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Case Number

WP No. 5354 of 2001

Attorney(S)

For the Appellant: P. Navin Rao, Advocate.

Judges

S.B Sinha, C.J
V.V.S Rao, J.

Acts

ARTICLE 14 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition challenges a transfer order dated 12-2-2001 by which the petitioner, P. Anjaneyulu (a Telecom Office Assistant, Grade I, posted at Karimnagar), was transferred to the Office of GMTD, Cuddapah. The impugned transfer was issued under Rule 37 of the P & T Manual, Volume IV. The petitioner contended that promotions and postings up to Grade-III were organized at the Secondary Switching Area (SSA) or district level and that the transfer moved him outside his unit of appointment.

Procedurally, the petitioner had earlier faced departmental proceedings for alleged embezzlement of Rs. 1,47,000/-. Those proceedings were the subject of OA No. 701 of 1997 before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which by order dated 9-6-1997 directed the disciplinary authority to conclude proceedings within a specified period, failing which they would abate. The disciplinary authority later dropped the charge-sheet by order dated 20-1-1998. Despite that, the transfer order impugned in this writ petition was passed on 12-2-2001. The petitioner filed an Original Application (OA No. 284 of 2001) before the CAT challenging the transfer; the CAT dismissed the OA by a common order dated 1-3-2001. The petitioner challenged the CAT's dismissal by filing the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the transfer order dated 12-2-2001 was lawfully made as an administrative transfer under Rule 37 of P & T Manual, Volume IV, or whether it was passed for an unauthorised purpose (i.e., effectively in lieu of punishment) given earlier departmental proceedings that were dropped.
Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal erred in dismissing the Original Application challenging the transfer.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner was serving as Telecom Office Assistant, Grade I, in Karimnagar and was eligible for promotion to Grade II; postings and promotions up to Grade III are SSA/district-based and the transfer removed him from his cadre/unit.
The transfer was wrongful because it took him outside his unit of appointment and was without jurisdiction or justification.

Respondents' Arguments

The respondents relied on administrative exigency and invoked Rule 37 of the P & T Manual to justify the transfer.
They stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner (along with another official) had been involved in financial embezzlement of Rs. 1,47,000/- in Karimnagar SSA; disciplinary action had been initiated but not concluded due to administrative reasons and delay, and ultimately the proceedings were not concluded.
The respondents contended that, on review, the administration concluded that officials involved in financial frauds should not be continued at the same place, and the transfer was intended to prevent repetition of frauds and to avoid demoralising honest officials.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Secretary of State v. Tameside, 1976 (3) All. ER 665	Guidance on judicial review: determine and follow the correct judicial approach; read administrative communications fairly and in context; consider whether extraneous matters were relied on, whether relevant matters were omitted, and whether there was bad faith.	The Court used this authority to frame the approach to reviewing the transfer decision and to emphasize that the reasons for administrative acts must be examined in context to determine propriety.
S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 491; AIR 1979 SC 49	If discretionary power is exercised for an unauthorised purpose, it is generally immaterial whether the decision-maker acted in good or bad faith; courts can adjudicate where reasons show improper matters were considered or proper matters omitted (citing Pilling v. Abergele).	The Court relied on this principle to hold that a transfer motivated by an unauthorised purpose (i.e., effectively punitive) is invalid even if the authority acted in good faith.
Pilling v. Abergele Urban District Council, (1950) 1 KB 636	When an authority states reasons that show they took into account matters they ought not to have, or omitted matters they ought to have considered, the court can and ought to adjudicate.	Cited (via S.R. Venkataraman) to support the proposition that improper considerations vitiate the exercise of discretion; applied to assess the transfer decision's stated reasons.
The Queen on the Prosecution of Richard Westbrook v. The Vestry of St. Pancras, (1890) 24 QBD 371	If a public authority exercising discretion takes into account matters which courts consider improper, then in law the authority has not truly exercised its discretion.	Adopted to reinforce that considering improper factors (e.g., punitive intent) renders the discretionary act invalid.
Sedler v. Sheffield Corporation, (1924) 1 Ch 483	Followed the principle that improper considerations invalidate the exercise of discretion.	Referenced as an example of the enduring application of the principle that improper motives or considerations vitiate discretionary acts.
Shamrao Chandrappa Kamble v. Deputy Engineer, 1998 (2) SLR 418	Held that transfers issued merely to avoid taking disciplinary action (i.e., to circumvent departmental enquiry requirements) are vindictive and malicious; affected officials should be given opportunity to explain and be heard.	Used to support the view that transfer cannot be a substitute for departmental proceedings and that transfers issued to avoid enquiries are unlawful; court relied on this to characterise the impugned transfer as improper.
S.V. Singh v. Union of India, 1988 (2) SLR 545	Authority relied upon in Shamrao (Calcutta High Court decision referenced in the Bombay High Court judgment cited above).	Referenced (through Shamrao) as supporting precedent that transfers to avoid disciplinary action are improper.
R. Sudhakar v. M/S Indian Immunologicals, Hyderabad, 1997 (5) ALD 175	When an order of transfer is arbitrary, it can violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.	Cited to show that arbitrary transfers may offend equality principles under Article 14; the Court invoked this to underline the constitutional dimension of arbitrary/punitive transfers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded with a focused analysis based on the facts as established in the record and the respondents' own counter-affidavit. It first observed that it was unnecessary to decide whether Rule 37 itself permitted the transfer in the abstract; rather, the decisive issue was the purpose and context of the transfer.

