United States v. Hawkins and the Limits of Reasonable Suspicion to Extend Traffic Stops

I. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s published decision in United States v. Tremayne T. Hawkins (No. 24‑4502, Dec. 11, 2025) is a significant Fourth Amendment opinion refining when police may lawfully extend a traffic stop to investigate suspected drug activity. The court reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress a firearm discovered during a stop that began with valid traffic infractions but evolved into a drug investigation based on a set of largely generic and innocuous factors.

At its core, the opinion reinforces, and in some respects sharpens, prior Fourth Circuit case law (including Foster, Massenburg, Drakeford, and Bowman) that:

Presence in an area associated with criminal activity is a weak factor;
An old drug conviction cannot be used to “label” someone a drug dealer and then reinterpret mundane conduct through that lens;
An ambiguous parking-lot encounter, without visible exchange of items or other concrete indicia, does not amount to a “drug deal” just because an experienced officer thinks so;
Minor, reconcilable inconsistencies in stories from occupants of a car do not generate reasonable suspicion of crime; and
Even in combination, such weak, generic factors do not create reasonable suspicion sufficient to prolong a traffic stop beyond the time needed to address the traffic infractions.

The ruling thus places a meaningful constraint on the use of traffic stops as springboards for open-ended drug investigations, particularly in the context of “high drug activity” neighborhoods and individuals with prior drug histories.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Surveillance and the Traffic Stop

In the early afternoon, drug task force officers were surveilling a car in an area known to them for “high-volume drug activity.” The car:

had an expired registration,
had dark window tint, and
had a malfunctioning taillight.

The officers recognized the driver, Cornelious Johnson, as someone on federal supervised release for a 2015 drug conviction. Deandre Williams was in the front passenger seat.

The car drove to an apartment complex that officers knew from prior drug investigations. In the parking lot:

A man in a red jacket, Jackie Byrd (also known to the officers from prior drug work), approached the vehicle.
Byrd reached into the car and conversed with Johnson and Williams for about two minutes.
Johnson and Williams remained inside the car the entire time.
The officers later admitted they did not see any items exchanged or Byrd in possession of anything when he walked away.

After Byrd left, Tremayne Hawkins (the eventual defendant) approached and got into the back seat. The car drove off.

Task force officers relayed their observations to Officer Brandon Stanley, who stopped the car shortly thereafter. Stanley had several possible grounds:

An illegal left turn by Johnson;
The faulty taillight;
The expired registration; and
The officers’ suspicion that a drug transaction had occurred at the apartment complex.

During the stop, Stanley separated the occupants and questioned them about their recent interaction with Byrd:

Williams said they were coming from the apartment complex; when asked whether they met anyone there, he first said no, then acknowledged the man in the red jacket and said Byrd had asked for a cigarette.
Johnson also said they were coming from the apartments, and that Byrd was Hawkins’s uncle asking about a job.

Stanley viewed these explanations as inconsistent and called a K‑9 unit. The dog alerted to the exterior of the car. Officers then:

removed everyone from the car,
conducted pat‑downs, and
searched the vehicle.

No drugs were found. However, a firearm was found in Hawkins’s waistband. Hawkins admitted he was prohibited from possessing a firearm due to a prior domestic battery conviction.

B. Charge, Motion to Suppress, and District Court Ruling

A federal grand jury indicted Hawkins for unlawful possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of:

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).

Hawkins moved to suppress the firearm under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), arguing:

The officers had no reasonable suspicion of drug activity; and
Stanley unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time needed to deal with the traffic offenses, turning it into a drug investigation.

After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. It held that Stanley had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, relying on:

Johnson’s prior drug conviction and supervised release status;
The officers’ belief they had seen a hand‑to‑hand drug transaction with Byrd;
The area’s reputation for drug trafficking; and
Inconsistencies between Johnson’s and Williams’s statements.

Hawkins entered a plea agreement preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The Fourth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviewed the denial of the motion to suppress.

III. Summary of the Fourth Circuit’s Opinion

The panel (Judge Benjamin writing, joined by Judge Floyd and Judge Giles) reversed the district court and remanded. Applying Rodriguez v. United States and related Fourth Circuit authority, the court held:

