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Case Number

Special Appeal No. 7 of 1958, against judgment and order of Election Tribunal, Secunderabad, in El. Petn. No. 226 of 1957

Attorney(S)

For the Appellant: B.C.Jain, C.P.Sarathy, Gapal Rao Ekbote, Advocates.

Judges

P. Chandra Reddy, C.J
Jaganmohan Reddi, J.

Acts

Section 2(5)(a) and Section 32(c) and Rule 24(1) of the Hyderabad Forest Act.15. Section 2(5)(a) of the Hyderabad Forest Act (II of 1355F, as amended by Act XXIX of 1956),
Ss. 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended by Act XXVII of 1956 (hereinafter called the Act).
Section 32(c)

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Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Jaganmohan Reddi, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order of the Election Tribunal, Secunderabad, which dismissed a petition under Sections 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (as amended). The petitioner (appellant) was the defeated Congress candidate at the Legislative Assembly election for the Adilabad Constituency (polling on 4 March 1957), who polled 8,700 votes. The successful candidate (1st respondent, Socialist) polled 9,423 votes. The second respondent polled 4,897 votes; three other candidates had withdrawn and remained ex parte before the Tribunal.

The appellant alleged five grounds to set aside the election of the 1st respondent:

That the 1st respondent, through agents, induced certain village groups to vote for him by providing free liquor (allegation concerning village Soan).
That the 1st respondent bribed women voters in that village with sums of Rs. 0-4-0 to Rs. 0-6-0 each.
That an agent (Krishna Rao) induced voters in Gulamadugu to vote for the 1st respondent by providing free liquor.
That the 1st respondent, through his brother Chenna Reddy (alleged to be the Patwari), threatened voters (that Government revenues would be doubled) and distributed polling chits in his own handwriting (a complaint about this was lodged with the Returning Officer on 3-3-1957).
That the 1st respondent held a beedi-leaf contract with the Government in 1956 for certain villages which was subsisting at the time nomination papers were filed (impugned as a disqualifying interest under S. 7(d)).

The Election Tribunal framed four issues (the first covering the first two allegations; the remaining three covering the rest). The Tribunal decided all issues against the appellant on facts and law and dismissed the election petition. This appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the allegations that the 1st respondent (or his agents) induced voters by providing free liquor and by bribing women voters were proved and constituted corrupt practices sufficient to set aside the election.
Whether Chenna Reddy (the 1st respondent's brother) — allegedly a Patwari — issued polling chits in his own handwriting and threatened voters (that Government revenues would be doubled) and whether those acts were proved.
Whether, if the acts in (2) were proved, they fell within the mischief of Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (i.e., procuring assistance from persons in the service of the Government, such as revenue officers/village accountants).
Whether the beedi-leaf contract executed between the 1st respondent and the Government (entered 9 February 1956, operative till 30 September 1956) rendered the 1st respondent disqualified under Section 7(d) of the Act — in particular, whether that contract was a contract "for the supply of goods or the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by the appropriate Government."

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The appellant alleged multiple corrupt practices: inducement by free liquor; bribery of women voters; improper actions by an agent; and corrupt influence and distribution of polling chits and threats by Chenna Reddy (alleged Patwari), which were said to influence votes for the 1st respondent.
Regarding the beedi-leaf contract, the appellant (through his counsel) argued that the contract's terms together with the Forest Act and rules (Section 2(5)(a), Section 32(c), and Rule 24(1) of the Hyderabad Forest Act) made the contractor perform duties that were effectively services for the Government — and therefore the 1st respondent had an interest in a Government contract within the meaning of Section 7(d). It was further argued that obligations subsisted after the contract's nominal expiry (and non-payment/no certificate under the rules indicated the contract remained subsisting).

1st Respondent's Arguments

The 1st respondent accepted that Chenna Reddy was his brother but denied that Chenna Reddy was the Patwari of the village in question, denied distributing chits in his hand, and denied threatening the villagers.
Regarding the beedi contract, the 1st respondent did not deny execution of the contract (Ex. B-1) but relied on the terms (showing the contract period to 30 September 1956) and the nature of the agreement to show it was a sale of forest produce rather than a contract for the performance of services for the Government.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

(The following summarizes the court's step-by-step analysis as it appears in the opinion.)

