Introduction

In United States v. Omelyan Botsvynyuk (3d Cir. Nos. 24-3253 & 24-3305, Mar. 28, 2025), a Third Circuit panel (Judges Bibas, Porter, and Montgomery-Reeves) issued a non-precedential, per curiam opinion summarily affirming two orders of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court had denied (1) a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and (2) a motion to reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(2) premised on Sentencing Commission Amendment 826, effective November 1, 2024.

The case arises from Botsvynyuk’s 2011 jury convictions for racketeering conspiracy and interference with interstate commerce by threats of violence, stemming from an extensive human trafficking enterprise involving Ukrainian nationals. He is serving a life sentence plus a consecutive 20-year term. After unsuccessful direct appeal and § 2255 proceedings, he sought sentence relief based on his sentence length, rehabilitation, health conditions, and a new guideline that bars the use of acquitted conduct in calculating relevant conduct.

The key issues on appeal were:

• Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying compassionate release by inadequately explaining its reasoning under Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), and by undervaluing asserted “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” including the new “unusually long sentence” ground in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).
• Whether Amendment 826 (excluding acquitted conduct from relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)) can support a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction when it is not listed as retroactive in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d), and whether non-retroactivity offends equal protection.

Concluding that the appeals presented no substantial question under 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, the Third Circuit granted the Government’s motions for summary affirmance and affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard and posture: Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court reviewed both denials for abuse of discretion and summarily affirmed because the appeals raised no substantial questions.
• Compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)): The panel held that the District Court’s explanation satisfied Concepcion’s requirement of a brief statement addressing non-frivolous arguments. The court further held that the “unusually long sentence” policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) requires a relevant change in law rendering the sentence disproportionate to what would be imposed today; Botsvynyuk identified no such change. The District Court also considered the § 3553(a) factors and his rehabilitation and health, and did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.
• Sentence reduction (§ 3582(c)(2)): The court held that Amendment 826 cannot support a § 3582(c)(2) reduction because it is not made retroactive in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d), and § 3582(c)(2) authorizes reductions only for retroactive amendments. The panel noted, additionally, that Botsvynyuk had not shown his sentence was enhanced by acquitted conduct. His equal protection argument challenging the Commission’s decision not to make Amendment 826 retroactive was unsupported and, in any event, undermined by the absence of any acquitted-conduct enhancement in his case.
• Outcome: Affirmed in full; Government’s motions for summary affirmance granted.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020): Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard governing compassionate release decisions. The panel reiterated that an appellate court will not disturb a denial absent a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors.
• United States v. Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016): Confirmed the deferential review posture in sentence-modification contexts.
• Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501–02 (2022): The Supreme Court held that district courts resolving sentence-modification motions must consider non-frivolous arguments but are not required to provide point-by-point rebuttals. The Third Circuit applied this principle to reject the argument that the District Court’s explanation was inadequate.
• Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 821 (2010): Reaffirmed that § 3582(c)(2) authorizes sentence reductions only when consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s applicable policy statements, and that such proceedings are constrained, not plenary resentencings. The Third Circuit relied on Dillon’s framework to hold that Amendment 826 cannot support a § 3582(c)(2) reduction because it is not retroactive under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d).
• Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam): Cited along with 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 to support summary affirmance where no substantial question is presented.
• United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 377 n.23 (3d Cir. 2024): Mentioned in a footnote as a decision limiting certain compassionate-release arguments to First Step Act changes to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The panel found it unnecessary to decide whether Rutherford’s limitation might apply beyond the § 924(c) context because Botsvynyuk failed the threshold requirement of showing any relevant change in law.
• United States v. Botsvynyuk, 552 F. App’x 178, 180 n.2, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2014) (non-precedential): The panel referenced the earlier direct-appeal decision to describe the seriousness of the human-trafficking enterprise and to note that a count initially charged was withdrawn at trial, undermining any claim that acquitted conduct enhanced the sentence.

Legal Reasoning

1. Compassionate Release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A))

The compassionate-release statute requires two showings: (a) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a reduction, and (b) consistency with the § 3553(a) factors to the extent applicable. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (as revised) provides non-exhaustive guidance on what can constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” including, as relevant here, the “unusually long sentence” ground in § 1B1.13(b)(6).

The panel rejected Botsvynyuk’s argument that the District Court failed to adequately explain its ruling. Citing Concepcion, the court reiterated that a district judge need only provide a brief, reasoned explanation reflecting consideration of non-frivolous arguments; a point-by-point refutation is not required. Here, the District Court’s order expressly addressed:

• The nature and circumstances of the offenses—egregious human trafficking and violence—as previously detailed in the 2014 appellate decision.
• The § 3553(a) purposes of sentencing, including the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, respect for law, just punishment, and public protection.
• Botsvynyuk’s rehabilitation and medical claims, while noting that rehabilitation alone is insufficient to establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).

On the “unusually long sentence” argument, the court emphasized that § 1B1.13(b)(6) allows consideration of sentence length when a change in law has rendered the original sentence disproportionate to what would be imposed today. The critical failure in Botsvynyuk’s presentation was the absence of any identified change in law that would materially affect his sentencing exposure. Without that threshold showing, the “unusually long sentence” policy statement could not supply an extraordinary and compelling reason.

The panel also noted the insufficiency of the medical submissions: although Botsvynyuk’s brief asserted pulmonary fibrosis, the medical records he attached did not list that condition. This gap undermined any claim that health circumstances independently justified relief.

