Reaffirming Ferranti: Plea Colloquies Must Be Knowing, Voluntary, and Accurately Recorded—Heightened Scrutiny Where Domestic Violence May Influence a Parent’s Admission (In re T. Hewitt, Mich. 2025)

Introduction

In In re T. Hewitt, Minor, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal from an October 23, 2024 decision of the Court of Appeals, leaving in place the adjudication of jurisdiction over a child under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). Although the Court issued no precedential opinion, Justice Thomas authored a comprehensive dissent urging review. That dissent re-centers a critical due process message first articulated in In re Ferranti: when a parent enters an admission during the adjudicative phase of a child protective proceeding, the trial court must ensure that the plea is knowing, understanding, and voluntary under MCR 3.971—and that the record clearly supports both voluntariness and an accurate factual basis.

The facts here raise a convergence of concerns: an incomplete and inaudible record of the plea hearing; the respondent-mother’s repeated expressions of confusion; the trial judge’s own concerns about the respondent’s “demeanor” and comprehension; the father’s disruptive presence and alleged intimidation in and around the courtroom during the colloquy; and undisputed shortfalls in advising the respondent of rights in the order and timing required by the court rules. These concerns are sharpened by the context of intimate partner violence (IPV) and Michigan authority cautioning that mere victimization by domestic violence, without more, is not a sufficient basis for adjudication or termination as to the victim-parent.

Parties:

Petitioner: Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
Respondent: Mother of TH (born January 2022)
Respondent-Father: Trevor Hewitt
Child’s lawyer-guardian ad litem: Invited to respond at the Supreme Court stage

Procedurally, the Supreme Court denied leave and a motion to appoint counsel; Justice Thomas dissented on both points, signaling the importance of the legal issues and the need for clarity about plea-taking in abuse/neglect cases involving IPV and deficient records.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s order (per curiam) denies leave to appeal and denies the motion to appoint counsel, indicating only that “we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed.” There is no majority opinion establishing new precedent.

Justice Thomas’s dissent, however, identifies substantial plain-error concerns with the adjudicative plea:

Repeated, recorded expressions by respondent that she did not understand the plea or “what admission means.”
Failure to advise the respondent of her appellate rights before accepting the plea as required by MCR 3.971(B)(6).
Failure to restate on the record the allegations to which the respondent was admitting, contrary to MCR 3.971(B)(1).
An inadequate factual basis that did not distinguish between the mother’s conduct and her victimization, raising concerns under In re Plump and In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch.
An incomplete and largely inaudible record, which prevented meaningful review even after the Court of Appeals obtained the audio recording.
Evidence that the father intimidated the mother during the proceeding, including outbursts and conduct that led to his exclusion from the courtroom.