On the allegations relating to free liquor and small cash payments (the matters comprising issues 1 and 2), the appellant chose not to press those charges on appeal, acknowledging that the evidence did not justify contesting the Tribunal's findings on those points.
With respect to the allegation that Chenna Reddy (the 1st respondent's brother) distributed polling chits in his handwriting and threatened villagers, the Tribunal had found (and this court accepted) that the appellant failed to prove two essential elements:
- That the chits were in Chenna Reddy's handwriting; and
- That Chenna Reddy threatened the villagers that Government revenues would be doubled if they did not vote as suggested.
Because these factual elements were not established, the Tribunal did not proceed to decide whether, if proved, such acts would fall within Section 123(7) of the Act; and this Court held the Tribunal was justified in its factual findings after reviewing the evidence.
The Court reviewed the procedural material relating to the complaint: a petition (Ex. 12) dated 3-3-1957 to the Returning Officer; the Tahsildar's report (Ex. P-13) dated 17-4-1957 describing an oral representation by the appellant that evening and the Tahsildar's visit to Koratkal. The report led to the temporary suspension of Narayana Reddy (the actual Patwari of Koratkal) for absence from duty, and a statement by R.V. Ramarao that the patwari had issued party poll chits. The court also accepted that Chenna Reddy was Patwari of a different village (Tandra) and not of Koratkal, where Narayana Reddy was the patwari.
Turning to the disqualification argument under Section 7(d), the Court examined the beedi-leaves contract (Ex. B-1, dated 9 February 1956, operative until 30 September 1956). The Court recognized that although the contract had expired before the election, the appellant argued that obligations might still subsist and that the contractor could still be deemed a Government contractor for the purposes of disqualification.
The Court then engaged in statutory and contractual construction:
- It identified Section 7(d)'s disqualification as applying to a person having "any share, or interest in a contract for the supply of goods to or for the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by, the appropriate Government."
- The Court examined the terms of the beedi-leaves contract and the Hyderabad Forest Act provisions relied on by the appellant (Section 2(5)(a) — defining forest produce to include beedi-leaves; Section 32(c) — rule-making power; and Rule 24(1) — restrictions on collecting leaves).
The Court analyzed the nature of the beedi-leaves arrangement and concluded:
- The contract is structured as a sale of forest produce by the Government to the contractor (the Mustazar), who is permitted to pick and remove beedi-leaves from the specified forest area during the contract period.
- The contractual clauses (preamble, Clause 1 on sale of forest produce, Clause 2 on the produce to be removed during the specified period, Clause 3 on commencement and mode of working, Clause 4 on consideration, Clause 5 on removal routes and deposits, Clause 6 deeming forest rules part of the agreement, Clause 7 on penalties, Clause 8 on dispute settlement, Clause 9 on statements of produce removed, Clause 10 obliging the forest officer) and Sch. I (specifying beedi-leaves) all indicate a contract of sale and purchase of forest produce rather than a contract for services.
- Although the contract prescribes certain conditions of collection (e.g., not breaking branches, requiring permission for coppicing under Rule 24), those conditions do not transform the agreement into a contract for the performance of services by the contractor for the Government. The Court found no evidence that the contractual terms required the contractor to perform services designed for forest preservation such that the contract would fall within Section 7(d).
- The Court rejected the appellant's contention that, in a welfare state, the sale arrangement must be treated as discharging state functions (and hence as service) in order to preserve forests. The Court held that the object and terms of the contract indicate purchase and sale of produce, not a service contract.
Given that the contract did not fall within the mischief of Section 7(d), the Court held that issues such as non-payment of amounts due or the absence of statutory certificates were immaterial to disqualification under Section 7(d).
Because the appellant failed to establish the alleged corrupt practices (a burden the Court described as resting heavily on the appellant), and because the beedi contract did not create disqualification, the Court affirmed the Tribunal's dismissal of the petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Consequences and immediate effects:

The Tribunal's finding that the appellant failed to prove the alleged corrupt practices is affirmed.
The Court held that the beedi-leaves contract was a sale/purchase of forest produce (not a contract for services) and therefore did not disqualify the 1st respondent under Section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The opinion records an advocate's fee of Rs. 250/- awarded.

