Introduction

In a nonprecedential summary order, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of pro se plaintiff Meryl Brodsky’s fourth federal lawsuit arising from the New York City Campaign Finance Board’s clawback of public matching funds from her unsuccessful 2005 City Council campaign. The court held that her renewed claims—including alleged violations of Internal Revenue Code sections 6103 and 7431 and a reprise of “fraud on the court” allegations tied to earlier state proceedings—are barred by res judicata. The panel also issued a clear warning that continued duplicative filings could trigger a leave‑to‑file sanction under In re Martin‑Trigona.

Parties and posture

• Plaintiff‑Appellant: Meryl Brodsky, pro se.
• Defendants‑Appellees: New York City Campaign Finance Board (the Board), the New York City Corporation Counsel (Muriel Goode‑Trufant), and the New York City/County Sheriff (named as “Non‑Party”). Brodsky also referenced former Board employees; the court treated them as in privity with the Board because the challenged actions were taken in their official capacities.
• Procedural posture: Appeal from the Southern District of New York’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on res judicata grounds. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Key issues

• Whether Brodsky’s fourth federal suit is barred by claim preclusion (res judicata) following prior federal dismissals on the merits involving the same nucleus of operative facts.
• Whether adding new defendants (former Board employees or the Sheriff) or refining legal theories (IRC §§ 6103 and 7431, “fraud on the court”) avoids preclusion.
• Whether a prior appellate affirmance partly on jurisdictional grounds (Rooker‑Feldman) negates the preclusive effect of a merits dismissal on other claims.
• Whether repetitive, meritless appeals may warrant a leave‑to‑file sanction.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit (Judges Lynch, Nardini, and Menashi) affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Brodsky’s amended complaint. Applying de novo review to both the Rule 12(b)(6) ruling and the res judicata question, and construing her pro se pleadings liberally, the court held that:

• The first federal action was adjudicated “on the merits” for res judicata purposes because a dismissal for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits. Earlier affirmance that discussed Rooker‑Feldman as to some claims did not undermine the preclusive effect as to claims dismissed on the merits, including § 6103.
• The parties are the same or in privity. Adding former Board employees did not change the analysis because the allegations concerned conduct in their official capacities, placing them in privity with the Board. Differences between Brodsky individually and her committee had already been rejected as a way around preclusion.
• The current claims either were brought or could have been brought in the first federal lawsuit. All arise from the same series of transactions: the Board’s post‑election effort to recover public funds and the resulting seizure of Brodsky’s assets. The court specifically noted that § 6103 claims were previously dismissed on the merits and that § 7431 claims could have been raised earlier.
• Given this is Brodsky’s fourth federal appeal on the same factual foundation, the court warned that further duplicative or vexatious filings may lead to a leave‑to‑file sanction.

The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed in full.

Analysis

Precedents cited and their role

• Soules v. Connecticut Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection, 882 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2018) — Provided the three‑part test for claim preclusion: (1) prior adjudication on the merits; (2) identity or privity of parties; and (3) the claims were or could have been raised previously. The panel organized its analysis around this framework.
• Berrios v. NYC Housing Authority, 564 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2009) — Confirmed that a dismissal for failure to state a claim (Rule 12(b)(6)) constitutes a final judgment “on the merits” for res judicata purposes. This was pivotal to treating Brodsky’s first federal action as preclusive.
• Monahan v. NYC Department of Correction, 214 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2000) — Articulated the “transactional approach” to claim preclusion: same transaction or series of transactions, overlap of evidence, and whether essential facts were present earlier. The court applied this to conclude all of Brodsky’s lawsuits arose from the same nucleus of facts—the Board’s recovery of funds and related enforcement steps.
• Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A., 125 F.4th 371 (2d Cir. 2025) — Stated the standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals (de novo, accepting facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor).
• Sharikov v. Philips Medical Systems MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024) — Reiterated that pro se filings are construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Even with that solicitude, the panel found res judicata dispositive.
• In re Martin‑Trigona, 9 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1993) — Recognized the Circuit’s authority to impose filing injunctions (including leave‑to‑file requirements) on vexatious litigants. The panel relied on this to warn Brodsky.
• Prior Brodsky decisions:
  • Brodsky v. Carter, 673 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2016) — Affirmed initial dismissal, invoking Rooker‑Feldman as to certain § 1983 challenges to state‑court outcomes and separately concluding she failed to allege conduct prohibited by § 6103.
  • Brodsky v. NYC Campaign Finance Board, 796 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2019) — Affirmed dismissal of a subsequent suit on res judicata grounds and rejected attempts to avoid preclusion based on party differences (e.g., the campaign committee vs. Brodsky individually). It also held that § 7431 could have been brought in the first suit.
  • Brodsky v. NYC Campaign Finance Board, 2023 WL 3162125 (2d Cir. May 1, 2023) — Again affirmed dismissal on res judicata and clarified that the earlier Rooker‑Feldman discussion did not negate the preclusive effect of merits‑based dismissals in the first case. It also rejected a Rule 60(d) “fraud on the court” attack because that theory could have been asserted initially.
• Related New York state decisions (contextual background):
  • Brodsky v. NYC Campaign Finance Board, 2007 WL 2176918 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 2007), aff’d, 57 A.D.3d 449 (1st Dep’t 2008) — Unsuccessful state injunctive challenge to the Board’s collection efforts.
  • Matter of Brodsky v. NYC Campaign Finance Board, 107 A.D.3d 544 (1st Dep’t 2013) — Upheld the garnishment order directing the sale of Brodsky’s stock to satisfy remaining amounts due.

