Unilateral Interstate Relocation and Joint Legal Custody:
Matter of Chad V. v. Kristen V. and the Perils of Moving Without Consent

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Matter of Chad V. v. Kristen V., 2025 NY Slip Op 06946 (Dec. 11, 2025), is a forceful reaffirmation of several core principles in New York custody and relocation law:

A primary physical custodian who shares joint legal custody may not unilaterally relocate a child out of state over the other parent’s objection.
Such a unilateral interstate relocation constitutes a “change in circumstances” sufficient to reopen an existing custody order.
Willful interference with the other parent’s relationship, including unilateral decisions about residence, schooling, and medical treatment, can justify a transfer of primary physical custody to the nonrelocating parent.

The case arises out of a post-divorce custodial arrangement in which both parents shared joint legal custody of a 2015-born child, with the mother as the primary physical custodian and the father enjoying frequent, flexible parenting time due to the close proximity of their homes in New York. After the mother secretly used a holiday trip to Illinois to marry a new partner and permanently relocate with the child, the father petitioned for modification of custody.

Family Court (Washington County) modified the prior order to award primary physical custody to the father (while preserving joint legal custody), and structured extended parenting time for the mother. The mother appealed, arguing principally that (1) her move was not a sufficient change in circumstances and (2) the child’s best interests favored her continued primary custody in Illinois. The Third Department affirmed in full.

In doing so, the court issued a particularly striking footnote rejecting the proposition— advanced by the mother and even by the attorney for the child—that a primary physical custodian need not obtain permission before relocating:

“Under the facts of this case, the argument by the mother and the attorney for the child that the mother, as the primary physical custodian, did not need to seek permission prior to relocating is anathema to the best interests of the child and is contrary to the well-settled precepts of family law.”

That language, coupled with the court’s analysis, gives this case particular precedential importance in the intersection of joint legal custody and relocation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Department’s decision can be summarized in three main holdings:

Change in Circumstances: The mother’s unilateral relocation with the child from New York to Illinois—significantly increasing the distance between the father and the child—constituted a clear and sufficient change in circumstances to revisit the existing custody arrangement. The court characterized the contrary argument as “completely devoid of merit,” citing prior relocation-modification decisions.
Best Interests and Custody Modification: Considering the totality of the circumstances, including:
- the mother’s unilateral relocation and lack of candor,
- her unilateral cessation of the child’s prescribed ADHD medication,
- multiple school changes after the move,
- the stability and family support available in New York, and
- the historically close and consistent relationship between father and child,
the court held that the child’s best interests were served by awarding the father primary physical custody in New York while maintaining joint legal custody.
Relocation Burden under Tropea: The court further held that the mother failed to meet her “heavy burden” under Matter of Tropea v Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 (1996), of showing that relocation to Illinois was in the child’s best interests. Although the parties agreed that Chicago might offer enhanced educational and cultural opportunities, the mother had since moved to a suburb without providing meaningful evidence about the new school or environment, whereas remaining in New York preserved the child’s familiar doctor, school, community, and family support.

Concluding that Family Court’s findings had a “sound and substantial basis” in the record, the Third Department affirmed the order granting the father primary physical custody and a detailed parenting schedule in favor of the mother.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Pre-divorce and initial custodial arrangement

The parents are the biological parents of a child born in 2015.
They separated in 2019. The mother moved out of the marital residence into an apartment located approximately 1,000 feet away, allowing the father frequent and regular contact with the child.
In 2022, a judgment of divorce was entered.
The judgment incorporated but did not merge a custody agreement under which:
- The parties had joint legal custody of the child.
- The mother had primary physical custody.
- The father had parenting time “as mutually agreed” – a flexible but practically robust schedule facilitated by the close proximity of the parties’ homes.

B. The mother’s new relationship and relocation

In May 2023, the mother met her current husband (the stepfather) online; he lives in Illinois.
In November 2023, over the father’s objections, the mother traveled with the child to Chicago, Illinois, ostensibly for Thanksgiving.
While in Illinois, she married the stepfather.
After the marriage, she informed the father that she had enrolled the child in school in Illinois and that she and the child would be permanently residing there.
The father learned of the marriage indirectly—from his stepdaughter’s father—underscoring a lack of transparency.

