Reaffirming MVRA Restitution Proof and Explanation Requirements: PSR Assertions Alone Are Insufficient — United States v. Thomas (3d Cir. 2025)

Reaffirming MVRA Restitution Proof and Explanation Requirements: PSR Assertions Alone Are Insufficient — United States v. Thomas (3d Cir. 2025)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (non-precedential disposition)

Panel: Chief Judge Chagares, Judge Porter, Judge Chung (opinion)

Date: March 28, 2025

Introduction

In United States v. Antwaine Thomas, the Third Circuit affirmed a 272-month sentence for armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm, but vacated the district court’s restitution order of $103,443.97. The disposition, while not precedential, offers a clear, practical reaffirmation of key principles under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A and § 3664: (1) the government bears the burden to prove the amount of loss by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) when restitution is disputed, a district court must anchor its award to record evidence and explain its calculations; and (3) estimates or bare assertions in a Presentence Report (PSR) will not suffice without supporting documentation and judicial findings.

The case arises from a July 2018 armed bank robbery in New Jersey, where Thomas and an accomplice, Kareem Moore, robbed a Fulton Savings Bank branch. Thomas pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (armed bank robbery) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence). The district court deemed Thomas a career offender and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range (272 months). It also ordered restitution to a bank employee (D.B.) and the bank’s insurer (PMA Companies).

On appeal, Thomas challenged: (1) his career offender designation, contending a 2002 drug conviction fell outside the 15-year lookback; (2) the PSR’s labeling of that drug offense as involving crack cocaine; (3) the sufficiency of the government’s proof supporting restitution; and (4) the district court’s failure to explain its restitution calculation. The Third Circuit rejected the first two challenges but agreed on the latter two, vacating the restitution order and remanding.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit held:

  • Career offender status affirmed. The district court did not clearly err in relying on the PSR to find two qualifying predicates (a 2002 controlled substance offense and a 2008 bank robbery). Thomas did not timely object under Rule 32, offered no documentation, and—despite raising late, generalized objections—gave the court no reason to discredit the PSR’s account.
  • Drug-type mislabeling immaterial. Under plain-error review, Thomas could not show a reasonable probability that the sentence turned on whether the 2002 conviction involved crack cocaine rather than marijuana, especially given the court’s explicit reliance on the seriousness of the instant offense, his criminal record, and deterrence.
  • Restitution vacated. The PSR’s summaries of a victim-loss declaration and insurer payouts lacked necessary detail and documentation. The district court adopted the PSR’s restitution figure without analysis or findings. Because the government did not meet its burden by a preponderance and the court did not explain its calculation, the restitution award could not stand.

Disposition: Restitution order vacated; sentence otherwise affirmed; case remanded for further restitution proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

The panel’s reasoning is grounded in a series of Third Circuit decisions that regulate sentencing proofs and MVRA restitution:

  • Reliance on unchallenged PSRs. United States v. Watkins, 54 F.3d 163, 166–67 (3d Cir. 1995) allows sentencing courts to rely on PSR facts when not meaningfully challenged. This justified the district court’s adoption of the career-offender predicates where Thomas failed to timely object or submit records.
  • Preservation concepts: issue vs. argument; waiver vs. forfeiture. United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341–42 (3d Cir. 2013), distinguishes preserving “issues” from specific “arguments,” informing the panel’s view that Thomas’s late, generalized challenge did not compel deeper inquiry below. United States v. Brito, 979 F.3d 185, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2020), emphasizes forfeiture (failure to assert) versus waiver (intentional relinquishment), steering the standard of review (plain error vs. clear error).
  • Standards of review. United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 337 (3d Cir. 2014), and United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 138 (3d Cir. 1999) establish clear-error review for preserved factual challenges; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) and Brito govern plain-error review for forfeited claims. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007), and United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 150 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) articulate the clear-error standard. United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186, 198 (3d Cir. 2019) and Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) define prejudice under plain error (reasonable probability of a different outcome against the whole record).
  • MVRA proof and explanation requirements. United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2007), Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549–50 (3d Cir. 1994), and Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 962 (3d Cir. 1992) require the government to prove loss by a preponderance and the district court to “point to record evidence” supporting the calculation, not just PSR estimates. United States v. Fallon, 470 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2006) emphasizes restitution must be limited to losses “directly resulting” from the offense conduct. United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 797 (3d Cir. 1999) illustrates the type of detailed proof (medical bills, employment records) that can support restitution for psychological injury and lost wages.
  • Cross-circuit alignment on explanations. The opinion’s reliance on First and Eleventh Circuit cases (United States v. Cardozo, 68 F.4th 725, 741 (1st Cir. 2023); United States v. Maurya, 25 F.4th 829, 837 (11th Cir. 2022)) underscores a broad consensus: restitution awards must bear a rational connection to record-backed data and be adequately explained.
  • Career-offender framework and lookback. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) requires two qualifying felony predicates for career-offender status; the Guidelines’ commentary regarding the 15-year lookback (cited to § 4A1.1 cmt. n.1 in the opinion) permits counting an older sentence if incarceration extended into the 15-year period preceding the instant offense.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning spans three core topics: the career-offender designation, the alleged PSR drug-type error, and the restitution order.

