The Right to Form Associations in India: A Constitutional Analysis

The Right to Form Associations in India: A Constitutional and Judicial Disquisition

Introduction

The right to form associations or unions is a cornerstone of a democratic polity, enabling individuals to collectively express, pursue, and defend their common interests. In India, this right is enshrined as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the right to form associations in India, examining its constitutional contours, the scope delineated by judicial pronouncements, the permissible restrictions, and its application in various contexts. The analysis draws heavily upon landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of India and High Courts, which have incrementally shaped the understanding and operationalization of this vital freedom.

Constitutional Framework and Scope of the Right

Article 19(1)(c) – The Core Right

Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens the right "to form associations or unions." This provision is pivotal for the exercise of various other rights, including freedom of speech and expression, and for the functioning of a vibrant civil society. The right is not absolute and is subject to "reasonable restrictions" that can be imposed by the State under Article 19(4) in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, or morality.

The Meaning and Ambit of "Form"

The Supreme Court has interpreted the word "form" in Article 19(1)(c) expansively. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row[1], the Court observed that the right to form an association is an extensive and fundamental one. It was clarified that the word "form" must refer not only to the initial commencement of the association but also to the continuance of the association as such.[2] This interpretation was significantly reinforced in Smt. Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India[3], where the Court held that the right to form an association necessarily implies that the persons forming the association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit. The Court stated:

"The right to form an association, in our opinion, necessarily implies that the persons forming the association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the voluntary association without any option being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an association."[4]

Thus, the right under Article 19(1)(c) encompasses not just the act of forming an association but also its continued existence and the autonomy to determine its membership, free from unwarranted external interference in its composition.[5] The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in M. Sitharamachary v. The Senior Deputy Inspector Of Schools, also noted that the right to form an association implies the right to refuse to belong to an association.[6]

Concomitant Rights: Scope and Limitations

While the right to form and continue an association is fundamental, the courts have clarified that this right does not extend to guaranteeing the achievement of the association's objectives or to specific activities of the association. In All India Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial Tribunal[7], the Supreme Court held that even a liberal interpretation of Article 19(1)(c) cannot lead to the conclusion that the fundamental right to form unions carries with it a concomitant guarantee that trade unions so formed shall be enabled to carry effective collective bargaining or shall achieve the purpose for which they were brought into existence. The Court observed that "the right guaranteed under sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 19 extends to the formation of an association and insofar as the activities of the association are concerned or as regards the steps which the union might take to achieve the purpose of its creation, they are subject to such laws as might be framed and the validity of such laws is to be tested by reference to the criteria to be found in clause (4) of Article 19 of the Constitution."[8]

This principle was reiterated in Dharam Dutt And Others v. Union Of India And Others[9], where the Court, drawing from All India Bank Employees' Assn. and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, affirmed that the right to form associations does not include the right to achieve a particular object, as that would be a "concomitant to a concomitant." Similarly, in T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu[10], the Supreme Court categorically held that government employees have no fundamental, statutory, or moral right to strike, distinguishing the right to associate from the methods employed by the association to achieve its aims. The argument that the freedom guaranteed should extend to the effective functioning of the association to achieve its lawful objects, unless restricted by public order or morality, was also considered and largely circumscribed in early cases like Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash v. The Union of India.[11]

Reasonable Restrictions under Article 19(4)

Grounds for Restriction

Article 19(4) permits the State to make any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Article 19(1)(c) "in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality." These grounds are exhaustive, and any restriction not falling within these parameters would be unconstitutional.[12]

Judicial Scrutiny of "Reasonableness"

The judiciary plays a crucial role in determining the "reasonableness" of restrictions. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row[1], the Supreme Court laid down seminal principles for testing reasonableness. It held that the test of reasonableness should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, and the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. Crucially, the Court invalidated Section 15(2)(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 (as amended in Madras), which allowed the executive to declare an association unlawful without adequate judicial oversight, deeming it an unreasonable restriction due to procedural deficiencies and lack of judicial scrutiny.

In O.K. Ghosh And Another v. E.X. Joseph[13], the Supreme Court, while examining the validity of rules restricting government servants' associational rights, emphasized that for a restriction to be valid under Article 19(4), its connection with public order must be "rationally proximate and direct," not "far-fetched or problematical." This echoes the sentiment in Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia[14] (cited in O.K. Ghosh).

The Right in Specific Contexts

Government Servants

It is well-established that government servants, like other citizens, are entitled to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19, including Article 19(1)(c).[13][15] However, their rights can be subject to specific regulations. In O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph[13], the Supreme Court struck down Rule 4(B) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, which virtually compelled a government servant to withdraw membership from a service association if government recognition was withdrawn or not accorded. The Court found no direct or proximate connection between such a restriction (conditioning association on government recognition) and public order, thus rendering it unreasonable. However, as noted earlier, the right to form associations does not grant government employees a right to strike.[10]

Police Forces and Armed Forces (Article 33)

Article 33 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to enact laws restricting or abrogating the fundamental rights of members of the Armed Forces or the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order, to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them. In Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karmachari Sangh And Others v. Union Of India And Others[16], the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966, and rules thereunder which imposed restrictions on police associations, including derecognition of their union. The Court reasoned that such restrictions were permissible under Article 33 to maintain discipline and operational integrity within the police force. This underscores that for certain categories of public servants, the right to association can be more significantly curtailed in the interest of public order and discipline.

Recognition of Associations

The Supreme Court has consistently held that while the right to form an association is fundamental, the right to its recognition by the government or other authorities is not a fundamental right. In Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash v. Union of India[11] (also cited in Janardan Vasant Patil v. Director General Of Police[15] and P.K. Dash, Advocate & Ors. v. Bar Council Of Delhi & Ors.[2]), the Court clarified that if a law regulated the recognition of an association, such conditions were not necessarily infringements of Article 19(1)(c), as recognition is a privilege granted by the State and can be subjected to conditions. The right to obtain recognition is a consequence that emanates from the statute providing for it, not a concomitant of the right to form an association.[17]

Interference with Internal Management and Composition

The principle laid down in Smt. Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India[3]—that the right to form an association includes the right to determine its membership and continue the association as originally constituted—is a strong safeguard against arbitrary state interference. The Court invalidated the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962, which altered the composition of an existing society by introducing new members without the consent of the original members. This was seen as a direct infringement of Article 19(1)(c). This was reiterated in Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy And Others.[4]

However, this protection is not absolute for all types of associations. In Daman Singh v. State of Punjab[18] (cited in P.K. Dash[2] and Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation[4]), the Supreme Court distinguished Damyanti Naranga in the context of cooperative societies. The Court held that once a society is formed under a statute (like a Co-operative Societies Act), its members cannot contend that any statutory amendment affecting the society's composition or management infringes their right to form an association, as they join the society subject to the provisions of that Act. The Court noted that the association right does not render an institution immune from state takeover or regulation if its functioning is deleterious to its members or the public, citing The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic And Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. The State of Delhi.[2]

In Asom Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti And Another v. State Of Assam And Others[19], the Supreme Court addressed a situation where the management of a society was taken over by the State through legislation, initially stated as a temporary measure. The Court expressed concern when such "temporary" measures continued indefinitely, effectively depriving members of their right to manage the association, suggesting that such prolonged state control could indeed infringe Article 19(1)(c).

Judicial Interpretation and Evolution

The Indian judiciary has played a pivotal role in interpreting and evolving the right to form associations. Key principles that have emerged include:

  • The right extends to the formation and continuation of an association with chosen members.[1][3]
  • It does not guarantee the achievement of the association's objectives or the right to engage in specific activities like strikes.[7][10]
  • Recognition of an association by the State is not a fundamental right.[11]
  • Restrictions must be reasonable and fall strictly within the grounds specified in Article 19(4), with a direct and proximate nexus to those grounds.[1][13]
  • Special provisions like Article 33 allow for greater restrictions on the associational rights of armed forces and police personnel.[16]
  • Interference with the composition of a voluntary association is generally impermissible,[3] though statutory bodies like cooperative societies may be subject to different rules.[18]

The courts have consistently sought to balance the individual's right to associate with the State's legitimate interests in maintaining public order, morality, and the sovereignty and integrity of India.

Conclusion

The right to form associations under Article 19(1)(c) of the Indian Constitution is a cherished fundamental right, integral to democratic functioning and individual liberty. Judicial interpretation has clarified its expansive scope, covering not only the initial formation but also the continuation and internal autonomy regarding membership. Simultaneously, the judiciary has delineated its limitations, emphasizing that the right does not extend to an unfettered pursuit of an association's objectives or immunity from reasonable, constitutionally sanctioned restrictions. The jurisprudence reflects a careful balancing act, safeguarding the essence of associational freedom while acknowledging the State's regulatory powers in the larger public interest. The principles laid down in landmark cases continue to guide the adjudication of complex issues arising from the exercise of this fundamental right, ensuring its enduring relevance in the Indian legal landscape.

References