Presumption Against Exclusion of Defense Witnesses and Clarified Application of Rule 5-502 and McCarty Balancing in State v. Garcia

Introduction

State v. Garcia (2025-NM-SC-40221 consolidated with 2025-NM-SC-40225) marks a watershed moment in New Mexico criminal procedure by establishing that: (1) a general reservation to call any opposing party’s witnesses satisfies the notice requirements of Rule 5-502 NMRA; and (2) before excluding a defense witness, a trial court must apply the McCarty presumption against exclusion and conduct a four-factor balancing test.

The case arose from a joint drive-by shooting in Valencia County that left one brother dead and the other injured. Defendants Jesus Garcia and Alexandro Montelongo-Murillo (together “Codefendants”) were indicted for first-degree murder, conspiracy, and attempted murder. On the eve of trial, the district court excluded testimony of a critical eyewitness—one the State itself had listed—because the defense had merely reserved the right to call any State witness under Rule 5-502(A)(3). The Supreme Court of New Mexico unanimously held this exclusion violated the Codefendants’ constitutional right to present a defense and reversed for a new trial; it also clarified the standard for admission of nonstandard eyewitness identifications under State v. Martinez.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Vargas, writing for a unanimous court, addressed two principal issues:

Witness Exclusion: The district court excluded defense‐called eyewitness Lorenzo Montaño based solely on a perceived violation of Rule 5-502(A)(3). The Supreme Court held that (a) a reservation to call any of the State’s witnesses satisfies Rule 5-502 notice requirements; (b) even if the rule had been violated, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Montaño without applying the mandatory McCarty presumption against exclusion and balancing test; and (c) exclusion of a defense witness is an extreme sanction that should be used only in the most egregious cases. Accordingly, the convictions were reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Eyewitness Identification: Codefendants had moved to suppress the pretrial “show‐up” identifications by the surviving brother, Scott Sandoval, under Martinez (2021-NMSC-002). The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that exigent public‐safety circumstances (an ongoing drive-by shooting, multiple armed suspects at large, repeated 911 calls) supplied a “good reason” for the nonstandard procedure, rendering the identifications admissible.

Having reversed for retrial, the Court found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions and thus remanded for a new trial on first-degree murder, conspiracy, and attempted murder.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Rule 5-502 NMRA (Defense witness disclosures): Requires a list of names and addresses of defense witnesses. The district court read it to forbid a general reservation to call State witnesses; the Supreme Court rejected that reading.
McCarty v. State, 1988-NMSC-079: Imposes a presumption against excluding defense witnesses and requires a four‐factor balancing test before sanctioning defense noncompliance with discovery rules.
Harper v. State, 2011-NMSC-044 & State v. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017: Emphasize that exclusion of witnesses is a severe sanction; the Court must consider the intentionality of the violation, prejudice to the opposing party, and availability of lesser sanctions.
State v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002: Adopted a per se rule against unnecessarily suggestive police identification procedures, subject to a “good-reason” exception.
Commonwealth v. Austin and Commonwealth v. Johnson (Mass. cases): Interpret “good reason” as exigent circumstances—public safety, immediate investigation needs, and prompt confirmation of suspect identity.

2. Legal Reasoning

On witness exclusion, the Supreme Court applied a two‐step approach:

Plain‐Text and Purpose of Rule 5-502: The Court held that Rule 5-502’s notice requirement is liberally construed to facilitate interviews. A defendant may reserve the right to call any of the State’s witnesses rather than redundantly retype each name and address. This satisfies the rule’s purpose and imposes no unfair surprise on the prosecution.
McCarty Presumption and Balancing Test: Even assuming a Rule 5-502 violation, the Court held the district court committed clear error by excluding Montaño without (a) presuming against exclusion; (b) considering lesser sanctions; (c) assessing whether the State was truly prejudiced (it was not—Montaña was the State’s own witness whom they had already interviewed); and (d) determining whether the defense acted in bad faith (they did not). Montaño would have provided fully exculpatory testimony identifying another shooter. Excluding him eviscerated the Codefendants’ right to present a defense.

On eyewitness identification, the Court applied Martinez’s two‐part test:

Codefendants met their prima facie burden to show the police used a suggestive “show-up” procedure.
The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that “good reason” existed: an ongoing, dangerous, multi-location shooting, suspects at large, and an overloaded law enforcement response. Under Massachusetts precedents, these exigent circumstances justified a prompt, albeit nonstandard, identification.

3. Impact and Future Significance

Defense Practice: Counsel may consistently use a general reservation to call any opposing witnesses without fear of automatic exclusion. Formal redundancy is unnecessary.
Trial Courts: Before excluding a defense witness for discovery‐rule noncompliance, judges must apply the McCarty presumption against exclusion, weigh lesser sanctions, assess real prejudice, and consider defense prejudice. Exclusion must remain a last resort.
Eyewitness Identification Law: Confirms that Martinez’s per se exclusion applies only when no legitimate law enforcement purpose supports a suggestive procedure. In exigent, public-safety emergencies, “good reason” will often justify expedient identifications.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 5-502(A)(3) NMRA: Requires defense lawyers to tell the State which witnesses they plan to call and how to reach them. In practice, lawyers can simply say “we reserve the right to call any of the State’s witnesses,” and that is good enough.
McCarty Presumption: An accused has a fundamental right to present defense witnesses. Judges must start with the assumption that defense witnesses should be allowed, and only exclude testimony if a balancing test shows no less severe remedy will work.
“Good Reason” in Martinez: Police may sometimes use suggestive methods (like a “show-up” where only one suspect is shown) if there is an urgent need—dangerous suspects at large, multiple crime scenes, ongoing risk to the public, and overloaded resources.

Conclusion

State v. Garcia establishes two critical rules: (1) a general reservation to call any opposing party’s witnesses satisfies Rule 5-502’s notice requirements; and (2) before excluding a defense witness, trial courts must apply the McCarty presumption against exclusion and conduct a four-factor balancing test considering least‐severe sanctions, prejudice, and willfulness, together with the impact on the defense. These guardrails protect the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense while still permitting courts to enforce discovery rules in the most egregious circumstances. Moreover, the Court reaffirmed that Martinez permits admittance of suggestive show-up identifications when exigent public-safety needs justify them. Together, these holdings sharpen the boundaries between zealous advocacy, orderly trial preparation, and the truth-seeking function of our courts.