Key factual points the Court relied upon:

Disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner for alleged embezzlement of Rs. 1,47,000/-, and the petitioner had challenged the delay in CAT OA No. 701 of 1997.
The CAT directed the disciplinary authority to conclude proceedings within a specified period (order dated 9-6-1997); the disciplinary authority ultimately dropped the charge-sheet by order dated 20-1-1998.
Despite the closure of departmental proceedings, the transfer order was passed on 12-2-2001—about three years after the charge-sheet was dropped.
The respondents' counter-affidavit explicitly stated that the transfer was ordered because the petitioner was involved in financial embezzlement and that officials involved in fraud should not be continued at the same place to avoid repetition of frauds and demoralisation of honest officials.

Legal analysis:

The Court treated the respondents' stated reasons as demonstrating that the transfer was not a routine administrative measure but an act taken for an unauthorised punitive purpose — effectively in lieu of punishment, despite the disciplinary proceedings having been closed. The Court stressed that an order of transfer cannot lawfully be used as a substitute for disciplinary proceedings or punishment where the person has not been afforded an opportunity of being heard and where no departmental decision to punish has been validly taken.
The Court applied established administrative-law principles (as reflected in the cited precedents) that where discretionary powers are exercised for an unauthorised purpose or where improper considerations are taken into account, the exercise of discretion is vitiated and the act is subject to judicial review regardless of the decision-maker's good faith.
Relying on prior authorities, the Court emphasised that a transfer which is effectively punitive and issued without following disciplinary procedure or providing an opportunity to be heard is unlawful. The respondents' own averments that the transfer sought to prevent repetition of fraud and to avoid demoralisation were treated as evidence that the transfer was motivated by impermissible considerations.
The Court concluded that the learned Tribunal (CAT) erred in dismissing the Original Application because it failed to set aside a transfer that was shown by the respondents' own statements to be actuated by an unauthorised purpose.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed; the impugned transfer order dated 12-2-2001 is set aside and a writ of mandamus issues directing the respondents to forbear from acting pursuant to or in furtherance of that transfer order.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The respondents are prohibited from acting on the transfer order dated 12-2-2001; the petitioner's challenge succeeds. The Court made no order as to costs.
Broader precedent: The opinion applies established administrative-law principles concerning the misuse of transfer powers as a substitute for disciplinary action and reiterates that discretionary transfers motivated by impermissible purposes are vitiated. The Court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond these established authorities.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to facts, arguments, authorities, reasoning, and relief as set out in the provided opinion; no information beyond the text of that opinion has been added.

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P. Anjaneyulu v. Chief Manager, A.P Circle, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., Govt. Of India, Hyd. And Another

S.B Sinha, C.J:— This writ petition arises out of a common order dated 1-3-2001 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in OA Nos. 283 and 284 of 2001 whereby and whereunder the learned Tribunal has dismissed the Original Applications filed by the petitioner herein and one V.V Ramana Reddy. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Tribunal the applicant in OA No. 284 of 2001 has preferred this writ petition.

2. The petitioner herein, in the said original application, inter alia questioned an order dated 12-2-2001 passed by the respondents transferring him from Karimnagar to Cuddapah. The said order of transfer reads thus:

“No. TA/STB/1-5/93.KAA/IV dated 12-2-2001

Sub:—Transfers and postings in the cadre of TOA (a)/SS(0) under Rule 37 of P&T Manual Volume IV-Reg.

