“False” Means “Not True”: Section 1014 Does Not Criminalize Merely Misleading Statements

Thompson v. United States, 604 U.S. ___ (2025)

Introduction

In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split over the scope of the federal false-statements statute governing banking and FDIC matters, 18 U.S.C. §1014. The Court held that §1014 prohibits “knowingly” making a false statement to influence the FDIC, and that the statute does not criminalize statements that are merely misleading if they are not false. The decision vacates a Seventh Circuit judgment that had permitted conviction based on “misleading representations,” and it remands for a sufficiency review focused strictly on falsity.

The case arose after Patrick Thompson, who took out three loans totaling $219,000 from a bank that later failed, disputed with FDIC’s servicer the accuracy of a $269,120.58 balance (principal plus interest). On recorded and noted calls, he said he had “no idea where the 269 number comes from” and that he “borrowed … $110,000,” and he separately mentioned “home improvement.” Prosecutors charged two counts under §1014. A jury convicted. The lower courts declined to decide whether Thompson’s statements were false, reasoning that the statute also covers misleading statements. The Supreme Court disagreed.

Key issues presented: (1) whether §1014’s prohibition on “false statements” reaches statements that are misleading but literally true; (2) how context informs whether a statement is “false”; and (3) the proper standard for reviewing sufficiency on remand.

Summary of the Opinion

• Holding: Section 1014 criminalizes “false” statements; it does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false.
• Textual anchor: “False” means “not true,” both in 1948 (when §1014 was enacted) and today. The statute does not use the word “misleading,” and Congress has elsewhere shown it knows how to prohibit “false or misleading” statements.
• Precedents: The Court’s reasoning tracks United States v. Wells (no unmentioned element—materiality—may be read into §1014) and Williams v. United States (a §1014 conviction requires an actual statement that can be characterized as true or false). Kay v. United States does not support criminalizing merely “misleading” statements under §1014’s predecessor.
• Context matters: Whether a statement is “false” can depend on context. A statement that is literally true may be false in context if it asserts or implies a proposition that is untrue.
• Disposition: The Seventh Circuit’s judgment is vacated. On remand, the court must assess whether a reasonable jury could find Thompson’s statements were false (not merely misleading) in context.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
  The Court held §1014 does not contain a materiality requirement because “materiality” is not mentioned, while other statutes do mention it. Thompson extends Wells’s logic: if §1014 does not even “mention” materiality, it certainly does not silently reach the distinct category of “misleading” statements. The case enforces a familiar textualist constraint—courts may not add words that Congress omitted.
• Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982).
  Williams reversed a §1014 conviction because depositing a bad check is not itself a “statement” capable of being true or false. Thompson leverages Williams to emphasize two minimum conditions for §1014 liability: the defendant must “make a statement,” and that statement must be capable of being characterized as true or false. By extension, conduct or omissions that merely “mislead” do not suffice unless the statement itself is false in context.
• Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938).
  The government relied on Kay’s references to “false and misleading representations” in a predecessor statute. Thompson explains that Kay used “misleading” primarily to describe intent associated with false statements, not as a separate statutory category, and notably used “false and misleading” together. Kay therefore does not transform “false” into “false or misleading.”
• Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) and Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
  These decisions underscore two drafting canons employed here: Congress “knows how to” include words when it intends to, and courts avoid readings that render Congress’s words elsewhere superfluous. Because Congress elsewhere uses “false or misleading,” it is improper to inflate “false” in §1014 to mean “false or misleading.”
• Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624 (2012); Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
  These cases supply secondary textual principles: “any” is expansive but not transformative; it broadens the universe of false statements covered, but it does not transmute “false” into “misleading.”
• Peel v. ARDC, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) and Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
  Cited to underscore the simple logical point that a statement may be truthful yet misleading, and that a statement cannot be both true and false at once.
• Lower-court precedents and the circuit split:
  The Seventh Circuit’s United States v. Freed, 921 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2019), allowed §1014 convictions based on misleading statements; the Sixth Circuit’s United States v. Kurlemann, 736 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2013), required literal falsity and rejected liability premised solely on omissions or implications. Thompson resolves this split in favor of Kurlemann’s approach.

