Case Title:
N. S. Madhanagopal v. K . Lalitha
According to the Supreme Court, Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code does not define abuse, humiliation, or defamation as an offence in and of itself.
The bench of Justices S.Abdul Nazeer and JB Pardiwala remarked that in order to demonstrate the aggravation of other elements of the crime under Section 294 of the IPC, more evidence must be shown.
A lady filed a complaint against the defendants in this case before a judicial magistrate for the offences covered by Sections 294(b) and 341 of the Indian Penal Code, respectively. Before the Madras High Court, the accused filed a plea under Section 482 CrPC, which was denied.
The Apex Court bench noted in the appeal that the only allegation in the complaint was that the accused used profane language against the complainant. The standard for obscenity under Section 294(b) of the IPC, according to the court, is whether the allegedly obscene material has a propensity to deprave and corrupt persons whose minds are susceptible to such immoral effects.
According to Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, anyone who, to the annoyance of others, (a) commits any obscene act in a public place or (b) sings, recites, or utters any obscene song, ballad, or words in or near a public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term that may extend to three months, with fine, or with both. Referencing the findings from P.T. The court stated in Chacko v. Nainan -
“It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b). None of the records discloses the alleged words used by the accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by themselves cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC. To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient but there must be further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC are made out.”
The court further noted that this case does not fall under Section 341 IPC (wrongful restraint). It noticed:
"In order to attract the application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed, and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant. The averments made in the complaint according to us are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint.”
The court stated further when granting the appeal:
“Taking cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach. This is a proposition not only based on sound logic but is also based on fundamental principles of justice, as a person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process. Issuance of process must be preceded by an application of judicial mind to the material before the court to determine if there is ground for proceedings against the accused. When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process. We have our own doubts about whether even the verification of the original complainant on oath was recorded before taking cognizance and issuing process.”