C. Father’s petition for modification

In December 2023, only weeks after the move and marriage, the father filed a Family Ct Act article 6 modification petition.
He sought:
- Sole custody of the child, and return of the child to New York; or
- If the child were allowed to remain in Illinois, a schedule granting him parenting time every holiday and the entire summer.
The father alleged that the mother’s removal of the child from New York without his consent was a change in circumstances.

D. Family Court’s decision

After a fact-finding hearing and a Lincoln hearing (in camera interview with the child), Family Court (Referee Racino) held:
- The unilateral move to Illinois constituted a change in circumstances.
- The child’s best interests required modification.
- The parties would continue to share joint legal custody, but the father would have primary physical custody in New York.
The court crafted a parenting schedule for the mother that included:
- Summer recess parenting time,
- Every other holiday, and
- Additional time as agreed by the parties.

E. Appeal to the Third Department

On appeal, the mother challenged:

The finding of a change in circumstances based on her relocation.
The best-interests determination that shifted primary physical custody to the father.
Other issues (not detailed in the opinion), which were summarily rejected as lacking merit.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Relocation as a Change in Circumstances

The court relied on longstanding Third Department authority to establish that a unilateral relocation can itself constitute the requisite change in circumstances to reopen a custody order:

Matter of Gregio v Rifenburg, 3 AD3d 830 (3d Dept 2004)
The court here quoted Gregio for the proposition that a unilateral relocation “which significantly increased the visitation distance” between a parent and the child is a sufficient change in circumstances.
Matter of Hanson v Hanson, 283 AD2d 677 (3d Dept 2001)
Hanson similarly recognized that a custody arrangement may be revisited when a relocation substantially alters the noncustodial parent’s ability to exercise meaningful parenting time.

These cases underpin the court’s rejection of the mother’s argument that her move was not a material change. By calling the argument “completely devoid of merit,” the court signals that, at least in this Department, unilateral interstate relocation that greatly expands distance is all but automatically a change in circumstances.

B. Best Interests Factors

The court cited Matter of Brooke PP. v Joshua QQ., 240 AD3d 1047 (3d Dept 2025) for the canonical list of best-interests factors:

Quality of each parent’s home environment;
The need for stability in the child’s life;
Each parent’s willingness to foster a positive relationship with the other parent;
Each parent’s past performance and relative fitness;
Each parent’s ability to provide for the child’s intellectual, emotional, and overall well-being.

Although Brooke PP. is recent, it essentially restates well-established New York best-interest criteria, which trace back through decades of custody jurisprudence. The Chad V. court uses this framework explicitly in evaluating the competing custodial homes.

C. Interference with Visitation as Evidence of Unfitness

Two key precedents are cited to support the notion that interference with visitation can be determinative in custody contests:

Matter of Ahmad v Naviwala, 306 AD2d 588 (3d Dept 2003), lv dismissed 100 NY2d 615 (2003)
This case articulated the powerful rule (quoted in Chad V.):
“[W]here there is a willful interference with a noncustodial parent’s right to visitation, it is deemed to be so inconsistent with the best interests of the children as to, per se, raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent.”
Matter of Meier v Key-Meier, 36 AD3d 1001 (3d Dept 2007)
Meier applied that Ahmad doctrine; Chad V. invokes it to underscore that the mother’s conduct—unilaterally relocating, altering schooling, and discontinuing medication without consulting the father—strongly suggests custodial unfitness.

In Chad V., the court explicitly characterizes the mother’s actions as the type of willful interference that triggers the “per se” inference of unfitness.