Legal Reasoning

The Court proceeds in classic textualist fashion. First, it anchors its analysis in ordinary meaning: “false” meant “not true” when §1014 was enacted in 1948 and still means that today. It then contrasts §1014’s wording with other statutes that explicitly reach both “false” and “misleading” statements—indeed, multiple Title 18 provisions expressly use both terms. Reading “false” to encompass “misleading” would render the separate appearance of “misleading” elsewhere functionally redundant.

Historical context reinforces this textual judgment. Congress consolidated multiple “false statement” provisions into §1014 in 1948, none of which used “misleading,” even as other statutes from that same period did use the phrase “false or misleading.” This well-worn inference—Congress knew how to say “false or misleading” and chose not to—carries significant weight.

The Court’s treatment of precedent is equally disciplined. Wells stands for the proposition that courts cannot graft unmentioned elements (like materiality) into §1014; by analogy, they cannot expand “false” to mean “false or misleading.” Williams supplies the requirement that there be an actual “statement” that is capable of being true or false and reminds courts not to collapse omissions or conduct into “statements.” And Kay is harmonized by recognizing that its references to “misleading” described intent accompanying false statements, not an independent statutory category of liability.

Crucially, the Court clarifies that “context matters” to falsity. Some statements that are literally true in isolation are false as used or understood in context because the utterance asserts or necessarily implies an untrue proposition. But §1014 still requires proof of falsity—prosecutors cannot rest on mere “misleadingness” without demonstrating that the statement, in its communicative context, conveyed something that was not true.

Concurrences: Key Emphases

• Justice Alito agrees entirely and distills five takeaways:
  • §1014 reaches only “false” statements; “misleading” is not in the statute.
  • “False” bears its ordinary meaning: “not true.”
  • Falsity is judged in context; language is not parsed in isolation.
  • “False” and “misleading” can overlap in practice, but courts and juries should stick to falsity and avoid “misleading” language in §1014 instructions.
  • On remand, the sole question is sufficiency: whether any rational jury could find falsity beyond a reasonable doubt (Jackson v. Virginia standard).
• Justice Jackson underscores that the jury in this case was already instructed in terms of “false statements,” not “misleading representations.” She suggests the Seventh Circuit’s task on remand is limited and that, on this record, the sufficiency question is not reasonably debatable.

Impact and Implications

Thompson provides clear, nationwide guidance on §1014. Its immediate and longer-term effects include:

• Uniform standard across circuits: The decision resolves a split (Seventh vs. Sixth Circuits) and requires the government to prove falsity, not mere misleadingness, in all §1014 prosecutions.
• Charging and prosecutorial strategy:
  • Prosecutors must identify the specific proposition the defendant’s words asserted in context and prove that proposition is not true. It is no longer sufficient to argue that a statement was technically true but “misleading.”
  • Where conduct involves half-truths or omissions, the government may consider alternative statutes that expressly reach “misleading,” “fraudulent,” or “concealment” conduct (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1001(a)(1) conceals-by-scheme, §1001(a)(2) materially false statements, 18 U.S.C. §1344 bank fraud), subject to their distinct elements and limits.
  • Investigative practice will likely shift toward tighter, specific questioning that elicits clear, falsifiable assertions.
• Defense strategy:
  • Defendants can press a “literal truth in context” defense, arguing that any misleading implication does not convert a true statement into a false one. They should request jury instructions that falsity means “untrue when made,” and object to any “misleading” language untethered to falsity.
  • But beware: context can transform a technically true statement into a false one by necessary implication. Half-truths can be actionable if, in context, they assert something that is not true.
• Jury instructions and trial management: Thompson validates pattern instructions that require a finding that the defendant “made a false statement” and counsels against references to “misleading” in §1014 cases. Expect litigants to focus on how the “context” of an utterance defines what proposition it conveyed.
• Financial regulatory and workout communications: Borrowers and their counsel negotiating with FDIC, receivers, and bank servicers must ensure their statements are accurate as communicated. Disputing balances is lawful, but declarative statements such as “I have no idea where the amount comes from” or “I only borrowed X” can be false in context if they convey propositions that the speaker knows are not true.
• Doctrinal limits and open questions:
  • Thompson is statute-specific. It does not alter the reach of statutes that expressly target “misleading,” “fraudulent,” or “concealment” conduct, or that define falsity more broadly (e.g., “false, fictitious, or fraudulent” in §1001).
  • The decision nods to “contextual falsity” but leaves to future cases where the line falls between a misleading but true statement and one that is false by necessary implication. Statements of opinion, memory (“I don’t recall”), or intent may present nuanced questions on what proposition was communicated and whether it was untrue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• False vs. Misleading:
  A “false” statement is not true. A “misleading” statement can be true yet likely to cause misunderstanding. §1014 punishes the former, not the latter, unless the statement, in context, asserts something untrue.
• Contextual Falsity:
  Whether a statement is false can depend on context. A technically true statement can be false in context if it communicates an untrue proposition. Example (from Justice Alito’s concurrence): When asked “Did you eat all the cookies?” a child who ate twelve says “I ate three.” The words are literally true in isolation, but in context assert “I ate only three,” which is false.
• “Any” is expansive, not transformative:
  Saying “any false statement” enlarges the universe of covered false statements but does not convert “false” into “false or misleading.”
• Canon against surplusage:
  Courts avoid interpretations that make statutory words redundant. Because many statutes prohibit “false or misleading” statements, it would make those statutes redundant if “false” already included “misleading.”
• Materiality vs. Falsity:
  Wells held §1014 does not require “materiality.” Thompson likewise rejects importing “misleadingness.” The statute requires a false statement plus the intent to influence the FDIC—nothing more, nothing less.

