This Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the tenant in H.R.C.O.P No. 4 of 1990, on the file of the Principal District Munsif (Rent Controller), Tindivanam.

2. By virtue of the impugned order, the Rent Controller allowed the application of the first respondent herein, to get himself impleaded in the proceeding and allowed him to continue the proceeding already initiated by the previous landlord.

3. The Original Petition was filed by the previous owner as R.C.O.P No. 4 of 1990. Pending proceeding, the respondent No. 1 purchased the property as per sale deeds dt. 23.12.1991 and 24.12.1991 Thereafter, an application was filed by the very same respondent to get himself impleaded as a respondent in the proceeding, which he subsequently withdrew. Later he filed the present application, namely, IA. No. 5 of 1994, for getting himself impleaded as additional petitioner in the R.C.O.P In the meanwhile, the Original Petition itself was dismissed for default, and hence, the first respondent wanted himself to be permitted to continue the Original Petition, or to initiate proceedings for restoration of the Original Petition.

4. By the impuged order, the Rent Controller allowed the first respondent's request, though objected to by the petitioner herein.

5. The main ground of attack by the petitioner is that once the eviction petition is not pending before the Rent Controller, there is no proceeding in which the first respondent can get himself impleaded or substituted or permitted to continue the proceeding. According to him, being a Tribunal, the powers are restricted as provided under the Rent Control Act, and hence the order of the Rent Controller is without jurisdiction.

6. Being a Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, my powers are limited, i.e, this Court has only to see whether the jurisdiction exercised by the Rent Controller is within his limits.

7. It is true that the Act does not provide for the impleading of purchaser in a pending proceeding or in a proceeding which is dismissed for default. But it is settled law by this Court that in a pending proceeding, a purchaser can be impleaded and he can continue the proceeding.

8. In 92 L.W 303 (N. Subbiah v. M. Seshagiri Rao, C.J held thus:—

“The purchaser of a property, in the course of proceedings under the Rent Control Act, can be brought on record for the purpose of continuing the application filed by the quondam owner, namely, his vendor, and the mere fact that the tenant has, at the instance of the quondam owner, attorned to the purchaser, who wishes to bring himself on record in those proceedings, would not be a material interdict which would prevent the subsequent purchaser from being brought on record for continuing the proceedings either in the original stage or at the execution state.”

9. In 1991-1 L.W 349 (V. Shanmugham v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (M/S)), Venkataswami, J. (as he then was), held thus:—

“The purchaser of a building during the pendency of a Revision Petition in the High Court against an eviction order is entitled to execute the decree for eviction notwithstanding the fact that the purchaser has not been brought on record before the final disposal of the Revision Petition.”

In that case, the learned Judge was considering the provisions or Order 21, Rule 16 and Section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code, and being an executing Court, the learned judge held that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply. But, even then, the learned judge discussed the entire case-law and held that the purchaser can continue the proceeding already initiated by earlier landlord.

10. The powers of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority are conferred by the Statute. But the question is, whether, apart from the powers that have been granted, the Tribunals constituted have got incidental powers which are not strictly provided under the Statute, but which should be necessary for rendering justice between the parties.

11. In 94 L.W 108 (Sreenivasan Chettiar v. R.M Kalyani Ammal), Ratnam, J. (as he then was), was dealing with a case whether the Appellate Authority has got power in allowing an application analogous to Order 41 Rule 2, C.P.C, i.e, whether the Appellate Authority can permit the appellant to raise additional grounds in appeal. The learned Judge held thus:—

“… From the language of S. 23 of the Act, it is clear that the Appellate Authority constituted under S. 23 of the Act is not a court as normally understood and accepted and consequently, the procedures of a civil court cannot be applied to those authorities. But then the question still remains whether in the absence of any specific provisions either in the Act or in the Rules, a litigant who has by inadvertence omitted to raise a ground of objection against the order of the Rent Controller should be precluded from doing so. To negative the putting forth of such a ground would be to bar a party from setting out what might be a vital objection to the order appealed against and in my view, so long as the appeal has not been disposed of, the grating of permission to raise additional grounds of appeal would be part of the power to decide the appeal itself. This would be so, because under S. 23(3) of the Act, it is not as if the hearing of the appeal is confined only to those grounds of appeal raised against the order of the Rent Controller but the decision is on the appeal against the order of the Controller as a whole and not limited to only those grounds upon which an appeal had actually been preferred. Though the Appellate Authority constituted under the Act is not a Court and consequently it had not inherent powers as such to permit the raising of additional grounds of appeal, yet S. 23(3) would enable the Appellate Authority in the process of hearing the appeal to decide the appeal not only on grounds which have been raised before, but also on other grounds which may be raised later. In the absence of any bar on a litigant analogous to O. 41, R. 2,. C.P.C, such a power in the Appellate Authority is available. The conduct of the appeal so long as it is pending is entirely in the hands of the Appellate Authority, that Authority being statutorily vested with the authority to decide …”

