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  • S. 12 of the Specific Relief Act.26.
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  • S. 12 of the Specific Relief Act.26.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent No. 1 (plaintiff in the trial court) sued for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 13-12-1946, which he had with the owner of the property, respondent No. 2 (who had been defendant No. 1 at trial). The appellant is the subsequent transferee of the property (having acquired it from one of the respondents). The appellant asserted that before the 13-12-1946 written agreement between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, there had been a prior oral agreement dated 27-11-1946 between respondent No. 2 (through her husband) and the appellant to convey the same property to the appellant. The appellant also alternatively claimed he was unaware of any prior agreement and was a bona fide transferee for value without notice.

The trial Judge found that the oral agreement of 27-11-1946 was not proved and, alternatively, that the appellant had knowledge of the agreement dated 13-12-1946 when he took a sale deed. Consequently the trial Judge directed the appellant to execute a sale deed of the property covered by the 13-12-1946 agreement in favour of respondent No. 1 upon payment of the agreed consideration (Rs. 5,940), and ordered both respondent No. 2 and the appellant to hand over possession of the properties to respondent No. 1. Defendant No. 2 (the purchaser/transferee who appealed) brought the matter in this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant proved the alleged oral agreement dated 27-11-1946 by preponderance of the evidence.
  2. Whether the appellant had notice of the prior written agreement dated 13-12-1946 (i.e., whether he was a bona fide transferee for value without notice).
  3. Whether the written agreement of 13-12-1946 lacked mutuality because it was executed by the vendor alone and did not expressly state the consequences if the purchaser refused to perform.
  4. Whether the presence of an earnest deposit (Rs. 500, partly cash and partly held by a third party) or the fact that the vendor would not receive cash at completion negatived consideration or otherwise rendered specific performance inappropriate.
  5. Whether the parties' provision for the plaintiff's recovery of damages rebutted the presumption that damages would be an inadequate remedy (under the proviso to Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act), and if so whether that barred specific performance.
  6. Whether, given the vendor had conveyed to a subsequent purchaser who had notice, the court could direct that purchaser to execute a conveyance in favour of the original purchaser (i.e., the remedy of ordering reconveyance by the transferee).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • There was an oral agreement dated 27-11-1946 between respondent No. 2 (through her husband) and the appellant to convey the property to the appellant, and the later sale deed to the appellant was in pursuance of that oral agreement.
  • In the alternative, the appellant argued he did not know of the agreement between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 and was therefore a bona fide transferee for value without notice.
  • The appellant relied on two documentary items (Exs. 34 and 89) and oral testimony (his own and Ishwarbhai, an attesting witness to the appellant's sale deed) in support of the oral agreement claim.

Respondent No. 1 / Plaintiff and Trial Court's Position

  • The oral agreement of 27-11-1946 was not proved: the documentary evidence cited by the appellant did not specifically record the alleged agreement and the oral testimony was insufficient and inconsistent.
  • The appellant knew of the 13-12-1946 agreement (for example, evidence of a witness Bhagwanbhai, an express mention in the appellant's own sale deed, and the small-village proximity argument), so the appellant had notice and was not a bona fide purchaser without notice.
  • Even if an earnest deposit was to be returned by the vendor or the vendor would receive no net cash on completion, that did not negate consideration or bar specific performance.
  • The fact the agreement provided for damages in case of vendor's default did not, by itself, rebut the presumption that damages would be an inadequate remedy; and in any event the adequacy-of-damages point was not raised at trial and could not properly be taken for the first time on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Potter v. Sanders, (1846) 67 ER 1057 (A) The court may, in a suit for specific performance, direct a subsequent purchaser who bought with notice of an earlier agreement to execute a conveyance in favour of the party entitled under the earlier agreement; the remedy can include orders for all necessary parties to convey. The court relied on this principle to justify the trial court's decretal direction calling upon the appellant (a subsequent purchaser/transferee who had notice) to execute a sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court proceeded through a sequential analysis tied closely to the trial court's findings and the evidence adduced:

