United States v. Halls: A Generic Reference to “Standard Conditions” Is Not a Valid Pronouncement of Non‑Mandatory Supervised Release Terms

Second Circuit, Summary Order (Oct. 1, 2025). Panel: Judges Park, Pérez, and Merriam.

Note: Although this disposition is a Second Circuit Summary Order and therefore non‑precedential, it applies and clarifies the Circuit’s precedential decision in United States v. Maiorana (Aug. 28, 2025) regarding pronouncement of supervised release conditions.

Introduction

In United States v. Halls, the Second Circuit addressed three recurring sentencing and plea issues arising from a narcotics prosecution in the Northern District of New York. Defendant‑Appellant Shameek J. Halls pled guilty under a written agreement to offenses arising from a drug‑distribution operation in Binghamton, New York, and received a 240‑month term of imprisonment. On appeal he raised three claims:

that the district court’s plea colloquy violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11;
that the government breached the plea agreement by advocating for two Guidelines enhancements not enumerated as stipulations in the agreement; and
that the district court impermissibly imposed two discretionary supervised release conditions in the written judgment that were not orally pronounced at sentencing.

The panel affirmed the plea’s validity and found no government breach. But relying on its recent decision in United States v. Maiorana, it vacated two discretionary supervised release conditions—the “Financial Records Condition” and the “Search Condition”—that were included in the written judgment yet never pronounced (or specifically incorporated) at the sentencing hearing. The court remanded with instructions consistent with Maiorana and reminded the district court of its obligation under United States v. Sims to conduct an individualized assessment before imposing any special conditions.

Summary of the Opinion

Rule 11 claim rejected: Applying plain‑error review (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)), the court held that the district court took sufficient steps to ensure Halls understood the statutory penalties—even though the judge allowed the prosecutor to recite them and did not immediately ask Halls if he understood that recitation. The court emphasized the judge’s subsequent inquiries about the plea agreement (which contained the penalties), Halls’s understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty, and Halls’s explicit affirmation to proceed.
Plea‑agreement breach claim rejected: The court construed the plea agreement under principles of contract law, strictly against the government but found no breach. The agreement preserved the government’s right to urge particular offense levels and Guidelines ranges absent an explicit stipulation to the contrary, and it disclaimed that any estimates were binding. The government’s sentencing advocacy for a credible‑threat enhancement and an aggravating‑role enhancement did not violate the agreement.
Supervised release conditions vacated and remanded: In light of Maiorana, a defendant’s right to be present at sentencing requires that all non‑mandatory supervised release conditions—standard and special—be pronounced, or expressly and specifically incorporated by reference, at the sentencing hearing. A generic statement that the defendant “shall comply with the standard conditions adopted by this Court” was insufficient to impose the two discretionary conditions at issue. The panel vacated those conditions and remanded for either (a) proper pronouncement after notice and with the defendant present (subject to waiver), or (b) striking of the conditions without a new hearing. The panel also noted that after Halls’s sentencing, NDNY General Order #23 was amended to remove those conditions; therefore, re‑imposition would require full recitation or explicit adoption of another written notice and an individualized assessment under Sims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rule 11 and Plain Error:
- Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1) requires the court to ensure the defendant understands the maximum and any mandatory minimum penalties.
- United States v. Johnson, 850 F.3d 515 (2d Cir. 2017): reiterates the Rule 11 advisements a court must give.
- Tellado v. United States, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2014): alleged unobjected‑to Rule 11 errors are reviewed for plain error.
- United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 (2010): defines plain‑error elements—error; clear/obvious; affecting substantial rights; seriously affecting fairness/integrity/public reputation.
- United States v. Rodriguez, 725 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2013): recognizes it is not reversible error per se for a court to delegate recitation of penalties to the government; courts assess the colloquy as a whole.
Plea Agreements and Alleged Breach:
- United States v. Wilson, 920 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2019): plea agreements are interpreted de novo, like contracts, but strictly against the government; prosecutors are held to meticulous standards.
- United States v. Rivera, 115 F.4th 141 (2d Cir. 2024): focus is on the parties’ reasonable understanding of the agreement’s terms; unpreserved breach claims are reviewed for plain error.
- United States v. Lenoci, 377 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2004): absent a specific provision barring advocacy for an adjustment, the government may argue for it.
- United States v. McDermott, No. 24-511, 2024 WL 5114132 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (summary order): agreeing to “data points” does not limit the government to only those inputs at sentencing.
- United States v. Hotaling, Nos. 24‑434, 24‑436, 2025 WL 2416346 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2025) (summary order): similar approach to government’s latitude where no express limitation exists.
Pronouncement of Supervised Release Conditions; Variance Between Oral and Written Sentences:
- United States v. Washington, 904 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2018): identifies as a question of law whether the written judgment impermissibly differs from the sentence orally pronounced in open court.
- United States v. Maiorana, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 2471027 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2025): establishes that all non‑mandatory supervised release conditions—both standard and special—must be pronounced or expressly and specifically incorporated by reference during the sentencing proceeding. Courts may not add them later in the written judgment.
- United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2024): when imposing special conditions, a court must conduct an individualized assessment demonstrating how each condition is reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors, and state reasons on the record.