12. In this connection, the powers of the Tribunal and that of a civil Court may also be considered.

13. In A.I.R 1965 S.C 1595 (A.C Companies v. P.N Sharma), their Lordships held that the Tribunals have got a greater role in the administration of justice, and they are constituted by the statute in exercise of Sovereign power. Their Lordships further held that under our Constitution, the Judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily confered on the ordinary Courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of courts and to their adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These Courts can be described as ordinary courts of civil judicature. Their Lordships held as follows:—

“…. The expression “Court” in the context denote a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary hierarschy of courts which are entrusted with the State's inherent judicial powers. A Sovereign State discharges legislative, executive and judicial functions and can legitimately claim corresponding powers which are described as legislative, executive and judicial powers. Under our Constitution, the judicial functions and powers of the State are primarily conferred on the ordinary courts which have been constituted under its relevant provisions. The Constitution recognised a hierarchy of Courts and to their adjudication are normally entrusted all disputes between citizens and citizens as well as between the citizens and the State. These Courts can be described as ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. They are governed by their prescribed rules of procedure and they deal with questions of fact and law raised before them by adopting a process which is described as judicial process. The powers which these courts exercise, are judicial powers, the functions and the decisions they reach and pronounce are judicial decisions.

“In every State there are administrative bodies or authorities which are required to deal with matters within their jurisdiction in an administrative manner and their decisions are described as administrative decisions. In reaching their administrative decisions, administrative bodies can and often do take into consideration questions of policy. It is not unlikely that even in the process of reaching administrative decisions, the administrative bodies or authorities are required to act fairly and objectively and would, in many cases have to follow the principles of natural justice: but authority to reach decisions conferred on such administrative bodies is clearly distinct and separate from the judicial power conferred on Courts, and the decisions pronounced by administrative bodies are similarly distinct and separate in character from judicial decisions pronounced by Courts. Tribunals which fall within the purview of Art, 136 (1) occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of our Constitution. Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for the decision and in that sense, they share with the courts one common characteristic: both the courts and the tribunals are “constituted by he State and are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions”. (Vide Durga Shankar Metha v. Raghuraj Singh, 1955-I SCJ 267 at P. 272 = AIR 1954 SCJ 520 at P. 522.) They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with and finally determine disputes between parties which are entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their functions and exercising their powers, the courts have to conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed but the approach adopted by both the courts and the Tribunals is substantially the same, and there is no essential difference between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of Courts, so in the case of Tribunals, it is the State's inherent judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function, which they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the courts established by the Constitution: but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its judicial powers and functions in tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features which are common to the Tribunals and the Courts, and features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the fundamental feature which is common to both the courts and the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign State.”

14. In A.I.R 1969 S.C 430 (Income Tax Officer, Cannanore. v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi), the question that came up for consideration was whether, under the income tax Act, the Appellate Tribunal has got power to grant stay, pending Appeal. As under the Rent Control Act, only certain powers of Civil Court were granted for the Appellate Tribunal Section 131 of the Income-Tax Act said that they shall exercise the same powers as are vested in the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in matters specified in the Section. But those powers relate only to discovery and inspection, enforcing the attendance of witnesses, compelling production of books of accounts, etc., issue of commission and allied matters. Going by that power alone, their Lordships held that the power of stay is not available. Their Lordships held (at page 433) thus:—

“…. In Domat's Civil Law, Cushing's Edition, Vol. I, at page 88, it has been stated:

“It is the duty of the judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears to be regulated by their express dispositions but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which appear to be comprehended either within the consequences that may be gathered from it.”

