concerned is mandatory before obtaining the finger print of the accused as contained in Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

    39. It is strenuously contended by learned Additional Public Prosecutor that Section 5 of the Act would not affect the power of the Police Officer under Section 4 of the Act to take finger prints of the person arrested in connection with the case and as such, P.W 15 is competent to take the finger prints, and therefore, the evidence of P.Ws 12 and 15 is admissible. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor cited a decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1978 Cri-LJ 1251 : (1978) 3 SCC 435 : AIR 1978 SC 1248 (Shankaria v. State Of Rajasthan .) to substantiate his contention. Relevant portion of the observations of the Supreme Court in 1978 Cri LJ 1251 is as follows:—

    “79. Mr. Gambhir next contends that in view of S. 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, it was incumbent on the police to obtain the specimen thumb impression of the appellant before a Magistrate, and since this was not done the opinion rendered by the Finger-Print Expert Mr. Tankha, by using those illegally obtained specimen finger impressions, must be ruled out of evidence.

    80. The contention appears to be misconceived because in the State of Rajasthan, the police were competent under S. 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, to take the specimen finger-prints of the accused, and this they did, in the instant case, before the Superintendent of Police, Shri. K.P Srivastava. It was not necessary for them to obtain an order from the Magistrate for obtaining such specimen finger-prints.”

    40. Above said observations are made by the Supreme Court to hold that the said evidence is admissible in the light of the existence of relevant rules framed by the Rajasthan Government under the powers conferred under Section 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act.

    41. Admittedly, no rules have been framed by Tamil Nadu State. Section 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act would provide that any person who has been arrested in connection with the offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year or upwards, shall, if so required by a police officer, allow his measurements to be taken in the prescribed manner.

    42. So, the prescribed manner for taking measurements of finger prints from the person arrested could be indicated either by the rules framed under Section 8 of the Act or any other rules and procedures framed by the State. The observation of the Supreme Court, as mentioned earlier, would indicate that if the rules are not framed, then it is necessary for the Police Officer to obtain permission under Section 5 of the Act. In this State, as noted above, no rules have been framed under the Act giving the procedure denoting the “prescribed manner” for taking finger prints.

    43. When similar question was raised earlier before a Division Bench of this Court in (1994) (1) Mad LW (Cri) 58 (Ravanan v. State (Inspector of Police), Kumbakonam), it was argued that a Police Officer, during the course of investigation, after arresting a person, shall take him before the Magistrate concerned and obtain orders from the Magistrate before taking finger prints under Section 5 of the Act, as Section 4 of the Act would not confer power to the Police Officer for taking the finger prints. This argument was rejected by the Division Bench and quoted the following observations made in Cri A. Nd. 169 of 1986, dated 7-2-1992:—

    “The Act does not say that S. 5 refers to the prescribed manner spelt out in S. 4 of the Act. The power of the Magistrate under S. 5 of the Act does not seem to affect the power of a police officer, to take finger prints or photographs of the persons arrested in connection with the various facts referred to under S. 4 of the Act…………S. 8 confers power on the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. It was stated by the learned Public Prosecutor, that the State of Tamil Nadu had not framed any rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. After careful consideration of Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act, we are unable to agree with Mr. N. Dhinakar that invariably during investigation a person arrested must be taken before a Magistrate and orders obtained before the finger prints of such persons could be taken by a Police Officer. Ss. 4 and 5 operate in different fields and obviously if the State Government had made any rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, the Investigating Officer, ought to have followed such rules which would fall within the ambit of “Prescribed manner” contemplated under S. 4 of the Act. If the State Government has not made any rules under the Act, it will be the duty of the investigating officer, to follow Police Standing Order 836. Police Standing Orders are in the nature of instructions given to be followed by the Police Force ………………

    “Finger impressions shall be taken only by officers declared by a Superintendent or, in the City of Madras, by the Commissioner of Police, to be qualified to take clear and well-rolled impressions,”

    ……………………We think it necessary that the State Government must make rules under S. 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. Some of the State Governments have made rules. A proper procedure in obtaining finger prints must be followed for otherwise, the sanctity of scientific evidence not only gets obliterated but also becomes an exercise in futility…………………………”

    44. The abovesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court would show that even in the absence of rules by the State under Section 8 of the Act, the Police Officer has to follow the Police Standing Orders, which gives the “prescribed manner” for taking the finger prints.

    45. Let us now see as to whether the said procedure has been followed by P.W 15 who has taken the finger prints.

    46. In this case, P.W 15 Inspector of Police would state that he had taken impressions, the finger prints of A-4 on 24-7-1992 and sent him for remand. P.W 12 finger print expert who has given the opinion on a comparison as against A-4, would state that as per Ex. P-47, the finger prints of A-4 was taken by one Head Constable 2127. Admittedly, he has not been examined. Curiously, P.W 15 has not stated that he followed the procedure provided in the Police Standing Orders relating to taking of finger prints. It has not been established in this case that the said Head Constable or the Inspector of Police P.W 15 has been declared to be a competent officer to take finger print in the “prescribed manner” as provided under Section 4 of the Act.

    47. The method of taking finger prints with reference to the appliances forms part of Police Standing Order-836(4)(a). Police Standing Order 836(4) (d) states that the prints should invariably be taken on an authorised finger prints slip in Form No. 141 thereunder. As per Police Standing Order 836(4)(k), the finger impression shall be taken in the moffusil areas only by the Officers declared by the Superintendent of Police or in the City of Madras by the Commissioner of Police to be qualified to take clear well rolled impressions.

