Scope of “Taking” Under 18 U.S.C. § 2119: No Claim-of-Right Defense in Federal Carjacking

Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Barnes (No. 22-2147, decided May 12, 2025) clarifies the scope of the “taking” element in the federal carjacking statute (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and holds that a defendant’s good-faith—but mistaken—belief as to vehicle ownership does not bar a carjacking conviction. Stetson Shane Barnes and three co-conspirators stole a motorcycle from Justin Swenson’s carport. During their escape, Barnes discharged a firearm, killing Swenson. Convicted of conspiracy, carjacking resulting in death, and felon-in-possession of a firearm, Barnes appealed on two grounds:

His honest belief that the motorcycle belonged to a co-conspirator, not the victim, barred the “taking” element of carjacking; and
He was wrongly denied a self-defense instruction as to the carjacking-resulting-in-death count.

The appellate court rejected both arguments, affirming that § 2119 does not incorporate a common-law claim-of-right defense and that Barnes, as the initial aggressor who never effectively withdrew, could not claim self-defense.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit issued a unanimous opinion (Judges Holmes, McHugh, Eid) affirming the district court in all respects:

Interpretation of “Taking” (18 U.S.C. § 2119): The court held, de novo, that § 2119’s “taking” element means simply acquiring control or dominion over the vehicle by force or intimidation, without regard to the owner’s identity or the defendant’s belief about ownership. It does not import a trespassory or “intent to steal” requirement from common-law robbery or larceny.
Claim-of-Right Defense: Because § 2119 lacks any express common-law term of art (e.g., “feloniously,” “with intent to steal”), the canon of imputed common-law meaning does not apply. Accordingly, a defendant’s honest belief in a right to possession is no defense.
Self-Defense Instruction: Barnes, as the initial aggressor in the carjacking, never effectively withdrew from the confrontation (he fled with the bike in tow while armed). Under federal common law, one who remains engaged in the underlying crime cannot later claim self-defense. Thus no such jury instruction was required.

Judgment: Convictions on Counts 1 (conspiracy), 2 (carjacking resulting in death), and 6 (felon-in-possession) affirmed. Count 5 (firearm discharge resulting in death) dismissed for jury deadlock.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court reviewed both common-law and federal authorities to locate any textual anchor for a claim-of-right defense in § 2119:

Common-law Robbery and Larceny: Blackstone’s and Bishop’s definitions require a trespassory “felonious taking” with intent to steal, and most jurisdictions allowed a claim-of-right defense when the taker honestly believed in ownership.
Robbery-Specific Statutes: Other federal robbery provisions (18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(b), 2114(a), 2115) use phrases like “intent to steal” or “property belonging to … another,” signaling that Congress knows how to import common-law elements when desired.
Carter v. United States (2000): The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)’s “take … by force …” does not import all common-law robbery elements simply because the crime resembles robbery; no common-law term of art appeared in § 2113(a).
United States v. Gurule (2006) & Payne (1996): Tenth Circuit cases confirming that § 2119 is a general intent crime and that the “taking” need only be an act of acquiring dominion by force or intimidation. Motive or intent to steal is relevant only to the separate requirement of intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in several steps:

Statutory Text: § 2119(a) forbids “tak[ing] a motor vehicle … from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation.” Unlike sibling robbery statutes, it omits “feloniously,” “intent to steal,” or “belonging to another.”
Canon of Imputed Common-Law Meaning: Applies only when Congress uses a common-law term of art. Here, “take” as used in § 2119 is descriptive, not a term of art importing all robbery elements.
Analogy to § 2113(a) (Carter): The Supreme Court in Carter rejected reading into § 2113(a) any common-law larceny or robbery elements beyond the plain text. § 2119’s parallel structure and textual omissions suggest the same result.
Policy and Absurdity Arguments: Barnes’s policy argument (that victims might be punished when defending their own vehicles) does not override clear text; moreover, Congress likely intended to discourage self-help recoveries by victims.
Rule of Lenity: No grievous ambiguity exists after textual and contextual analysis; thus lenity does not apply.

Impact

This decision has significant implications for federal criminal practice:

Clarifies that defendants cannot evade carjacking liability by claiming honest belief in ownership.
Limits available defenses under § 2119 to those expressly incorporated (e.g., lack of force or intent to harm), not any claim of right.
Guides sentencing in multi-defendant theft-and-violence prosecutions by foreclosing certain severance arguments.
Reinforces the principle that general-intent offenses with a force element do not import every historical common-law nuance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

To aid understanding, key legal terms are explained:

“Taking”: In § 2119, simply the act of acquiring control or dominion—by force or intimidation—over a vehicle. No separate “intent to steal” is required.
Claim-of-Right Defense: A common-law defense allowing someone who genuinely but mistakenly believes property is theirs to avoid larceny or robbery liability. Not available under § 2119.
Imputed Common-Law Meaning: An interpretive tool: when a statute uses a term of art from the common law, it “imports” its established meaning unless Congress indicates otherwise.
Self-Defense as Initial Aggressor: Federal law bars a defendant who instigates a violent crime from later claiming self-defense—unless he completely and clearly withdraws, which did not occur here.

Conclusion

United States v. Barnes confirms that the federal carjacking statute (18 U.S.C. § 2119) stands apart from common-law robbery in that it does not recognize a good-faith claim of right to the vehicle. A “taking” under the statute requires only force or intimidation to acquire control of the vehicle; ownership and intent to steal are immaterial. Moreover, an initial aggressor in a violent property crime cannot later resurrect a self-defense claim unless he fully withdraws. This ruling provides clear guidance to practitioners and lower courts on the boundaries of permissible defenses under the carjacking statute and underscores the importance of textual analysis in defining federal criminal offenses.