A traffic stop may not be prolonged beyond the time necessary to address the traffic violation, absent either consent or reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.
The Government identified four factors to justify extending the stop:
- the locations involved (area of drug activity; apartment complex known from prior investigations);
- Johnson’s 2015 drug conviction and supervised release status;
- the two‑minute interaction with Byrd in the parking lot; and
- minor inconsistencies in Johnson’s and Williams’s explanations.
Each factor, considered individually, carries little or no weight toward reasonable suspicion:
- “High crime” or drug‑activity areas are a weak, generic factor.
- A prior criminal record, especially a decade‑old drug conviction, cannot alone give rise to reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity.
- The interaction with Byrd lacked any concrete signs of a drug deal (no items exchanged, no visible contraband, no abrupt hand‑to‑hand contact, and in broad daylight in a public lot).
- The discrepancies in the accounts of what Byrd had asked about (a cigarette vs. a job) were minor and easily reconcilable.
Even considered collectively under the “totality of the circumstances” test, these factors did not supply a particularized and objective basis to suspect criminal activity. At most, they amounted to an “inarticulate hunch,” which Terry v. Ohio forbids as a basis for intrusion.
The opinion emphasized that the Government’s case for reasonable suspicion was weaker than in earlier Fourth Circuit cases (Drakeford and Bowman), where the court nevertheless found no reasonable suspicion.

Because the extension of the stop was unlawful, the K‑9 sniff and the subsequent discovery of the firearm were tainted by the Fourth Amendment violation. The firearm should have been suppressed, and the district court’s contrary ruling was reversed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Governing Fourth Amendment Framework

The court begins with core Fourth Amendment principles:

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const. amend. IV.)
A traffic stop is a seizure and must be reasonable in scope and duration. (Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).)

Under Rodriguez, a seizure justified solely by a traffic violation “becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the traffic] mission.” That mission typically includes:

Checking the driver’s license;
Verifying registration and insurance;
Checking for outstanding warrants; and
Issuing a citation or warning.

To go beyond that mission—e.g., to turn the stop into a drug investigation—officers must either:

Obtain consent; or
Develop “reasonable suspicion” that “illegal activity is afoot.” (United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008).)

“Reasonable suspicion” is a lower standard than probable cause, but it is not toothless:

The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, together with rational inferences, that suggest criminal activity. (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).)
The court must assess the totality of the circumstances, and not parse each fact in isolation. (United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).)
Seemingly innocent factors can add up to reasonable suspicion, but courts are “skeptical of Government attempts to spin . . . largely mundane acts into a web of deception.” (United States v. Foster, 824 F.3d 84, 89 (4th Cir. 2016), quoting United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2011).)
Additional facts can also dispel a suspicion that might otherwise seem reasonable. (Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 386 (2020).)

This framework structures the court’s factor‑by‑factor evaluation of the Government’s proffered reasons for extending the stop in Hawkins.

B. Precedents and Their Influence on the Decision

1. Terry v. Ohio (1968): Specific and Articulable Facts

The opinion relies heavily on Terry’s foundational requirement that officers point to “specific and articulable facts” justifying a stop or extension. Terry warns against intrusions based on “inarticulate hunches.” Hawkins uses that language to reject the Government’s effort to elevate a bare suspicion of drug activity into reasonable suspicion.

2. Rodriguez v. United States (2015): The “Mission” of a Traffic Stop

Rodriguez is central: once the tasks tied to the traffic infraction are completed (or reasonably should be), an officer may not prolong the stop to conduct further investigation (like a K‑9 sniff) absent reasonable suspicion. Hawkins applies this rule to hold that the K‑9 sniff was an unconstitutional extension because the Government failed to carry its burden of showing reasonable suspicion.

3. Fourth Circuit Precedents on Reasonable Suspicion

United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2017): Recognizes “ordinary inquiries” incident to a traffic stop (ID, registration, insurance, warrants), echoing Rodriguez.
United States v. Foster, 824 F.3d 84 (4th Cir. 2016) & 634 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2011): Emphasize skepticism toward attempts to recast mundane behavior as suspicious; stress that prior criminal history must be coupled with concrete, present‑tense indicators.
United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011): Holds that “presence in a high crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation” to carry substantial weight.
United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc): Reaffirms that presence in a high‑crime area is at most a contextual consideration, not a stand‑alone basis for reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Drakeford, 992 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2021): Rejects reasonable suspicion despite a much denser web of drug‑related indicators, including a confidential informant, multiple suspicious meetings, syringes, and apparent hand‑to‑hand transactions; warns that the Government may not label someone a drug dealer and filter all observed conduct through that assumption.
United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 2018): Holds that factors such as nervousness, luggage, food, energy drinks, and vague travel plans—in isolation and together—do not amount to reasonable suspicion sufficient to extend a stop.
United States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2010): Recognizes that repeated brief, conversation‑free hand‑to‑hand contacts with multiple individuals can support an inference of drug dealing.
United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2011): Explain that while courts must consider the totality of circumstances, they may analyze each factor in turn before evaluating them cumulatively.

