Orders Obtained by Fraud in Indian Jurisprudence: Nullity and Remedial Powers
1. Introduction
The maxim “fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant” – fraud and justice never dwell together – has pervaded Indian jurisprudence since the colonial era. Contemporary decisions of the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirm that any judicial or quasi-judicial order vitiated by fraud is a nullity, capable of being struck down at any stage and by any court.[1] The present article analyses the doctrinal foundations, statutory underpinnings and judicial articulation of this principle, with a focus on the liability of parties who procure orders obtained by fraud.
2. Conceptual Framework and Statutory Basis
2.1 Defining “Fraud on the Court”
Indian courts adopt a broad conception of fraud: “an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing an unfair advantage by taking undue advantage of another.”[2] Critical is the element of deception practised on the adjudicatory body itself; mere erroneous statements or inadvertent omissions do not suffice.
2.2 Statutory Anchors
- Section 44, Evidence Act 1872: permits a party to show that any judgment, order or decree was delivered by a court not competent to deliver it “or was obtained by fraud or collusion.”
- Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908: reserves the inherent power of civil courts to act ex debito justitiae to recall or set aside orders obtained by fraud.[3]
- Articles 136, 142, 226 & 227, Constitution of India: confer wide supervisory and corrective jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court and High Courts, consistently invoked to neutralise fraudulent orders.[4]
3. Evolution Through Leading Precedents
3.1 Early Recognition
Pre-independence decisions such as Patel Bhagubhai Ranchhodas v. Bai Arvinda (1937) treated fraudulently procured maintenance orders as legal non-entities, foreshadowing later doctrine.[5]
3.2 Supreme Court Canon
- S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1: Non-disclosure of a registered release deed was held to constitute fraud on the court, rendering the preliminary decree for partition void ab initio. The Court clarified that such a decree “can be challenged in any court, at any time.”
- Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550: Recognised the judiciary’s inherent power under s.151 CPC to recall its own judgment when confronted with forged documents. Importantly, the Court distinguished between review on merits and recall for fraud – the latter is not constrained by limitation.
- United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh (2000) 3 SCC 581: Reiterated that High Courts cannot shirk their “plenary” constitutional powers when allegations of fraud are raised against Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awards. The impugned awards were quashed and a de novo inquiry ordered.
- A.V. Papayya Sastry v. State of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221: Furnished a comprehensive synthesis, holding that the doctrine of merger and the finality of litigation yield to the higher principle that “a judgment obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity.”
3.3 Subsequent Jurisprudence
High Courts continue to apply these principles in varied contexts – matrimonial decrees (Amita Joshi v. Sandeep Kumar, P&H 2017), caste validity certificates (Apoorva, Bom 2010), land acquisition (Harrisons Malayalam Ltd. v. State of Kerala, Ker 2018), and consumer disputes (Lucknow Development Authority v. Kripal Singh, SCDRC 2019). The doctrinal reach is thus trans-jurisdictional, encompassing civil, criminal, consumer, administrative and even RERA proceedings.[6]
4. Analytical Themes
4.1 Fraud: Nullity versus Irregularity
The Supreme Court draws a fundamental distinction between a mere irregularity, which may render a decision voidable, and fraud, which renders it void ab initio. Consequently, principles such as res judicata or waiver do not bar a collateral attack on a fraudulent order.[7]
4.2 Inherent and Supervisory Powers to Recall
Section 151 CPC and Articles 226/227 & 136 empower courts to correct their own process when invoked. While statutory limitations (e.g., thirty-day recall under Order IX Rule 13 CPC) constrain review of ex-parte decrees, the courts consistently hold that such procedural bars are inapplicable when the foundation itself is fraudulent. Tribunals not expressly vested with review power (such as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal) have nonetheless been directed to recall awards upon discovery of fraud, the Supreme Court supplying the jurisdictional underpinning.
4.3 Standard and Burden of Proof
Because the charge of fraud impeaches the integrity of judicial proceedings, the burden rests heavily on the alleging party, who must establish fraud by cogent and clear evidence (though not necessarily beyond reasonable doubt).[8] Courts have permitted discovery, cross-examination and even forensic examination of documents (e.g., Indian Bank) to discharge this burden.
4.4 Interaction with Finality, Merger and Res Judicata
- Doctrine of Merger: Once an appellate judgment is shown to be infected by fraud, the underlying judgments do not revive; rather, the entire edifice collapses (Papayya Sastry).
- Res Judicata: Supreme Court in Raju Ramsingh Vasave recognised fraud as an express exception to s.11 CPC; policy considerations of finality cannot shield fraudulent orders.
- Statutory Appeal v. Recall: While an appellate remedy is ordinarily exclusive, courts allow a parallel recall application where the gravamen is fraud, obviating multiplicity and preventing perpetuation of illegality.
4.5 Remedial Consequences
Once fraud is established, the primary order and all consequential proceedings are void, with two corollaries: (1) benefits derived thereunder must be restituted, and (2) fresh adjudication may commence if the underlying cause survives (as ordered in Rajendra Singh). Additionally, courts increasingly impose exemplary costs and initiate perjury proceedings to deter abuse (Smriti Madan Kansagra, 2021).
5. Critical Appraisal
5.1 Strengths of the Current Doctrine
- Affirms the primacy of integrity over procedural finality, aligning with constitutional values of fairness and rule of law.
- Provides a flexible, cross-jurisdictional corrective mechanism adaptable to statutory silences.
- Deters litigants from abusing judicial processes, thereby safeguarding institutional credibility.
5.2 Emerging Challenges
- Over-Invocation Risk: Allegations of fraud are increasingly raised as a tactical device, delaying enforcement. Courts must vigilantly screen such pleas at the threshold.
- Absence of Uniform Procedure: Neither CPC nor tribunal statutes prescribe a dedicated procedure for recall for fraud, leading to ad-hocism. A legislative framework – possibly modelled on Order XLVII (review) but tailored to fraud – could enhance predictability.
- Tribunal Capacity: Specialised bodies (e.g., MACT, RERA) may lack forensic or investigative resources to adjudicate complex fraud claims. Judicial directions for coordinated inquiry with investigative agencies may fill this gap.
6. Conclusion
Indian law unequivocally treats an order obtained by fraud as null and void. Through a rich line of precedent – Chengalvaraya Naidu, Indian Bank, Rajendra Singh, Papayya Sastry – the Supreme Court has forged a coherent doctrine anchored in statutory provisions and constitutional principles. While the flexibility of inherent and supervisory powers has served justice, the time is ripe for codified procedures balancing deterrence of fraud with expedition in litigation. Until then, courts must continue their vigilant stance, mindful that the purity of the judicial stream is essential to the legitimacy of the rule of law.
Footnotes
- The lineage originates in English law: Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702, endorsed by Indian courts in, inter alia, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh (2000) 3 SCC 581.
- S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1.
- See Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (1996) 5 SCC 550 (paras 22-24) recognising s.151 CPC recall jurisdiction.
- A.V. Papayya Sastry v. State of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221 (paras 34-41); Art. 142 invoked to do “complete justice.”
- Patel Bhagubhai Ranchhodas v. Bai Arvinda, 1937 SCC OnLine Cal 33.
- See, e.g., Amita Joshi v. Sandeep Kumar, 2017 SCC OnLine P&H 4396; Apoorva v. Scrutiny Committee, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1053; Lucknow Development Authority v. Kripal Singh, (2019) SCDRC UP 124.
- A.V. Papayya Sastry, supra note 4, para 38; Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar (2008) 9 SCC 54.
- Sher Mohammad Khan v. Madan Lal, 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 17958 (discussing evidentiary threshold).