The Chief General Manager, BSNL, A.P Telecom Circle Hyderabad has ordered the following transfers and postings under Rule 37 of P & T Manual Volume IV with immediate effect:

1. Sri V.V Ramana Reddy, SS (O), Karimnagar is hereby transferred and posted to O/o. TDM, BSNL, Srikakulam.

2. Sri P. Anjaneyulu, TOA (G) Karimnagar is hereby transferred and posted to O/o. GMTD, Cuddapah.

The officials are entitled for TA/DA. They may be relieved immediately in the instructions to report to the concerned SSA Heads.

Sd/- (Ch. V.S Jaganadha Rao)

Asst. Director Staff,

For CGM, BSNL, AP Circle, Hyd.”.

3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner at all material times is working as Telecom Office Assistant, Grade I, in the district of Karimnagar and he was eligible for promotion to Grade-II and was expecting his promotion shortly. The learned Counsel further submits that the posts in relation to the said cadre upto Grade-Ill are organised at the District level i.e, Secondary Switching Area (hereinafter referred to as ‘SSA’ for the sake of brevity), which was earlier called as Telecom District and for the purpose of recruitment and promotions upto Grade-Ill, SSA is the unit.

4. The grievance of the petitioner is that by reason of the impugned order he had unjustly been transferred from Karimnagar to Cuddapah. The petitioner contends that each Revenue District is organised as SSA and the Revenue District is headed by a General Manager and he was transferred outside the unit of appointment/cadre, which is without jurisdiction.

5. The respondents have filed a counter-affidavit before the learned Tribunal supporting the order of transfer. The relevant portion of the statement made by the respondents in support of the order of transfer at paragraph 2(A) and (B) of the counter-affidavit reads thus:

“2……….

(A) The applicant along with another Shri P.V Rama Reddy were involved in a case of financial embezzlement to the extent of Rs. 1,47,000/- in Karimnagar, SSA. Though disciplinary action was taken up against the applicant along with another official, the same could not be concluded due to the transfer of enquiry officer/presenting officer and other administrative reasons. Ultimately, the administration could not finalise disciplinary proceedings and they were terminated due to the delay.

(B) The authorities reviewed the conduct of the applicant and came to the conclusion that the official who involved in financial frauds should not be continued at the same place and to avoid repetition of such frauds and to avoid demoralising effect on other honest officials, invoked Rule 37 of P & T Manual, Vol. IV and issued the impugned transfer order”.

6. The learned Counsel for the respondents has reiterated before us the same contentions, which were raised before the learned Tribunal.

7. Having regard to the order proposed to be passed by us, we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether in terms of Rule 37 of the P & T Manual, Volume IV, the petitioner can be transferred or not.

8. In the instant case, admittedly the departmental proceedings were initiated against the’ petitioner. The petitioner questioned the said proceedings before the learned Tribunal, which was numbered as OA No. 701 of 1997, on the ground of delay. The learned Tribunal, by an order dated 9-6-1997, directed the disciplinary authority to conclude the proceedings within a certain period, failing which the same shall abate. As admittedly the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded within the period specified by the learned Tribunal, the Telecom District Manager, Karimnagar, who was the disciplinary authority, in his letter bearing No. X/DE(A)/R-14.Disc/1997-98/17 dated 20-1-1998, passed the following order:

“Sub:—Rule 14 Inquiry against Sri P. Anjaneyulu, TOA (G), O/o SDOP, Karimnagar - Reg.

Ref:—1. This office letter dated 22-8-1992.

2. CAT-HD verdict vide OA No. 701 of 1997 dated 9-6-1997.

3. GMT/WL Lr. No. TAW/ST/6-7/94-95/159, dated 16-6-1997.

The undersigned acting as disciplinary authority in the above case, in pursuance of the CAT-HD judgment and in accordance with GMT/WL letter cited under reference 3, do hereby drop the charge-sheet issued under Rule 4.

Sd/- (N. Janardhana Rao)

Telecom District Manager, Karimnagar-505001.”

9. Despite the said order of dropping the charge-sheet against the petitioner herein, the impugned order has been passed after a period of three (3) years.

10. As indicated hereinbefore, the respondents support the impugned order of transfer on the ground that it was passed on administrative exigencies.

11. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of transfer cannot be said to have been passed either as a routine affair or on administrative exigencies or in a routine manner.

12. The petitioner was said to have embezzled a sum of Rs. 1,47,000/- and a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against him. As indicated hereinbefore, for one reason or the other, the said disciplinary proceeding was dropped. In that situation, it was impermissible for the respondents herein to transfer the petitioner so as to avoid purported repetition of such frauds, as also demoralising effect on the other officials. The statements made in the counter-affidavit clearly show that the impugned order has been passed for unauthorised purpose. The appropriate authority with a pre-determined view that the petitioner herein is guilty of commission of the said misconduct, although, as noticed hereinbefore, the departmental proceedings against the petitioner had been closed as far back as on 20-1-1998, has passed the said order. Although a Court or a Tribunal does not normally interfere with an order of transfer, it is also well settled that no order of transfer can be passed by way of or in lieu of punishment. Such an order of transfer would be vitiated in law, inasmuch as prior thereto, neither any departmental proceeding has been initiated nor the petitioner had been granted an opportunity of being heard.

13. In Secretary of State v. Tameside, 1976 (3) All. ER 665, Lord Scarman, L.J, observed:

“As always with judicial review, it is vital to determine, and then strictly to follow, the correct judicial approach to the problem placed before the Court. Counsel for the Secretary of State put it correctly when he submitted that the letter of 11th June was crucial to the Secretary of State's case, and that it must be read fairly, not legalistically, and must be studied in contemporary context, that is to say, as things were on 11th June. Counsel was also right to remind the Court that it is not suggested (a) that in the letter any reliance was placed on extraneous or irrelevant matters; (b) that the Secretary of State had omitted or failed to take into consideration any relevant matters (unless being misinformed is such a failure); (c) that the Secretary of State in using his power of direction under Section 68 had any intention other than to secure compliance with the policy and intendment of the statute; and (d) that there was bad faith on his part”.

14. In S.R Venkataraman v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 491 : AIR 1979 SC 49, at paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment, the Apex Court has clearly held:

“6. It is however not necessary to examine the question of malice in law in this case, for it is trite law that if a discretionary power has been exercised for an unauthorised purpose, it is generally immaterial whether its repository was acting in good faith or in bad faith. As was stated by Lord Goddard, C.J, in Pilling v. Abergele Urban District Council, (1950) 1 KB 636, where a duty to determine a question is conferred on an authority which state their reasons for the decision, “and the reasons which they state show that they have taken into account matters which they ought not to have taken into account, or that they have failed to take matters into account which they ought to have taken into account, the Court to which an appeal lies can and ought to adjudicate on the matter.’”

15. The principle which is applicable in such cases has thus been stated by Lord Esher M.R in The Queen on the Prosecution of Richard Westbrook v. The Vestry of St. Pancras, (1890) 24 QBD 371, at p. 375:

“If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take into account matters which the Courts consider not to be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in the eye of the law they have not exercised their discretion.”

This view has been followed in Sedler v. Sheffield Corporation, (1924) 1 Ch 483.”

16. Yet again, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Shamrao Chandrappa Kamble v. Deputy Engineer, 1998 (2) SLR 418, relying on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in S.V Singh…/ v. Union Of India…/Opposite Party., 1988 (2) SLR 545, held that an order of transfer has been issued merely to avoid taking disciplinary action against the petitioner which would have entailed holding a departmental enquiry in accordance with the departmental rules and regulations. This powerful weapon of transfer has been used vindictively and maliciously. The least that the authorities could have done was to consider the explanation of the petitioner and to give him an opportunity of hearing.

17. The case at hand is worse, inasmuch as herein the petitioner was transferred on the same allegations despite the fact that the disciplinary proceedings against him were closed.

18. A learned Judge of this Court in R. Sudhakar v. M/S. Indian Immunologicals, Hyd., Hyderabad, 1997 (5) ALD 175, held that when an order of transfer is arbitrary, the same would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

19. For the reasons aforementioned, in our opinion, the learned Tribunal has committed a grave error in dismissing the Original Application filed by the petitioner herein. The writ petition is therefore allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Let a writ of mandamus issue directing the respondents to forbear from acting pursuant to or in furtherance of the order of transfer dated 12-2-2001. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.

P. Anjaneyulu v. Chief Manager, A.P C...