Hawkins synthesizes these precedents and goes a step further by:

downgrading the already weak “high crime area” factor when the location is merely associated with prior investigations;
refusing to bootstrap a decade‑old drug conviction into present reasonable suspicion; and
contrasting its facts with Drakeford and Bowman to show that if the more suspicious fact patterns there did not suffice, the far thinner record here certainly does not.

4. Supreme Court Authority on “High Crime Areas” and Dispelled Suspicion

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Recognizes that presence in a high‑crime area is relevant but insufficient standing alone.
Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (2020): Notes that additional facts may either support or dispel reasonable suspicion.

The panel uses these cases to further cabin the “high crime area” rationale and to support the idea that added context (e.g., broad daylight, public setting, extended conversation rather than furtive, quick exchange) actually undermines—not bolsters—the inference of drug dealing.

5. Out-of-Circuit Authority on Inconsistent Statements

The panel cites:

United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2010), and
United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965 (11th Cir. 2003)

for the proposition that minor, reconcilable inconsistencies between driver and passenger statements do not create reasonable suspicion. This undercuts the district court’s reliance on differing explanations about what Byrd had asked them.

C. The Court’s Factor-by-Factor Assessment

1. Locations Involved: “High Crime Area” as a Weak, Generic Factor

The Government relied on two location‑based ideas:

The officers were surveilling an area of “high‑volume drug activity.”
The apartment complex was known from previous drug investigations.

The Fourth Circuit sharply limits the weight of this factor. While acknowledging that a location’s crime profile is relevant context, the court repeats its consistent view that:

Being in a high‑crime area is “too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation” to carry substantial weight (Massenburg); and
The Government is not permitted to treat presence in such an area as a proxy for criminality (Curry, Wardlow).

Notably, the court emphasizes that the apartment complex itself was not identified as a “high crime area” per se, only as a place that had featured in prior drug investigations. This makes the factor even weaker than the already modest “high‑crime neighborhood” consideration.

In practical terms, the court is saying: “You cannot point to ‘this is a place we’ve done drug cases before’ as a meaningful building block of reasonable suspicion in the absence of concrete suspicious behavior.”

2. Johnson’s 2015 Drug Conviction and Supervised Release

The officers knew:

Johnson had a 2015 federal drug conviction; and
He was on supervised release starting in 2019.

The panel reiterates that a prior criminal record, standing alone, does not establish reasonable suspicion. Instead, it must be paired with “concrete factors” indicating current illegal conduct (Foster).

Here, no such present‑tense concrete factors linked Johnson’s old conviction to the events at hand. There was no evidence:

that Johnson was violating supervised release conditions;
of new, ongoing drug activity; or
that something about his conduct at the apartment complex resembled known patterns of dealing (beyond the officers’ unsupported hunch).

Invoking Drakeford, the court warns again that:

“The Fourth Amendment does not allow the Government to label a person as a drug dealer and then view all of their actions through that lens.”

To treat Johnson’s conduct as suspicious simply because of his past conviction would effectively authorize a perpetual, suspicion‑lightstop regime for individuals with drug histories. The court firmly rejects that approach.

3. The Apartment Parking Lot Interaction with Byrd

This is perhaps the Government’s strongest (and yet still inadequate) claimed basis for suspicion: Byrd, a known figure from prior drug investigations, approached the car, reached inside, and talked with Johnson and Williams for about two minutes.

The panel lays out what was not observed:

No drugs or money were seen.
No handshake or brief, furtive hand‑to‑hand exchange.
No bulges, no stuffing of items into pockets, no obvious concealment behavior.
No multiple individuals approaching the car in rapid succession, as is often seen in street‑level dealing (Johnson).
The conversation lasted about two minutes—longer than the abrupt, non‑conversational “hand‑to‑hand” encounters that usually trigger suspicion in case law.
The interaction occurred in broad daylight, in a public parking lot, not in a particularly clandestine or furtive setting.

Moreover, the officers did not even attempt to interview Byrd while still in the parking lot, meaning they made no effort to substantiate their impression with additional facts.

Against that factual backdrop, the court holds that this interaction:

lacked the concrete hallmarks that prior cases have required before deeming a transaction suspicious, and
could not be transformed into a “drug deal” simply because officers insisted “I know it when I see it.”

Quoting Judge Wynn’s concurrence in Drakeford, the panel underscores that the outcome of a suppression motion cannot turn on an officer’s unelaborated statement to that effect. Experienced intuition must still be grounded in observable, objective facts.

4. Minor, Reconcilable Inconsistencies in the Occupants’ Statements

The Government argued that Williams’s and Johnson’s differing descriptions of what Byrd had asked about during the parking‑lot encounter—one said a cigarette, the other said a job—supported reasonable suspicion.

