When Duration Equals Scope: Delegating the Temporal Reach of Arbitration Agreements in Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Abigail Dalila Cerna, as Next Friend of R.W. v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC confronts a recurring and practically important question in arbitration law: who decides whether an arbitration agreement covers a later-occurring incident when the contract is silent about duration?

The case arises from a child’s injury at a trampoline and adventure park. On a first visit, the child’s mother signed a comprehensive release and arbitration agreement. On a second visit months later, she did not sign a new document, and her child was allegedly injured. When she sued, the park sought to compel arbitration under the earlier agreement.

The central doctrinal question was not whether the claims, in fact, fall within the arbitration clause. Instead, it was who gets to answer that question:

Is this a “formation” or “existence” issue that only a court can decide?
Or is it a “scope” (arbitrability) issue that can be delegated to an arbitrator under a clear delegation clause?

Justice Bland, writing for a unanimous Court, affirms the court of appeals and holds that, where the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement are undisputed and no superseding contract is invoked, the question whether the agreement extends to a later event is a scope question. Because the parties here clearly and unmistakably delegated scope and arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, the trial court was required to compel arbitration and leave the duration/coverage question to the arbitrator.

This opinion clarifies and reinforces Texas’s “two-step” framework for arbitration motions—existence vs. scope—and significantly tightens the boundary between non-delegable existence challenges and delegable scope disputes, especially where parties attempt to recharacterize scope objections as formation defects.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The August 2020 Visit and Agreement

On August 30, 2020, Abigail Cerna and her child visited Pearland Urban Air Trampoline and Adventure Park. As a condition of entry, Cerna signed a document titled:

“Customer Release, Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, and Indemnification Agreement” (the “August Agreement”).

Key features of the August Agreement included:

Broad Release of Claims – Cerna released all claims against Urban Air and related entities in exchange for entrance to the Pearland location “or any other premises owned or operated by Urban Air wherever located.”
Broad Arbitration Clause – The clause required that:
“Any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, breach thereof, the Premises, Activities, property damage (real or personal), personal injury (including death), or the scope, arbitrability, or validity of this arbitration agreement (Dispute)… [be] settled by binding arbitration…”
Disputes were to be administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Commercial Industry Arbitration Rules.
No Express Duration Term – The agreement did not specify how long it would last or whether it would apply to future visits beyond the initial entry.

B. The November 2020 Visit and Injury

On November 21, 2020—almost three months later—Cerna and her child returned to the same Urban Air facility:

No new release or arbitration agreement was signed at the second visit.
During this visit, Cerna alleges that her child suffered a serious foot injury while jumping on a trampoline.

Cerna subsequently filed suit against Urban Air, alleging negligence and related tort claims arising from the November incident.

C. Motion to Compel Arbitration

Urban Air moved to compel arbitration, arguing that:

The August Agreement was a valid contract binding Cerna (and her child, through her status as next friend).
The arbitration clause applied to:
- Personal injury claims arising from the premises and activities at the park; and
- Disputes about the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration provision.
Therefore, whether the November visit was covered was itself a question the parties had delegated to the arbitrator.

Cerna opposed the motion, asserting that:

The August Agreement did not (and could not) apply to the November visit.
Because no agreement was executed in November, there was no arbitration agreement governing the November incident.
Thus, the threshold question was one of the existence of an arbitration agreement for the November visit—something only the court could decide.

The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration.

D. Court of Appeals Decision

On interlocutory appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Houston) reversed. It held:

Valid Contract – The August Agreement was a valid contract binding Cerna and, via her capacity, her child. (Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air, 693 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024).)
Argument Was About Scope, Not Existence – Cerna’s contention that the August Agreement did not apply to the November visit was characterized as a scope challenge: it addressed what claims or events the agreement covered, not whether a contract had formed. (Id. at 716–17.)
Delegation Clause Controlled – Because the August Agreement expressly delegated disputes concerning “scope, arbitrability, or validity” to an arbitrator, the court held that such questions must be decided in arbitration, not by the court. (Id. at 717.)

The court of appeals also addressed a second issue about whether the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) required the parties’ attorneys to sign the agreement. It concluded that question too was delegated to the arbitrator. The concurring justice would have treated that as a formation issue, but concluded the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed. Cerna did not raise this issue in the Supreme Court of Texas.

E. Supreme Court of Texas Review

The Supreme Court of Texas granted review. The key question before it was narrow but important:

Given that the August Agreement is a valid arbitration agreement, is the dispute over whether it covers the November visit a non-delegable “existence/formation” question for the court, or a delegable “scope/arbitrability” question for the arbitrator?

The Court affirmed the court of appeals and directed the trial court to compel arbitration.

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Court reiterates the two-step framework governing motions to compel arbitration:

Existence: The court must first decide whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
Scope: If an agreement exists, the next question is whether the present claims fall within that agreement’s scope. Parties may, however, delegate this scope question to an arbitrator through a clear and unmistakable delegation clause.

Applying that framework, the Court holds:

Cerna does not dispute the validity or formation of the August Agreement.
She does not claim any superseding contract was formed in November that might negate or replace the August Agreement.
Her contention—that the August Agreement does not apply to the November visit because it lacked durational language—is therefore a question about the scope (or temporal reach) of an existing agreement, not about its existence.
The August Agreement’s arbitration clause explicitly requires arbitration of disputes involving the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration agreement. This is a “clear and unmistakable” delegation of arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.
Because the parties unmistakably delegated scope/arbitrability questions, the court must compel arbitration and allow the arbitrator to decide whether the November claims fall within the agreement’s reach.

The Court expressly declines to opine on the merits—i.e., whether the August Agreement does in fact cover the November visit. That is for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Doctrinal Framework: Existence vs. Scope and Delegation

1. The Two-Step Inquiry

The Court restates the basic rule for compelling arbitration, citing In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011):

(1) there is a valid arbitration clause, and (2) the claims in dispute fall within that agreement’s scope.

This two-step inquiry maps onto two distinct types of questions:

Existence / Formation: Did the parties ever agree to arbitrate at all?
- Was there offer, acceptance, consideration?
- Was there capacity, authority, or a required signature?
- Is one party a non-signatory with no basis to be bound?
Scope / Arbitrability: What disputes does the existing arbitration agreement cover?
- Do these particular claims arise out of or relate to the contract?
- Does an exception or carve-out apply?
- Does the agreement cover the time period, subject matter, or parties at issue?

The Court underscores that a court must not compel arbitration unless it is satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists, citing statutes and cases:

Texas Arbitration Act (TAA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.021(b).
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 4.
TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694, 720 (Tex. 2023).
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 69 (2019).

2. Delegation Clauses and the “Clear and Unmistakable” Standard

Because arbitration is a matter of contract, parties can specify not only what is arbitrable, but also who decides threshold questions (i.e., “gateway” issues of arbitrability). A clause assigning arbitrability questions to the arbitrator is often called a delegation provision.

However, courts will not infer such a delegation lightly. The Court recites the established rule:

Courts enforce these “delegation provision[s]” only if they “clearly and unmistakably” delegate matters of scope to an arbitrator.

This standard is derived from U.S. Supreme Court precedent and has been adopted in Texas cases like Robinson v. Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 518, 525 (Tex. 2019), and TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d at 719.

Here, the August Agreement does exactly that. It expressly includes disputes about the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration agreement among the “Dispute[s]” to be arbitrated. The Court notes that:

It has previously treated similar language as a clear and unmistakable delegation (e.g., Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero, 642 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2022)).
Accordingly, the clause here likewise qualifies as a valid delegation provision.

B. When Is a Dispute About “Existence,” and When Is It About “Scope”?

The opinion carefully distinguishes between three categories that can be easily conflated:

Challenges to formation/existence of an arbitration agreement;
Challenges to whether an agreement still exists after a later contract is made (continuing existence); and
Challenges to the scope or applicability of a concededly valid agreement to particular claims or events.

1. True Existence / Formation Challenges

Courts must decide “challenges to the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate.” The opinion cites:

In re Morgan Stanley & Co., 293 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex. 2009).
J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227–28 (Tex. 2003) (courts apply ordinary contract law principles to ensure enforceable agreement).

Examples of such existence questions include:

Was the contract signed by a person with authority?
Was there mutual assent or meeting of the minds?
Is a non-signatory being compelled without a recognized legal basis? (See G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 524 (Tex. 2015).)

These are the types of disputes that a delegation clause cannot strip from the court; there must be an agreement before any delegation can operate.

2. Continuing Existence After a Later Contract

A subtler version of an existence challenge arises when the same parties sign a second contract that may supersede or replace an earlier arbitration agreement. Then the issue is whether the first agreement “still exists at all.”

The Court cites:

Transcor Astra Group S.A. v. Petrobras America Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462, 480 (Tex. 2022).
Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143 (2024).

In Transcor Astra, the Texas Supreme Court held that where parties later execute a settlement agreement, the question whether the original arbitration provision survived is one for the court because it goes to whether the arbitration agreement continues to exist.

In Coinbase v. Suski, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted this approach: when there are two contracts—one sending arbitrability to arbitration, and a later one sending disputes to court—a court must decide which contract governs. Otherwise, a delegation clause would improperly “elevate” itself above other contract terms and undermine ordinary principles of contract formation and modification.

3. Scope Questions: “Does This Agreement Cover These Claims?”

Once an arbitration agreement is conceded to exist and to bind the parties, remaining disputes typically concern scope. That is, does the agreement:

cover this type of controversy?
reach this subject matter?
apply during this time period or to this visit?

Examples from Texas cases include:

Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 283 (Tex. 2021) (scope issue where clause had a clear carve-out);
RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Tex. 2018) (party conceded existence but contested scope; delegation enforced);
TotalEnergies, 667 S.W.3d at 720 (dispute about whether claims “arise out of” a contract containing arbitration provision).

In TotalEnergies, the Court explicitly warned against “collaps[ing] two separate inquiries” by re-labeling a scope objection as an existence challenge—arguing that an agreement does not “exist as to the claims asserted.” The opinion in Cerna adopts this same reasoning.

C. Applying the Framework to Cerna’s Arguments

Cerna attempted to frame her objection as one of non-existence by asserting:

The August Agreement cannot apply to the November visit, and thus no agreement to arbitrate exists for the November visit.

The Court rejects that framing. It emphasizes:

Cerna does not dispute that the August Agreement was formed and is valid.
She does not claim it failed for lack of consideration, capacity, assent, or signature.
She does not claim that any new contract was formed in November that displaced or superseded the August Agreement.

Her only contention is that, because the August Agreement is silent as to duration, it does not apply in time to the November visit. That, the Court says, is a classic scope issue:

Cerna questions the extent of the agreement’s applicability—that is, whether it “exists as to the claims [she] has asserted in this suit.”

The Court treats attempts to phrase scope objections as existence challenges—which it describes as saying an agreement “does not exist as to the claims”—as doctrinally improper for two reasons:

It conflates the two distinct steps of the Rubiola test (existence and scope).
It would effectively nullify delegation clauses, because any scope disagreement could be rebranded as an “existence” issue and pulled back into court.

Thus, the Court holds that the temporal reach (duration) of the arbitration agreement in this context is a question of scope.

D. Enforcement of the Delegation Clause

Having concluded that the dispute is about scope, the Court turns to the delegation clause. The August Agreement provides that disputes about the “scope, arbitrability, or validity” of the arbitration agreement shall be settled by binding arbitration.

The Court notes that:

It has previously upheld clauses that similarly assign questions of the “validity, scope, and breadth” of arbitration agreements to arbitrators, as in Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, 642 S.W.3d at 587.
It has consistently held that when a party concedes the existence of an arbitration agreement, a clear delegation clause must be enforced. (See RSL Funding, 569 S.W.3d at 126.)

Accordingly, the Court holds:

The parties have agreed that an arbitrator, not the courts, decides whether the August Agreement applies to subsequent visits, and we must respect this agreement.

On that basis, the Court:

Affirms the court of appeals’ decision; and
Remands the case to the trial court with instructions to compel arbitration.

The Court deliberately “express[es] no opinion” on the ultimate question whether the August Agreement actually governs the November visit; that is part of the merits of arbitrability, reserved to the arbitrator.

E. Interaction with Federal Law: Henry Schein and Coinbase

The opinion reinforces its reasoning with two important U.S. Supreme Court decisions:

1. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63 (2019)

In Henry Schein, the Supreme Court rejected the “wholly groundless” doctrine, under which some courts had refused to send even a clearly delegated arbitrability question to arbitration if they deemed the argument for arbitration frivolous or clearly non-meritorious.

The Texas Supreme Court quotes Henry Schein to emphasize:

The “wholly groundless” doctrine improperly merged two distinct issues:
- Who decides arbitrability? and
- Who wins on arbitrability?
When the parties delegate arbitrability to an arbitrator, courts must respect that agreement, even if they believe the arbitrability argument is weak or frivolous.

Applied here, this means:

Even if Urban Air’s argument that the August Agreement covers the November visit were weak, that goes to who prevails on arbitrability, not who decides.
Because the parties delegated scope/arbitrability, the arbitrator must decide whether Urban Air’s position is correct or frivolous.

2. Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143 (2024)

Coinbase is invoked to delineate the boundary where courts must step in. It holds:

Where parties have agreed to two contracts—one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts—a court must decide which contract governs.

The Texas Supreme Court uses Coinbase to support its statement that:

A subsequent contract that may supersede an earlier arbitration agreement creates a true “existence” dispute (does the earlier agreement still exist?), which the court must resolve; and
Allowing an arbitrator to resolve that conflict would “impermissibly elevate a delegation provision over other forms of contract.”

In Cerna, no such later, potentially conflicting contract exists for the November visit. Hence, the Coinbase scenario does not apply, and the matter remains a delegable scope question.

F. Other Precedents Cited and Their Roles

The opinion situates itself within the Court’s broader arbitration jurisprudence by citing a series of prior Texas cases:

In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001) – Establishes that once the movant proves an agreement’s existence, the court must determine whether the agreement covers the non-movant’s claims (the classic existence-then-scope structure).
Robinson v. Home Owners Management Enterprises, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2019) – Explains “questions of arbitrability” and the clear and unmistakable standard; limits those questions to:
- whether a valid arbitration agreement exists; and
- whether that agreement applies to a type of controversy.
Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. Sotero, 642 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2022) – Confirms that language assigning the “validity, scope and breadth” of the agreement to arbitration is a clear delegation.
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022) – Reiterates that courts must enforce arbitration contracts like any other contract (no special anti-arbitration rules).
RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. 2018) – Demonstrates enforcement of delegation where parties concede a valid arbitration agreement but dispute its scope; outlines the “proper procedure” for two-step existence/delegation analysis.
TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. 2023) – The closest precedent; warns against collapsing existence and scope; holds that disputes over whether claims “arise out of” an agreement containing an arbitration clause are scope issues, delegable if clearly provided for.

Collectively, these precedents provide the doctrinal scaffolding that Cerna builds upon and extends to the specific context of temporal coverage of arbitration agreements in repeat-visit settings.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Arbitrability” vs. “Merits”

Merits – Whether the plaintiff should win or lose the underlying dispute (e.g., negligence, causation, damages).
Arbitrability – Whether the dispute should be resolved in arbitration or in court, and under what rules.

Within “arbitrability” questions, there are sub-issues:

Was an arbitration agreement formed (existence/formation)?
What disputes does it cover (scope)?
Is the agreement still in effect in light of later contracts (continuing existence)?
Are there defenses like unconscionability applicable to the arbitration clause?

B. Delegation Provision

A “delegation provision” is a clause within an arbitration agreement that explicitly states that disputes about:

the scope of the arbitration agreement,
its validity, or
whether particular claims are arbitrable

will be decided by the arbitrator rather than by a court. Because that is a significant shift from the default rule, courts require that the parties’ intention to delegate these gateway questions be “clear and unmistakable.”

C. Existence vs. Scope in Everyday Terms

A simple analogy helps:

Existence Question: Did we ever sign any contract to use this gym?
– If the answer is “no contract was ever entered into,” that’s an existence issue.
Scope Question: Given that we did sign a contract, does it cover:
- this type of injury?
- this class of activities?
- this time period or this particular visit?

In Cerna, everyone agrees that the August Agreement was signed and valid. The fight is over the second set of questions— how far that contract extends in time and circumstance. That’s a scope dispute.

D. Why Duration is Treated as Scope Here

Because no new agreement was made in November, the question is not whether a contract still exists after being replaced or superseded; it is about how far the original agreement—concededly in place—reaches in time.

Put differently:

Does the August Agreement apply only to the day it was signed?
Does it apply to all subsequent entries until revoked?
Does the phrase “entrance to the Pearland location” imply a single-use or continuing license?

Those are questions about what the parties meant in the August Agreement—a classic interpretive scope inquiry, which, because of the delegation clause, must be answered by the arbitrator.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Strengthening Delegation Clauses in Texas

This decision further entrenches a strong pro-delegation stance in Texas arbitration law:

If a party concedes a valid arbitration agreement and that agreement clearly delegates scope and arbitrability issues, courts will rarely intervene at the second stage.
Parties will find it more difficult to escape arbitration by recharacterizing scope complaints (e.g., “this particular event isn’t covered”) as formation or existence challenges.

Drafting consequences:

Businesses that routinely use arbitration clauses—especially in consumer, recreational, and service agreements—may be encouraged to include explicit delegation language addressing “scope, arbitrability, or validity.”
Lawyers should expect that once such clauses are in place and formation is conceded, Texas courts will send a broad range of coverage disputes to arbitrators.

B. Repeat-Visit and “Once-and-for-All” Releases

The holding is particularly significant for businesses that deal with repeat visits on standardized agreements: trampoline parks, gyms, climbing facilities, amusement venues, and similar enterprises.

Key practical takeaway:

If a customer signs a release and arbitration agreement once, and the document is silent about duration, any later argument about whether it covers a subsequent visit will likely be treated as a scope question, delegable if a clear delegation clause exists.

The decision does not hold that a one-time agreement automatically covers all future visits; it only holds that:

The question who decides that issue—court or arbitrator—is answered by the delegation clause.

Businesses seeking maximum clarity may, nonetheless, want to:

Include express duration language (e.g., covers “this and all future visits until revoked in writing”); or
Require periodic re-execution of releases for each visit or at defined intervals.

C. Limits Preserved: Protection Against Unbounded Delegations

The Court makes clear that its holding does not mean delegated arbitration provisions will be enforced “in perpetuity and without judicial inquiry,” as Cerna had warned. Several safeguards remain:

The “clear and unmistakable” standard ensures that delegation will not be found by implication or accident.
If a party later enters into a new contract that changes the dispute-resolution mechanism, courts must decide which agreement controls under Transcor Astra and Coinbase.
Courts still must decide true formation/existence questions: whether any arbitration agreement was ever formed, whether it is void, or whether it binds the party at all (e.g., non-signatories without a recognized binding theory).

Moreover, if a party invokes arbitration in a wholly inappropriate context—e.g., urging arbitration of a dispute clearly outside the subject matter of the agreement—an arbitrator can and should reject that effort, and may treat it as frivolous.

D. Alignment with Federal Arbitration Policy

The decision aligns Texas law with federal arbitration jurisprudence:

It respects the FAA’s directive that arbitration contracts be enforced according to their terms (Morgan v. Sundance).
It applies the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the “wholly groundless” exception (Henry Schein).
It incorporates Coinbase’s framework for that narrow class of cases involving multiple contracts with conflicting dispute-resolution provisions.

This ensures a relatively seamless interface between Texas arbitration doctrine and federal law, reducing forum-dependent uncertainty on these threshold arbitrability issues.

VII. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Cerna v. Pearland Urban Air, LLC solidifies a key principle in Texas arbitration law:

Where parties concede a valid arbitration agreement and raise no superseding contract, disputes about the agreement’s temporal reach— including whether it covers a later visit—are questions of scope, not existence. When a clear and unmistakable delegation clause assigns scope and arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, courts must compel arbitration and leave those questions to the arbitrator.

The decision:

Clarifies and enforces the distinction between non-delegable formation/existence questions and delegable scope questions.
Strengthens the enforceability of explicit delegation provisions in Texas.
Provides guidance for entities using waivers and arbitration agreements in repeat-visit or recreational settings.
Aligns Texas doctrine closely with recent U.S. Supreme Court authority, especially Henry Schein and Coinbase.

In practical terms, parties who sign arbitration agreements with robust delegation clauses should expect that Texas courts will:

First, verify that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and has not been superseded; and
Then, if a clear delegation clause is present, send disputes over coverage, duration, and arbitrability to the arbitrator.

The governing message is contractual: courts will hold parties to the bargain they struck—including their agreement about who decides the very boundaries of that bargain.