Legal reasoning

The panel’s reasoning is straightforward and tracks the Soules three‑part res judicata test:

1. Adjudication on the merits. Brodsky’s first federal case was dismissed, in part, for failure to state a claim, including her § 6103 theory. Under Berrios, such a dismissal is a final judgment “on the merits” for claim preclusion. Although the Second Circuit’s 2016 affirmance partially relied on Rooker‑Feldman for the § 1983 claims, that jurisdictional discussion did not erase the merits‑based portions of the dismissal—a point the court underscored by citing its 2023 summary order in the third Brodsky appeal.
2. Same parties or privity. The Board and Corporation Counsel were defendants then and now; the Sheriff has been named previously as well. As to newly named former Board employees, the court held (consistent with its 2023 order) that they are in privity with the Board because the alleged conduct was undertaken in their official capacities. The plaintiff’s earlier argument that the presence or absence of the campaign committee matters was already rejected on appeal in 2019.
3. Same claims, or claims that could have been brought. The transactional nucleus has not changed: all suits arise from the Board’s enforcement efforts and related state‑court collection proceedings regarding the public matching funds. Under Monahan, new legal labels (e.g., § 7431 damages for alleged tax return information disclosure, Rule 60(d) “fraud on the court” theories) do not evade preclusion if they grow out of the same series of events and could have been asserted earlier. The panel noted that both the district court and the Second Circuit had already rejected Brodsky’s § 6103 theory on the merits, and that the § 7431 claim was one she could have raised in the first federal case.

The court also addressed two related points succinctly but significantly:

• Rooker‑Feldman coexistence with claim preclusion: Where a prior case was dismissed on mixed grounds, the jurisdictional disposition of some claims (barred by Rooker‑Feldman) does not dilute the preclusive effect of merits dismissals of other claims arising from the same transaction.
• Judicial immunity: To the extent the amended complaint could be read to encompass claims against the state judge who issued the garnishment order, those claims would be barred by absolute judicial immunity (and the district court did not construe the pleading to include such a claim).

Impact and practical implications

Although this is a summary order without precedential effect, it meaningfully reinforces several recurring principles in federal civil practice:

• 12(b)(6) dismissals can have sweeping preclusive consequences. Litigants must bring all related theories (including federal statutory claims like § 7431) in their first action arising from a single set of facts. Splitting claims or saving theories for later suits invites preclusion.
• Privity forecloses defendant‑switching as an end‑run. Suing agency officials or employees, in their official capacities, after suing the agency itself does not avoid claim preclusion. The same is true for re‑configuring plaintiff identity (e.g., candidate vs. campaign committee) where interests align.
• Rooker‑Feldman does not immunize the rest of a mixed dismissal from preclusion. Even if some counts were jurisdictionally barred in the first action, counts dismissed on the merits still preclude relitigation of theories arising from the same transaction.
• Vexatious litigation risks filing injunctions. The court’s Martin‑Trigona warning highlights that serial, duplicative appeals can lead to leave‑to‑file sanctions, even for pro se litigants.
• Campaign finance enforcement disputes must be consolidated. Disagreements over public matching funds, clawbacks, and related enforcement steps should be litigated comprehensively and promptly. Once courts resolve claims on the merits, subsequent suits based on the same events will almost certainly be barred.

