Reaffirming Kisor Deference and the 75-to-1 Video-Image Ratio under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 – Commentary on United States v. Gregory Chandler, Jr.

1. Introduction

In United States v. Gregory Chandler, Jr., Nos. 21-14125 & 23-12836 (11th Cir. June 23, 2025) (non-published), the Eleventh Circuit confronted a familiar cluster of child-pornography sentencing issues—juror bias during voir dire, the controversial image-count enhancement, oral pronouncement of supervised-release conditions, and the timeliness of restitution appeals. The defendant, proceeding pro se at trial, challenged both his conviction and several components of his sentence (120 months’ imprisonment, 15 years’ supervised release, and $24,000 restitution). Although the decision is labelled “Do Not Publish,” its reasoning deepens two developing strands of Eleventh-Circuit law:

• Continued Kisor-based deference to Sentencing Guidelines commentary—specifically the “75 images per video” conversion found in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2.
• The sufficiency of a district court’s shorthand reference to “standard conditions” of supervised release without oral recitation, confirmed under United States v. Hayden.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims of juror taint during voir dire.
• Affirmed the 5-level image-count enhancement because the district court did not plainly err in treating each video as 75 images and in deferring to the Guidelines commentary.
• Affirmed the supervised-release conditions, holding that the district court’s reference to “mandatory and standard” conditions and later inclusion of the written list satisfies due-process concerns.
• Dismissed the challenge to the restitution order as untimely (notice of appeal filed 18 months late).

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) – Confirmed the district court’s wide discretion in conducting voir dire and evaluating juror bias.
• United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2011) – Established that unpreserved voir-dire objections are reviewed for plain error.
• Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019) – Describes when courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations; here, the Sentencing Commission’s commentary counts.
• United States v. James, 135 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2025) – Clarified that SCOTUS’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) narrowing Chevron deference has no impact on Kisor deference to the Sentencing Commission. Chandler adopts that holding in footnote 1.
• Unpublished Eleventh-Circuit cases—Carmody (2023), Vandyke (2024), Peralta (2024)—all applied the 75-to-1 ratio, signalling a consistent (if non-precedential) posture.
• United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832 (11th Cir. 2024) – Held that referencing “standard conditions” and inserting them in the written judgment is enough when the defendant is allowed to object. Chandler explicitly relies on Hayden.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Because the district judge immediately cut off the disparaging juror, excused her, re-read the presumption-of-innocence instruction, and invited further responses, the panel found no actual or potential prejudice and thus no plain error under Hill.

The Guideline is silent on whether a video is an “image.” The Eleventh Circuit held it reasonable to treat the term as ambiguous, thereby triggering Kisor deference to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary. Because the 75-to-1 conversion is “reasonable” and at least “authoritative,” the district court’s adoption, even if possibly debatable, was not plainly erroneous. The court noted that no published Eleventh-Circuit opinion compels a different result and that sister circuits (Sixth Circuit’s Phillips) largely concur.

Echoing Hayden, the court observed three safeguards met here: (1) reference to “standard conditions,” (2) opportunity for the defendant to object, and (3) verbatim inclusion of the standard list in the written judgment. Consequently, the absence of a full oral reading did not violate due process.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A) gives a criminal defendant 14 days to appeal. Chandler’s 18-month delay was fatal, and criminal restitution orders are treated as final, appealable judgments distinct from post-sentencing modifications.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Stability for § 2G2.2 Enhancements: Although not precedential, Chandler buttresses a line of Eleventh-Circuit authority accepting the 75-to-1 ratio. Until a published decision or en banc review says otherwise, district judges in the circuit can confidently continue applying the multiplier.
• Post-Loper Bright Landscape: Footnote 1’s reference to James signals that challenges to guideline commentary based on the demise of Chevron deference will likely fail. The Eleventh Circuit treats Kisor as untouched.
• Trial Strategy and Objections: The opinion is a cautionary tale about preserving objections. Chandler’s failure to invoke specific grounds at trial subjected every appellate claim to the daunting plain-error standard.
• Supervised-Release Practice: District courts in the Eleventh Circuit may continue the efficient practice of generically incorporating “standard conditions” without enumerating each—provided defendants get a chance to object and the conditions appear in writing.
• Restitution Appeals: Defendants and counsel must note that amending a judgment to add restitution restarts no new clock; timeliness remains jurisdictional.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Plain Error Review: A four-part test: (1) error; (2) clear or obvious; (3) affects substantial rights (usually the outcome); and (4) seriously affects the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. If any element fails, relief is denied.
• Kisor Deference: Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation if (1) the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, (2) the interpretation is reasonable, and (3) it reflects the agency’s authoritative, fair, and considered judgment. The Sentencing Commission’s commentary qualifies.
• U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D): A 5-level enhancement applies if the offense involves 600 or more “images” of child pornography. The commentary instructs courts to treat each video as 75 images for counting purposes.
• Standard vs. Special Conditions: “Standard” conditions apply in almost every case (e.g., report to probation, no new crimes). “Special” conditions are tailored to the defendant (e.g., computer monitoring, sex-offender treatment).
• Supervised Release: A period of community monitoring after imprisonment. Violating conditions can lead to additional penalties or re-incarceration.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Gregory Chandler, Jr. solidifies, albeit in an unpublished format, two practical truths in Eleventh-Circuit criminal sentencing. First, courts will continue to defer under Kisor to the Sentencing Commission’s 75-to-1 video-image guidance, undisturbed by the broader administrative-law turbulence following Loper Bright. Second, a district judge’s shorthand reference to “standard conditions” of supervised release suffices when the conditions mirror the Guidelines and the defendant can object. Together, these holdings provide prosecutors, defense counsel, and district judges a clearer procedural roadmap, while reminding litigants that timely objections and appeals remain the linchpin of effective appellate review.