Wood v. State (Del. 2025): Indictment Citation Errors as “Form” When Essential Facts Provide Notice; Rule 35(a) Limits and CSAC/Rape Double-Jeopardy Separation

1. Introduction

In Wood v. State (Supreme Court of Delaware, Dec. 22, 2025), appellant Bruce Wood challenged the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a). Wood had been convicted in 2007 of multiple counts of sexual offenses against two child victims (referred to as CG and SP): eight counts tied to CG, eight counts tied to SP, and two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child (CSAC)—one for each victim—resulting in an aggregate sentence of 290 years.

The appeal presented recurring postconviction themes—double jeopardy, guideline deviations, alleged sentencing bias—as well as an issue the Supreme Court itself flagged: the indictment’s apparent mislabeling/miscitation of the CG counts because, during the period of CG’s abuse (1996–1998), the Delaware Criminal Code did not contain an offense titled “first-degree rape,” and the indictment cited a statute section that then defined a different offense. The key questions were:

Whether those indictment defects rendered Wood’s CG convictions/sentences “illegal” and correctable under Rule 35(a).
Whether sentencing on both “rape/unlawful sexual intercourse” and CSAC violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Whether guideline deviations, omission of aggravators, alleged “closed mind,” and other trial-level complaints can be addressed via Rule 35(a).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Rule 35(a) relief. The Court held:

The indictment’s mislabeling and statutory miscitation for the CG counts were errors of form, not substance, because the charging language alleged the essential facts of the then-existing offense of first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse under then-extant Section 775, and Wood was not prejudiced.
Wood’s additional claims newly raised on appeal (confusing jury instructions, insufficiency of evidence, ineffective assistance) were not cognizable under Rule 35(a) and, in any event, did not present plain error.
Sentences for CSAC and the underlying sexual-intercourse offenses do not violate double jeopardy because the crimes have distinct elements; the Court extended the rationale previously applied to “first-degree rape” and CSAC to “first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse” and CSAC.
A sentence within statutory limits is not “illegal” merely because the court did not articulate aggravators on the record or deviated from nonbinding SENTAC guidelines; and the record did not support claims of demonstrably false sentencing information or judicial bias/vindictiveness.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Rule 35(a) scope and the definition of an “illegal sentence”

Fountain v. State (2014): supplied the standard of review—abuse of discretion, with de novo review for legal questions.
Brittingham v. State (1998): provided the Court’s canonical definition of an “illegal sentence” and supported the Court’s insistence that Rule 35(a) is not a vehicle for relitigating trial errors or conviction validity. The decision’s taxonomy—statutory-max issues, double jeopardy, ambiguity, internal contradiction, omission of a mandatory term, uncertainty, or unauthorized judgment—structured the Court’s screening of Wood’s claims.

B. Indictment defects: “form” vs. “substance,” notice, and jurisdiction

Robinson v. State (1991): anchored the conclusion that an indictment may be amended as to form (not substance) so long as no new/different charge is introduced and substantial rights are not prejudiced. The Court used Robinson’s framework to characterize the indictment’s miscitation/misnaming as “form” because the essential factual allegations matched the offense that existed at the time.
Del. Super. Ct. Crim R. 7(c): reinforced that an indictment must state essential facts, and that statutory citation errors are not grounds for dismissal absent prejudice—critical to the Court’s “notice-first” approach to the CG indictment problem.
Kellam v. State (2025): supported the proposition that a defect curable by amendment does not deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction. That matters in Rule 35(a) posture because Wood’s theory implicitly suggested the court lacked lawful authority to enter the CG convictions/sentences.

C. Double jeopardy: CSAC vs. rape/unlawful sexual intercourse

St. Louis v. State (2002): previously recognized that first-degree rape and CSAC have distinct elements and are separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Wood extends that same reasoning to the earlier statutory analogue—first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse—by applying the same “distinct elements” analysis.
State v. Leighton (1996): quoted legislative history (S.B. No. 17 synopsis) describing CSAC as creating a “new and separate crime,” supporting the conclusion that cumulative punishment was intended even where an older version of the underlying intercourse statute lacked an explicit “separate charge” clause.

D. SENTAC guidelines and reasons for departure

Brochu v. State (2016) and Mayes v. State (1992): controlled the Court’s rejection of Wood’s guideline-based and “no-aggravators-stated” arguments. Together, they confirm that SENTAC guidelines are voluntary/nonbinding and that a defendant cannot obtain relief from a statutorily authorized sentence merely because it exceeds the guideline recommendation or because reasons were not stated “for the record.”

E. Procedural history cases (contextual, not doctrinal drivers)

Wood v. State, 956 A.2 d 12 2 8 (Del. 2 008) (direct appeal affirmed convictions/sentence).
Wood v. State (2010; 2011; 2018) (postconviction denials affirmed).
Wood v. Pierce (2015) and Wood v. May (2021) (federal habeas efforts denied).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The Court’s threshold methodology: what Rule 35(a) can—and cannot—do

The Court began with the Brittingham v. State definition of “illegal sentence,” using it as a jurisdictional/functional gatekeeper. This framing matters: Wood attempted to inject conviction-level complaints (jury instructions, evidentiary sufficiency, ineffective assistance) into a sentencing-correction vehicle. By treating those as outside Rule 35(a)’s limited mission, the Court kept the inquiry focused on whether the sentence was unlawful in the Brittingham sense.