The court analogizes to Pack and Perkins and holds that:

Minor inconsistencies in details that are easily reconcilable do not give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Here, both men:
- acknowledged being at the same apartment complex, and
- acknowledged interacting with Byrd.
The different explanations (job vs. cigarette) can readily coexist—Byrd may have done both or the men may have focused on different parts of the interaction.

Thus, the supposed inconsistency was too slight and too ambiguous to meaningfully contribute to reasonable suspicion.

5. The Totality of the Circumstances and Comparison to Prior Cases

The court then steps back to consider all four factors together, as required by the “totality of the circumstances” approach. It stresses two key points:

The totality test is not a license to aggregate trivialities.
The Government must still point to “concrete reasons to suspect criminal activity” when combining innocent‑seeming factors (Bowman). Here, each factor carries minimal weight. When added together, they do not suddenly crystallize into a particularized, objective basis for suspicion; they remain a collection of relatively innocuous facts.
The Government’s case is weaker than those in Drakeford and Bowman.
The panel expressly compares the record here to those earlier cases:
- Drakeford involved:
  - a confidential informant identifying the defendant as a trafficker;
  - multiple suspicious short‑duration meetings;
  - discovery of syringes in an associated vehicle;
  - a sequence of travel to and from a residence in a pattern consistent with drug pickups/drops; and
  - perceived hand‑to‑hand exchanges.
- Bowman involved numerous travel and demeanor‑based factors (nervousness, luggage, food, energy drink, vague itinerary).
In both cases, the Fourth Circuit still found no reasonable suspicion. The facts in Hawkins are “weaker” by comparison: only a brief, non‑specific encounter in a familiar location, an old conviction, a generic “drug area,” and minimal discrepancies in the occupants’ stories.

Given that even the richer, more suspicious records of Drakeford and Bowman fell short, the panel concludes that the far sparser record here cannot sustain reasonable suspicion either.

D. Procedural Nuance: The “Rodriguez Moment” the Court Sidesteps

Hawkins argued that Stanley effectively abandoned the traffic mission as soon as he approached the car and immediately launched a drug investigation, rendering even the early questioning improper under Rodriguez.

The panel notes:

Stanley did not issue a ticket (and rarely does);
He delayed giving even a warning until the end of the encounter; and
He testified that his focus was on investigating possible drug crimes.

Nonetheless, the court chooses not to resolve exactly when the “Rodriguez moment” occurred—i.e., when the stop ceased to be devoted to the traffic infraction and became an investigation requiring independent reasonable suspicion. Instead, the panel assumes for the sake of argument that all of the Government’s proffered facts (including the post‑stop statements) may be considered. Even under that generous assumption, reasonable suspicion is still lacking.

This approach avoids a more granular timing analysis but sends a clear message: even taking the Government’s strongest version of events, the stop was unlawfully prolonged.

E. Doctrinal Clarifications and Emerging Principles

Several important doctrinal clarifications emerge from Hawkins:

“High crime” or “drug activity” locations are extremely weak indicators absent concrete, individualized behavior.
The opinion slightly tightens the grip on this factor by emphasizing that:
- Being in or near a location of past investigations carries little probative value;
- Labeling a place as a “drug area” does not transform ordinary conduct into suspicious conduct.
Old convictions cannot be used to “brand” a person.
Police may not assume that someone with a 10‑year‑old drug conviction is always and everywhere a likely drug dealer. More is needed: contemporaneous behavior, specific intelligence, or objective indicators linking present conduct to criminal activity.
Ambiguous interactions cannot be upgraded to “drug deals” by officer fiat.
Conversations and gestures that are perfectly consistent with innocent social interaction—especially when officers see no contraband or exchanges—do not become suspicious merely because the officer “knows” a drug deal when he sees one.
Minor discrepancies in passenger and driver stories are not enough.
Courts will differentiate between:
- fundamental, irreconcilable conflicts about where people are coming from or going, which may support suspicion; and
- secondary, plausibly reconcilable details that do not.
Totality of the circumstances is not a magic incantation.
Courts will still ask whether, taken together, the factors meaningfully distinguish the case from everyday law‑abiding behavior. Aggregation of trivialities does not transform them into reasonable suspicion.

V. Simplifying Key Concepts

1. “Seizure” and “Traffic Stop”

A person is “seized” under the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, such as when an officer pulls over a car with lights and sirens. Every traffic stop is a seizure.

2. Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause

Reasonable suspicion is a moderate standard. The officer must have specific facts suggesting that crime may be occurring, but does not yet need enough evidence to justify an arrest.
Probable cause is higher—enough facts to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been committed and that the suspect did it.