  1. Analysis of proof for the alleged oral agreement (27-11-1946):
    • The appellant relied on two letters (Exs. 34 and 89) and oral testimony (the appellant himself and Ishwarbhai). Ex. 34 (a postcard from defendant No. 1's husband) did not specifically refer to any oral agreement and at most indicated an interest in purchase; it could not be said to support the alleged oral agreement.
    • The second letter (dated 30-12-1946 from Jhaverbhai Lallubhai) was consistent with the witness's explanation that it concerned a separate approach to a third party (Soma) and, given its date, could not be taken as corroboration of the prior oral agreement (in any event the written agreement of 13-12-1946 already existed by that time).
    • The oral testimony supporting the appellant's case was limited: besides the appellant there was only Ishwarbhai (an attesting witness to the appellant's sale deed). The alleged oral agreement involved defendant No. 1's husband, yet neither defendant No. 1 nor her husband testified; they appeared unwilling to support the appellant's story despite attempts to secure their presence.
    • There were inconsistencies in dates asserted (e.g., different Margashirsha dates noted) and a claimed cash payment of Rs. 451 that lacked documentary corroboration. Given the property's indebtedness (it was barely sufficient to cover debts), it was implausible that such a payment would have been made without any written acknowledgement; no such writing was produced.
    • On this basis the court agreed with the trial judge that the oral agreement was not proved.
  2. Knowledge/notice of the 13-12-1946 agreement:
    • The trial judge relied on (i) evidence of a witness Bhagwanbhai, (ii) an express mention of the agreement in the appellant's own sale deed, and (iii) the small-village context making such transactions known locally. The agreement was dated 13-12-1946 and the appellant's sale deed was dated 3-2-1947.
    • The appellate court accepted that there was no plausible reason why the oral agreement would have been mentioned in the appellant's sale deed unless the appellant had become aware of the earlier written agreement executed in favour of respondent No. 1 on 13-12-1946. On that basis the court found the appellant had notice.
  3. Mutuality, consideration and the effect of an earnest deposit:
    • The appellant contended the written agreement lacked mutuality because it was executed only by the vendor and not by the purchaser. The court explained that mutuality is inherent in contracts of sale: both parties are entitled to insist on completion and it is not necessary for the document to recite expressly what happens if the purchaser defaults.
    • The fact the agreement spelled out consequences if the vendor failed (damages and return of earnest) did not demonstrate an intention to deny the vendor reciprocal remedies; there was nothing in the document showing the parties intended that a purchaser could not be compelled to perform.
    • Regarding the earnest deposit of Rs. 500 (Rs. 200 in cash, Rs. 300 with Jhaverbhai) and the vendor's not receiving net cash on completion (because the purchase price was to be applied to pay the vendor's creditors), the court held that these facts did not mean the agreement lacked consideration or that specific performance should be refused. The consideration was the agreed payment of Rs. 5,940 to discharge debts; that the vendor would not receive cash personally did not negate consideration.
  4. Adequacy of damages and the clause providing for damages:
    • The appellant argued that because the agreement provided for recovery of damages if the vendor defaulted, this rebutted the presumption that damages would be an inadequate remedy (relevant to Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act). The court observed that the adequacy-of-damages point had never been raised at trial, depriving the plaintiff of an opportunity to show why damages would be inadequate; accordingly it should not be raised for the first time on appeal.
    • Even if the point were permitted, the court noted that the mere provision for damages is only one consideration and does not automatically rebut the presumption that damages are inadequate for contracts concerning immovable property.
  5. Remedy against a subsequent transferee with notice:
    • The court accepted that because the vendor had conveyed to a subsequent purchaser who took with notice of the earlier agreement, equity permits the court to direct that purchaser to execute a conveyance in favour of the original purchaser. The court cited Potter v. Sanders to support the proposition that the order can be for all necessary parties to convey.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellate court upheld the trial court's conclusions that the alleged oral agreement of 27-11-1946 was not proved and that the appellant had notice of the prior written agreement dated 13-12-1946. The decretal directions upheld require the appellant to execute a sale deed in favour of respondent No. 1 upon payment of the consideration (Rs. 5,940) and ordered both respondent No. 2 and the appellant to hand over possession of the properties agreed to be conveyed to respondent No. 1.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the appellant (a subsequent transferee who had notice) must convey the property to respondent No. 1 on payment of the agreed consideration, and possession must be delivered as directed by the trial court. The appeal against that relief was dismissed.
  • The opinion does not discuss broader legal policy or announce a new principle of law beyond applying established equitable remedies (including ordering a purchaser who bought with notice to reconvey), and relied on prior authority (Potter v. Sanders) for the remedial power to require conveyance by a subsequent purchaser with notice.