Applying the plain-error standard from In re Ferranti, the dissent would grant leave to determine whether the plea was knowing, understanding, and voluntary, and whether the errors affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (2014):
Sanders explains that the adjudicative phase is where the court determines its authority to exercise jurisdiction over a child. It also rejected the “one-parent doctrine,” underscoring that the adjudication must be valid as to each parent against whom coercive state power will be exercised. Justice Thomas invokes Sanders to emphasize the foundational importance of a proper adjudication; if adjudication is infirm, later dispositional and termination steps are compromised.
In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1 (2019):
Ferranti is the lodestar for plea-taking in child protective cases. It requires that a parent’s plea be “knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made” (MCR 3.971(D)(1)) and that the court provide the full suite of advisements in MCR 3.971(B) before accepting a plea, including the consequences of the plea and the availability of appellate review. Ferranti also confirms that unpreserved errors in the plea colloquy are reviewed for plain error and that failures in the advisement process can warrant reversal because they affect substantial rights and the integrity of the proceeding.
MCR 3.971 and MCR 3.972:
MCR 3.971(B) details what a trial court must advise before accepting a plea: rights being waived, consequences (including potential use at termination), right to counsel, possible support obligations after termination, and the availability of appellate review. MCR 3.971(D)(2) further requires an “accurate plea,” i.e., a record-based factual basis supporting that one or more petition allegations are true. MCR 3.972 governs trial adjudications when no plea is taken.
In re SLH, 277 Mich App 662 (2008):
The Court of Appeals held that failure to properly advise a respondent of rights renders a plea “fatally defective.” Although predating Ferranti, SLH remains a forceful reminder that shortcuts in the colloquy are not harmless formalities.
In re Plump, 294 Mich App 270 (2011), and In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326 (2022):
These cases caution that a parent’s status as a domestic-violence victim cannot, by itself, be the basis for termination; termination is permissible where a parent’s own behaviors directly harm the child or expose the child to harm. By analogy at the adjudicative phase, a factual basis must differentiate between a victim-parent’s circumstances and any conduct by that parent that would support jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). Justice Thomas flags that the record here may show only exposure to the father’s violence—not the mother’s conduct warranting jurisdiction.
NCJFCJ Guidance (2011):
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges notes perpetrators often weaponize court proceedings to control victim-parents and children. Justice Thomas cites this to contextualize how on-the-record intimidation can compromise voluntariness.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Thomas’s analysis proceeds from the plain-error framework applied in Ferranti. The question is whether the record shows error that was plain, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The dissent identifies multiple errors and systemic concerns:

Voluntariness and Understanding (MCR 3.971(D)(1)): The transcript twice records the respondent saying “I don’t understand,” and later, “I don’t really understand what admission means.” The court itself questioned her “demeanor” and confidence in the admission. While a short recess occurred for consultation with counsel, repeated inaudible responses leave it unclear whether the respondent ever affirmatively and comprehensively acknowledged full understanding after the break. In a high-stakes proceeding involving parental rights, these signals of confusion are significant.
Advisement of Rights Before Acceptance (MCR 3.971(B)): The court did not advise the respondent of her appellate rights until after accepting the plea, contrary to MCR 3.971(B)(6). That matters because a plea cannot be “knowing” and “voluntary” if the parent is not first informed of the rights and consequences associated with pleading, including the right to seek appellate review.
Stating the Allegations on the Record (MCR 3.971(B)(1)): The court did not restate the specific allegations to which the respondent was admitting at the time of the plea. Without a clear articulation of the allegations, the court cannot ensure the parent’s understanding or build a record that allows later review.
Accurate Plea/Factual Basis (MCR 3.971(D)(2)): The record appears to reflect only that the child was “exposed to domestic violence,” with no clarification of whether the mother’s conduct—not simply the father’s violence—created the statutory basis for jurisdiction. Under Plump and Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, a victim-parent’s exposure to another’s violence, without more, is not alone a sufficient basis for coercive state intervention culminating in potential termination. A compliant factual basis must delineate the respondent’s conduct or omission that meets MCL 712A.2(b)(2).
Coercive Context/Intimidation: The father disrupted the hearing, attempted to speak for the mother, and, per the prosecutor, intimidated her off the record in the hallway. The trial court ultimately removed the father for safety, acknowledging that he posed “risk of danger to everyone here.” The IPV context and real-time intimidation are relevant to whether the plea was voluntary and uncoerced.
Inadequate Record: Many of the respondent’s answers were marked “inaudible,” and the Court of Appeals’ effort to review the audio did not remedy the deficiency. An inaudible or incomplete record undermines appellate review and, here, obscures whether crucial advisements and acknowledgments occurred.

In aggregate, these issues strongly implicate the core due process requirements that Ferranti and MCR 3.971 enforce. Justice Thomas concludes that the confluence of confusion, incomplete advisements, potentially insufficient factual basis, IPV-driven intimidation, and a compromised record warrants plenary review. She would therefore grant leave—and appoint counsel—to assess whether the adjudication should be set aside.