Application to Thompson’s Case and the Remand

The Supreme Court did not decide whether Thompson’s statements were false, emphasizing its role as a court of review. It remanded for the Seventh Circuit to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government (Jackson v. Virginia), any rational jury could find falsity beyond a reasonable doubt. Two points loom large:

• Count One (February 23 call): Thompson said, among other things, “I have no idea where the 269 number comes from” and “I borrowed … I think it was $110,000,” while disputing the invoice amount. The sufficiency question is whether, in the conversational context (including the existing invoice and his loan history), these words conveyed a proposition that was not true—e.g., that he owed no more than $110,000, or that he truly had “no idea” about the source of $269,120.58. The jury could find falsity if those utterances, in context, asserted something untrue.
• Count Two (March 1 call): Thompson’s statement that funds were for “home improvement” appears to have been conceded as false. That concession, if accepted on remand, may independently sustain the second count.

Justice Jackson notes the jury was already properly instructed that it must find “false” statements, not “misleading” ones, and suggests the record strongly supports affirmance under the proper standard.

Practice Pointers

• For prosecutors:
  • Identify the precise factual proposition the defendant’s words conveyed in context; prove it was untrue when made and that the defendant knew it was untrue.
  • Structure interviews and forms to elicit specific, falsifiable assertions; avoid ambiguity that invites “literal truth” defenses.
  • Consider alternative charges where the conduct sounds in omission, concealment, or misleading half-truths (e.g., §1001 concealment or fraud statutes), subject to their elements.
• For defense counsel:
  • Press the distinction between misleading and false; demand the government pin down the asserted proposition and its falsity.
  • Request instructions defining “false” as “untrue when made” and excluding “misleading” language untethered to falsity.
  • Warn clients that half-truths can be false in context; add clarifying qualifiers where appropriate to avoid false implications.
• For agencies and lenders:
  • Use precise questions and disclosures in forms and communications. Where possible, require yes/no or quantified answers that minimize ambiguity.
  • Document the context in which statements are made; contemporaneous records can be determinative of what a statement conveyed.

Conclusion

Thompson v. United States establishes a bright-line statutory rule with an important nuance. The bright line: §1014 punishes only “false” statements—statements that are not true—and does not criminalize statements that are merely misleading. The nuance: Falsity is judged in context, and a statement that is technically true can be false by necessary implication when viewed as an ordinary listener would understand it.

The Court’s disciplined textual analysis, reinforced by statutory structure and history, harmonizes §1014 with surrounding federal law and resolves a circuit split. At the same time, the decision preserves robust tools against deception by recognizing that context defines what a speaker actually asserted. The remand task is straightforward: decide whether a rational jury could find that Thompson’s words, in their actual communicative setting, asserted untrue propositions that he knew to be untrue. Going forward, Thompson will shape how prosecutors charge, how juries are instructed, and how parties communicate with financial regulators: clarity counts, precision is paramount, and falsity—not mere misleadingness—is the touchstone of §1014.