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  • ARBITRATION PROTOCOL AND CONVENTION ACT
  • S. 5, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 6 of 1937.
  • provisions of S. 7 of Act 6 of 1937.16. Section 7
  • provisions in the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Rule 2 of O. 39
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • ARBITRATION PROTOCOL AND CONVENTION ACT
  • S. 5, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 6 of 1937.
  • provisions of S. 7 of Act 6 of 1937.16. Section 7
  • provisions in the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Rule 2 of O. 39
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs (referred to in the opinion as appellants) against an order of the learned Judge of the City Civil Court refusing to grant an injunction which the plaintiffs had prayed for. Two proceedings between the parties were pending concurrently:

  • A petition filed by the respondents in the City Civil Court on 23-6-1955 under S. 5 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 6 of 1937, seeking a decree in terms of a foreign award said to have been validly made between the parties.
  • A suit filed by the appellants (No. 2554 of 1955) seeking a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding to obtain a decree in terms of the foreign award; the suit included multiple allegations challenging the grant of such a decree.

While the petition was pending, the appellants moved for an interim injunction by notice of motion. The trial Judge dismissed that notice of motion. The appellants appealed the dismissal of the notice of motion to this Court. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeal was incompetent because the trial Judge's order had been made under the Court's inherent jurisdiction (S. 151 of the Code) and not under Order 39, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which would make the order appealable under Order 43).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dismissing the appellants' notice of motion for injunction was an appealable order (i.e., made under Order 39, Rule 2) or was made under the Court's inherent jurisdiction (S. 151) and consequently not appealable.
  2. Whether the appellants' suit for permanent injunction could properly be treated as invoking the remedy under Order 39, Rule 2 (by liberal construction of the words "other injury of any kind") or instead was based on the inherent jurisdiction under S. 151.
  3. Whether the petition under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 6 of 1937 (and specifically S. 7 of that Act), and the separate suit filed by the appellants should be tried together as companion proceedings or tried separately, and what the procedural consequences of either course would be.
  4. What matters fall within S. 7(1) of Act 6 of 1937 (clauses (a)–(e)) and when S. 7(3) (and S. 7(2) as to separate suits) permits or requires a separate suit rather than summary disposal on a petition filing a foreign award.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. Lam)

  • The appeal against the dismissal of the notice of motion is incompetent because the trial Judge's order was made under the Court's inherent jurisdiction (S. 151) rather than under Order 39, Rule 2; orders under inherent jurisdiction are not appealable under Order 43.
  • Given the pleadings and affidavits, the notice of motion was taken out under inherent jurisdiction (S. 151) and not under the specific provisions of Order 39, Rule 2.

Appellants' Arguments (Mr. Kapadia)

  • The appellants relied on Order 39, Rule 2: its words are wide enough (in particular the phrase "other injury of any kind") to include the injunction sought and to make the order appealable under Order 43.
  • The phrase "other injury of any kind" should be given a liberal construction so as to allow interim injunction relief in appropriate cases falling under Order 39, Rule 2.
  • Relied on the Calcutta High Court decision in "Umapati Choudhari v. Subodh Chandra Choudhari" to support a broad view of Order 39, Rule 2 and the availability of injunction in similar circumstances.
  • Argued that certain matters (including points going to competence and validity of the petition) could justify separate suit relief and that he wished to protect his client's rights to appeal if the suit were dismissed after the petition succeeded—seeking conversion of the appeal into a revisional application if necessary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Umapati Choudhari v. Subodh Chandra Choudhari, 1553 Cal. 377 (AIR V 40) (A) Consideration of whether a claim for injunction in circumstances of challenge to a decree (partition decree in that case) could be maintained under Order 39, Rule 2; observation that "injury" may have wide denotation and discussion of the Court's inherent jurisdiction under S. 151. The Court examined the decision but treated the observation as not decisive for the present case. It concluded that the Calcutta High Court judges in that case relied more on the inherent jurisdiction under S. 151 than on Order 39, Rule 2, so the authority could not be relied on unqualifiedly to support the appellants' position here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise fashion:

  1. The Court first addressed the respondents' preliminary objection that the appeal is incompetent. It explained the general rule that orders under Order 39 granting or refusing injunctions are appealable under Order 43, but that orders made under the Court's inherent jurisdiction (S. 151) are not appealable.
  2. It examined the pleadings (the plaint) and the affidavits supporting the notice of motion to determine whether the appellants had relied on Order 39, Rule 2 or on S. 151. The Court found that, on the material averments, the appellants had placed reliance on the inherent jurisdiction under S. 151 and had not, in substance, framed their case under Order 39, Rule 2.
  3. The Court considered Mr. Kapadia's contention that Order 39, Rule 2 should be given a wide construction (especially the phrase "other injury of any kind") and examined the cited Calcutta High Court case (Umapati Choudhari). The Court noted the Calcutta Bench's view that the word "injury" could have a wide meaning but observed that the Calcutta decision itself relied primarily on the Court's inherent jurisdiction under S. 151 rather than treating Order 39, Rule 2 as exhaustive. Accordingly, that decision could not be taken as furnishing unqualified support for the appellants' position.
  4. Having concluded that the notice of motion had been taken out under S. 151, the Court held that the trial Judge's order dismissing the notice must be read as an order under S. 151; therefore the appeal was, in principle, incompetent.
  5. Despite this, at the request of Mr. Kapadia the Court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a revisional application, because the trial Judge's decision involved matters raising points of jurisdiction. The Court noted that it is normally reluctant to interfere with the exercise of inherent jurisdiction but accepted to deal with the matter on revision for the stated reason.
  6. On the substantive procedural question of how to proceed between the two pending matters (the petition under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act and the separate suit), the Court analysed Section 7 of Act 6 of 1937. It observed:
    • S. 7(1) (clauses (a)–(e)) enumerates the points which can and must be tried by the Court where a petition to enforce a foreign award is presented.
    • S. 7(2) provides for a separate suit in respect of contentions indicated in that sub-section.
    • If all the plaintiffs' contentions fall legitimately within S. 7(1) the plaintiffs may not be entitled to invoke S. 7(3) to justify a separate suit; conversely, if some contentions do not fall under S. 7(1) they may be pursued in a separate suit under S. 7(3).
  7. The Court declined to express a definitive opinion on all contested points (for example the precise interplay between S. 7 sub-sections and the corresponding provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act prior to the 1940 amendment). Instead, the Court identified a practical and procedural solution: directing that the petition and the suit be tried together as companion proceedings.
  8. The Court explained the practical consequences favoring this approach: it would avoid prejudice to the appellants (who feared losing the right of appeal if the petition alone were determined first), permit appellate or revisional remedies if the suit were dismissed, and allow the same Court(s) to treat appeal and revision arising from the two companion proceedings together.
  9. The court additionally suggested that the trial Judge could, if expedient, ask the parties to lead evidence in the petition and, by agreement, treat that evidence as applying to the suit as well.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The Court held that the order dismissing the appellants' notice of motion must be regarded as an order made under S. 151 (the inherent jurisdiction of the Court) and not under Order 39, Rule 2; accordingly the appeal as originally presented by the plaintiffs was incompetent.
  • The Court, exercising its discretion, treated the appeal as a revisional application because the trial Judge's findings raised points of jurisdiction and therefore proceeded to deal with the matter on revision.
  • The Court directed the learned trial Judge to try the petition (filed under the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 6 of 1937) and the suit (No. 2554 of 1955) together as companion proceedings and indicated procedural measures (including allowing evidence in the petition to be treated as evidence in the suit by agreement) to minimize prejudice to either party.
  • The interim injunction previously issued in the application for injunction is vacated.
  • "The petitioners to pay the costs of this revisional application of the Opponents." (as stated in the opinion)
  • "No order as to costs." (as stated in the opinion — appearing to relate to the injunction application).

Implications:

The immediate practical consequence is that the appellants' appeal against the dismissal of their notice of motion was not competent as an appeal (because the trial Judge's order is treated as having been made under S. 151). The Court nonetheless entertained the substantive issues on revision and ordered the petition and the suit to be tried together to protect both parties' procedural and substantive rights. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new binding principle of law beyond the application of the statutory scheme (S. 7 of Act 6 of 1937, the distinction between O. 39, R. 2 and S. 151, and the practical direction to try companion proceedings together). The Court expressly refrained from deciding certain contested legal questions (for example, detailed interactions of S. 7 sub-sections and historical provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act prior to the 1940 amendment), and therefore no sweeping new precedent is announced on those unresolved points.

Disposition / Orders

  • The learned trial Judge is directed to try the petition and the suit as companion proceedings and to consider whether evidence led in the petition may be treated as evidence in the suit by agreement of the parties.
  • The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs of this revisional application of the Opponents (as recorded in the opinion).
  • The interim injunction issued in the application for injunction is vacated.
  • No order as to costs (as recorded in the opinion in relation to the injunction matter).