Implications for wider law: The opinion contains a conclusion on the legal character of the beedi-leaves contract (sale of forest produce rather than a service contract for Government) as applied to Section 7(d). The opinion does not state that it establishes a binding new precedent beyond the resolution of this appeal; accordingly, the direct effect is the dismissal of the appellant's election petition and the imposition of costs as recorded above.

Source: Opinion of Jaganmohan Reddi, J., as supplied. No additional material or external authorities have been added beyond what appears in that opinion.

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R. Deshpande v. Muttam Reddy And Others

Jaganmohan Reddi, J.:— This appeal is directed against the order of the Election Tribunal, Secunderabad, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Ss. 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended by Act XXVII of 1956 (hereinafter called the Act). The appellant is the defeated Congress candidate who obtained 8,700 votes in the elections for the Legislative Assembly from the Adilabad Constituency, the polling for which took place on the 4th of March 1957.

2. The 1st respondent is the successful Socialist candidate who polled 9,423 votes. The 2nd respondent was an independent candidate who obtained 4,897 votes, while respondents 3, 4 and 5, though candidates at the election had withdrawn from the contest and so remained ex parte before the Election Tribunal. The appellant alleged five grounds for setting aside the election of the 1st respondent, namely: (1) On the morning of the polling day at the village Soan, the 1st respondent through Gajapathi Rao and Saya Gowd of the same village, induced the Bhois, Washermen and the Harijan voters of the village to cast their votes for him by providing them with free liquor. (2) He bribed the women voters of the said village to secure votes for him by the payment of Rs. 0-4-0 to Rs. 0-6-0 each. (3) On the same day his agent, one Krishna Rao, induced the voters of the village of Gulamadugu to vote for him by providing them free liquor. (4) He, through his brother Chenna Reddy, the Patwari of that village, induced the voters to vote for him on pain that if they did not vote in the manner suggested by him, the Government revenues will be doubled. It is further alleged that the said Chenna Reddy distributed polling chits filled in his own hand and secured votes for the 1st respondent about which a complaint was lodged by the appellant with the Returning Officer on 3-3-1957. (5) The 1st respondent was a beedi-leaf contractor of the Government for the villages of Kamalkot and Berelli in 1956 which contract was subsisting at the time the nomination papers were filed.

3. The Election Tribunal framed four issues with respect to these allegations, the first issue comprising the first two allegations and the other three covering the rest of the allegations. The Tribunal held all the issues against the appellants both on facts and on the question of law and dismissed the petition.

4. In this appeal the learned advocate for the appellant submitted that he does not wish to press allegations 1 to 3, the subject-matter of issues 1 and 2, as he would not be justified on the evidence to contest the findings of the Tribunal. With respect to the allegation covered by issue 3, the 1st respondent's case was that though Chenna Reddy is his brother, he is not the Patwari of village, nor did he distribute the chits written to his hand, nor did he threaten the villagers.

5. The Tribunal held, firstly, that the appellate did not prove that the chits alleged to have been distributed by Chenna Reddy were in his hand-writing, and secondly that the appellant did not prove that Chenna Reddy threatened the villagers that if they did not vote for the 1st respondent the Government revenues would be doubled. In this view the Tribunal did not express any view the further question raised before it, whether on corrupt practice alleged fell within the mischief of S. 123(7) of the Act.

6. Learned advocate raised similar contentions before us. Section 123 of the Act enumerates certain corrupt practices for the purposes of the Act and sub-sec. (7) specifies as a corrupt practice the obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person, any assistance (other than the giving of vote) for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election, from any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following classes enumerated therein, in which the revenue officers including village accountants, such as patwaris, karnams, etc. are also listed.

