Introduction
Case: In the Matter of Valerie Bois and Alan Bois
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
Date: August 6, 2025
In this post-divorce-order appeal and cross-appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s
temporary alimony award, marital property division, and term alimony award. Decided by order under Supreme Court Rule 20(3),
the case clarifies several important points in New Hampshire domestic relations law, most notably that
temporary alimony is not constrained by the term-alimony formula in RSA 458:19-a, II(a) when the payee’s reasonable need
is lower than the formula amount. The Court also reaffirmed the broad discretion afforded trial courts
in valuing property, denying reimbursement alimony, crafting an unequal property division, and setting the amount and
duration of term alimony, provided there is an objective basis in the record to support those choices.
The parties married in 2001 and divorced in 2024. Wife appealed the temporary alimony amount, the valuation of her Florida property,
and the denial of reimbursement alimony. Husband cross-appealed the unequal (60/40) property division and the award of term alimony.
Both appeals failed.
Analysis
Statutory Framework
-
RSA 458:19, XIV (Supp. 2024): Defines “temporary alimony” as periodic support while a case is pending, ending upon the
effective date of the divorce or related decree.
-
RSA 458:19-a, II(a) (Supp. 2024): Sets the term-alimony amount as the lesser of the payee’s reasonable need or a formula
based on 23% of the difference in the parties’ gross incomes, unless justice requires adjustment.
-
RSA 458:19-a, V and VI(b) (Supp. 2024): Reimbursement alimony compensates for contributions to the payor’s resources when
property division is inappropriate or inadequate; orders must include findings supporting awards or denials.
-
RSA 458:19-a, IV(f): In awarding term alimony, the court considers the property division (among other factors).
-
RSA 458:16-a, II(h), (m), (n) (Supp. 2024): Equitable property division factors include contributions to the other party’s
career and career-related sacrifices, the value of premarital property, and the value of property acquired by devise or inheritance.
Precedents Cited and Their Role
-
In the Matter of Letendre & Letendre, 149 N.H. 31, 34 (2002): Confirms the broad discretion of trial courts over property
division and alimony—framing the deferential appellate posture in this case.
-
In the Matter of Silva & Silva, 171 N.H. 1, 9 (2018): Reiterates the “unsustainable exercise of discretion” standard,
guiding the Court’s limited review.
-
In the Matter of Braunstein & Braunstein, 173 N.H. 38, 47 (2020): Emphasizes that appellate courts do not reweigh
equities and defer to the trial court on credibility and evidentiary weight—critical to upholding the property valuation
and alimony need findings.
-
In the Matter of Heinrich & Heinrich, 164 N.H. 357, 363-64 (2012): A trial court need not give equal weight to all
RSA 458:16-a factors; it can select and weigh as appropriate—supporting the unequal division.
-
In the Matter of Sanborn & Bart, 174 N.H. 343, 354 (2021): Affirms that an objective basis in the record is enough
to sustain an unequal distribution—applied to the 60/40 division here.
-
In the Matter of Nassar & Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 772 (2008): Reinforces broad discretion in determining alimony amount and duration.
-
In the Matter of Cohen & Richards, 172 N.H. 78, 83 (2019): Confirms that alimony is based primarily on income and need.
-
In the Matter of Kosek & Kosek, 151 N.H. 722, 725 (2005): Appellate courts assume subsidiary findings necessary to support
the trial court’s general rulings—used to uphold the denial of reimbursement alimony.
-
Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993); Sup. Ct. R. 25(8): Permits declining to address additional arguments that
do not warrant further discussion.
Legal Reasoning
1) Temporary alimony: reasonable need may be less than, and thus control over, the formula
The trial court looked to RSA 458:19-a, II(a)’s 23% income-difference formula as a benchmark but ultimately awarded
$800/month temporary alimony because Wife’s reasonable need was less than the formula amount (approximately $2,501/month
given the parties’ incomes). The Supreme Court held that nothing in the statutory scheme requires a temporary alimony award
to be set at the term-alimony formula when the payee’s reasonable need is lower. This is a practical, text-grounded clarification:
RSA 458:19, XIV defines temporary alimony but does not import the term-alimony formula as a constraint when the court
finds lower need.
2) Property valuation: deference to credibility determinations
The core valuation dispute centered on whether a third-floor bedroom should count towards the home’s living area.
Husband’s appraiser included it; Wife’s did not. The trial court expressly noted the bedroom access issue and found
Husband’s appraisal more reliable, then discounted for repairs to reach $681,500. On appeal, the Court declined to reweigh
the competing appraisals, emphasizing deference to the trial court on credibility and evidentiary weight (Braunstein).
The valuation was supported by an “objective basis” and therefore within discretion.
3) Reimbursement alimony: adequate findings and the role of property division
Wife sought reimbursement alimony for unpaid work as office manager/accountant from 2005–2013. The trial court found that
both parties contributed to the marriage, that neither caused disproportionate growth or diminution of assets, and that the
property division (60/40 in Wife’s favor) accounted for her unpaid work. While the order did not use talismanic language,
the Supreme Court deemed the findings sufficient and, under Kosek, assumed any necessary subsidiary findings.
This underscores that reimbursement alimony will often be denied where an equitable property division adequately compensates
the payee’s contributions.