Legal Reasoning

I. No Rule 11 Error in the Plea Colloquy

Halls did not object contemporaneously to the plea colloquy, so the panel reviewed for plain error. While the judge invited the prosecutor to recite the statutory penalties and did not immediately ask Halls whether he understood that recitation, the court’s overall colloquy satisfied Rule 11. Key points:

The Second Circuit has “never held ... that delegating to the Government the responsibility for explaining the applicable penalties constitutes reversible error under Rule 11” (Rodriguez).
The judge questioned Halls about whether he had discussed and understood the written plea agreement—which itself set out the maximums and minimums—and whether he understood the Guidelines and the consequences of pleading guilty.
When asked, “Now that you’ve heard about the potential statutory sentence and the guidelines, do you still wish to plead guilty?”, Halls unequivocally answered, “Yes.”

Given this record, any omission in not directly asking—immediately after the government’s recitation—whether Halls understood the penalties did not constitute a clear or obvious Rule 11 violation, and certainly did not affect his substantial rights or the fairness of the proceedings.

II. No Government Breach of the Plea Agreement

Halls argued the government breached the agreement by advocating for a two‑level credible‑threat enhancement and a two‑level aggravating‑role enhancement, which raised his Guidelines range from 168–195 to 228–270 months. The court rejected this claim because:

The agreement listed statutory maxima/minima and contained specific stipulations (e.g., drug weight; premises maintenance under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12); acceptance-of-responsibility concessions). It did not stipulate to an overall offense level or a specific Guidelines range.
The agreement expressly stated that any pre‑sentencing “estimate” of offense level, criminal history, or Guidelines range was preliminary and not binding on the parties, Probation, or the court; and that, absent an explicit stipulation limiting advocacy, the government could urge the court to adopt particular offense levels, grounds for departure, or Guidelines ranges.
Although the government offered an estimated range at the change‑of‑plea hearing at the court’s request, Halls had already signed the agreement. The judge also emphasized that the court could sentence above, below, or outside the Guidelines depending on the facts and law.
Under Lenoci, McDermott, and Hotaling, absent express limitations, agreeing to some “data points” or partial stipulations does not bar the government from advocating for other adjustments at sentencing.

Construing the agreement strictly against the government did not change the outcome; nothing in the text foreclosed the government’s enhancements advocacy, and the agreement’s disclaimers defeated any reasonable reliance on the hearing‑time estimate.

III. Error in Imposing Unpronounced Discretionary Supervised Release Conditions

The core remedial holding turns on Maiorana. A defendant’s right to be present at sentencing requires that all non‑mandatory supervised release conditions—both standard and special—be either:

read or otherwise pronounced during the sentencing proceeding; or
expressly adopted or specifically incorporated by reference to “particular” conditions previously set forth in writing and made available to the defendant in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a court‑adopted notice.

At Halls’s sentencing, the court stated only that he “shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this Court.” At that time, NDNY General Order #23 included the Financial Records and Search conditions as “standard conditions.” But the sentencing judge:

did not recite those “particular” conditions;
did not specifically reference General Order #23 by name; and
did not incorporate any writing in which those conditions had been set forth for Halls (the PSR did not list them).

Under Maiorana, a generic reference to “standard conditions adopted by this Court” is insufficient. The two discretionary conditions were therefore “not lawfully imposed.” The panel vacated those conditions and remanded with explicit instructions:

If the district court intends to reimpose them, it must convene a hearing with the defendant present (unless waived), and either recite the conditions or expressly adopt/specifically incorporate a written notice made available to the defendant at sentencing. After NDNY later amended General Order #23 to strike these two conditions, a bare reference to that General Order will no longer suffice; the court must use another qualifying written source or recite the conditions in full.
If the court reimposes them as “special conditions,” it must conduct an individualized assessment under Sims, tie each condition to § 3553(a) factors, and state reasons on the record.
Alternatively, the court may strike the conditions without a new sentencing proceeding.