D. Relocation Cases Emphasizing the Nonrelocating Parent’s Relationship

The court relies on relocation-modification cases to stress that when a relocation would be highly detrimental to a parent-child relationship, it weighs strongly against the relocating parent:

Matter of Batchelder v BonHotel, 106 AD3d 1395 (3d Dept 2013)
The Chad V. court quotes Batchelder almost verbatim:
“[I]t is clear from the record that the proposed relocation would be highly detrimental to the father’s existing relationship with the child—particularly in light of the distance involved.”
Matter of Megan UU. v Phillip UU., 193 AD3d 1287 (3d Dept 2021)
Megan UU. similarly emphasizes the weight courts give to the impact of relocation on the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent.

By invoking these cases, the court aligns Chad V. with a line of decisions that prioritize preserving a close and historically consistent parent-child bond over the benefits of relocation, particularly when that bond would be substantially impaired by distance.

E. Unilateral Decision-Making and Custodial Unsuitability

The court references cases where unilateral major decisions by a custodial parent—especially in the context of joint legal custody—undermined that parent’s suitability as primary custodian:

Matter of Keefe v Adam, 85 AD3d 1225 (3d Dept 2011)
Keefe addressed circumstances in which a custodial parent’s unilateral decision-making (e.g., concerning residence, schooling, or medical care) conflicted with joint legal custody obligations and weighed against continued primary custody.
Matter of Meier v Key-Meier, 36 AD3d 1001 (3d Dept 2007)
As noted above, Meier is cited both for the interference doctrine and for supporting the conclusion that repeated unilateral acts undermining the noncustodial parent’s role justify modifying custody.

In Chad V., these precedents are applied to the mother’s unilateral choices regarding:

Relocation to Illinois,
Enrollment in multiple new schools, and
Discontinuation of ADHD medication,

all taken without consultation or consent from a joint legal custodian.

F. The Tropea Relocation Framework and Its Progeny

The cornerstone of New York relocation jurisprudence is:

Matter of Tropea v Tropea, 87 NY2d 727 (1996)
Tropea rejected mechanical rules (e.g., presumptions for or against relocation beyond a fixed radius) and adopted a flexible, child-centered, totality-of-the-circumstances test. Key Tropea factors include:
- Each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move;
- The quality of the relationships between the child and both parents;
- The impact of relocation on the quantity and quality of contact with the nonrelocating parent;
- The degree to which the custodial parent’s and child’s lives may be enhanced (economically, emotionally, educationally) by the move;
- The feasibility of preserving a meaningful relationship through suitable visitation arrangements.

The Chad V. court pairs Tropea with more recent Third Department applications:

Matter of Jahari BB. v Zada CC., 232 AD3d 1142 (3d Dept 2024)
Matter of Britney A. v Jonathan A., 238 AD3d 1447 (3d Dept 2025)
Matter of Anwar RR. v Robin RR., 196 AD3d 756 (3d Dept 2021)
Matter of Daniel G. v Marie H., 196 AD3d 801 (3d Dept 2021)

These cases collectively:

Reaffirm that a relocating parent bears a “heavy burden” to show that relocation is in the child’s best interests.
Emphasize deference (“sound and substantial basis”) to the Family Court’s credibility assessments and weighing of the Tropea factors.

In Chad V., the court explicitly holds that the mother failed to meet her Tropea burden, particularly due to the lack of evidence about the new suburban environment and the substantial continuity and support available in New York.

V. Legal Reasoning in Depth

A. The Change-in-Circumstances Threshold

To modify a prior custody order in New York, the petitioning party must first establish a “change in circumstances” since the entry of the last order, such that reconsideration of custody is necessary to serve the child’s best interests. Only then does the court proceed to a full best-interests analysis.

Here, the mother argued that her move to Illinois with the child did not constitute a sufficient change. The Third Department emphatically disagreed:

“The mother’s argument that her move to Illinois with the child is not a sufficient change in circumstances is completely devoid of merit. To the contrary, a unilateral relocation such as this, which significantly increased the visitation distance between [the father] and the child, is a sufficient change in circumstances.”

Key features of the court’s reasoning:

The relocation was unilateral, over the father’s sustained objections.
The relocation was interstate, from New York to Illinois, greatly increasing distance and travel burdens.
The move was effectuated in a manner suggesting concealment and lack of consent:
- The father’s text messages showed he was hesitant or dismissive of even a holiday trip.
- The mother admitted the packed luggage did not signal a permanent move.
- The father only learned of the marriage from a third party, not from the mother.

