PSR-Based Notice Satisfies Oral Pronouncement Requirements for Supervised Release: The Fifth Circuit’s Extension of Rule 32 Inferences in United States v. Lezama-Ramirez

Introduction

United States v. Lezama-Ramirez is a Fifth Circuit decision refining the oral-pronouncement doctrine for supervised release conditions and clarifying how the Presentence Report (PSR) can serve as adequate notice when conditions are not read aloud at sentencing. The defendant, a previously removed noncitizen who pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), received 24 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release. He appealed on the ground that the supervised-release conditions listed in the written judgment did not fully align with what the district court orally pronounced.

Two clusters of issues emerged:

• Whether standard and special conditions listed in the PSR but not read aloud at sentencing were validly imposed; and
• Whether specific variances between the court’s oral pronouncement and the written judgment created conflicts requiring vacatur.

The panel affirmed most conditions but vacated and remanded one special condition after finding a “more burdensome” variance in the written judgment. In doing so, the majority leaned on inferences from Rule 32 cases to conclude the defendant had adequate notice of PSR-listed conditions even though they were not orally enumerated—an approach sharply questioned in a dissent.

Summary of the Judgment

• Standard of Review:
  • For conditions disclosed in the PSR but not read aloud—and to which the defendant did not object at sentencing—review is for plain error (citing United States v. Diggles, en banc).
  • For variances that become apparent only when the written judgment issues after sentencing, review is for abuse of discretion (citing United States v. Pelayo-Zamarripa).
• PSR-Disclosed Conditions Upheld: The court affirmed Standard Conditions 2–9, 11–13, and Special Condition 1. The district court did not need to read them aloud because they were disclosed in the PSR, the PSR was adopted without objection, and the record supported inferences that defendant had notice.
• Special Condition 2 Vacated in Part: The oral pronouncement barred reentry without written DHS permission if deported. The written judgment added a 72-hour reporting requirement upon reentry. Because the reporting duty added a burden not pronounced orally, the panel vacated that condition and remanded to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement.
• Standard Condition 10 Affirmed: The oral prohibition on “possessing” weapons versus the written prohibition on “own, possess, or have access to” was treated as an ambiguity, not a conflict; the written judgment permissibly clarified the scope.
• Dissent: Judge Southwick would have excised all PSR-listed conditions that were not explicitly pronounced because, in his view, oral pronouncement cases require something closer to direct confirmation that the defendant reviewed the PSR with counsel, not merely inferences from the record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)

  Diggles anchors the modern Fifth Circuit framework for supervised-release conditions. It requires that discretionary conditions be orally pronounced or otherwise that the defendant have meaningful notice and opportunity to object. Diggles also sets the plain-error posture when conditions are disclosed in the PSR and adopted without contemporaneous objection. Lezama-Ramirez relies on Diggles for both propositions.

• United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Molina-Alonso, 834 F. App’x 80 (5th Cir. 2020)

  These cases hold that a district court need not read each condition aloud if they were disclosed in the PSR. The Lezama-Ramirez majority cites this line to reject the argument that silence at the podium, standing alone, invalidates PSR-listed conditions.

• Rule 32 cases: United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Duruisseau, No. 20-30649, 2021 WL 5778463 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 2021)

  These decisions allow courts to draw “reasonable inferences” from the record to determine whether the defendant read and discussed the PSR with counsel (Rule 32(i)(1)(A)). The Lezama-Ramirez majority leans on this inferential methodology to establish notice of PSR-listed conditions, even though the judge did not read them aloud. The dissent flags this as an unwarranted importation of Rule 32 inferences into the oral pronouncement doctrine.

• United States v. Pelayo-Zamarripa, 81 F.4th 456 (5th Cir. 2023)

  Provides the abuse-of-discretion standard for resolving discrepancies first apparent when the written judgment issues post-sentencing. The panel uses Pelayo-Zamarripa to evaluate whether the written judgment “broadens” or is “more burdensome” than the oral pronouncement.

• United States v. Tanner, 984 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2021)

  When a discrepancy is an “ambiguity,” courts examine the entire record to discern sentencing intent. Tanner supports affirmance of Standard Condition 10: the written term (“own, possess, or have access to”) clarifies the orally imposed prohibition on possessing weapons.

• United States v. Riojas-Flores, 834 F. App’x 120 (5th Cir. 2021)

  Recognizes that adding a reporting obligation that was not orally pronounced is “more burdensome.” The majority follows this to vacate Special Condition 2’s written 72-hour reporting requirement.