1) Career-offender designation: PSR reliance under clear-error review.

Thomas argued that his 2002 drug conviction did not qualify as a predicate because any associated incarceration fell outside the 15-year lookback measured from the 2018 offense. Yet, he neither objected to the PSR by the Rule 32(f)(1) deadline nor supplied documentation contradicting the PSR’s chronology (which indicated incarceration within the lookback via a parole violation in 2003). At sentencing, counsel conceded the lack of records. The district court adopted the PSR, and the Third Circuit—reviewing for clear error—found no basis to disturb that finding. Under Watkins, a sentencing court may rely on unchallenged PSR facts; under the clear-error standard, the question is whether the court’s finding lacked any credible evidentiary support or rational link to the record. It did not. The panel also declined to consider documents Thomas first proffered on appeal, noting that the district court cannot be faulted for not examining evidence never presented to it. Any ineffective-assistance claim concerning failure to gather records was expressly left for collateral review (see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003)).

2) PSR’s drug-type label: no plain-error prejudice shown.

Thomas contended the PSR wrongly described the 2002 offense as involving crack cocaine rather than marijuana. He conceded forfeiture, triggering plain-error review. The panel emphasized the prejudice prong: there must be a reasonable probability the sentence hinged on the alleged mistake. The district court’s explanation focused on the gravity of the armed robbery, victim impact, Thomas’s lengthy criminal history, and deterrence—not the drug type in a 2002 offense. Given an advisory range of 272–319 months and the imposition at the bottom, Thomas could not show the requisite probability that the drug-type label affected the outcome.

3) Restitution: MVRA burden not met; absence of findings requires vacatur.

The MVRA mandates restitution for offenses like armed bank robbery. But it also assigns the government the burden to prove the amount of loss by a preponderance (18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)), and requires the court to resolve disputes with tethered findings. Here, the PSR listed:

  • $20,000 attributed to D.B., a bank employee, “for psychological harm” and related costs (401(k) cash-out penalties, deferred car payments, therapy).
  • $83,443.97 attributed to PMA, the bank’s insurer, for amounts paid “in connection with the instant offense,” including payments to employees such as D.B.

The Third Circuit identified multiple evidentiary gaps:

  • D.B.’s $20,000 claim. The record did not itemize or substantiate how the listed reasons aggregated to $20,000 (e.g., penalty amounts for the 401(k) distribution, projected lost earnings from early withdrawal, documented therapy bills, or quantifiable lost wages). Jacobs illustrates the level of detail often necessary.
  • PMA’s payments. The PSR reflected that PMA reported paying $26,012.34 on behalf of D.B., whereas D.B. herself reported receiving $12,084.47 in workers’ compensation—an unexplained discrepancy of roughly $14,000. The opinion hypothesized this could reflect direct payments to providers, but emphasized that the record contained no underlying billing, wage, or ledger detail to confirm that all amounts were directly caused by the offense (as Fallon requires).

Despite Thomas’s preserved objection to restitution, the district court adopted the PSR’s restitution total “without explanation or analysis.” Under Copple, Logar, and Vitillo, the absence of record-based findings requires vacatur where the figure is “devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational relationship to the supporting data.” The panel thus vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, Thomas is a clear, practical reminder of core MVRA requirements and of best practices at sentencing:

  • For prosecutors and probation:
    • Do not rely on PSR summaries alone when restitution is (or is likely to be) disputed. Submit the underlying documentation: medical bills, therapy invoices, wage records, workers’ compensation statements, itemized insurer payment ledgers, and affidavits tying each expense to the offense.
    • Reconcile differences between what an insurer reports paying and what a victim reports receiving. Identify direct-to-provider payments and demonstrate causation and reasonableness.
    • Address collateral source and subrogation rules under § 3664(j) to prevent double recovery and to identify the proper payees (often the insurer to the extent it compensated the victim).
  • For district courts:
    • When restitution is disputed, make explicit findings. Identify the source documents, explain any calculations, and connect each component of loss to the offense conduct.
    • Be cautious about adopting a PSR’s restitution number without record citation and explanation; Thomas shows this can be reversible error.
  • For defense counsel:
    • Preserve objections early under Rule 32(f). If contesting career-offender predicates, secure incarceration records, judgments, parole/violation files, and DOC time logs before sentencing.
    • On restitution, demand production of the government’s proof, and where necessary request an evidentiary hearing under § 3664(d) to test causation, necessity, and amount.
  • Substantive MVRA guidance reinforced:
    • Psychological injury and related costs (e.g., therapy) can be compensable, but must be supported by records and tied to the offense (Jacobs).
    • Insurers are legitimate restitution recipients to the extent they have compensated victims, but their claims must be documented and net of any offsets to avoid double counting.
    • Courts must ensure losses “directly result” from the crime (Fallon), not from unrelated or speculative downstream effects.

Regarding sentencing more broadly, Thomas illustrates the consequences of forfeiture. Where a defendant does not timely object or furnish contradictory proof, the district court may rely on the PSR, and appellate relief becomes unlikely under deferential standards. The opinion also clarifies that immaterial errors (e.g., a drug-type label not relied upon at sentencing) will not warrant relief under the demanding plain-error framework absent demonstrated prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • MVRA (Mandatory Victims Restitution Act). For certain crimes (including armed bank robbery), restitution is mandatory. The government must prove the victim’s losses by a preponderance of the evidence. The court must resolve disputes and explain its findings. Restitution is limited to losses directly caused by the offense.
  • Presentence Report (PSR). A report prepared by Probation that compiles offense facts, criminal history, guideline calculations, and restitution claims. Courts may adopt PSR facts if not challenged, but PSR estimates alone cannot establish contested restitution without underlying evidence and judicial findings.
  • Career Offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1). A guideline enhancement for defendants with at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses. Whether prior sentences count can depend on a “lookback” period—older sentences can still count if incarceration extended into the 15 years before the new offense.
  • Lookback Period. In general terms, sentences imposed more than 15 years before the instant offense are not counted unless incarceration for that prior offense continued into the 15-year window.
  • Standards of Review.
    • Clear error: For preserved factual disputes (e.g., restitution amount), the appellate question is whether the district court’s finding lacks credible evidentiary support or a rational connection to the record.
    • Plain error: For forfeited claims (not timely raised), the appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affected substantial rights (reasonable probability of a different outcome), and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  • Waiver vs. Forfeiture. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture is failure to timely assert a right. Forfeiture typically triggers plain-error review, not outright bar to review.
  • Direct Causation in Restitution. The loss must flow directly from the offense, not from independent or attenuated causes. Courts scrutinize medical and wage claims to ensure a direct link.

What Happens on Remand

On remand, the district court will revisit restitution. The government may present additional documentation for D.B. and PMA, such as:

  • Detailed medical and therapy bills, treatment summaries, and proof of payment;
  • Employment and wage records showing lost time and amounts paid via workers’ compensation;
  • Itemized insurer ledgers identifying each payment, to whom it was made (victim vs. provider), and how it relates to the robbery;
  • Proof of 401(k) penalties or lost investment earnings tied to the offense’s effects, if claimed;
  • An explanation preventing double recovery and clarifying payees consistent with § 3664(j).

The court should make explicit findings tying each component to the offense, ensuring the total restitution equals the proven, directly caused loss.

Conclusion

United States v. Thomas delivers a straightforward but important message: when restitution is contested, district courts must do more than adopt a PSR number. They must anchor the award to concrete, record-backed proof and explain how each element of loss is calculated and causally connected to the crime. The opinion also illustrates the practical consequences of sentencing litigation choices—late or unsupported objections are unlikely to unsettle a PSR-backed career-offender designation, and immaterial PSR inaccuracies will not support plain-error relief absent prejudice.

Key takeaways:

  • MVRA restitution requires proof by a preponderance; PSR summaries are not enough if disputed.
  • District courts must make explicit findings and explain restitution calculations.
  • Insurer payments are recoverable but must be documented and reconciled with victim receipts to avoid double counting.
  • Timely, well-supported objections matter—both for career-offender predicates and restitution.

While non-precedential, Thomas aligns with—and reinforces—the Third Circuit’s consistent approach to restitution and sentencing proof. Practitioners should treat it as a practical checklist for building (or challenging) MVRA restitution records and for preserving issues essential to meaningful appellate review.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Comments