TransUnion Standard Applied to NVRA: Informational Injury Requires Concrete Downstream Harm

Introduction

The Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is a Third Circuit precedential decision (April 25, 2025) addressing whether a public‐interest organization (PILF) had Article III standing under the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) when its request for certain voter‐roll records was denied. Following discovery of a “glitch” in Pennsylvania’s DMV system that allegedly allowed noncitizens to register, PILF sought public‐inspection records under NVRA § 8 (52 U.S.C. § 20507). The Secretary refused, PILF sued, the District Court granted informational‐injury standing, and after cross‐motions for summary judgment, the Third Circuit reversed—holding that under TransUnion v. Ramirez private plaintiffs must show a concrete downstream harm connected to the statute’s purpose before an informational injury is “concrete” enough to confer standing.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit held PILF lacked Article III standing because it alleged only a bare procedural injury—denial of records—without any concrete, particularized downstream harm tied to the NVRA’s purpose.
PILF’s claimed injuries (inability to analyze Pennsylvania’s voter‐roll maintenance, to publish educational materials, and litigation costs) were too abstract or general to satisfy TransUnion’s concreteness requirement.
The court vacated the District Court’s summary‐judgment order (both in part granting relief and in part denying it) and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. An attorneys’‐fees award also was void for want of standing.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (1989) & FEC v. Akins (1998): Held that plaintiffs denied records under public‐disclosure statutes suffered a cognizable “informational injury.” The Third Circuit recognized these as foundational but explained they pre‐date TransUnion’s requiring downstream harm.
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (2021): Clarified that an informational injury is concrete only if (1) the plaintiff was denied information the statute requires to be disclosed and (2) that denial caused adverse “downstream consequences” bearing a close relationship to harms traditionally actionable in courts.
Kelly v. RealPage Inc. (3d Cir. 2022): Applied TransUnion to confirm that public‐disclosure claims must allege both denial and a nexus to a protected interest, i.e., a downstream harm causally connected to the statutory purpose.
Scott v. Harris (5th Cir. 2022) (NVRA context): Held civic‐engagement organizations lacked standing because they alleged no meaningful evidence of how withheld records would concretely further their voting‐rights mission.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three steps:

Statutory Purpose of NVRA: Congress enacted the NVRA to expand voter registration and participation in federal elections, and to protect electoral integrity and maintain accurate rolls—goals that transcend mere public access to records.
Article III Standing Requirements: Under Lujan and TransUnion, a plaintiff must allege (a) a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (b) traceable to the defendant, and (c) redressable by the court. TransUnion tightened the “informational injury” doctrine by demanding a downstream consequence linked to the statute’s interest.
Application to PILF’s Claims:
- PILF’s asserted harms—an inability to study and analyze state practices or to produce educational materials—did not align with the NVRA’s core purpose of enlarging voter participation.
- No evidence showed that denial of records actually hindered PILF’s participation in the electoral process or harmed any specific Pennsylvania voters.
- Lawsuit expenses and internal costs cannot manufacture standing: private plaintiffs may not “spend their way” into Article III jurisdiction.

3. Impact

This decision will:

Reinforce TransUnion’s framework across statutes with public‐disclosure provisions, ensuring a uniform requirement that informational injuries produce concrete downstream harms.
Limit broad “public‐interest” suits under the NVRA (and similar statutes) by demanding a tangible, statutory‐purpose nexus—reducing speculative or generalized challenges.
Guide lower courts to require proof of how withheld records directly impede voter registration, actual voting rights, or another NVRA‐protected interest.
Discourage litigation by out‐of‐state or non‐member organizations lacking a personal stake tied to concrete harm from denial of statutory records.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Standing: Constitutional doctrine requiring plaintiffs to show they have suffered a real, specific injury that the court can remedy.
Informational Injury: Harm resulting from denial of access to records a statute mandates be disclosed. Post-TransUnion, this alone is not enough—plaintiffs must show adverse downstream effects.
Downstream Consequences: Real‐world effects caused by lack of information—e.g., inability to register voters or challenge wrongful exclusions—directly tied to a statute’s aim.
NVRA § 8 (52 U.S.C. § 20507): Requires states to make voter‐roll maintenance records publicly available for two years and allows “any person aggrieved” to sue if records are withheld.
Zone of Interests: Prudential standing test ensuring a plaintiff’s interests fall within those the statute was designed to protect.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s ruling in Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Secretary, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania clarifies that under the NVRA (and analogous public‐disclosure statutes) private plaintiffs must do more than allege denial of information. They must demonstrate concrete, particularized downstream harms—connected to expanding voter participation and protecting electoral integrity—that flow from the record‐denial. By applying TransUnion’s heightened standing standard, the court reinforces constitutional limits on federal‐court jurisdiction and narrows the pathway for public‐interest groups to enforce disclosure rights absent a tangible, statutory‐purpose nexus.