Strickland’s Double-Deference: Religion-Based Batson Challenges and Standard Jury Instructions in Federal Habeas Review

Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s April 11, 2025 per curiam decision in Christin Bilotti v. Florida Department of Corrections, a federal habeas corpus appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Christin Bilotti, convicted in Florida state court of second-degree murder, pursued state post-conviction relief and, upon its denial, sought federal habeas review. The two central issues on appeal were:

Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington for failing to preserve a religion-based Batson-type challenge to the prosecution’s peremptory strike of a Jehovah’s Witness juror;
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Florida’s standard jury instructions on second-degree murder and principals liability.

Although the district court denied relief on both grounds, this appeal probes the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of (a) Strickland’s two‐prong test of deficiency and prejudice in the double-deferential AEDPA context, and (b) the scope of state law deference to Florida’s preserved jury instructions.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Bilotti’s § 2254 petition. Key holdings include:

Batson-Type Claim (Religion): Even assuming prejudice (since the Fourth DCA initially ruled in Bilotti’s favor on appeal), counsel’s performance was not deficient because, at the time of trial, Florida law had not categorically extended Batson or its state analogue (Neil-Slappy) to religion. No competent practitioner could be faulted for declining to preserve a challenge that rested on unsettled law.
Jury Instructions (Second-Degree Murder/Principals): The trial court’s instructions mirrored Florida’s standard jury charges, which had never been invalidated by the Florida Supreme Court. Under state precedent, failure to object to valid, standard instructions cannot constitute deficient performance, nor could it have prejudiced Bilotti.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s decision leans heavily on:

Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668, 1984) – the two-prong test for ineffective assistance (deficiency and prejudice).
AEDPA’s deferential standard (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) – requiring that a state court’s resolution of a constitutional claim be “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”
Batson v. Kentucky (476 U.S. 79, 1986) – race‐based exclusion from juries and its Florida analogue (Neil v. State, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) and State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988)).
Florida standard jury instructions for second-degree murder and principals liability (In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 137 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 2014) & 665 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1995)).
State appellate decisions on religion-based strikes (Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Olibrices v. State, 929 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)) – held juror removal unconstitutional only when the stricken individual constituted an “ethnic” subgroup, not broad religious categories.
Florida decisions on counsel’s duty to object to standard instructions (Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 2000); Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 2011)).

Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit conducted a two‐step analysis under AEDPA and Strickland:

Deficiency Prong: Counsel’s performance is measured against prevailing professional norms at the time of trial. Because Florida had not recognized religion alone as a Batson-protected category (race, gender, ethnicity only), failing to lodge a religious-based strike challenge was not objectively unreasonable. Counsel could not have predicted how the state’s high court would later treat Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Prejudice Prong: Even if counsel erred, Bilotti could not establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome, because (a) under Florida law a religion-only objection was nonviable, and (b) the second-degree murder and principals instructions were correct as a matter of state law. Moreover, under Florida precedent, preservation of challenges to standard jury instructions is not required.

The panel also addressed the scope of the Certificate of Appealability (COA). Although the COA framed only the prejudice prong on the Batson‐type claim, the court nonetheless reviewed deficiency de novo (no state‐court ruling on that issue) and reaffirmed that it may affirm on any ground supported by the record.

Impact

This decision solidifies several important principles in post-conviction habeas practice:

Double Deference: Challengers face both Strickland’s high bar for ineffective assistance and AEDPA’s further deference to state‐court determinations.
Unsettled Law: Counsel cannot be faulted under Strickland for failing to advance novel Batson extensions before a state’s highest court has recognized them.
State Law Deference on Jury Instructions: Standard jury charges sanctioned by a state’s supreme court are presumptively correct, and counsel’s failure to object to them is non-deficient.

Lower courts will rely on Bilotti to reject challenges to counsel’s performance when the underlying law was in flux, especially in jurisdictional nuances of peremptory-strike doctrine and standard criminal jury instructions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Strickland’s Two Prongs: (1) Deficiency: Was counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable under professional norms?
(2) Prejudice: Is there a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome would have been different?
AEDPA Deference: Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court’s ruling is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
Batson and Neil-Slappy Doctrine: Prosecutors cannot use peremptory strikes to exclude potential jurors for discriminatory reasons. Federal law (Batson) covers race; Florida’s Neil-Slappy extends to race, gender, and ethnicity, leaving “religion alone” unsettled at the time of Bilotti’s trial.
Standard Jury Instructions: Model jury charges approved by a state’s highest court are presumed correct. Failure to object to them cannot be constitutionally deficient counsel under Strickland.

Conclusion

Bilotti v. Florida Department of Corrections reaffirms that, under AEDPA’s double-deferential framework, counsel’s performance must be judged by professional norms prevailing at trial, and deference to state‐court decisions is robust. Attorneys are not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise unsettled extensions of peremptory‐strike protections—such as religion-based challenges before their jurisdiction’s highest court has recognized them—or for declining to object to standard jury instructions that remain valid under state law. This decision thus provides a clear guidepost for habeas practitioners and trial counsel alike in assessing the viability of retrospectively attacking preservation and challenge strategies in state criminal proceedings.