Impact

Practical Consequences for Future Sentencings in the Second Circuit

Pronouncement standard tightened in practice: After Maiorana and this application in Halls, district courts cannot rely on global or generic formulations (e.g., “standard conditions adopted by this Court”) unless they also expressly identify and incorporate a specific written set of “particular” conditions that was provided to the defendant at sentencing (e.g., PSR annex, Guidelines text, or a standing notice identified on the record).
Standing orders require explicit on‑record adoption: Even where a district’s general order enumerates standard or local conditions, the sentencing judge must either reference that order by name and specifically adopt it, or recite the conditions. A generic assertion is not enough.
PSR drafting and preparation will matter more: Probation offices should list the intended non‑mandatory conditions in the PSR or attach them as an appendix so that the court may incorporate them by reference on the record. Absent such listing, later additions in the written judgment risk vacatur.
Defense counsel should vigilantly preserve and seek relief: If non‑mandatory conditions later appear in the written judgment but were not pronounced or expressly incorporated at the hearing, counsel should move to correct the judgment or seek relief on appeal under Maiorana. Counsel should also consider objecting at sentencing when the court uses generic phrasing without specific incorporation.
Prosecutors should ensure a clean record: To avoid remands, the government should propose language and prompt the court to expressly adopt either (a) the PSR’s enumerated conditions, (b) the Guidelines’ standard conditions as written, or (c) a specific local notice by name and date. Where special conditions are sought, prosecutors should build a record addressing Sims’s individualized assessment requirement.
Limited scope of remand: Halls exemplifies that the appropriate remedy is ordinarily targeted: vacate only the unlawfully imposed non‑mandatory conditions and remand for proper pronouncement or striking. A full resentencing is not required unless other errors warrant it.
Plea‑agreement practice reaffirmed: The decision underscores the importance of clear plea‑agreement drafting. Absent an explicit stipulation barring further advocacy, the government retains latitude to urge additional enhancements. Defendants should not rely on colloquy‑time “estimates” as binding.

Systemic Effects in the NDNY and Beyond

NDNY General Order #23 changes are consequential: Because NDNY later removed the Financial Records and Search conditions from its general order, they can no longer be added via a simple reference to that order. Any reimposition now requires a full on‑record process consistent with Maiorana and an individualized assessment under Sims.
Increased alignment with national practice trends: While Halls itself is a summary order, it illustrates the Second Circuit’s move—via Maiorana—to require transparent, defendant‑facing pronouncement of all non‑mandatory supervised release terms, reducing after‑the‑fact surprises in written judgments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11 colloquy: Before accepting a guilty plea, the judge must ensure the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the consequences of the plea (including maximum and any mandatory minimum penalties), and the rights being waived. The court may rely on the entire dialogue and the signed plea agreement to confirm understanding.
Plain error review: When the defendant did not object in the district court, the appellate court asks whether there was an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. It is a high bar.
Plea‑agreement breach: Plea agreements are read like contracts, but strictly against the government. If the agreement does not expressly bar the government from advocating for an enhancement, the government may generally argue for it, especially where the agreement disclaims that any Guidelines “estimate” is binding.
Converted Drug Weight: A Guidelines methodology that converts different controlled substances into a common drug‑weight equivalent to determine offense level.
Aggravating‑role enhancement: Under the Guidelines, increases the offense level if the defendant acted as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the criminal activity.
Credible‑threat enhancement: A two‑level increase that may apply when the offense conduct involved credible threats of violence (the precise Guideline depends on the facts).
Mandatory vs. non‑mandatory supervised release conditions: Mandatory conditions (e.g., not committing new crimes) are imposed by statute. Non‑mandatory conditions (standard or special) are discretionary and tailored by the court. After Maiorana, all non‑mandatory conditions must be pronounced or specifically incorporated on the record at sentencing.
Oral pronouncement vs. written judgment: The sentence is the one announced in open court. The written judgment cannot add discretionary conditions the judge did not pronounce or specifically adopt at the hearing.
Incorporation by reference: The sentencing court may avoid reading every condition in full by specifically adopting a particular writing (e.g., PSR appendix, Guidelines section, or named court notice) that was made available to the defendant. Generic references are insufficient.
Individualized assessment: Before imposing special conditions, the court must connect each condition to the statutory sentencing factors (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)) and explain why the condition is appropriate for that defendant.

Conclusion

United States v. Halls provides a clear and practical application of the Second Circuit’s newly articulated pronouncement rule in Maiorana. The panel reaffirms three key principles:

A Rule 11 colloquy is evaluated holistically; delegating recitation of penalties to the government is not per se error, and a defendant’s understanding may be established through the plea agreement and the court’s broader inquiry.
Plea agreements that preserve the government’s advocacy rights and disclaim binding Guidelines estimates permit the government to argue for additional enhancements absent an explicit contrary stipulation.
Most significantly, sentencing courts must ensure that all non‑mandatory supervised release conditions are either pronounced or expressly and specifically incorporated by reference to particular written conditions made available to the defendant at sentencing. A generic reference to “standard conditions adopted by this Court” does not suffice.

Although non‑precedential, Halls underscores how Maiorana will operate in day‑to‑day sentencing practice: district courts, probation, and counsel must create a clean sentencing record that transparently identifies any discretionary supervised release conditions. Where that does not occur, the appropriate remedy is targeted vacatur and remand limited to the conditions at issue, with the option either to strike them or to reimpose them in compliance with Maiorana and Sims. The decision thus advances both the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing and the integrity of the sentencing record.