Under Third Department authority, these facts make the existence of a change in circumstances all but undeniable. The court’s reliance on previous cases (e.g., Gregio, Hanson) gives the ruling a strong sense of continuity with prior doctrine rather than a novel expansion.

B. Best Interests: Comparative Evaluation of the Parents

Once the threshold was met, the court turned to the best interests of the child. Applying the factors cited from Brooke PP., the court balanced the following:

1. Quality of the home environments and stability

Both parents were found to be “fit and loving” with stable home environments, in the abstract.
However, the mother’s relocation to Illinois introduced instability:
- The child had been in the same New York school district his entire life.
- After the move, he changed schools more than once (Chicago city and then a suburb).
By contrast, remaining in New York with the father offered:
- Continuity of school;
- Continuity of pediatrician;
- Continuation of existing extracurriculars and friendships;
- Proximity to extended family on the father’s side.

The court clearly weighed this continuity and stability in favor of the father.

2. Willingness to foster the other parent’s relationship

Initially, both parties had co-parented well, and the father had enjoyed frequent contact due to living only 1,000 feet away.
The mother’s unilateral relocation, however, severely impaired the father’s ability to maintain that high level of contact.
The court viewed the move as not merely a logistical change but as a form of willful interference with the father’s relationship, especially in the context of joint legal custody and the timing and manner of the move.

Under Ahmad and Meier, such interference is “per se” inconsistent with the child’s best interests and strongly indicative of custodial unfitness. This principle plays a decisive role in the judgment that the father is the more appropriate primary custodian.

3. Past performance and relative fitness

The court examined not only where the child lived, but how each parent exercised their custodial role:

The father:
- Consistently exercised parenting time prior to the move.
- Responded promptly by filing his modification petition within weeks of learning of the permanent relocation.
- Maintained a home environment that, notwithstanding the mother’s criticism about home improvement projects, was not shown by evidence to be unsafe or unsuitable.
The mother:
- Unilaterally relocated the child out of state against the father’s objection.
- Married during a holiday visit and converted what the father understood as a temporary trip into a permanent move.
- Unilaterally discontinued the child’s prescribed ADHD medication despite joint legal custody.
- Enrolled the child in two different schools post-move (indicating instability).

These actions, considered collectively, led the court to conclude that the mother was not well-suited to remain primary physical custodian, despite being a generally caring parent. The father’s consistent role, coupled with the mother’s unilateral decision-making, tipped the balance in favor of a custody modification.

C. Application of Tropea: Did the Mother Justify Relocation?

Even though this was formally a modification proceeding initiated by the father, the court effectively undertook the Tropea analysis for the mother’s de facto relocation request. It emphasized that the mother bore a “heavy burden” to demonstrate that relocation to Illinois was in the child’s best interests.

Notable features of the court’s Tropea reasoning:

Purported benefits of relocation:
Both parties agreed that Chicago could provide enhanced educational and cultural opportunities. However, the court stressed that:
- The mother had moved again—to a suburb—and there was no testimony at trial about the child’s new school or community.
- Thus, the mother failed to substantiate the claimed advantages with evidence about the child’s actual current environment.
Impact on the father-child relationship:
The father had been an active, hands-on parent with frequent contact under the original arrangement. Relocation to Illinois, with substantial travel distance and cost, would dramatically curtail that relationship, a factor strongly disfavored by Tropea, Batchelder, and Megan UU.
Feasibility of alternative visitation arrangements:
Although long-distance schedules can sometimes preserve relationships via extended holidays and summers, the court implicitly concluded that this arrangement would be a poor substitute for the frequent, ongoing contact the child enjoyed in New York.
Comparison with remaining in New York:
In New York, the child retained:
- The same doctor,
- The same school and peers,
- Existing extracurricular activities, and
- Support from the father’s extended family living nearby.
The stability and support structure in New York weighed heavily against the move.