7. It is true that the appellant submitted a petition on 3-3-1957 (Ex. 12) to the Retuning Offices, Nirmal Constituency, in which he stated that Chenna Reddy, the Patwari is propagating for his brother, which is highly objectionable and requested that necessary action may be taken against the Patwari. It appears from the report of the Tahsildar, Ex. P-13, dated 17-4-1957 that the appellant had made an oral representation to him at 8 p.m, on 3-3-1957 and that he consulted the Deputy Collector, Adilabad, who was also there and then proceeded to Koratkal to see if this was so.

8. On reaching the place, when he found that Narayana Reddy, the patwari of the village was not there and the election staff were finding it difficult to make their arrangements, he immediately placed him under suspension for absenting him-self from duty, that one R.V Ramarao who was in the village informed him that the patwari him issued some party poll chits, as such he asked some to be produced, so that necessary action could be taken. It is in evidence and now admitted that Chenna Reddy was not the patwari of Koratkal, but of the village Tandra and that his younger Brother, Narayana Reddy is in fact the patwari of Koratkal.

9. Before the question, whether the polling chits given by the patwari of another village can be deemed as a corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123(7), it would be necessary to consider whether Chenna Reddy had given any polling chits asking the voters to vote for the symbol ‘TREE’ which was assigned to the Socialist party, or that he threatened the voters as alleged. On a perusal of the evidence adduced in this behalf, we think that the Tribunal was fully justified in holding that this allegation is not proved. (His Lordship then discussed the evidence and proceeded):

10. There now remains the contention that there was a subsisting Beedi-leaves contract between the 1st respondent and the Government, disqualifying him from being elected under the inhibition contained in S. 7(d) which is as under:

“7. A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State

(d) if, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account, he has any share, or interest in a contract for the supply of goods to or for the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by, the appropriate Government;”

11. The 1st respondent does not deny the execution of the contract, Ex. B-1 which was entered into between him and the Government on the 9th February, 1956. According to the terms of the agreement it enures till the 30th day of September, 1956, so that clearly on the date of the election, the contract had expired. It is true, as contended by the learned advocate for the appellant, that though the contract might expire, the obligations under the contract may still subsist and the 1st respondent can, notwithstanding the expiry of the date, be still deemed to be a contractor of the Government.

12. The question in this case is whether the terms of the contract, read with the Forest Act and the aisle made thereunder, deem it a contract for the supply of goods or the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by the appropriate Government. The nature of the Beedi-leaves contract is such that no supply of goods or execution of any works to or for the Government is envisaged. The Government for a consideration sells the Beedi-leaves in forest areas specified in the contract to the contractor (the Mustazar) who should within the period of the contract, pick the Beedi-leaves and remove them from the forest.

13. Learned advocate, Shri Ekbote, contends that the terms of the contract read with the provisions of the Forest Act and the rules thereunder require the contractor to act in a certain way and to do certain things before he can pick the leaves. This contract allowing the contractor to pick the beedi-leaves is designed to keep the forest in a proper condition and consequently the contractor is deemed to be performing a service for the Government.

14. In this view he submits that the contract for picking the beedi-leaves is one which comes within the definition of S. 7(d) of the Act and if so the fact that there were still some amounts due from the contractor to the Government together with the fact that no certificate as required under the rules has been given, shows that the contract is still subsisting. In support of this argument, the learned advocate refers is to the definition of forest produce under Section 2(5)(a) and Section 32(c) and Rule 24(1) of the Hyderabad Forest Act.

15. Section 2(5)(a) of the Hyderabad Forest Act (II of 1355F, as amended by Act XXIX of 1956), defines forest produce as including beedi-leaves. Section 32(c) authorises the Government to make rules for the granting of licenses to persons cutting trees of such forest and remove such trees or timber or other forest-produce for the purpose of trade and the production or return of such licences. In exercise of the powers under this section, forest rules have been made of which Rule 24(1) is a special rule for leaves of Diospyros Melanarylon (beedi-leaves) which is as under:

“24(1). Whilst collecting leaves no branches shall be broken or lopped.

(2) The contractor may coppice trees under 9″ in girth in Farwari (February) with the previous permission of the Divisional Forest Officer in writing, though the contractor shall not be entitled to the material so felled.”