• United States v. Thomas, 830 F. App’x 420 (5th Cir. 2020)

  Endorses using the written judgment to “define [the] scope” of an orally pronounced condition without creating a conflict. The panel analogizes to Thomas in upholding Standard Condition 10.

• Recent and unpublished signals cited by the dissent:
  • United States v. Martinez-Rivera, No. 24-20031, 2025 WL 985711 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025)
  • United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292 (5th Cir. 2023)
  • United States v. Quezada-Atayde, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 2237939 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025)

  The dissent reads these authorities as counseling closer adherence to explicit, on-the-record confirmation that a defendant reviewed the PSR with counsel, rather than relying on inference alone. That interpretive dispute defines the fault line in Lezama-Ramirez.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in two tracks, keyed to the type of challenge.

1) PSR-Disclosed Conditions Not Read Aloud (Plain Error Review)

Lezama-Ramirez contested Standard Conditions 2–9 and 11–13 and Special Condition 1 on the ground that the court did not read them aloud. The majority rejected this challenge under plain-error review because:

• The PSR contained the thirteen standard and two special conditions, and the district court expressly adopted the PSR without objection.
• Defense counsel displayed granular familiarity with the PSR at sentencing, correcting the court about the criminal history category by citing the exact PSR page.
• In allocution, the defendant stated he would comply “with all the requisites or the requirements that the Court asks of me,” supporting inferences of notice.
• The same suite of conditions had been imposed at the defendant’s prior § 1326(a) sentencing, bolstering the inference that he understood the content and scope of the conditions adopted again.

On that record, the majority held that the district court did not err—let alone plainly err—by not reading the conditions aloud. Critically, the court applied an inferential approach to notice, drawn from Rule 32 precedents (Esparza-Gonzalez and Duruisseau), to conclude the defendant understood the PSR-listed conditions the court was imposing.

2) Discrepancies Between Oral Pronouncement and Written Judgment (Abuse of Discretion Review)

• Special Condition 2 (vacated in part):

  The court orally stated that upon deportation the defendant could not re-enter without written permission of the Secretary of Homeland Security. The written judgment added that if he re-enters, he must report to the nearest U.S. Probation Office within 72 hours. The government conceded that the reporting obligation is more burdensome. Following Riojas-Flores, the panel vacated this added burden and remanded to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement.

• Standard Condition 10 (affirmed):

  Orally, the court prohibited “possessing” a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or any dangerous weapon. The written judgment banned “own, possess, or have access to” those items. The panel deemed the difference an ambiguity rather than a conflict. Looking to Thomas and Tanner, it held the written language clarified the scope of the oral restriction and did not impermissibly expand it. No abuse of discretion occurred.

The Dissent’s Critique

Judge Southwick argued that the majority erred by importing the “reasonable inference” methodology from Rule 32 into the oral-pronouncement context. In his view:

• Oral-pronouncement cases require something closer to an explicit, on-the-record verification that the defendant personally reviewed the PSR with counsel before imposing non-read conditions.
• Prior cases have treated the two lines (Rule 32 verification versus oral pronouncement) as distinct, with stricter expectations in the oral-pronouncement context.
• Even if inferences were appropriate, the record here did not support an inference that the defendant (as opposed to counsel) had read and discussed the PSR.

On that basis, the dissent would have excised the PSR-listed standard conditions 2–9 and 11–13 and special condition 1 from the written judgment.

Impact

• Doctrinal Clarification (and Tension):

  The majority consolidates the Fifth Circuit’s tolerance for PSR-based notice with an explicit willingness to draw Rule 32-style inferences to establish that a defendant understood PSR-disclosed supervised-release conditions adopted at sentencing. While Grogan and Diggles already allowed reliance on the PSR, Lezama-Ramirez strengthens that pathway by approving record-based inferences even without a direct Rule 32 colloquy. The dissent underscores the fragility of this move, portending further appellate attention or en banc interest.

• Practical Sentencing Effects:

  District courts in the Fifth Circuit can feel more secure that adopting PSR-listed conditions without reading them verbatim will survive appellate scrutiny, provided the record shows meaningful engagement with the PSR and an opportunity to object. Still, the safest practice remains to (a) confirm on the record that the defendant and counsel read and discussed the PSR, and (b) orally summarize or incorporate the conditions with specificity to avoid variance disputes.