The net result is that the mother was found to have failed her Tropea burden. The court did not need to reach nuanced balancing between modest gains and modest losses; instead, it saw the record as plainly favoring non-relocation and a transfer of primary physical custody.

D. Standard of Review: “Sound and Substantial Basis”

The court concluded by invoking the deferential appellate standard applicable to custody determinations:

“In view of the foregoing, and giving the requisite deference to Family Court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, the court’s determination that it was in the child’s best interests to award primary physical custody to the father has a sound and substantial basis in the record.”

This underscores that:

Family Court’s credibility determinations (e.g., which parent was more truthful about advance notice or consent to relocation) are given substantial deference on appeal.
The Appellate Division’s role is not to re-try the facts, but to ensure that the Family Court’s conclusion is supported by evidence that reasonably substantiates its decision.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying the Obligations of a Primary Physical Custodian with Joint Legal Custody

The decision’s most forceful language appears in footnote 1, where the court condemns the argument that a primary physical custodian need not seek permission before relocating:

“[T]he argument by the mother and the attorney for the child that the mother, as the primary physical custodian, did not need to seek permission prior to relocating is anathema to the best interests of the child and is contrary to the well-settled precepts of family law.”

Key implications:

In a joint legal custody arrangement, major decisions—including relocation out of state—are shared decisions.
A primary physical custodian cannot rely on their custodial status as a license for unilateral relocation.
Attorneys and parents should understand that pursuing a “move now, litigate later” strategy risks not only judicial disapproval but also loss of primary custody.

While this does not create new law in a technical sense, it offers an unmistakably strong and quotable statement that will likely be cited in future cases involving:

Unilateral relocations by a primary custodian, and
Disputes over the scope and meaning of joint legal custody.

B. Reinforcement of the “Per Se” Interference Doctrine

By embracing the Ahmad / Meier line, the decision reinforces that:

Willful interference with the noncustodial parent’s right to visitation is per se inconsistent with the child’s best interests.
Such interference “raises a strong probability” that the interfering parent is unfit as the custodial parent.

In practice, this means that:

Parents who unilaterally relocate, conceal their plans, or otherwise seriously undermine the other parent’s access are at serious risk of losing primary custody.
Family Courts have strong appellate support when they respond to such conduct by transferring custody.

C. Integration of Relocation and Modification Frameworks

The case illustrates how New York courts integrate:

The change-in-circumstances requirement for modification petitions; and
The Tropea relocation analysis.

In situations like this—where the custodial parent relocates first and the noncustodial parent then seeks modification—courts will:

Deem the relocation itself a change in circumstances (particularly if it is unilateral and out-of-state), and then
Apply Tropea within the best-interests analysis to determine whether the child should remain in the new location or return to the original community.

This integrated framework reinforces that relocation cannot be insulated from scrutiny simply because it has already occurred. If the relocating parent cannot demonstrate the move is in the child’s best interests, a court may shift primary custody to the nonrelocating parent.

D. Practical Guidance for Practitioners and Parents

The decision carries several practical lessons:

Do not relocate unilaterally in joint legal custody cases.
Parents must either:
- Secure written consent from the other parent, or
- Seek court permission for relocation before moving.
Document and communicate transparently.
Covert plans, ambiguous communications, and surprise permanent moves are viewed extremely negatively and will undermine a parent’s credibility and custodial position.
Major medical and educational decisions must be shared under joint legal custody.
Unilaterally discontinuing prescribed medication or switching schools without consent can be powerful evidence of disregard for joint legal custody and the co-parent’s role.
Noncustodial parents should act promptly.
The father’s quick filing after discovering the relocation bolstered his credibility and showed seriousness about preserving his relationship with the child.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion uses several technical legal concepts. The following explanations may help non-lawyers.

A. Joint Legal Custody vs. Primary Physical Custody

Joint Legal Custody means both parents share decision-making authority about important aspects of the child’s life: schooling, medical care, religious upbringing, and major moves.
Primary Physical Custody (or primary residential custody) means the child lives most of the time with one parent, but the other parent still has regular parenting time.