    48. Admittedly, no evidence has been adduced to show that either P.W 15 or the Head Constable who took finger prints from A-4, has been declared either by the Super intendent of Police or the Commissioner of Police, as the case may be, to be qualified as a competent Officer to take clear well rolled impressions. There is also no evidence to show that the finger prints were taken in Form No. 141 specified in the Police Standing Orders. There is also no indication that the method of taking finger prints as pro vided in Police Standing Order 834(4)(a) had been followed. Thus, it is clear that none of the provisions of the Police Standing Order 836, relating to taking of the finger prints of the accused, had been followed by the in vestigating agency.

    49. That apart, M.O 15 betel nut box was taken from the scene of occurrence on 23-6-1992. P.W 16 finger print expert on the same day, went to scene of occurrence and P.W 14, the photographer took photos and chance prints found on M.O 15 kept in the scene of occurrence: Admittedly P.W 13, the first investigating officer did not prepare any mahazar for recovery of M.O 15. No reference had been made about M.O 15 in the observation mahazar in Ex.P-2. Though it is stated by P.W 15 that the betel nut box which contained M.O 13, the chance prints of A-4 was sent on 3-7-1992 to the Court.’ P.W 8, the Court clerk would state that the same was received only on 23-7-1992. There is no explanation on the side of the prosecution as to why there was no recovery of mahazar in regard to the recovery of M.O 15 and as to why M.O 15 containing M.O 13 chance prints, was sent to the Court nearly after a month.

    50. In the light of the above fact situation, we are unable to act upon the finger print expert's opinion Ex.P-26, even assuming that the Head Constable or the Inspector of Police could invoke power under Section 4 of the Act by following the procedure under the Police Standing Order to take the finger prints without approaching the Magistrate under Section 5 of the Act.

    51. As such, we are constrained to hold that A-4 cannot be convicted merely on the basis of the finger print expert's opinion, which in or considered opinion, is insufficient in the present facts of the case, as the same cannot be accepted in view of violation of prescribed procedures. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed on A-4 are liable to be set aside.

    52. In the result, the conviction and sentence imposed on A-1 to A-3 are confirmed. The conviction and sentence imposed on A-4 are set aside. Since A-4 is in jail, he is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required in any other case. The appeal is partly allowed.

    53. Before parting with the case, we are constrained to remind the Government the necessity for framing the rules regarding the “prescribed manner” for taking measurements of the finger prints from the arrested person.

    54. The Supreme Court in (1976) 1 SCC 542 : AIR 1976 SC 69 (supra) and (2002) 2 Mad LW (Cri) 836 : (1976 Cri LJ 10) (supra) would specifically state that in the absence of rules, the Police Officer has to approach the Magistrate concerned under Section 5 of the Act for obtaining permission for taking finger prints of the accused and if the same was not done, the opinion of the finger print expert would become inadmissible.

    55. In this case, we have stated that even though the rules have not been framed under Section 8 of the Act, there are procedures provided under the Police Standing Orders for taking the finger prints and the compliance of those rules would satisfy the “prescribed manner” as provided under Section 4 of the Act.

    56. However, we have acquitted A-4 on facts, since the procedures prescribed under the Police Standing Orders have not been complied with.

    57. Yet another argument is possible to contend that even when the provisions of Police Standing Orders have been complied with, the said compliance would not make the finger print expert's opinion admissible, as the Police Standing Orders do not have any statutory force. To avoid this Criticism, it is better for the State to frame rules prescribing the procedures for the same.

    58. Under those circumstances, we think it necessary to direct the State Government to make the rules under Section 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. As a matter of fact, similar direction has been given by a Division Bench of this Court earlier in Cri. A. No. 169 of 1986; dated 7-2-1992, as indicated in the earlier paragraphs. But still, such a direction has not been complied with by the State Government.

    59. It is noticed that several State Governments have made rules. In our view, a proper procedure in obtaining finger prints from the accused, might be followed. Otherwise, the sanctity of the scientific evidence not only gets obliterated, but also becomes an exercise in futility.

    60. In a similar situation, in a case coming from Rajasthan, the Supreme Court in (1978) 3 SCC 435 : AIR 1978 SC 1248 : (1978 Cri LJ 1251) (supra), while rejecting the contention of learned counsel for the accused that in view of Section 5 of the Act, it was incumbent on the part of the investigating agency to obtain the specimen thumb impression of an accused before a Magistrate or after obtaining an order of the Magistrate and since that was not done, the opinion rendered by the finger print expert must be ruled out of evidence, would observe that the said contention appears to be misconceived, because, in the State of Rajasthan, the Police were competent under Section 4 of the Act to take specimen impression of the accused in the presence of Superintendent of Police and as such, it was not necessary for the Police to obtain order from the Magistrate concerned.

    61. Thus, it is clear that by framing proper rules under Section 8 of the Act, giving the procedure for taking the finger prints, the sanctity of the scientific evidence adduced by the finger print expert would certainly save the prosecution. Therefore, it is desirable for the State Government to frame appropriate rules under Section 8 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, giving clear-cut guidelines and procedures indicating the “prescribed manner” as provided under Section 4 of the Act for taking the finger prints of the accused in custody.

    62. Accordingly, learned Public Prosecutor is directed to get a copy of this judgment and send the same to the State Government with a covering letter, intimating our direction to enable the Government to frame the rules expeditiously.

    63. Order accordingly.

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