The Fact-Bound Limit on Interlocutory Immunity Appeals: Commentary on McKee v. Montiel (11th Cir. 2025)

The Fact-Bound Limit on Interlocutory Immunity Appeals:
A Comprehensive Commentary on McKee v. Montiel, 24-11828 (11th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In Michelin D. McKee v. James Montiel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted a recurring procedural question in civil-rights litigation: when may a law-enforcement officer immediately appeal a district court’s denial of qualified or state sovereign immunity? Although the Supreme Court’s collateral-order doctrine authorizes some interlocutory appeals, the line between reviewable legal issues and non-reviewable factual disputes remains hazy in practice. McKee v. Montiel clarifies—within the Eleventh Circuit—that where the district court denies immunity on the ground that genuine factual disputes exist, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction.

The controversy stems from an August 2020 shooting in an Orlando mall parking lot that left Salaythis Melvin dead. Deputy James Montiel, claiming he saw Melvin armed and turning to shoot, fired a single round into Melvin’s back. Melvin’s estate sued for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for battery under Florida law. The district court denied Montiel’s motion for summary judgment. Montiel sought an immediate appeal, asserting qualified and sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing that the appeal turned entirely on factual disagreements rather than legal questions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Holding: The Eleventh Circuit lacks appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s interlocutory order denying Montiel’s motion for summary judgment grounded in qualified and state sovereign immunity, because the denial rests on disputed material facts rather than on purely legal determinations.
  • Disposition: Appeal dismissed.
  • Rationale in brief: Under the collateral-order doctrine, a denial of immunity is immediately appealable only when the appellate court can decide the issue “as a matter of law.” Here, the district court found numerous factual conflicts—whether Melvin possessed or drew a gun, whether he posed a threat, and whether Montiel issued commands. Montiel’s arguments sought to re-litigate those facts. As precedent forbids the Eleventh Circuit from weighing evidence at the interlocutory stage, jurisdiction was absent.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) – Origin of the collateral-order doctrine, allowing certain non-final orders to be treated as “final” for appeal.
  • Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) – First recognized that a denial of qualified immunity can be an immediately appealable collateral order.
  • Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996) – Qualified immunity appeals are impermissible when they challenge only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plaintiff’s version of facts.
  • Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020) & English v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151 (11th Cir. 2023) – Eleventh Circuit cases drawing a jurisdictional boundary: legal issues reviewable; factual disputes not.
  • Coleman v. Hillsborough County, 41 F.4th 1319 (11th Cir. 2022) – Interlocutory jurisdiction over state sovereign immunity is likewise limited where disputes are factual.

The panel leaned heavily on Hall and English, both recent Eleventh Circuit decisions involving police shootings where jurisdiction was refused because the officers’ appeals “asked the court to believe their version of events.” By cataloguing those cases, the court signaled continuity and reinforced a growing body of circuit authority channeling fact-heavy immunity disputes to trial.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Two-Step Qualified Immunity Analysis
    The court reaffirmed that qualified immunity entails (i) determining the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and (ii) deciding whether those facts amount to a violation of clearly established law. If the officer challenges the district court’s fact-finding (step i), interlocutory review is unavailable.
  2. Application to Montiel’s Appeal
    Every issue Montiel raised—armed suspect, threat perception, commands given—was labelled factual. The district court had identified evidentiary conflicts (body-cam footage, DNA results, inconsistencies in officers’ statements). As a result, the appellate court lacked a purely legal question to decide.
  3. Parallel State Sovereign Immunity
    Florida’s immunity statute (§ 768.28) confers immunity from suit unless the officer acts “in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard.” Because the district court’s denial rested on its view that excessive force could be found, the appellate court treated the state-law appeal identically.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

  • Procedural Guidance: Reinforces a bright(er) line in the Eleventh Circuit: defendants may not secure interlocutory review merely by re-arguing facts or pointing to disputed video evidence. District judges can confidently deny summary judgment where credibility issues loom, knowing that immediate appeals will fail.
  • Litigation Strategy: Civil-rights plaintiffs gain leverage; officers and municipalities face full discovery and the prospect of trial more often. Settlement incentives may increase once immunity appeals are foreclosed.
  • Doctrinal Consistency: The opinion harmonizes qualified-immunity and state-sovereign-immunity jurisprudence, applying the same jurisdictional filter to both.
  • Future Appeals: Counsel for public officials must frame immunity arguments in legal—not factual—terms, e.g., “Even accepting plaintiff’s facts, no clearly established right was violated,” or risk dismissal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified Immunity: A defense for government officials sued under § 1983. It shields them from trial and liability if (a) they did not violate a constitutional right, or (b) the right was not “clearly established” at the time.
  • Collateral-Order Doctrine: An exception to the general rule that only final judgments can be appealed. Some interim decisions, including qualified-immunity denials, may be appealed immediately—but only if they involve pure legal questions.
  • Interlocutory Appeal: An appeal taken before the trial court issues a final judgment.
  • State (Sovereign) Immunity in Florida: Florida waives immunity for governmental entities and employees only in limited circumstances; individual officers remain immune unless they act with bad faith, malice, or willful disregard.
  • Genuine Dispute of Material Fact: Evidence on a key point is contradictory such that a jury—not a judge—must decide what actually happened.

5. Conclusion

McKee v. Montiel does not break new substantive ground in excessive-force doctrine, but it cements an important procedural principle: appellate jurisdiction over immunity denials evaporates when the dispute is factual. The Eleventh Circuit’s message is unmistakable—where credibility, video interpretation, or evidentiary conflicts exist, immunity must wait for trial (or settlement). This ruling protects the role of the jury, discourages premature appeals, and fosters consistency between federal and state immunity frameworks. Practitioners should treat McKee as a roadmap for crafting (or defeating) interlocutory immunity appeals in the Eleventh Circuit and, by analogy, in circuits that follow similar jurisdictional boundaries.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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