Introduction

In this nonprecedential order, the Seventh Circuit dismissed Michael T. Jackson’s appeal from the revocation of his supervised release and the resulting sentence, granting appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders v. California. The appeal arose from Jackson’s 2021 conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), the terms of which included 36 months of supervised release following a 48‑month prison term. Within months of beginning supervision, Jackson was arrested for aggravated fleeing; over a year later he was recorded participating in a “brutal” group beating, leading to arrests for aggravated battery and mob action. After an evidentiary hearing at which Jackson contested all violations, the district court found multiple violations, revoked supervision, and imposed 24 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release—the statutory maximum custodial term for a Class C felony revocation and a total post‑revocation term within § 3583(h).

The core issues presented on appeal concerned: (1) whether Jackson had any nonfrivolous procedural or evidentiary challenges to revocation under Rule 32.1 and the preponderance standard of § 3583(e)(3); (2) whether an on‑video beating qualifies as a Grade A violation mandating revocation under Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) whether the sentence was procedurally or substantively deficient under the deferential “plainly unreasonable” standard; and (4) whether any challenge to the reimposed supervised-release term or its conditions could be preserved after no objection below. The court answered each in the negative.

Summary of the Opinion

• Anders posture and scope of review: Because Jackson plausibly contested the alleged violations, the court applied the Anders safeguards (Gagnon v. Scarpelli) and limited review to issues raised by counsel, especially given Jackson’s nonresponse to counsel’s motion (Bey).
• Procedural adequacy: The district court satisfied Rule 32.1(b)(2)’s requirements: notice, disclosure of evidence, assistance of counsel with cross-examination, and an opportunity to speak and submit mitigation (Jones).
• Evidentiary sufficiency and violation grade: Under the preponderance standard of § 3583(e)(3) and abuse-of-discretion review (Golden), videos showed repeated punching of a non‑resisting victim, supporting a finding that Jackson committed aggravated battery punishable by more than one year (720 ILCS 5/12‑3.05). That conduct is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), making it a Grade A violation and mandating revocation (§§ 7B1.1(a)(1), 7B1.3(a)(1)).
• Sentencing reasonableness: With a policy-statement range of 33–41 months (Grade A; CHC VI) but a statutory cap of 24 months for a Class C felony revocation (18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), § 3559(a)(3)), the court imposed the cap. The sentencing explanation addressed § 3553(a) considerations and mitigation (Childs; Castaldi). No nonfrivolous procedural or substantive objection existed.
• Supervised-release term and conditions: The combined 24 months’ imprisonment plus 12 months’ supervised release did not exceed the original maximum of three years for a Class C felony (§ 3583(b)(2), (h)). Any challenge to conditions was waived for failure to object with notice (Flores).
• Outcome: The motion to withdraw was granted; appeal dismissed.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Establishes that appointed counsel may withdraw if, after thorough review, counsel determines an appeal is frivolous and files a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Here, counsel’s analysis was deemed adequate, so the court proceeded to evaluate potential issues and, finding none nonfrivolous, granted withdrawal.
• Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973): Provides that defendants generally have a presumptive right to counsel in revocation proceedings when violations are plausibly contested. The panel invoked Gagnon to confirm the applicability of Anders procedures in this supervised‑release revocation appeal.
• United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014): In the Anders context, the Seventh Circuit limits its review to the potential issues identified by counsel, especially where the defendant does not file a response. That framework guided the scope of review here.
• United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2002): Best practice requires counsel to consult clients about risks of appealing a revocation. The panel noted uncertainty whether that occurred but found it immaterial given the absence of any nonfrivolous appellate issues.
• Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2): Enumerates procedural protections in revocation hearings—notice, disclosure, counsel and cross‑examination, and allocution. The court concluded the district court complied.
• United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2014): Confirms the procedural safeguards necessary for revocation were respected; applied here to reject procedural challenges.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3): Sets the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for proving violations and provides revocation imprisonment maximums keyed to the class of the original felony (two years for Class C felonies).
• United States v. Golden, 843 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 2016): Establishes abuse-of-discretion review for revocation findings and that a videotaped beating constitutes a Grade A “crime of violence” violation, warranting mandatory revocation. Golden directly anchors the panel’s conclusion that Jackson’s recorded assault is a Grade A violation.
• U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(1), 7B1.3(a)(1), 7B1.4; § 4B1.2(a)(1): Chapter 7 policy statements classify violations and advise ranges. Grade A violations include conduct constituting offenses punishable by >1 year and that are “crimes of violence.” Section 4B1.2(a)(1) defines “crime of violence” by the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
• 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8), 3559(a)(3): Post‑2022, § 924(a)(8) sets a 15‑year maximum for § 922(g), classifying the original crime as a Class C felony (10–25 years), which in turn sets a two‑year revocation cap under § 3583(e)(3) and a three‑year supervised-release cap under § 3583(b)(2).
• United States v. Childs, 39 F.4th 941 (7th Cir. 2022): On appeal from revocation sentences, review is “highly deferential,” and reversal occurs only if the sentence is “plainly unreasonable.” The panel found the 24‑month sentence within the cap and adequately explained under § 3553(a).
• United States v. Castaldi, 743 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2014): Requires consideration of nonfrivolous mitigation; the district judge did so here (employment, family ties, community work).
• 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) and § 3583(b)(2): After revocation, the sum of the reimprisonment term and any new supervised‑release term cannot exceed the original maximum supervised-release term (three years for a Class C felony). Jackson’s total (24 months + 12 months) complied.
• United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019): Failure to object to supervised-release conditions with notice operates as waiver; applied to foreclose challenges to the reimposed conditions.
• Illinois law (720 ILCS 5/12‑3.05): Aggravated battery is punishable by more than one year in prison. The court relied on the conduct shown on video to classify the violation as Grade A under the Guidelines.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: process, proof, and punishment.

