Introduction

In this nonprecedential summary order, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s sprawling employment discrimination action against Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC (sued as The Westin New York at Times Square/Marriott International). The decision is instructive on three recurring issues:

• The pleading standards for Title VII religious discrimination and hostile work environment claims in the post-Iqbal era;
• The enforcement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 against prolix, unstructured “kitchen-sink” pleadings—particularly after multiple opportunities to amend;
• The strong judicial preference for adjudication on the merits over default, especially where service is defective and an extension is promptly sought.

Joseph Johnson alleged a wide array of matters—ranging from religious discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment to various criminal “charges.” He attached hundreds of pages of exhibits across multiple iterations of his complaint. The district court twice permitted amendment, directed him to seek assistance from the court’s pro se clinic, and warned that any further filing must comply with Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirement. After Johnson’s second amended complaint remained prolix and failed to state plausible claims, the court dismissed under Rules 12(b)(6) and 8, and denied default judgment. The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects.

Summary of the Opinion

• Title VII religious discrimination (failure to accommodate / disparate treatment): Even crediting that Johnson objected to COVID-19 vaccination on religious grounds, the employer’s alternative accommodation—mandatory testing for unvaccinated employees—was not plausibly alleged to be unreasonable. The complaint lacked minimal facts supporting an inference of discriminatory intent.
• Title VII hostile work environment: Conclusory assertions of a “hostile” and “toxic” workplace, and isolated disputes with co-workers not tied to religion, did not plausibly allege conduct “severe or pervasive” and based on a protected characteristic.
• Rule 8 dismissal (with no further leave to amend): The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the second amended complaint as indecipherable and noncompliant with Rule 8, especially after prior leave to amend, express warnings, and an opportunity to obtain pro se clinic assistance.
• Default judgment: Denial was proper given concerns about defective service and the judiciary’s strong preference to resolve disputes on the merits.
• Appellate motions: The Court allowed Starwood to file a late opposition to Johnson’s motion and denied Johnson’s motion styled as a “Civil Action for Abuse of Fraud. FRAP 10,” as well as his motion to file a supplemental brief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): The lodestar for the plausibility standard. The Second Circuit reiterated that threadbare recitals and conclusory statements do not suffice. Johnson’s allegations lacked the factual substance needed to push his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.
• Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015); Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023): The panel quoted the familiar Littlejohn/Buon formulation for discrimination claims at the pleadings stage: the plaintiff must plausibly allege membership in a protected class, qualification, an adverse employment action, and at least minimal support for an inference of discriminatory intent. Johnson’s allegations did not meet this minimal inference requirement.
• Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2002): Reaffirms that employers must reasonably accommodate genuine religious practices absent undue hardship. The Court noted Johnson’s apparent attempt to frame a religious accommodation claim, but found no plausible allegation that COVID testing (offered to the unvaccinated) was an unreasonable accommodation.
• We the Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam): Cited for the principle that an employer need not provide the employee’s preferred accommodation under Title VII. This supported the conclusion that offering testing rather than exemption from all COVID-related protocols could be a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law on these pleadings.
• Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 320–21: Hostile work environment requires allegations that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is severe or pervasive and tied to a protected trait. Johnson’s allegations were vague, conclusory, and not linked to religion.
• Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1988); Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995): Authorize dismissal for Rule 8 violations. While denying leave to amend simply because a complaint is prolix can be an abuse of discretion, dismissal without further leave is permitted in “extraordinary circumstances,” such as repeated failure to cure prolixity after warnings and opportunities to amend. Those circumstances were present here.
• Mazzei v. The Money Store, 62 F.4th 88 (2d Cir. 2023): Confirms de novo review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, with liberal construction of pro se pleadings and favorable inferences to the plaintiff.
• Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2006): Establishes “special solicitude” for pro se litigants, but clarifies that they remain bound by procedural and substantive rules—important context for affirming a Rule 8 dismissal here.
• Shah v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Civil Service, 168 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004); City of N.Y. v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2011): These cases set the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denials of default judgment and emphasize the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits and the disfavored nature of default judgments—especially salient where service is defective and an extension is promptly sought.
• Shakirov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024): Reaffirms liberal construction of pro se filings—used here to note that even with liberal construction, Johnson’s allegations did not state a plausible claim.

Legal Reasoning

1. Religious discrimination / accommodation under Title VII: The Court assumed, for argument’s sake, that Johnson objected to the COVID-19 vaccine on religious grounds and that he suffered adverse actions. But the complaint did not plausibly allege discriminatory intent or that the employer’s offered accommodation—periodic COVID testing for unvaccinated employees—was unreasonable. Citing We the Patriots, the panel underscored that Title VII does not entitle an employee to the accommodation of his choice. The exhibits attached to the complaint (communications about testing protocols) did not cure the absence of factual allegations showing why testing was an inadequate or punitive accommodation based on religion.
2. Hostile work environment: The complaint’s labels—“hostile” and “toxic”—were unsupported by concrete facts tying workplace conduct to Johnson’s religion or showing severity or pervasiveness. Disputes with coworkers, unconnected to a protected trait, do not satisfy the standard. Accordingly, the claim failed under Harris and Littlejohn.
3. Rule 8 enforcement and dismissal without further leave: The district court carefully applied Salahuddin: while courts generally allow amendment when a complaint is merely prolix, extraordinary circumstances warrant dismissal without further leave where repeated amendments remain unintelligible after explicit warnings and assistance opportunities. Johnson’s second amended complaint interwove sparse narrative with hundreds of pages of unorganized exhibits, named unrelated incidents and entities, and invoked inapposite criminal statutes. After two prior opportunities (including a direction to seek help from the pro se clinic) and a clear Rule 8 warning, dismissal was a proper exercise of discretion.
4. Default judgment and service defects: Given defects in service (Starwood credibly explained it only learned of the action upon the default motion), the district court appropriately denied default. The Second Circuit reiterated its strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits and its reluctance to enter the “most severe” sanction of default absent exceptional circumstances.
5. Procedural motions on appeal: The Court permitted Starwood to file a late opposition to Johnson’s motion, and it denied Johnson’s separate motion styled “Civil Action for Abuse of Fraud. FRAP 10” and his motion to file a supplemental brief. The panel also declined to dispose of the appeal based on defects in Johnson’s brief under Rules 28 and 32 and Local Rule 28.1, choosing instead to reach and reject the claims on the merits.