    Ambalal Kesherbhai v. Ranchhodbhai Jerbhai And Another,

    Respondent No. 1 had filed suit from which the present appeal arises for specific performance of an agreement for sale of property entered into between him and the owner of the property, respondent No. 2 who was defendant No. 1 in the trial Court. The agreement is dated 13-12-1946.

    2. The appellant is the subsequent transferee of the property from respondent No. 1, and it was his case that prior to the agreement between respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2, respondent No. 2 had entered into an agreement with him orally on 27-11-1946 to convey the same property to him and that the subsequent sale deed executed by respondent No. 2 was in pursuance of the prior oral agreement. He also claimed in the alternative that he did not know of oral agreement. He also claimed in the alternative that he did not know of the agreement between the respondents and was a bona fide transferee for value without notice of the agreement in favour of respondent No. 1.

    3. The learned trial Judge has held that there was no oral agreement between respondent No. 2 and the appellant, and in the second instance that the appellant knew full well of the agreement between the respondents when he took a sale deed of the properties conveyed to him.

    4. He has consequently called upon the appellant to execute a sale deed of the property covered by the agreement of 13-12-1946 in favour of respondent No. 1 on payment to the appellant of the consideration of the agreement, namely, Rs. 5940. He has also ordered both respondent No. 2 and the appellant to hand over possession of the properties agreed to be conveyed to respondent No. 1.

    5. Defendant No. 2 has come in appeal and the first point which falls for determination is as to whether the appellant has proved the oral agreement of 27-11-1946. Now, the agreement being oral, there could be of course no document in regard to it. But the appellant relied upon two letters, Exs. 34 and 89, in support of his case that there was such an oral agreement, and the oral evidence of himself and one Ishwarbhai, who was the attesting witness to the sale deed.

    6. Now, Ex. 34 is a postcard written by defendant No. 1's husband to the appellant. It does not specifically mention anything about any oral agreement to convey the property later on agreed to be conveyed to respondent No. 1 on 13-12-1946; but defendant No. 1's husband says that he would write to the appellant and then he should be present. He said that he could not come (apparently at some earlier time) because of some Government work, but immediately he finds that he could come, he would intimate the appellant and come.

    7. It may at the most show that the appellant was anxious to purchase the property from defendant 1 as respondent No. 1 was. If an oral agreement had as a matter of fact been entered into, there was no particular reason for defendant No. 1's husband not to say that he would come for the purpose of executing the document together with his wife defendant No. 1. In any case, it is obvious that in the absence of any specific reference in the letter to the agreement, which was supposed to have taken place before, it is not possible to say that Ex. 34 supports the case of an oral agreement on 27-11-1346.

    8. The second letter is a letter dated 30-12-1946 written by the plaintiff's witness Jhaverbhai Lallubhai to the appellant. When the witness was asked about this letter, he said that he had written the letter to the appellant because the appellant had told him that he was willing to purchase part of a house belonging to one Soma and had asked him to approach Soma in the matter. There is nothing in the letter of 30-12-1946 written by the witness which is against this reply given by him.