Maxwell on ‘Interpretation of Statutes’, Eleventh Edition contains a statement at p. 350 that “where an Act confers a Jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary, to its execution. Cul Jurisdictio data est. ea quoge conces a esse vindentur. Since quibus jurisdictio explicari non notuit.” An instance is given based on Ex Parte, Martin, (1879) 4 QBD 212 at P. 491 that

“Where an inferior court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced”.

Following the said principle, the learned judge held that when exercising the power of appeal, the power to grant stay is implicit.

15. In A.I.R 1970 SC 759 (Mst. Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari Sharama and others), the question that came up for consideration was under the Motor Vehicle Act. There, the applicant, for the grant of stage carriage permit, died, and there is no provision under the Act that his legal representative can continue the proceeding, nor Order 22, C.P.C or the powers under Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act were made applicable. Their Lordships, after discussing the entire case law, held thus:—

“… In the absence of any statute or statutory rule, the Regional Transport Authority may devise any reasonable procedure for dealing with the situation. As stated in American Jurisprudence, 2nd, Vol. 2 (Administrative Law), Article 340 P. 155” where the statute does not require any particular method of procedure to be followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions.” (See also Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol. 73 (Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, Article 73, P. 399). The Regional Transport Authority has complete discretion in the mater of allowing or refusing substitution. It is not bound to embark upon prolonged investigation into disputed questions of succession. Nor it is bound to allow substitution of such an order which will delay the proceedings unreasonably or will otherwise be detrimental to the interests of the public generally”.

16. In this case, the contention that is raised is, that Section 27 of the Act allows only a legal representative to be impleaded, or the proceedings can be continued by or against the legal representative. An argument is put forward that when once the legal representative is allowed to be impleaded or if the proceeding is continued against them, the Statute does not empower the Tribunal to implead a purchaser. The said contention can be met if we look into the definition of ‘landlord’ under The Act. Section 2(6) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, reads thus:—

“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise required:—

(6) “landlord” includes the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of mother or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant:”

If we go by the above definition, a purchaser from a landlord is also entitled to receive rent. The building is admittedly in the occupation of the petitioner, as a tenant. If he is a landlord, Rule 12 of the Act empowers him to file an application to restore the application which was dismissed for default. The competency of the respondent to file an application to restore cannot be disputed, for, he right is given to a landlord. That apart, under Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, all the rights of the lessor, if conveyed to a stranger, the purchaser gets all the rights. By virtue of Section 109 of the Act, the right of the purchaser is recognised to get himself impleaded, or to continue the proceedings already initiated. Even if the tenant does not recognise or attorn the tenancy to the purchaser, that will not take away the right of the purchaser to get himself impleaded or to continue the proceedings already initiated. In this case, the eviction petition is on the ground that the tenant has committed default in paying the rent. Admittedly, from the date of sale deed, i.e, from 23.12.1991, the first respondent herein is entitled to collect the rent. In that capacity also, he is entitled to proceed with the matter after getting it restored. The contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the present first respondent himself filed an application and later withdrew the same, and hence the present application is lacking in good faith.

17. It is true that the present first respondent filed an application. But, in the earlier proceeding, he wanted himself to be impleaded as a respondent. If his right as a landlord is recognised, he cannot get himself impleaded as a respondent, for, there is no dispute between the original landlord and the purchaser. He rightly withdrew the same, and therefore, that cannot be a bar for filing the present application.

18. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the first respondent's right is not taken away, and he can file an application for eviction.

19. It is true, the first respondent can file a separate petition for eviction. But, that is not the only remedy which is recognised under law. If the first respondent can get himself impleaded or he can continue the earlier proceeding, he can shorten the litigation. The question whether the same cause of action arises, or the Rent Control Courts can take note of the subsequent events are matters not to be considered at present. We are now concerned only with the locus standi of the first respondent to either get himself impleaded or to continue the earlier proceedings. The Rent control court has rightly allowed the application.

20. In this connection, it is also appropriate to note that none of the petitioner's rights is affected. Whatever defence he had against the original landlord is available to him against the purchaser also. In fact, he is not an aggrieved person so as to file a Revision under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. In the Result, the Revision Petition is dismissed with costs.

KA/RR/VCS