4) Unequal property division: integrating statutory factors
Husband argued that the court’s unequal division could be justified only by two Wife-held assets—an inherited account
($40,436) and a personal injury settlement account ($57,557)—and that the differential awarded to Wife exceeded those amounts.
The Supreme Court rejected this narrow view. The trial court cited RSA 458:16-a, II(m) and (n) for premarital/inherited assets
and, importantly, also relied on RSA 458:16-a, II(h) to account for Wife’s unpaid work in Husband’s business and primary
caregiving role. Because the trial court expressly considered “all of the statutory factors,” and the record supported those
facts, the unequal division had the required objective basis (Sanborn) and was within discretion (Letendre; Heinrich).
5) Term alimony: need-based award adjusted in light of property division
The trial court found Wife’s income was $7,083/month against $15,312 in monthly expenses, trimming certain items:
it deemed a $1,500 New Hampshire rent and a $1,631 Florida mortgage payment unnecessary and indicated $3,152 in general/personal
expenses needed to be trimmed. Even assuming 80% trimming of that last category, the Court observed a shortfall remained—
supporting a finding of “some need” (Cohen; Braunstein).
Applying the statutory framework, the court noted the guidelines would yield approximately $2,501/month for ten years and six months,
but—considering the favorable 60/40 division to Wife pursuant to RSA 458:19-a, IV(f)—it reduced the term to six years, with
four years at the $2,501 rate and two years at half that rate. The Supreme Court held this reflected proper consideration of the property
division, and implicitly found that the unequal division did not eliminate need. This is a textbook example of tailoring the duration
and amount of alimony to the overall economic outcome of the divorce.
Impact and Practice Implications
-
Temporary alimony practice: This order clarifies that courts may set temporary alimony below the 23% formula when the payee’s
reasonable need is lower. Practitioners should present detailed, credible budgets and evidence of actual need; the formula is
not an entitlement at the temporary stage.
-
Evidentiary deference on valuation: Competing appraisals will be resolved at the trial level. On appeal, credibility
and weight determinations receive strong deference. Ensure appraisals squarely address disputed features (e.g., inclusion/exclusion
of living areas) and document the basis for adjustments.
-
Reimbursement alimony: To prevail, a payee must show that property division is inappropriate or inadequate to compensate
for contributions. Where the court grants a favorable property division and makes findings that both parties contributed,
reimbursement alimony is unlikely. Trial courts should make explicit findings; however, appellate courts may assume
necessary subsidiary findings to support a general ruling.
-
Unequal property division: RSA 458:16-a invites holistic consideration. Contributions to the other spouse’s career and
primary caregiving can justify unequal distributions even apart from inherited or premarital assets. Practitioners should marshal
evidence of these contributions, not just focus on asset-source arguments.
-
Alimony-property division interplay: RSA 458:19-a, IV(f) expressly allows the property division to influence alimony.
Courts may shorten the term or taper the amount of alimony to reflect a favorable property award, while still maintaining
support for demonstrated need. Present integrated proposals showing how property division and alimony together meet equitable goals.
-
Appeals are uphill: The “unsustainable exercise of discretion” standard is highly deferential. To succeed, an appellant must
show the absence of an objective basis or a legal error; mere disagreement with the weighing of evidence will not suffice.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Temporary alimony
- Support payments while the case is pending, ending when the divorce or related decree becomes effective. It is guided by reasonable need and is not automatically governed by the term-alimony formula.
- Term alimony
- Support for a defined period after divorce. Under RSA 458:19-a, II(a), the amount is the lesser of the payee’s reasonable need or 23% of the difference between parties’ gross incomes, subject to equitable adjustments.
- Reimbursement alimony
- A mechanism to compensate a spouse for economic or non-economic contributions to the other spouse’s financial resources where property division is inadequate or inappropriate to provide that compensation.
- Unsustainable exercise of discretion
- The appellate standard for reviewing trial-court decisions on property division and alimony. The Supreme Court asks whether there is an objective basis in the record to support the decision and will not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment.
- Reasonable need
- The payee spouse’s actual, credible, and reasonably necessary monthly expenses, adjusted to reflect post-divorce circumstances and any necessary economizing.
- 23% formula
- For term alimony, 23% of the difference in the parties’ gross incomes at the time the order is created; it acts as a ceiling when need is lower and as a cap when need is higher, unless justice requires an adjustment.
Conclusion
The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s order in In the Matter of Valerie Bois and Alan Bois reinforces the broad discretion of
trial courts in divorce cases and clarifies a key point of temporary support: when a spouse’s reasonable need is lower than
the statutory 23% income-difference formula, temporary alimony may be set below that formula. Beyond that clarification,
the decision methodically applies deferential review to uphold the trial court’s credibility-based property valuation,
denial of reimbursement alimony with adequate findings, an unequal property division supported by multiple statutory factors,
and a term alimony award calibrated to both demonstrated need and the property distribution.
Key takeaways: temporary alimony is need-driven; property and alimony are integrated remedies; detailed factual findings are vital;
and appeals will turn on whether an objective, record-based rationale exists. For practitioners and trial courts alike,
the case offers a clear, pragmatic roadmap for aligning alimony and property outcomes with the statutory scheme and the equities
of each marriage.
Disposition: Affirmed. MACDONALD, C.J., and DONOVAN and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred.