Voluntary Home Entry and Probable Cause in Warrantless Arrests: Reaffirmation of Fourth Amendment Boundaries

Introduction

In Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept., 24-630-cv (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2025), the Second Circuit addressed a § 1983 suit arising from a warrantless arrest for alleged possession of counterfeit currency. Plaintiff‐appellant Kelly Glover challenged summary judgment in favor of Onondaga County, its Sheriff’s Department and two deputies, arguing false arrest, unlawful entry and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, due process violations, and municipal liability. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, clarifying the contours of probable cause, voluntary consent to home entry, and procedural due process when no formal charges follow a brief detention. Although issued as a summary order, this decision underscores important applications of established Fourth Amendment law and municipal liability doctrine in § 1983 practice.

Summary of the Judgment

The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Glover’s claims of false arrest/false imprisonment, unlawful entry and seizure, denial of due process, and Monell liability.
Deputy Albanese watched surveillance footage showing a woman (later identified as Glover) using two counterfeit $20 bills at a Wegmans store. He matched her image via a store loyalty card and DMV photos, went to her home, and—after she invited him in—questioned her. Glover admitted presence at Wegmans and use of bills but later offered an innocent explanation (bills from an ATM). Despite this, Albanese arrested and detained her for about four hours, conducted a strip search, continued investigating, then “unarrested” and released her with a signed waiver form. No charges were filed.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed:
1. No abuse of discretion in denying Glover’s late discovery motions or in deeming the summary‐judgment motion unopposed.
2. Probable cause existed to arrest Glover for criminal possession of a forged instrument under New York Penal Law § 170.30, based on video evidence, inspection of the bills, and her admissions.
3. Voluntary consent to home entry occurred when Glover invited Deputy Albanese in; she did not ask him to leave until after he announced the arrest. Thus, no Payton violation.
4. Brief pre‐arraignment detention (≈4½ hours) without formal charges did not breach due process; no private cause of action under C.P.L. § 140.20 independent of constitutional claim.
5. Monell claim failed because Glover suffered no compensable injury from signing the release form and cannot predicate liability absent a constitutional violation.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980): Prohibits warrantless home entries for arrests absent consent or exigent circumstances. The court reaffirmed that voluntary invitation negates the Payton bar.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991): Requires prompt judicial probable‐cause determinations (generally within 48 hours). A brief detention of under five hours with no charges filed does not violate due process.
Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996): Established that existence of probable cause defeats false‐arrest claims under § 1983 and New York law.
Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362 (2d Cir. 1989): Held that police need not possess evidence sufficient for conviction—only facts sufficient to warrant a reasonable person’s belief that a crime occurred.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Imposes municipal liability under § 1983 only when a plaintiff demonstrates a policy or custom that causes a constitutional violation.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit applied well‐settled Fourth Amendment and § 1983 principles:

Probable Cause: Probable cause exists when an officer has trustworthy facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution. Here, surveillance tape, physical inspection of the counterfeit bills, and Glover’s own admission established more than a mere suspicion. Under Grant v. City of New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), “passing a counterfeit note coupled with an identification” creates probable cause for arrest.
Voluntary Consent to Entry: Payton’s warrant requirement does not apply when the resident knowingly invites the officer inside. Glover’s testimony showed affirmative invitation prior to any request to leave.
Post‐Arrest Explanations and Continued Investigation: An officer is not required to accept an arrestee’s version of events and must pursue additional investigation as warranted. As held in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018), officers need not eliminate every innocent explanation before making an arrest.
Due Process and Prompt Arraignment: Under McLaughlin, a delay beyond 48 hours absent exigent circumstances is suspect. Here Glover’s ≈4½‐hour detention with immediate release and no charges fell well within permissible bounds.
Municipal Liability: Without an underlying constitutional violation or demonstrable injury caused by a county policy or custom, a Monell claim cannot survive. Signing a release form—unopposed and without prolonging custody—inflicted no cognizable injury.

3. Impact

Although nonprecedential, this summary order underscores critical practices for § 1983 litigators and law enforcement:

Officers may rely on less‐than‐complete information so long as probable cause exists at the time of arrest.
Invitation to enter a home, even if motivated by courtesy or perceived exigency, renders entry lawful absent later withdrawal of consent before arrest.
Delay in arraignment under 48 hours generally poses no constitutional violation if detainees are released promptly without charge.
Municipal defendants will continue to resist Monell claims where no direct harm flows from routine administrative forms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on facts and circumstances known to law‐enforcement officers, that a person has committed a crime. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or knowledge of every element of the offense.
Warrantless Entry Exceptions: The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant for home arrests (Payton rule), but voluntary invitation by the resident is a valid exception.
Prompt Arraignment: Under McLaughlin, courts demand that individuals arrested without a warrant be arraigned (or receive a probable‐cause hearing) within 48 hours. Shorter pre‐arraignment detentions—especially when followed by release—do not violate due process.
Monell Liability: Municipalities are not automatically liable under § 1983. Plaintiffs must show a county policy or custom directly caused a federal rights violation and concrete injury.

Conclusion

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept. reaffirms foundational Fourth Amendment doctrines in the § 1983 arena. It stresses that an arrest based on valid probable cause stands even if post‐arrest inquiry yields an innocent explanation, and that a resident’s invitation into the home absolves the need for a warrant under Payton. The decision also clarifies the bounds of prompt arraignment and Monell liability, emphasizing that neither brief, charge-free detentions nor routine waiver forms furnish grounds for due process or municipal-liability claims absent concrete harm. Practitioners and law enforcement agencies will find guidance here on structuring investigations, obtaining lawful entry, and managing the procedural aftermath of warrantless arrests.