16. In this rule there is no indication that the forest contractor is required to do anything other than to cut beedi-leaves, though he is permitted to do certain things for the purposes and prohibited from cutting or breaking or lopping any branches. Except for the mere statement that the picking of beedi-leaves is essential to preserve the forests, there is nothing either in the evidence or on record to substantiate this assertion. If the Government does not give licences to pick the beedi-leaves in any forest, it is not shown how the forest is going to be injured or how the growth of the trees is going to be impeded.

17. We would have thought that any shedding of the beedi-leaves or for that matter, any leaves which are shed from the trees in a forest is an ordinary function of nature giving rise to new growth. If at all, the leaves that are shed become in time leaf manure and strengthen the land. This is a natural process. If the Government allows persons to pick leaves, whether bidi-leaves or any other leaves, from trees in the forest, which are their property, it is only with a view to earning revenue and with this object it enters into contacts. A perusal of the contract entered into with the 1st respondent clearly shows that the agreement is one for the sale of forest produce.

18. The preamble as well as the various clauses of the agreement make that clear. Clause 1 refers to the sale of the forest produce (beedi-leaves) in the area specified in Sch. I. Clause 2 states that the forest produce sold and purchased is all the said forest produce which may now exist or may come into existence in the contract area which the forest contractor may remove from the said area in accordance with the terms of the contract during the period 9th February, 1956 to the 30th September, 1956, both days inclusive, and that it is agreed that the said forest produce may be extracted by the forest contractor only during the aforesaid period.

19. Clause 3 provides the time of commencement of work and the mode of working as specified in Sch. II, which states that the contractor shall commence his work before the 24th February, 1958 and shall to the satisfaction of the officer empowered to execute the contract on behalf of Government make continuous and adequate progress throughout the term of the contract. Clause 4 deals with consideration. Clause 5 specifies the routes by which the forest produce may be removed and the deposits where it shall be presented for examination.

20. Clause 6 deems the forest rules which are in force at the date of the agreement and as modified in Sch. V, as part of the agreement. Clause 7 provides for penalties for non-fulfilment of the terms of the agreement. Clause 8 is the provision for settlement of disputes by the Inspector-General of Forests whose decision is final. Clause 9 requires the forest contractor to file a statement in the prescribed form showing all forest produce removed by him from the said area. Clause 10 places an obligation on the forest officer to abide by the terms of the agreement and to allow the forest contractor to avail himself of all the conditions of the contract.

21. In Sch. I it is specified that the forest produce consists of beedi-leaves. These provisions leave no doubt feat the agreement between the Government and the 1st respondent is one for sale and purchase of beedi-leaves, pure and simple. The fact that in the performance of the contract certain terms and conditions have been agreed to by both the parties, does not have the effect of converting this contract into one of the service or taking it out of the category of a pure purchase and sale of beedi-leaves.

22. It is not uncommon, in daily commercial transactions of purchase and sale of goods, for parties to enter into agreements where under one party agrees to buy and the other to sell produce or commodities which may be lying on some land or at some place from which the purchaser will have to collect it and for which purpose he is given certain facilities such as to go on the land or to place some obstacles etc. The fact that he has been permitted to do these things and has to do them in order to get at the goods sold, cannot deem him to be performing some services under the contract.

23. In our view, a contract of service must, in order to come within the mischief of Sec. 7(d) of the Act, specifically have as its object the performance of a service. In other words, it means a contract directly for the performance of services or ancillary to the performance of any such service. We are not impressed with the argument advanced by the learned advocate for the appellant, that, because in a welfare State under the Constitution where are essential and non-essential functions of a State, the sale of the beedi-leaves, in discharge of these non-essential functions is with the object of obtaining a service for the preservation of the forests.

24. As the contract in question does not come within the mischief of S. 7(d), the further question of non-payment of the amount due under the contract to the Government is not relevant or significant. The appellant having failed to prove corrupt practices alleged by him, an onus which rests heavily on him, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250/-.

HD/R.G.D

25. Appeal dismissed.

R. Deshpande v. Muttam Reddy And Others

Judicial Opinion Summary — Jaganmohan Reddi, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

1st Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

R. Deshpande v. Muttam Reddy And Others

Comments

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