1. Process (Rule 32.1 compliance): The court confirmed the district judge followed the procedural steps required for revocation. Jackson received written notice of the alleged violations and the evidence supporting them, had counsel who examined and cross‑examined witnesses (including the officer involved in the 2023 stop), and was allowed to present mitigation and allocute. The district court also struck references to uncharged firearm conduct and alleged gang membership, underscoring a focus on reliable, relevant evidence.
2. Proof (preponderance; abuse-of-discretion review): A preponderance standard governs supervised-release violations. The panel concluded the videos demonstrating Jackson repeatedly punching a man who did not fight back fully supported the district court’s finding of aggravated battery. Jackson’s arguments about the absence of medical evidence or the claim of self-defense did not carry the day: the finder of fact could reasonably conclude, by a preponderance, that his conduct constituted aggravated battery. Once aggravated battery was established, it qualified as a Grade A violation because it is punishable by >1 year and is a “crime of violence” under the force clause of § 4B1.2(a)(1). Under §§ 7B1.1(a)(1) and 7B1.3(a)(1), a Grade A violation mandates revocation. This reasoning mirrors Golden, where video evidence of a beating also yielded a Grade A classification.
3. Punishment (Chapter 7 policy statements; statutory caps; reasonableness): With a Grade A violation and Criminal History Category VI from the original sentencing, the policy-statement range was 33–41 months (U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4). But because the original § 922(g) conviction is a Class C felony (15-year maximum under § 924(a)(8)), § 3583(e)(3) capped revocation imprisonment at 24 months. The district judge imposed that cap after addressing the pertinent § 3553(a) factors: the seriousness of the post‑release conduct (a dangerous offense just two months into supervision and a later “brutal” beating), the need to protect the community and deter, and Jackson’s mitigation (employment, family, community work). Under the Seventh Circuit’s “plainly unreasonable” standard (Childs), the sentence was affirmed as reasonable. The additional one-year supervised‑release term complied with § 3583(h), and any challenge to the conditions was waived under Flores due to Jackson’s lack of objection.

3) Why the Precedents Mattered

• Golden’s conduct-based Grade A classification: Golden is pivotal because it confirms that, in the revocation context, courts may classify the violation grade by looking at the defendant’s actual conduct and asking whether that conduct would constitute a “crime of violence” punishable by more than one year, not whether the defendant was convicted of such an offense. The Jackson panel applied Golden’s logic to the video evidence.
• Childs’s deferential review of revocation sentences: By applying “plainly unreasonable,” the court made clear that well-explained sentences at or below statutory caps will rarely be disturbed, especially when the district court addresses key § 3553(a) factors and the defendant’s mitigation.
• Flores’s waiver rule for conditions: The panel’s reliance on Flores reflects a firm expectation that defendants must contemporaneously object to supervised-release conditions when they have notice, or risk waiver on appeal—equally true in post‑revocation settings.
• Anders and Gagnon in revocation appeals: The court reaffirmed that defendants who plausibly contest violations have the presumptive right to counsel for revocation appeals and that Anders procedures govern counsel’s withdrawal motions. Wheeler and Knox underscore a best practice of client consultation about the risks of pursuing a revocation appeal; the panel’s disposition shows that, while valued, a gap in the record on consultation will not bar granting a well‑supported Anders motion when nonfrivolous issues are absent and the defendant does not respond.