B. The indictment citation problem: why it did not make the CG sentences “illegal”

The Supreme Court itself raised the apparent defect: for conduct between Sept. 1, 1996, and June 30, 1998, the operative “rape” offense was codified as first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse under then-extant Section 775, while the indictment referenced an offense title (“first-degree rape”) that did not yet exist and cited then-extant Section 773 (which then described a different crime).

The Court’s resolution turned on notice and essential facts. Despite the wrong label/citation, the indictment alleged the elements the State had to prove under the then-applicable scheme: (1) intentional sexual intercourse, (2) victim under 12, (3) defendant over 18. Under Robinson v. State and Del. Super. Ct. Crim R. 7(c), that kind of defect is a matter of form, curable without altering the substance of the charge and without prejudicing substantial rights.

The practical consequence is significant: the Court treated the jury’s CG verdicts as convictions for the offense that actually existed at the time—first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse under then-extant Section 775—and held the sentencing court had authority to sentence on those convictions. Kellam v. State bolstered the conclusion that such curable defects do not strip jurisdiction.

C. Double jeopardy: cumulative punishment for CSAC and underlying intercourse crimes

Wood argued that punishing both the intercourse offenses and CSAC violated double jeopardy. Relying on St. Louis v. State, the Court reasoned that CSAC and first-degree rape are distinct because CSAC requires proof of a course of conduct (three or more acts over at least three months with a child under 14, plus living with/recurring access), while rape requires proof of sexual intercourse under specific circumstances.

The Court then extended this logic to the earlier statute: first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse likewise contains elements not required by CSAC (and vice versa), so each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not—defeating the double jeopardy challenge.

The Court also noted an explicit legislative authorization of cumulative punishment in 11 Del. C. § 773(b) (2000) (applicable to SP counts). For the CG counts (under Section 775), the Court acknowledged the absence of the same express clause but relied on State v. Leighton’s legislative-history quotation that CSAC was designed as a “new and separate crime”—supporting cumulative punishment as a matter of legislative intent.

D. SENTAC, aggravating factors, and “closed mind” claims: why they failed under Rule 35(a)

The Court rejected Wood’s arguments that the CSAC sentence was “excessive,” lacked cited aggravators, and exceeded SENTAC. Under Mayes v. State and Brochu v. State, SENTAC guidelines are nonbinding and the absence of stated reasons for departure (or aggravators noted on the sentencing order) does not make an otherwise statutorily authorized sentence “illegal.”

Finally, the Court found no record support for assertions that sentencing relied on demonstrably false information or judicial bias/vindictiveness—allegations that, even when colorable, require more than conclusory claims to transform a statutory-range sentence into an illegal one.

3.3. Impact

Indictment miscitation in historical-code cases: The decision provides a practical template for handling prosecutions spanning statutory renumbering/renaming. Where the indictment’s narrative allegations track the elements and provide notice, Delaware courts may treat incorrect labels/citations as form errors—reducing the likelihood that old-code miscues become postconviction escape hatches.
Rule 35(a) discipline: The Court reinforces Rule 35(a) as a narrow remedy, limiting its use to sentence legality rather than conviction validity. Litigants should expect attempts to repackage trial and counsel-error claims as “illegal sentence” arguments to be rejected.
CSAC stacking is reaffirmed (and broadened): By applying the St. Louis v. State rationale to first-degree unlawful sexual intercourse, the Court strengthens the State’s ability to seek cumulative punishment for course-of-conduct child abuse plus discrete underlying acts, including under prior statutory frameworks.
Guideline departures remain largely unreviewable as “illegality”: By reiterating Mayes v. State, the Court signals continued reluctance to treat guideline noncompliance or incomplete on-the-record reasoning as “illegal sentence” defects when the sentence is within statutory bounds.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 35(a) “illegal sentence”: A narrow remedy to fix sentences a court had no legal authority to impose (e.g., above statutory maximum, double-jeopardy forbidden, internally contradictory). It is not a general postconviction appeal.
Indictment error of “form” vs. “substance”: A form error is a mistake like a wrong statute number or mislabeled offense name that does not change what conduct is alleged and does not prejudice the defense. A substance error changes the charge itself or undermines notice of what must be defended.
Plain error: A highly deferential review standard for issues raised for the first time on appeal; relief is reserved for obvious errors that affect substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings.
Double jeopardy (multiple punishments): The Constitution generally forbids multiple punishments for the “same offense,” but separate offenses may be cumulatively punished if each requires proof of a fact the other does not, or if the legislature clearly intended cumulative punishment.
SENTAC guidelines: Delaware’s sentencing guidelines are advisory. A judge may sentence above them if the sentence remains within the statutory range; failure to justify the departure on the record typically does not make the sentence illegal.
CSAC (continuous sexual abuse of a child): A course-of-conduct crime aimed at repeated abuse over time, easing proof problems common in child-molestation cases where victims cannot identify specific dates for each act.

5. Conclusion

Wood v. State reinforces three core principles in Delaware criminal practice. First, indictment mislabeling or miscitation—even involving statutes that did not yet exist—does not automatically invalidate convictions or sentences when the indictment alleges the essential facts and provides fair notice, making the defect one of “form.” Second, Rule 35(a) remains tightly confined to true sentence illegality, not a second route for attacking trial proceedings or counsel performance. Third, CSAC may be punished cumulatively with underlying intercourse offenses without violating double jeopardy because the crimes contain distinct elements and reflect legislative intent to create a separate course-of-conduct offense. In combination, these holdings fortify finality in long-running child-sex-abuse prosecutions while clarifying how courts should treat charging-document errors arising from shifting statutory nomenclature.