    9. All that the letter says is that the man was about to accomplish or bring about something. It could hardly be the sale in furtherance of the oral agreement upon which the defendant relied, because prior to this date the witness had already written the agreement between the two respondents by which respondent No. 2 had agreed to convey the property to respondent No. 1. Mr. Pradhan contends that it may be that Jhaverbhai was running with both the purchasers; but there is nothing to show that was so.

    10. The oral evidence apart from defendant No. 2's is the evidence of only one Ishwarbhai, who is also an attesting witness to the sale deed taken by the appellant. The oral agreement is supposed to have been entered into not between defendant No. 1 herself and the appellant but between her husband and the appellant, his case being that it was agreed between the parties, namely, defendant No. 1 herself and the appellant before 27-11-1946, that she was to sell the property to the latter.

    11. The oral agreement between defendant 1's husband and the appellant is supposed to have been made on Margashirsh Sud, 2nd in accordance with the sale deed, but when the appellant gave a public notice on 9-1-1947 the date of the oral agreement was mentioned as Margashirsha Sud 4th. In the second instance, at the time when the oral agreement was alleged to have taken place Rs. 451 are alleged to have been, given in cash to defendant No. 1.

    12. Neither defendant No. 1 nor her husbands were examined in support of the story of the appellant. It is true that the appellant appears to have made a number of attempts to secure the presence of defendant No. 1 before the Court; but that does not alter the fact that defendant No. 1 seems to have been unwilling to come forward to support the story of the appellant. The property was admittedly burdened with debts before 27-11-1946.

    13. Whether we take into consideration the agreement for sale executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff or the sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the appellant, there can be little doubt that the property was just sufficient to pay off defendant No. 1's debts. In these circumstances it is not at all likely that defendant No. 2 would hand over a sum of Rs. 451 to defendant No. 1 without taking any writing from her. No such writing was taken, in any case none has been produced.

    14. The oral evidence adduced on behalf of defendant No. 2 was not sufficient to counteract these defects in the story of defendant No. 2 with regard to the oral agreement for purchase of 27-11-1946. The learned trial Judge was obviously right therefore in holding that this agreement was not proved.

    15. It was contended next that assuming that the oral agreement was not proved, there was nothing to show that the appellant knew about the agreement for sale. The learned trial Judge relied in support of his view that the appellant knew of it first upon the evidence of one Bhagwanbhai; secondly, upon the mention in the appellant's own sale deed of the oral agreement, and thirdly upon the fact that the village was a small village and ordinarily people would know about such an agreement at any rate after some time had elapsed.

    16. The agreement is dated 13-12-1946, and the sale deed which has been taken by the appellant is dated 3-2-1947. Here again I think that the learned trial Judge is right for the reason that there was no reason for the appellant to have the oral agreement mentioned in the sale deed, unless he had come to know of the agreement executed by defendant 1 in favour of plaintiff on 13-12-1946.

    17. It is contended, however, that even so there was no mutuality about the agreement between defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff for the reason that the agreement is executed by defendant No. 1 alone. It is not executed by the purchaser. In the second instance, the agreement provides that if defendant 1 did not execute the sale deed as she had promised to do, she would pay damages and the moneys which had been deposited as earnest would have to be returned by her.

    18. Mr. Pradhan contends that the document does not provide what was to happen in case in stead of defendant No. 1 refusing to complete the plaintiff refused to do so. Now, it is inherent in every contract of purchase and sale that both the parties are entitled to insist upon the completion of the contract. It is not necessary that the document should mention what the effect would be in case either party refused to complete.

    19. Parties sometime do mention what is to happen, and in any particular instance one may draw an inference that there was no mutuality of the contract from the failure of the parties to provide what was to happen in one case that is, when one party refuses to perform that contract and for not providing what was to happen if the other side failed to do so when taken in conjunction with other circumstances.