Impact

Although this is a summary order without precedential effect, it offers clear guidance for litigants and courts in several respects:

• Practical pathway for COVID-era religious accommodation claims: Where an employer offered COVID testing as an alternative to vaccination, a plaintiff must plausibly allege why that accommodation was unreasonable or discriminatory in context. Absent such allegations, the claim will likely fail at the pleading stage.
  • Context note: The Supreme Court’s decision in Groff v. DeJoy (2023) raised the Title VII undue hardship bar from “de minimis” to “substantial increased costs.” This panel did not reach undue hardship because it found no plausible allegation that the offered accommodation (testing) was unreasonable in the first place.
• Rule 8 discipline for prolix pleadings is real—especially after warnings: Courts may dismiss, with prejudice, serial, unintelligible complaints following repeated opportunities to cure. Attaching voluminous, unorganized exhibits does not substitute for a concise, coherent factual narrative showing entitlement to relief.
• Pro se “special solicitude” has limits: The Second Circuit will liberally construe pro se filings, but it will affirm dismissals where allegations remain conclusory and disorganized. Pro se litigants must still meet baseline procedural and substantive standards.
• Default judgments remain exceptional: Especially when service is defective, courts will favor allowing a response on the merits over entering default. Litigants should ensure proper service before seeking default, and defendants should promptly move to set aside defaults or seek extensions upon receiving late notice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 12(b)(6): A motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim.” The court asks whether, assuming all factual allegations are true, the complaint plausibly shows entitlement to relief. Conclusory statements are not enough.
• Rule 8(a)(2): Requires a “short and plain statement” of the claim. The complaint should clearly tell a coherent story: who did what, when, and why it violates the law—without burying the court in extraneous material.
• Title VII religious discrimination: Covers both disparate treatment because of religion and failure to reasonably accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs that conflict with job requirements (unless the accommodation imposes undue hardship). Employers need not provide the employee’s preferred accommodation.
• Hostile work environment: Harassment must be severe or pervasive and connected to a protected trait (e.g., religion). General “toxicity” or ordinary workplace disputes, untethered to a protected trait, do not suffice.
• Default judgment: A judgment entered when a defendant fails to respond. Courts disfavor default and prefer decisions on the merits; defective service is a classic reason to deny default.
• Standards of review:
  • De novo for 12(b)(6) dismissals (fresh look, no deference).
  • Abuse of discretion for Rule 8 dismissals, leave-to-amend decisions, and default-judgment rulings (deferential; the question is whether the district court acted within a range of acceptable choices).
• Summary orders and citation: Under FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, parties may cite post‑2007 summary orders, but they have no precedential effect. They can be persuasive but do not bind future panels.
• FRAP 10 (record on appeal): Governs the content and correction of the record on appeal; it is not a vehicle for launching a new “civil action” in the court of appeals.
• Criminal statutes in civil complaints: Private parties generally cannot enforce criminal laws via civil complaints; invoking penal provisions typically adds confusion without creating civil causes of action.

Practice Pointers

• For pro se plaintiffs:
  • Use a concise narrative. Identify the protected trait (e.g., religion), the specific adverse actions (e.g., termination, suspension, denial of a religious holiday), who took them, when, and why they were because of your religion.
  • For accommodation claims, allege: (1) your sincere religious belief; (2) the workplace requirement that conflicts with it; (3) that you notified your employer; and (4) why the offered accommodation was unreasonable or ineffective.
  • Attach only key documents. Exhibits should support, not replace, your factual allegations.
• For employers:
  • Document accommodation dialogues and alternatives offered. Courts may deem testing or scheduling adjustments reasonable where they address the religious conflict without imposing substantial costs.
  • Respond promptly to service and notices; request extensions as needed and explain any service defects.

Conclusion

In Johnson v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, LLC, the Second Circuit affirmed a comprehensive district court disposition: dismissal of a Title VII religious discrimination and hostile work environment suit for failure to state a plausible claim and for violating Rule 8, and denial of a default judgment bid amid service concerns. The panel emphasized that even with liberal construction for pro se litigants, the complaint must articulate a coherent, fact-based theory tying adverse actions to protected characteristics and explaining why any offered accommodation was unreasonable. The decision underscores enduring themes in federal practice: plausibility over conclusory labels, clarity over prolixity, reasonableness in accommodation over employee preference, and merits adjudication over defaults.

While nonprecedential, this summary order is a practical roadmap for litigants and district courts confronting similar pleadings in the post-pandemic workplace and beyond.