Judgment signature/endorsement recorded in the opinion: "S.L.L" and "Order accordingly."

    U.D. Patel And Co. v. C.M. Milligam And Clarke Ltd.

    This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the order passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court refusing to grant an injunction as prayed by them. It appears that between the plaintiffs and the defendants two proceedings are at present pending. The respondents have filed a petition in the City Civil Court on 23-6-1955.

    2. This petition has been filed under S. 5, Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act 6 of 1937. The respondents' case is that a foreign award has been validly made between them and the appellants and they want the City Civil Court to pass a decree in terms of this award. While the petition was pending in the trial Court, the appellants filed their suit No. 2554 of 1955.

    3. In this suit the appellants in substance contend that a decree in terms of the foreign award should not be passed and they have made several allegations in support of this prayer. It is a suit filed to obtain a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from taking any further steps in the matter of obtaining a decree in terms of the foreign award.

    4. After this suit was filed by the appellants, they took out a notice of motion and they urged that pending the final decision of this suit the respondents should be restrained making any further progress with their petition. This notice of motion was dismissed by the learned trial Judge and the appellants have come to this court in the present appeal against the said dismissal of the notice of motion.

    5. Mr. Lam for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection. He contends that the appeal from order preferred by the plaintiffs against the dismissal of their notice of motion is incompetent. It is clear that, if an order is passed under O. 39 granting or refusing to grant an injunction, the said order is appealable under O. 43 of the Code.

    6. On the other hand, if a prayer for injunction is made, not under the relevant provisions of O. 39, but under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under S. 151 and an order is passed either granting an injunction or refusing to grant it, the said order would not be appealable, and according to Mr. Lam, considering the material averments made in the plaint and in the affidavits in support of the notice of motion it would be clear that the notice of motion was taken out under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court and not under O. 39, R. 2.

    7. On the other hand, Mr. Kapadia for the appellants has relied upon the provisions of O. 39, R. 2, and he argues that the words in R. 2 of O. 39 are wide enough to include a claim for injunction such as has been made in the plaint and the claim for temporary injunction which has been made in the notice of motion. Rule 2 of O. 39 deals with suits for restraining the defendants from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind, and it provides that in such suits an order of interim injunction may be passed in an appropriate case.

    8. The words “other injury of any kind”, says Mr. Kapadia, must be very liberally construed and the jurisdiction of the Court to grant relief by way of interim injunction, where a party asking for such injunction is able to show other injury of any kind should not be denied. In support of this argument, Mr. Kapadia has invited my attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in ‘Umapati Choudhari v. Subodh Chandra Choudhari’, 1553 Cal. 377 (AIR V 40) (A).

    9. In this case, the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court were dealing with a claim for injunction made by persons who were not present at the time when a decree for partition was passed and the question which arose for decision was whether a claim for injunction in such circumstances could be maintained under O. 39, R. 2.

    10. It is true, as Mr. Kapadia points out, that Das Gupta, J. in dealing with the scope and effect of the provisions of O. 39, R. 2, has observed that the word “injury” should be given its widest denotation. But it is clear from the judgment that the learned Judges were disposed to place their order more upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under S. 151 of the Code and the principal point of law which the judgment deals with is whether the jurisdiction of the Court to grant injunction is confined to the provisions of O. 39 or can in an appropriate case be exercised even under S. 151.

    11. Das Gupta J. came to the conclusion that the provisions of O. 39 should not be regarded as exhaustive and that in proper cases it would be open to the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction and grant relief to a party by way of issuing an order of injunction. A contrary view taken by the Madras High Court did not appear to the learned Judges to be reasonable. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the observation on which Mr. Kapadia relies really amounts to such a decision on which reliance can be placed without any qualification.

    12. I do not, however, propose to express a definite opinion on this part of Mr. Kapadia's argument because I am satisfied that, even if the word “injury” used in O. 39, R. 2, is interpreted very liberally, that would not help the appellants because, after all, in considering the nature of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, one must inevitably consider the nature of the allegations made before him in support of the prayer for injunction, and on looking at the material averments in the plaint and in the affidavit in support of the notice of motion I am satisfied that reliance was placed on the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under S. 151 in support of the prayer for injunction, permanent and temporary, and that whoever drafted the plaint and the affidavit in support of the notice of motion did not purport to place his case on O. 39, R. 2 at all.