Bottom line: The District Court’s concise order reflected appropriate consideration of the arguments and governing factors. There was no abuse of discretion in denying compassionate release.

2. Sentence Reduction (§ 3582(c)(2)) and Amendment 826

Section 3582(c)(2) allows reductions only when a defendant “was sentenced based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” and only if “consistent with applicable policy statements” (Dillon). The applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, limits reductions to amendments the Commission has explicitly made retroactive by listing them in § 1B1.10(d).

Amendment 826, which provides that “relevant conduct does not include conduct for which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)), is not listed in § 1B1.10(d). Because it is not retroactive, it cannot support a § 3582(c)(2) reduction. The panel also pointed out a more basic problem: Botsvynyuk did not show that acquitted conduct was used to enhance his sentence. Indeed, a count initially charged was withdrawn at trial (2014 decision, 552 F. App’x at 180 n.2), defeating any factual premise that acquitted conduct drove his guideline range.

As for the equal protection challenge to the Commission’s decision not to make Amendment 826 retroactive, the court rejected it as unsupported and, in any event, moot on these facts: without proof that acquitted conduct affected the sentence, he could not show any disparate treatment or injury.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Compassionate release “unusually long sentence” claims must be anchored in a concrete change in law. This decision underscores that § 1B1.13(b)(6) is not a free-standing length-based safety valve. Movants must identify a specific legal change that would materially alter today’s sentencing outcome and explain the resulting disparity. Generic appeals to fairness, rehabilitation, or severity of sentence will not suffice.
• Concepcion’s “brief explanation” standard applies across sentence-modification contexts. Appellants cannot secure reversal merely by demanding granular, point-by-point judicial responses. Well-aimed, succinct orders that show consideration of non-frivolous points will withstand review.
• Amendment 826 is not retroactive for § 3582(c)(2) purposes. Until the Sentencing Commission lists it in § 1B1.10(d), defendants cannot invoke it to seek guideline-based sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2). Moreover, claims that acquitted conduct affected the sentence must be supported by the record; absent a showing that acquitted conduct enhanced the guideline range, challenges will fail on causation grounds even if retroactivity were available.
• Equal protection challenges to the Commission’s retroactivity selections face steep odds. The decision signals that, at least where a defendant cannot demonstrate that the non-retroactive amendment actually affected his sentence, equal protection arguments will be dismissed as unsupported.
• Practical takeaway for defense counsel: For § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions premised on § 1B1.13(b)(6), specify the exact change in law and demonstrate how, if applied today, it would produce a meaningfully lower sentence. For § 3582(c)(2) motions, verify that the relied-on amendment appears in § 1B1.10(d) and build a record showing that the amendment would change the guideline range actually used at sentencing.
• Although this opinion is non-precedential, it is a clear signal in the Third Circuit that courts will enforce both the threshold change-in-law requirement for “unusually long sentence” compassionate release and the Commission’s retroactivity gatekeeping for § 3582(c)(2) motions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Compassionate release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)): A mechanism allowing a court to reduce a sentence if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist and the § 3553(a) factors support reduction. The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13) offers non-exclusive examples, including certain health conditions, family circumstances, and—in limited circumstances—“unusually long sentences” tied to changes in law.
• “Unusually long sentence” under § 1B1.13(b)(6): This is not about mere severity. It applies only when a change in law means the defendant’s original sentence is now disproportionate to what would be imposed today. The movant must identify the relevant change in law and show the disparity.
• § 3553(a) factors: Statutory criteria that guide sentencing decisions, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history, the need for punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and provision of needed training or medical care.
• Rehabilitation alone is insufficient (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)): Congress has directed that rehabilitation, by itself, cannot qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling reason.”
• Sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2): Available only if the Sentencing Commission lowers the relevant guideline range and makes that change retroactive (as listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d)). If an amendment is not retroactive, the statute does not permit a reduction on that basis.
• Amendment 826 (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)): A new guideline rule that excludes acquitted conduct from “relevant conduct” calculations at sentencing. It governs future sentencings but, absent inclusion in § 1B1.10(d), does not authorize retroactive reductions under § 3582(c)(2).
• Summary affirmance (3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6): The Third Circuit may affirm without full briefing where an appeal presents no substantial question. It is a procedural mechanism signaling that the outcome is clear under existing law.
• Concepcion’s explanation standard: District courts must consider non-frivolous arguments but may resolve sentence-modification motions with a brief, reasoned statement; they need not systematically rebut every point raised.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s non-precedential decision in United States v. Omelyan Botsvynyuk provides crisp guidance on two recurrent sentence-modification questions. First, compassionate release predicated on an “unusually long sentence” requires identification of a relevant legal change that would materially alter today’s sentencing outcome; length and rehabilitation, without more, do not suffice, and district courts may deny such motions with brief but reasoned explanations consistent with Concepcion. Second, Amendment 826’s proscription of acquitted-conduct use in guideline calculations is not retroactive for § 3582(c)(2) purposes unless and until the Sentencing Commission lists it in § 1B1.10(d). Equal protection challenges to the non-retroactivity of amendments are unlikely to gain traction, especially where the defendant cannot show that the amendment would have affected his sentence.

While not binding precedent, the opinion reinforces a disciplined approach in the Third Circuit: defendants must tie compassionate-release arguments to concrete legal changes and must respect the Commission’s retroactivity gatekeeping for guideline-based sentence reductions. For practitioners, the message is practical and clear—identify the specific legal change, demonstrate its effect on today’s sentencing exposure, substantiate any medical claims with records, and verify retroactivity before invoking § 3582(c)(2).