4) Anticipated Impact

Although nonprecedential, this order offers several practical and persuasive guideposts for supervised-release litigation in the Seventh Circuit:

• Video evidence and Grade A classification: Clear video documentation of a violent assault can, by itself, establish a Grade A violation. Arguments focusing narrowly on the absence of medical records or formal injury documentation are unlikely to defeat a preponderance showing where the video depicts repeated, forceful blows to a non‑resisting victim.
• Mandatory revocation clarified: Once a Grade A violation is found, revocation is not discretionary; it is mandatory under Chapter 7 policy statements. Defense strategies should therefore focus on contesting grade classification or the existence of the violation, not on asking the court to continue supervision despite a Grade A finding.
• Sentencing at the statutory cap: Where the Chapter 7 range exceeds the revocation statutory maximum, district courts may impose the cap, so long as they address § 3553(a) considerations. This order reinforces that such sentences, accompanied by a tailored explanation, will typically withstand “plainly unreasonable” review.
• Conditions waiver continues to bite: Challenges to supervised-release conditions—whether newly imposed or carried forward—are likely foreclosed on appeal if not raised with notice in the district court.
• Anders practice in revocation appeals: The court’s treatment underscores that thorough Anders briefs, rooted in the record and applicable standards, will be granted where no nonfrivolous issues exist, even if the record does not definitively show client consultation as recommended by Wheeler/Knox.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anders brief and withdrawal: If appointed counsel, after a conscientious review, concludes an appeal lacks any nonfrivolous issues, counsel may ask the appellate court for permission to withdraw. Counsel must file a brief identifying any potential issues and explaining why they lack merit. The defendant can respond. If the court agrees, it grants withdrawal and dismisses.
• Revocation hearings vs. criminal trials: Revocation is not a new criminal prosecution. The government need only prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not), not beyond a reasonable doubt. Traditional trial rules of evidence are relaxed, and the judge is the factfinder.
• Violation grades (A, B, C): Chapter 7 of the Guidelines classifies supervised-release violations by severity. Grade A includes conduct constituting offenses punishable by more than one year that are crimes of violence (among others). A Grade A finding triggers mandatory revocation.
• “Crime of violence” in this context: The Guidelines define it to include offenses involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another. In revocation proceedings, courts may look to the defendant’s actual conduct to decide if it meets this definition. A recorded beating plainly qualifies.
• Statutory caps and policy statements: Chapter 7 ranges are advisory. By statute, maximum revocation imprisonment depends on the class of the original felony (two years for Class C). If the advisory range exceeds that cap, the cap controls.
• “Plainly unreasonable” review: Post‑revocation sentences are reviewed with deference. If the district court considers the statutory factors and provides a reasoned explanation, the sentence will be upheld unless it is plainly unreasonable in length or process.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture of conditions challenges: When a defendant has notice of supervised-release conditions and does not object, any appellate challenge is typically waived (intentionally relinquished), not merely forfeited (overlooked), making reversal far less likely.

Conclusion

United States v. Jackson reinforces several settled but critical principles of supervised-release law in the Seventh Circuit: (1) the Anders framework governs revocation appeals where violations are plausibly contested; (2) video evidence of an assault can support a Grade A “crime of violence” finding by a preponderance, making revocation mandatory; (3) sentencing at the statutory cap is sustainable when grounded in § 3553(a) factors, even if the advisory Chapter 7 range is higher; and (4) failure to object to supervised-release conditions with notice waives later challenges. While nonprecedential, the order is a clear, practical illustration of how appellate courts will analyze revocation records for procedural regularity, evidentiary sufficiency, and sentencing reasonableness, and it offers a cautionary blueprint for litigants on preserving and presenting viable issues in this recurring context.