    13. That being the nature of the case which was made before the learned Judge, I feel no difficulty in holding that the order dismissing the notice of motion must be taken as an order passed, not under the provisions of O. 39, but under S. 151 of the Code, and if that be the true position, the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs is incompetent.

    14. Mr. Kapadia has, however, requested us to convert his appeal into a revisional application. Normally this Court would be very reluctant to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under S. 151. But, in the present case, Mr. Kapadia contends that the dismissal of the notice of motion is based on findings made by the trial Court which raise points of jurisdiction, and so I am dealing with this matter as a revisional application.

    15. Shortly stated, the learned trial Judge appears to have taken the view that all the material allegations made by the plaintiffs in their suit and the issues arising therefrom can and ought to be tried on the petition itself. In coming to this conclusion the learned trial Judge has considered the provisions of S. 7 of Act 6 of 1937.

    16. Section 7 lays down the conditions for the enforcement of foreign awards, and cls. (a) to (e) of sub-s. (1) of S. 7 indicate the points which can and must be tried by the Court before which a petition filing the foreign award has been made. Sub-s. (2) of S. 7 provides for a separate suit in respect of contentions indicated in that sub-section.

    17. The dispute between the parties, therefore, lies within a very narrow compass. If all the contentions raised by the plaintiffs in their suit can be said to fall legitimately within the purview of S. 7 sub-s. (1), then it may not be open to the plaintiffs to invoke the provisions of S. 7 sub-s. (3) to justify the institution of a separate suit.

    18. On the other hand, if all or any of the contentions raised by the plaintiffs in their plaint do not fall under S. 7 sub-s. (1) then it would be open to them to argue that S. 7 sub-s. (3) authorises a separate suit to be filed. Besides, Mr. Kapadia seems to contend that, even in respect of some matters covered by S. 7 sub-s. (1), the remedy by a separate suit cannot be said to be excluded altogether, and in support of this argument he wanted to refer to the corresponding provisions in the Indian Arbitration Act prior to the amendment of 1940.

    19. On this part of the controversy again I do not propose to express any opinion. It seems to me that, having regard to the contentions raised by the plaintiffs, the best order to make would be that the learned Judge should try the petition preferred by the respondents and the suit filed by the appellants together as companion matters. Mr. Kapadia's real apprehension is that, if the petition succeeds and a decree follows on the petition, he will have no right of appeal.

    20. One way of looking at this position is that the Legislature has intended that the decision in summary proceedings permitted under the provisions of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act should end with the making of a decree and should not be protracted by the provision of an appeal. On the other hand, if Mr. Kapadia has filed a suit in which he raises his own contentions against the petition, its competence and the validity of a claim for a decree in terms of the foreign award, and this suit is dismissed, he has undoubtedly a right of appeal against the dismissal of his suit.

    21. If the two proceedings are tried in the trial Court as companion proceedings, Mr. Kapadia would really suffer no prejudice in case his suit is dismissed and the petition is allowed and a decree is ordered to be drawn up; it would be open to Mr. Kapadia's clients to prefer an appeal against the dismissal of the suit and bring the award decree to this Court under its revisional jurisdiction under S. 115.

    22. If the two proceedings are tried together as companion proceedings, the Court entertaining the appeal against the final decision in Mr. Kapadia's suit and the decree drawn on the petition would naturally be disposed to treat both the appeal and the revisional application as companion proceedings. Whereas the adoption of this course would cause no prejudice to Mr. Kapadia, if the petition is tried and then the suit is taken up, both the proceedings being treated as companion suits.

    23. Mr. Lam's contention that the petition should be tried first would also have been met. It is hardly necessary to add that, even though I am directing the learned Judge to try the two proceedings as companion proceedings, it does not mean that Mr. Lam will not be able to take any point against the competence of the suit which he feels like taking.

    24. The two proceedings will be treated as independent proceedings in a sense; but if they are treated as companion proceedings and disposed of one after the other the interests of both the parties will be met. Indeed, after delivering this judgment both the learned Counsel for the parties agreed that this would be a reasonable course to adopt in the interests of both the parties.

    25. I would accordingly direct the learned trial Judge to try the proceedings as companion proceedings. He may decide whether it would not be expedient to ask the parties to lead their evidence in the petition and treat it as evidence in the suit by agreement.

    26. The petitioners to pay the costs of this revisional application of the Opponents.

    27. The interim injunction issued in the application for injunction is vacated. No order as to costs.

    S.L.L
    Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    U.D. Patel And Co. v. C.M. Milligam And Clarke Ltd.
    (Dec 13, 1955)