The Padilla Tolling Rule: Dismissal Without Prejudice Does Not Stop the Statutory Clock for Second-Degree Felonies in New Mexico

1. Introduction

In State v. Padilla, decided on 15 July 2025, the New Mexico Supreme Court confronted a deceptively simple but recurring prosecution dilemma: what happens to the six-year statute of limitations for a second-degree felony when the State voluntarily or involuntarily dismisses a timely-filed information and then refiles after the limitations period has expired? The Court answered that question in unequivocal terms: the statute of limitations is not tolled. Dismissal without prejudice—here for improper venue—does not stop the statutory clock, and prosecutors cannot rely on common-law tolling theories to salvage the case.

The ruling—now dubbed here the “Padilla Tolling Rule”—rested on a close textual reading of NMSA 1978, § 30-1-9(B) and its five-year proviso, coupled with the Court’s refusal to extend the Court of Appeals’ 1978 decision in State v. Martinez to circumstances involving dismissed, rather than superseding, indictments. As a result, Demesia Padilla’s second-degree felony convictions for embezzlement-related offenses were vacated, and the contours of New Mexico limitations law were redrawn.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Issue Presented: Whether a criminal information filed within the six-year limitations period for a second-degree felony, but later dismissed without prejudice, tolls the statute so that the State may re-indict after the six years have run.
Holding: It does not. Section 30-1-9 does apply to second-degree felonies, but its five-year proviso withholds the benefit of tolling; therefore the re-indictment was untimely and Padilla’s convictions are vacated.
Key Doctrinal Moves:
- Section 30-1-9(B) establishes tolling only in limited circumstances and contains an express five-year cap that functions as an exception to the general tolling rule.
- The Court disavowed reliance on non-statutory or “common-law” tolling in criminal cases when a specific statute governs.
- State v. Martinez interpreted as dealing exclusively with pending/superseding indictments, not dismissed complaints.
Disposition: Court of Appeals affirmed; case remanded with instructions to vacate convictions.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Section 30-1-9 (1963): The star of the opinion. Adopted simultaneously with § 30-1-8, it lists four predicate events (loss, arrest of judgment, quashal, or dismissal for variance) that trigger tolling if a new charging document is filed. The crucial proviso—requiring the new filing within five years of the crime—became the decisive limitation.

State v. Martinez, 92 N.M. 291 (Ct. App. 1978): Frequently invoked by prosecutors to argue judicial tolling. Martinez allowed an indictment filed after the limitations period because a still-pending complaint in magistrate court was considered to have tolled the statute. In Padilla, the Supreme Court carefully cabineted Martinez to its facts—superseding indictments without dismissal—and refused to extend it to cases where the original action has been terminated.

United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976): A federal decision discussing 18 U.S.C. §3288 (six-month refiling window after dismissal). The State’s reliance on Grady was rebuffed; the Court emphasized different statutory schemes and rejected importing federal common-law tolling to New Mexico.

State v. Strand (Utah) and State v. Stewart (Vermont): out-of-state authorities that embraced common-law tolling. The Court declined to follow them, stressing fidelity to New Mexico’s legislative text.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual Analysis of § 30-1-9(B):
“…the proviso of Section 30-1-9(B)(4) operates to except some particular case or situation from a general principle…”

The Court parsed the subsection into a general rule (tolling when any of four triggering events plus a refiling occur) and an exception (no tolling if the new indictment is filed more than five years after the crime). Because second-degree felonies have a six-year limitations period, they automatically exceed the five-year cap; thus the statute on its face precludes tolling for such felonies.
Rejection of Implied/Common-Law Tolling:
Statutes of limitation create substantive rights, to be construed liberally for defendants. Where the Legislature has enacted a detailed tolling scheme, courts must not overlay judge-made doctrines unless the statute leaves genuine gaps. Here, no gap existed—the Legislature deliberately withheld tolling after five years.
Distinguishing Superseding vs. Dismissed Charges:
The State’s “continuation” theory works only if the second indictment is a true superseding indictment filed while the first is still alive. Once the first case is dismissed, the matter is closed; a new action must independently satisfy the statute.
Harmony with § 30-1-8:
Accepting the State’s argument (that any timely filing “locks in” the statute forever) would eviscerate § 30-1-9 and render large parts of the Criminal Code superfluous. The Court invoked the canon against surplusage to reject that reading.

3.3 Likely Impact

Prosecutorial Practice: Prosecutors must now account for venue and procedural defects within the ordinary limitations period. Strategic dismissals to refile later are no longer viable for second-degree felonies.
Defense Strategy: Defense counsel gain a bright-line argument for dismissal whenever a second-degree felony is re-charged outside six years, unless one of the statute’s other tolling clauses (e.g., flight, out-of-state residence) squarely applies.
Legislative Response: The decision may spur the Legislature to revisit § 30-1-9, particularly the five-year proviso, if broader tolling for serious felonies is deemed desirable.
Judicial Guidance: The opinion clarifies that New Mexico courts will not craft ad-hoc equitable tolling exceptions in criminal cases where the Legislature has spoken; future arguments must be grounded in statutory text.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statute of Limitations: A legal deadline. After the specified period (six years for second-degree felonies) the State loses the power to prosecute, unless a valid tolling provision applies.
Tolling: Suspends or “pauses” the running of the statute of limitations. Think of it as stopping a countdown clock. When tolling ends, the clock resumes with the remaining time.
Proviso: A clause beginning with “provided that” which places a condition or exception on a preceding statement.
Superseding Indictment: A new indictment filed before the original is dismissed that corrects errors or adds charges; it is part of the same continuous prosecution.
Dismissal Without Prejudice: The case is closed but the State may file a new case. However, any new case must still respect statutes of limitation.

5. Conclusion

State v. Padilla crystallizes a clear rule: once a second-degree felony charge is dismissed without prejudice, and the six-year limitations period has run, the State is out of time. Section 30-1-9’s five-year cap on tolling is an exception, not merely an extra requirement, and it forecloses reliance on common-law or equitable theories to extend prosecutorial life. The decision strengthens defendants’ repose interests, compels prosecutorial diligence, and underscores the primacy of statutory text in New Mexico criminal procedure.

Key takeaway: Timely filing is necessary, but not sufficient; the State must also bring any replacement charges within the statutory window, or risk permanent dismissal.