In this case, the mother was the primary physical custodian, but both parents had joint legal custody. Therefore, she was not free to unilaterally decide to relocate the child out of state.

B. Change in Circumstances

Once a custody order is entered (e.g., in a divorce judgment), it is not easily disturbed. A party seeking change must show a “change in circumstances”—a significant development that affects the child’s welfare since the last order. Examples often include:

Relocation that substantially affects a parent’s ability to maintain contact;
Serious new conflicts, abuse, or neglect;
Significant changes in a parent’s living situation, health, or stability.

In Chad V., the unilateral move to Illinois was the qualifying change in circumstances.

C. Best Interests of the Child

New York’s central standard in custody and visitation disputes is the “best interests of the child.” This is a fact-intensive inquiry that looks at:

The child’s need for stability;
Each parent’s parenting abilities and home environment;
The mental and physical health of the parents;
The child’s relationship with each parent;
Which parent is more likely to foster a relationship with the other parent;
Educational, emotional, and social factors.

It is a flexible standard, allowing courts to tailor decisions to the unique facts of each case.

D. Tropea Relocation Test

The Tropea test is specifically applied when a custodial parent seeks to move with a child, especially over a long distance (e.g., out of state). There are no hard-and-fast rules; instead, courts examine:

Why the parent wants to move (e.g., remarriage, better job, family support);
Why the other parent objects (e.g., harm to relationship, loss of contact);
How the move will affect the child’s relationship with both parents;
Whether the move will improve the child’s life (economically, educationally, emotionally);
Whether there is a workable plan for preserving the nonmoving parent’s relationship (e.g., extended holidays, summers, virtual contact).

The relocating parent has a “heavy burden” to show that, on balance, the move is truly in the child’s best interests.

E. Lincoln Hearing

A Lincoln hearing is a private, in-chambers interview between the judge and the child in a custody or visitation case. It allows the child to speak freely without the pressure of open court or parental presence. The interview is usually on the record but confidential, and it can be an important factor in the court’s best-interests analysis.

F. “Sound and Substantial Basis” Standard

On appeal, custody decisions are reviewed under a deferential standard. The Appellate Division asks whether the Family Court’s order has a “sound and substantial basis in the record.” This means:

There must be evidence in the record supporting the Family Court’s findings.
The Appellate Court generally does not second-guess credibility determinations or re-weigh evidence unless clearly erroneous.

In Chad V., the Third Department found that the Family Court’s decision met this standard and therefore affirmed.

G. “Per Se” Inference of Unfitness

When the court describes something as “per se” raising a strong probability of unfitness, it means:

That conduct is, in itself, so inconsistent with the child’s best interests that it almost automatically suggests the parent may be unfit to have primary custody.

Here, willful interference with the other parent’s visitation—especially through a unilateral and distant relocation—is such conduct.

VIII. Conclusion

Matter of Chad V. v. Kristen V. stands as a robust reaffirmation of several critical principles in New York family law:

Unilateral interstate relocation by a primary custodian with joint legal custody is a clear change in circumstances justifying reconsideration of custody.
Joint legal custody imposes real, enforceable obligations to consult and obtain consent (or court approval) for major decisions, including relocation, schooling, and medical treatment.
Willful interference with the other parent’s relationship—especially by relocating in secret or over objection—can justify transfer of primary custody, under the “per se” interference doctrine of Ahmad and Meier.
The Tropea framework remains central: parents who relocate must carry the heavy burden of proving that the move genuinely serves the child’s best interests, not merely the parent’s preferences or convenience.
Courts will strongly protect stability, continuity, and the preservation of meaningful relationships with both parents, particularly where a child has deep roots in one community and an active, involved nonrelocating parent.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of careful counseling: a primary physical custodian who shares joint legal custody cannot safely relocate out of state with a child without the other parent’s consent or court authorization. For parents, the message is equally clear: major decisions about a child’s life must be made collaboratively in a joint legal custody framework, and attempts to circumvent that requirement can have profound custodial consequences.

Unilateral Interstate Relocation and Joint Legal Custody: Matter of Chad V. v. Kristen V. and the Perils of Moving Without Consent