Complex concepts simplified

• Res judicata (claim preclusion): A doctrine preventing parties from re‑litigating claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action that ended in a final judgment on the merits, involving the same parties or their privies, and arising from the same transaction or occurrence. It promotes finality and judicial economy.
• Privity: A close alignment of legal interests between parties such that a judgment involving one binds the other. Government employees sued for official acts are typically in privity with their agency for preclusion purposes.
• Transactional approach (Monahan): Courts ask whether two suits arise from the same “nucleus of operative fact.” If yes, all claims—regardless of differing legal theories—must be brought together or be forfeited to claim preclusion.
• Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal “on the merits”: Even though it arises at the pleading stage, a dismissal for failure to state a claim is treated as a final merits judgment for claim preclusion purposes.
• Rooker‑Feldman doctrine: Lower federal courts cannot act as appellate courts reviewing final state‑court judgments. If a claim essentially seeks such review, it is jurisdictionally barred. However, when a mixed dismissal includes merits‑based dispositions, those parts still carry preclusive effect.
• IRC § 6103 and § 7431: Section 6103 restricts the disclosure of “returns” and “return information.” Section 7431 provides a damages cause of action for knowing or negligent unauthorized disclosures. In Brodsky’s first federal suit, the courts found she failed to allege any conduct prohibited by § 6103, and later held she could have brought a § 7431 claim at that time—thereby precluding later attempts.
• “Fraud on the court” (Rule 60(d)): An extraordinary remedy for egregious misconduct undermining the integrity of judicial proceedings. It is not a vehicle to relitigate issues that could have been raised earlier, and it cannot be used to collaterally attack state‑court judgments in federal district court.
• Leave‑to‑file sanction (Martin‑Trigona): An injunction requiring a litigant to obtain permission before filing additional papers, used to curb vexatious, repetitive, or meritless litigation that burdens courts and adversaries.
• Summary order and citation: This decision is a summary order and, per FRAP 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, may be cited with the “summary order” notation but does not have precedential effect.

Procedural timeline at a glance

• 2005: Brodsky receives NYC public matching funds; loses City Council race.
• 2007–2008: State courts reject her attempt to enjoin the Board’s collection efforts.
• 2013: State court upholds garnishment of Brodsky’s stock to satisfy remaining balance.
• 2015–2016 (First federal suit): Dismissed; Second Circuit affirms (Rooker‑Feldman as to some claims; failure to state a claim as to § 6103).
• 2018–2019 (Second federal suit): Dismissed on res judicata; affirmed.
• 2022–2023 (Third federal suit): Dismissed on res judicata, including Rule 60(d) “fraud on the court” theory; affirmed with clarification that mixed Rooker‑Feldman/merits outcomes still preclude merits‑dismissed claims.
• 2024–2025 (Fourth federal suit): Dismissed on res judicata; Second Circuit affirms and warns of potential leave‑to‑file sanction.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Brodsky v. NYC Campaign Finance Board underscores the full force of claim preclusion in the face of serial litigation. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal in the first action—here, including § 6103—constitutes a merits judgment that bars later suits arising from the same transaction, even when plaintiffs reframe theories (e.g., adding § 7431 or “fraud on the court”) or add defendants whose alleged conduct occurred in their official capacities. The panel’s express warning about leave‑to‑file sanctions further signals the court’s intolerance for duplicative litigation that rehashes settled disputes.

While nonprecedential, the order provides a clear roadmap for litigants and courts: bring all related claims up front, against all appropriate parties, or risk forfeiture through res judicata; do not expect to evade preclusion by altering labels or parties where the operative facts are unchanged; and recognize that mixed jurisdictional/merits dismissals retain preclusive bite as to the merits rulings. For government enforcement matters—such as campaign finance clawbacks—the decision reinforces the need for comprehensive, timely, and final resolution in the first federal case.