Post-Bruen Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Probable-Cause Parameters in Multi-State Drug Conspiracies
A Detailed Commentary on United States v. Miller, 23-7699-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2025)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Miller, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted a tripartite appeal arising from a Brooklyn drug‐conspiracy prosecution:

• Fourth-Amendment challenge – whether physical evidence seized during a purportedly unlawful arrest should have been suppressed;
• Sufficiency challenge – whether the evidence was adequate to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to distribute ≥1 kg of heroin; and
• Constitutional & jury-instruction challenges – whether the felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) survived NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022) and whether the jury should have been instructed under Rehaif v. United States (2019) that the defendant knew of his felon status.

Defendant-Appellant Clyde Miller, after driving from Pennsylvania to New York to assist reputed kingpin Anthony Yancey, was arrested with a loaded .380 pistol while parked a block from a controlled buy. The Eastern District of New York (Chief Judge Brodie) denied suppression, the jury convicted on all counts, and Miller received 180 months. The Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. Suppression Denied ➔ Affirmed. Continuous DEA surveillance, corroboration of Yancey’s “team” comment, and Miller’s proximity and behavior furnished probable cause.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence ➔ Affirmed. Interstate travel, coordinated movements, presence during preparation, and armed lookout posture supplied adequate circumstantial proof of conspiratorial intent.
3. § 922(g)(1) Conviction ➔ Affirmed.
   • Bruen does not invalidate the felon-in-possession ban; recent Second Circuit precedent (Zherka v. Bondi, 2025) forecloses that argument.
   • Failure to give a Rehaif knowledge-of-status instruction did not affect substantial rights; the record proved Miller’s awareness of his felonies.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) – set the “totality‐of‐the-circumstances” framework for probable cause; the panel applied it to multi-suspect drug deals.
• Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) – standard for “reasonably trustworthy information” supporting arrest.
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – reoriented Second-Amendment analysis toward historical tradition; invoked by Miller, distinguished by the court.
• Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025) – held that § 922(g)(1) is historically justified even after Bruen; provided binding precedent that resolved Miller’s claim.
• Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) – required the government to prove a defendant knew of his prohibited status; shaped the plain-error calculus.
• Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021) – clarified defendant’s burden on plain-error review of unpreserved Rehaif errors.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Probable Cause for Arrest
   The DEA’s real-time surveillance linked Miller to Yancey’s large-scale heroin transaction. Drug-trafficking lore—lookouts, armed protection, getaway drivers—rendered Miller’s conduct suspicious. The court deferred to experiential testimony (App’x 81) and, following Dufort, embraced a “fluid” probable-cause analysis.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence
   Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Huezo, the panel emphasized circumstantial inferences: a 350-mile 3 a.m. drive, constant accompaniment of the principal, and carriage of a loaded weapon. Such “aggregate” evidence met the conspiracy elements.
3. Second-Amendment Challenge
   Bruen restructured carry-licensing doctrine but preserved “historical exceptions.” Zherka catalogued 18th- & 19th-century laws disarming felons and reaffirmed § 922(g)(1). Miller’s claim thus failed at prong (2) of plain-error review: any error was not “clear or obvious.”
4. Rehaif / Jury-Instruction Error
   The district court omitted the mens-rea element, but substantial-rights prong was unsatisfied. Three prior felony convictions, service of custodial sentences exceeding one year, and stipulations erased any “reasonable probability” of acquittal (Greer).

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). Although a non-precedential summary order, the decision operationalizes Zherka by applying it to a real-world drug defendant. District courts will likely cite Miller to reject Bruen-type attacks without full briefing.
• Probable-Cause Template for Multi-State Surveillance Cases. The order reinforces the proposition that coordinated interstate travel, continued proximity, and drug-transaction context jointly satisfy probable cause—even absent direct possession of contraband.
• Rehaif Plain-Error Framework. The Second Circuit signals a stringent approach: defendants with incarceration histories or stipulations will rarely satisfy Greer.
• Practical Law-Enforcement Guidance. Agents’ testimony about typical roles in kilo-level deals (lookout, getaway) gained explicit appellate endorsement, bolstering similar affidavits in future warrants.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: A commonsense, probability-based standard—think “reasonable grounds,” not “proof beyond doubt.” Officers may synthesize observations, experience, and corroborated tips.
• Conspiracy Liability: Agreement + intent + any member’s overt act. One need not handle the drugs; being the armed backup can suffice.
• Plain-Error Review: A four-part appellate test for unpreserved objections. Errors must be obvious and outcome-determinative to warrant reversal.
• Bruen Framework: (1) Does the conduct fall within the “plain text” of the Second Amendment? (2) If yes, does historical tradition nonetheless allow regulation? Felon disarmament remains historically grounded.
• Rehaif Requirement: The government must prove the defendant knew he belonged to a prohibited category (e.g., felon). However, lengthy prior prison stints make this knowledge almost self-evident.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Miller is a succinct yet instructive reaffirmation of three doctrinal pillars:

1. Felon-in-Possession Constitutionality Post-Bruen. The Second Circuit, via Zherka, cements the view that historical analogues validate § 922(g)(1) for all felons, violent or otherwise.
2. Totality-Driven Probable Cause in Complex Drug Stings. Continuous surveillance and role-based conduct can legitimize arrests without the suspect’s direct handling of narcotics.
3. Narrow Pathway for Rehaif Relief on Plain-Error Review. Demonstrable awareness of felon status undercuts appellate challenges premised on omitted jury instructions.

Though issued as a non-precedential summary order, Miller offers concrete guidance to district courts, law-enforcement agencies, and criminal defendants alike. It underscores that the Second Circuit remains steadfast in upholding firearms disabilities for felons and recognizes pragmatic law-enforcement inferences in large-scale narcotics operations.