• Guardrails on Written Judgments:

  Written judgments cannot add burdens beyond what was orally pronounced. The 72-hour reporting requirement—common in immigration-related supervised-release conditions—is “more burdensome” if not pronounced and thus must be vacated or conformed on remand. Conversely, clarifying language that defines the scope (e.g., adding “own” or “access to” to a possession ban) can be sustained as an ambiguity-resolving clarification rather than a conflict.

• Litigation Strategy:

  Defense counsel must object at sentencing if they foresee concerns with PSR-listed conditions; otherwise, plain error will be difficult to show on appeal. Post-sentencing variances must be framed as conflicts, not mere ambiguities, and counsel should pinpoint added burdens. Prosecutors should ensure the written judgment precisely tracks the oral pronouncement (or truly clarifies it) to avoid vacatur and remand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Supervised Release: A post-incarceration monitoring period during which a defendant must comply with court-imposed conditions. Standard conditions apply in most cases (e.g., reporting, law-abiding conduct), while special conditions are tailored to the case (e.g., immigration-related reporting or treatment requirements).
• Oral Pronouncement Doctrine: The sentence pronounced in open court controls over the written judgment. If the written judgment conflicts by adding a more burdensome restriction, the conflict is resolved in favor of the oral pronouncement and the written judgment must be conformed.
• Presentence Report (PSR): A report prepared by probation that contains offense details, criminal history, guideline calculations, and recommended conditions. While judges need not read all conditions aloud, defendants must have notice and an opportunity to object.
• Rule 32 Verification: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A) requires courts to verify that the defendant and counsel have read and discussed the PSR. Some cases allow courts to infer compliance from the record; Lezama-Ramirez extends that inferential approach to the oral-pronouncement context for supervised-release conditions.
• Plain Error vs. Abuse of Discretion:
  • Plain error applies when a defendant had notice (e.g., from the PSR) but did not object at sentencing. It is a difficult standard that requires a clear and obvious error affecting substantial rights and the fairness of proceedings.
  • Abuse of discretion applies to discrepancies between the oral sentence and the written judgment that could not be objected to at sentencing because they first appeared in the judgment. Courts distinguish between “conflicts” (more burdensome additions) and “ambiguities” (clarifications consistent with the court’s intent).
• Conflict vs. Ambiguity (in Conditions):
  • Conflict: The written judgment imposes a broader or more burdensome condition than the oral pronouncement (e.g., adding a new reporting obligation). Conflict requires vacatur or conforming the written judgment.
  • Ambiguity: The written language reasonably clarifies the oral condition’s scope (e.g., specifying “own, possess, or have access to” to effectuate a possession ban). Ambiguity may be resolved by reviewing the record to discern intent.

Practical Guidance and Takeaways

• For District Judges:
  • State on the record that the defendant and counsel have read and discussed the PSR (explicit Rule 32 verification remains best practice).
  • Either orally pronounce each discretionary condition or expressly adopt the PSR’s conditions while confirming opportunity to object.
  • Ensure the written judgment matches the oral pronouncement verbatim, especially for immigration-related reporting requirements.
• For Defense Counsel:
  • Object at sentencing to any disputed PSR-listed condition; silence will trigger plain-error review and make reversal unlikely.
  • After judgment, scrutinize the written conditions for added burdens not pronounced orally (e.g., 72-hour reporting duties) and seek conformity.
• For Prosecutors and Probation:
  • Draft proposed written conditions to mirror the oral pronouncement; avoid adding substantive burdens post hoc.
  • Where clarity is needed, use written language that “defines scope” without expanding beyond what was orally imposed.

Conclusion

United States v. Lezama-Ramirez fortifies a pragmatic path for validating PSR-disclosed supervised-release conditions in the Fifth Circuit: when the record shows counsel’s robust engagement with the PSR and the court adopts it without objection, the conditions need not be read aloud to be enforceable. The panel also polices the line between “conflict” and “ambiguity” in matching written judgments to oral pronouncements, vacating new burdens (like added reporting obligations) but permitting clarifying scope language (such as “own, possess, or have access to” for weapon restrictions).

The decision’s most significant development is methodological. By borrowing Rule 32’s inferential approach to determine PSR notice in the oral-pronouncement context, the majority smooths practical sentencing administration but invites continued debate, as reflected in the dissent’s call for more explicit, defendant-focused verification. Going forward, the safest course for sentencing courts remains to make a clean Rule 32 record, orally identify or incorporate the conditions with specificity, and ensure the written judgment faithfully reflects what was said in open court.