In this case, the question is not whether officers had probable cause, but whether they had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond the traffic matters.

3. “Totality of the Circumstances”

This phrase means the court looks at all relevant facts together, rather than one at a time in isolation. For instance, being in a “high crime area” might carry little weight alone, but if combined with other, stronger indicators, could contribute modestly to suspicion. But totality does not permit stacking many weak, generic facts and declaring them suspicious by sheer aggregation.

4. “High Crime Area” Evidence

Courts allow officers to mention that an area has a lot of crime, but they treat that as a very weak factor because:

People live, work, and travel through such areas for entirely lawful reasons.
Otherwise, residents of those neighborhoods would be perpetually subject to heightened police intrusion.

Hawkins underscores that even weaker is the label “we’ve done drug investigations there before” when there is no statistical or concrete showing that the area as such is high crime.

5. K‑9 Sniffs and Extension of Stops

Officers often call a drug dog to walk around a car. Under Rodriguez, they may do so only if:

it occurs within the time reasonably needed to deal with the traffic violation; or
they have developed reasonable suspicion of an additional crime.

If the stop is prolonged solely to bring in the dog, the Government must justify that extension with reasonable suspicion—which it failed to do in Hawkins.

6. Motion to Suppress

A motion to suppress asks the court to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. If granted, the prosecution cannot use the excluded evidence at trial. Here, Hawkins moved to suppress the firearm as fruit of an unlawfully extended stop; the Fourth Circuit agreed suppression was required.

VI. Likely Impact and Future Applications

A. Policing and Drug Interdiction

Hawkins will likely influence day‑to‑day law enforcement practice in the Fourth Circuit (Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina) by:

Encouraging officers to document concrete, observable facts (e.g., visible exchanges, packaging, repeated short meetings) rather than relying on generalized experience or intuition.
Limiting the usefulness of “this area is known for drugs” and “this person has a drug record” as justifications for prolonging traffic stops.
Incentivizing officers to more promptly complete traffic‑related tasks rather than using the stop as an open‑ended opportunity to fish for unrelated drug crimes.

B. Litigation Strategy for Defense and Prosecution

Defense counsel will likely cite Hawkins to:
- challenge stops extended on the basis of high‑crime location, prior convictions, vague “hand‑to‑hand” observations, or minor story inconsistencies;
- argue that the totality of circumstances remains benign even when the Government strings together many small, generic facts.
Prosecutors will be prompted to:
- develop more specific, detailed records in suppression hearings;
- prepare officers to articulate exactly what about an interaction was suspicious—beyond labels like “drug area” or “known dealer.”

C. Guidance for District Courts

District judges evaluating motions to suppress now have a clear, published reminder that:

They must examine not only whether each proffered factor could be suspicious in some hypothetical case, but also whether, in context, it really distinguishes the defendant’s conduct from ordinary, lawful behavior;
They may not allow officers’ generalized experience or labels (high‑crime area, known dealer) to substitute for concrete evidence in the reasonable‑suspicion calculus; and
Comparative analysis with prior cases (Drakeford, Bowman, Foster) may be a useful reality check: if stronger fact patterns did not generate reasonable suspicion, weaker ones should not either.

D. Broader Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

Doctrinally, Hawkins continues the Fourth Circuit’s trend of robust enforcement of Rodriguez and Terry in the traffic‑stop context. It adds to a line of cases that:

resist dilution of the reasonable‑suspicion standard;
provide concrete examples of what is, and is not, enough to justify extending a stop; and
guard against the risk that individuals with prior convictions or those living in heavily policed neighborhoods will be treated as perpetually suspect.

As such, Hawkins stands as a clear, defense‑friendly precedent on the limits of transforming a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation based on thin, generic cues.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Hawkins is a significant reaffirmation of core Fourth Amendment protections in the context of traffic stops and suspected drug activity. The Fourth Circuit holds that:

Generic factors—an area associated with drug activity, an old drug conviction, an ambiguous parking‑lot interaction, and minor inconsistencies in occupants’ stories—do not, individually or collectively, supply reasonable suspicion.
Officers must rely on specific, articulable facts, not intuition dressed up as expertise.
The totality‑of‑the‑circumstances test cannot be used to stack trivialities into a justification for intrusive police conduct.

By reversing the denial of Hawkins’s motion to suppress, the court underscores that the Government bears a real burden to justify each extension of a stop beyond its original purpose. Hawkins thus strengthens the precedent that limits pretextual or exploratory extensions of traffic stops, ensuring that the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable seizures remain meaningful in everyday policing.