The short point which arises for decision in this revisional application is whether the petitioner can claim the protection of S. 60(1)(h), Civil P.C The petitioner, who is the judgment-debtor, pleaded that he was a labourer and as such his wages were not liable to be attached in execution of a decree passed against him.
2. This plea was rejected by the executing Court. That, is why the petitioner has come to this Court and on his behalf Mr. S.N Patel has argued that the view taken by the learned Judge about the status of the petitioner is clearly inconsistent with the rulings of this Court. I am satisfied that Mr. Patel's contention is well-founded.
3. Section 60(1)(h), Civil P.C exempts from attachment in execution proceedings the wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or kind, and the question therefore is whether the wages drawn by the judgment-debtor in the present case can be said to be the wages of a labourer or not. Ordinarily, a labourer would be a person who earns his bread by personal manual labour.
4. Again it may be conceded that, ordinarily such a person would require little or no art or skill or previous education for doing the work. Mr. Shastri argues that the petitioner who is a weaver in a textile mill, cannot be said to be a labourer because his work requires art, and that it is not simple manual labour put in by a coolie; and Mr. Shastri's contention is that it is to persons who put in simple manual labour that S. 60(1)(h) should be applied. That is the view which the learned Judge below has taken.
5. I, however, find that within the class of labourers under S. 60(1)(h) have been included spinners by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in — ‘Jechand Khusal v. Aba’, 5 Bom 132 (A), and also by the decision in ‘K.U Kulkarni v. Ganpat Hiraji’, AIR 1942 Bom 191 (B), where Wassoodew, J. has held that a jobber who partly did the work of a spinner and partly did the work of supervising the spinners was a labourer within the meaning of S. 60(1)(n). This was a stronger case from the decree-holder's point of view.
6. The wages which the judgment-debtor received were not received by him solely for the work of spinning, but partly for the said work and partly for supervising the work of spinners, and even so Wassoodew, J. took the view, following the judgment of the Division Bench to which I have just referred, that a person who does a composite duty of the kind just described could still claim to be a labourer. If a person who does spinning can be regarded as a labourer, I do not see why a person who does weaving should not be considered as a labourer. Therefore, I must hold that the learned Judge was in error in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was not a labourer within the meaning of S. 60(1)(h).
7. In the result, the order passed by the learned Judge would be set aside and the darkhast application dismissed. The petitioner will get his costs in this Court. Parties to bear their costs in the trial Court.
D.H.Z
Revision allowed.