Impact

Although the Court’s denial of leave creates no new binding precedent, the dissent is an important signal for Michigan juvenile courts, child-welfare practitioners, and appellate courts:

Heightened attention to plea colloquies under MCR 3.971: Trial courts should scrupulously deliver each advisement before accepting a plea, including appellate rights, and should explicitly identify the allegations admitted. Deviations that once might have been treated as “technical” can—post-Ferranti—require reversal.
Building a clean, audible record: Courts must ensure that microphones, audio equipment, and courtroom protocols produce an intelligible transcript. Where responses are inaudible, the court should restate, clarify, and confirm on the record. Missing or inaudible content can be outcome-determinative.
IPV-informed practice at adjudication: The presence of an alleged abuser in the courtroom may chill a victim-parent’s responses. Trial judges should deploy safety measures—removal of a disruptive party, separate waiting areas, remote participation, trauma-informed questioning, and breaks—to ensure voluntariness and comprehension.
Factual basis must distinguish victimization from culpable conduct: A bare statement that a child was “exposed to domestic violence” is insufficient if it fails to identify how the respondent-parent’s own conduct, neglect, or omissions satisfy MCL 712A.2(b)(2). The court should elicit specifics establishing parental responsibility, not just the existence of violence perpetrated by someone else.
Appointment of counsel in discretionary review: While the Court denied appointment here, the dissent underscores the importance of counsel when reviewing complex due process issues in cases where parental rights are at stake and the record is compromised.
Guidance for advocates: Defense counsel should object contemporaneously to incomplete advisements, request clear restatement of allegations, ask to exclude intimidating parties during the colloquy, and ensure a detailed factual basis addressing the respondent’s conduct. Prosecutors and LGALs should support trauma-informed practices that protect record integrity and voluntariness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudicative phase: The first phase of a child protective proceeding where the court decides whether it has jurisdiction over the child. The state must prove the petition’s allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, or the parent can admit/no-contest to allegations.
Plea (admission or no contest) in child protective cases: A parent may waive trial and admit the truth of certain allegations. The court must ensure the plea is knowing, understanding, and voluntary, and that there is a factual basis supporting at least one statutory ground for jurisdiction.
MCR 3.971: The court rule that governs plea-taking in abuse/neglect adjudications, prescribing specific advisements (including appellate rights) and requiring a factual basis.
MCL 712A.2(b)(2): The statutory ground that allows jurisdiction when a child’s home or environment is unfit due to neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent or custodian.
Plain error review: When a party did not object at the time, appellate courts ask whether there was an obvious error that affected the party’s substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Ferranti applied this to plea-colloquy errors in child protection.
Domestic violence context: Courts must distinguish between a parent who is a victim of IPV and a parent whose own conduct endangers a child. The former, without more, is not a basis for termination and should not be the sole basis for jurisdiction.
Lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL): The attorney appointed to represent the child’s best interests; here, the Supreme Court invited the LGAL to respond at the leave stage.
Case service plan: The court-ordered plan the parent must follow after adjudication to remedy the conditions leading to court involvement and to work toward reunification.

Conclusion

In re T. Hewitt does not create new binding precedent because the Supreme Court denied leave. Nonetheless, Justice Thomas’s dissent crystallizes and extends Ferranti’s due-process imperatives in a setting complicated by intimate partner violence and a compromised record. Three messages emerge powerfully:

Every plea at adjudication must be preceded by a full, on-the-record advisement of rights—including appellate rights—and must rest on a clear, accurate factual basis that addresses the respondent-parent’s conduct.
Courts must vigilantly ensure that the plea is truly knowing, understanding, and voluntary—an inquiry that must account for the real-time effects of courtroom intimidation and the broader dynamics of IPV.
An intelligible, complete record is not a technicality; it is the foundation of meaningful appellate review and public confidence in child welfare adjudications.

The dissent is a strong, practical reminder for the bench and bar: in child protective cases, process safeguards are not optional. When parental rights are at stake, strict compliance with MCR 3.971 and Ferranti, a trauma-informed courtroom, and a clean record are essential to the fairness and integrity of the system.