    20. But here the document purports to have been executed by defendant 1 in favour of plaintiff. Consequently plaintiff took down in writing what was to happen in case defendant 1 failed to perform her part of the contract. That does not mean that the parties intended that defendant 1 was not entitled to insist upon the completion of the contract of purchase. There is nothing in the document which would show that parties did not intend, as they would intend in every contract of purchase and sale, that if the purchaser refused to complete the contract the defendant could sue him for specific performance as well as for damages.

    21. The next point which is made is that it appears that in this case a sum of Rs. 500/- was given to defendant 1 at the time she entered into the agreement of 13-12-1946. The agreement provided that she would have to return the amount because apparently the debts of defendant 1 amounted to Rs. 5940 and that was the only price which was agreed to between the parties. Rs. 500/- were to be given to defendant 1 out of which Rs. 200/- were paid to her in cash, and Rs. 300/- were kept with one Jhaverbhai.

    22. So this amount was an earnest money or deposit made for securing the performance by the purchaser of his part of the contract. But I fail to understand why merely because this deposit was to be returned by the vendor at the time of the completion of the sale transaction the Court should say that it would not decree specific performance of the contract.

    23. It cannot be said that the agreement was without consideration, because the consideration for the agreement for sale was the payment of a sum of Rs. 5940 by the plaintiff to defendant No. 1. It was not to be paid directly to her. It was to be paid actually as a matter of fact to her creditors. Nothing was to go to her, for the reason that parties agreed that the property was just sufficient for paying off all the debts due from defendant No. 1; but one could not say that the transaction was a transaction without consideration merely because defendant No. 1 was not to get any money in that transaction; nor is it a case in which, for example, the mortgagee takes a document for sale from the mortgagor without payment of any fresh consideration.

    24. Defendant No. 1 had not only to pay the debts secured upon the property agreed to be conveyed but also there were debts due from her personally. The plaintiff had undertaken to pay out of the purchase money the debts due to the mortgagee as well as the debts due to the persons to whom defendant No. 1 owed only unsecured debts. I fail to understand that in such a case that defendant No. 1 was not to get any cash at the time of the sale is a consideration which would induce the Court to refuse to direct specific performance of the contract.

    25. Finally it said that in this case the parties appear to have provided that in case defendant 1 failed to perform her part of the contract then she would be liable in damages. It is conceded that this alone would not entitle defendant 1 or any successor of hers to say that they would not perform the contract. It is urged however that if parties provided that the plaintiff would be entitled to damages it would be quite sufficient to rebut the presumption that damages were an inadequate remedy in cases of contracts for sale of immovable property arising under the proviso to S. 12 of the Specific Relief Act.

    26. I find however that this question as to whether damages were an inadequate remedy was never raised at any time in the trial Court, with the result that the plaintiff had never had an opportunity to show why the damages would not be an adequate remedy, and the question ought not to be allowed to be taken up for the first time in appeal. But it is obvious that even if this question is allowed to be raised, the fact that the parties contemplated that the plaintiff would be entitled to damages is one of the considerations in deciding whether the damages are an adequate remedy.

    27. The presumption in the case of contracts for immovable property always is that damages are not an adequate remedy, and that presumption is not rebutted merely by the fact that the parties had provided for recovery of damages by the plaintiff. It has got to be remembered that a party to the contract may sometimes be entitled to damages is one of the considerations in addition to the remedy of specific performance.

    28. The decretal order does undoubtedly direct defendant No. 2 to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. But that is as it should be because owing to the conveyance executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 the title is now in defendant No. 2, and in a suit for specific performance where the vendor has conveyed the property to another who has purchased the property with notice of the earlier agreement for sale, it is open to the Court to direct the purchaser to execute a conveyance in favour of the purchaser; see — ‘Potter v. Sanders’, (1846) 67 ER 1057 (A). The order in that case was for all necessary parties to convey.

    29. The appeal will therefore be dismissed with costs.

    V.S.B
    Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    Ambalal Kesherbhai v. Ranchhodbhai Jerbhai And Another,
    (Sep 26, 1955)