Preponderance Standard Governs LUC Boundary Interpretations; Declaratory Orders Limited to Resolving Map Uncertainty

Introduction

In Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State (Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi, August 28, 2025), the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court clarified two important pillars of state land use and administrative law. First, when the Land Use Commission (LUC) hears a petition for a declaratory order seeking a boundary interpretation under Hawaiʻi Administrative Rules (HAR) § 15-15-22, the petitioner’s burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence—unless and until the LUC adopts a different standard by rulemaking. Second, the Court underscored that boundary interpretation is a narrow tool available only to resolve “uncertainty” in the location of district lines; it is not a substitute for a district boundary amendment, which carries significantly more rigorous procedural and substantive requirements.

The case arises from a 17.547-acre coastal parcel in North Kohala, Hawaiʻi Island. Honoipu Hideaway, LLC (Honoipu) asserted that the State Land Use District Boundaries Map H-3 (Māhukona), dated 1974, mislocated the conservation–agriculture boundary because the drafters relied on an outdated depiction of a plantation road that had been moved makai (toward the ocean) by 1961. Honoipu asked the LUC, via declaratory order, to “determine” the correct boundary along the mauka (mountain-facing) edge of the relocated road, which would shift approximately 1.813 acres from conservation to agriculture.

The LUC denied the request after a hearing, repeatedly emphasizing that Honoipu had not provided “conclusive” or “compelling” proof of error or intent. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded because the LUC applied a heightened evidentiary threshold. The Court held that the proper standard is preponderance of the evidence, not a “conclusive” or “compelling” showing, unless the LUC adopts a different burden by duly promulgated rule.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that a petitioner seeking an LUC boundary interpretation via declaratory order bears the burden of proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard, absent contrary rulemaking (HAR § 15-15-59; HAR § 15-15-100; HRS ch. 91).
The Court confirmed that boundary interpretation under HAR § 15-15-22 is limited to resolving uncertainties in the location of district lines. Where no uncertainty exists, the proper pathway is a district boundary amendment under HRS § 205-4, with its stringent safeguards.
The LUC erred by applying a heightened evidentiary threshold (“conclusive,” “compelling,” and “overwhelmingly compelling”) instead of the preponderance standard.
Because the error affected Honoipu’s substantial rights, the Court vacated the LUC’s order and remanded for new findings and conclusions using the correct burden of proof.
The Court did not reach Honoipu’s other challenges to the LUC’s findings and conclusions because the burden-of-proof error was dispositive.

Case Background

Honoipu acquired littoral property in North Kohala in 2018. The 1974 LUC map classifies approximately 4.794 acres as conservation and 12.228 acres as agriculture. Honoipu contended that the conservation–agriculture boundary was intended to follow an access road at the edge of agricultural use and that by 1961 this road had been relocated makai. According to Honoipu, the map drafters relied on an earlier road alignment, mistakenly placing 1.813 acres within the conservation district.

Citing the 1969 State of Hawaiʻi Land Use Districts and Regulations Review (Eckbo, Dean, Austin & Williams), which prioritized using roads at the edge of agricultural uses, Honoipu asked the LUC to interpret the boundary consistent with that policy. LUC staff acknowledged the road’s relocation but posited that the 1974 map “likely” preserved a 300-foot coastal setback rather than follow the new road to avoid costly redrawing—meaning the map reflected intended policy.

After a discretionary hearing, the LUC unanimously denied the petition. Commissioners emphasized the lack of “conclusive” proof and suggested that a boundary amendment, not a declaratory ruling, was the appropriate vehicle for any change from conservation to agriculture.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

Rosehill v. Land Use Commission, 155 Hawaiʻi 41, 556 P.3d 387 (2024): The Court drew on Rosehill for standards of review under HRS § 91-14(g) and the principle that courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations where a statute is silent or ambiguous. Here, the Court recognized the LUC’s practice of treating “uncertainty” to include clear mapping errors, but emphasized that the agency’s factual determinations must be made under a proper burden of proof.
In re Kanahele, 152 Hawaiʻi 501, 526 P.3d 478 (2023): Addressed classification of issues under HRS § 91-14(g) and the meaning of “contested case.” The Court relied on Kanahele (and Lingle) to reaffirm that discretionary hearings on declaratory orders are not “contested cases,” so HRS § 91-10’s express preponderance provision for contested cases does not directly apply.
Lingle v. Hawaiʻi Gov’t Employees Ass’n, 107 Hawaiʻi 178, 111 P.3d 587 (2005): Held that orders disposing of declaratory ruling petitions are appealable under HRS § 91-14. This foundation enabled appellate review of the LUC’s denial here.
Citizens Against Reckless Development v. ZBA, 114 Hawaiʻi 184, 159 P.3d 143 (2007): Restated that rules are construed like statutes; enforce plain meaning where unambiguous. The Court applied these principles to HAR §§ 15-15-22, -59, and -100.
Keep the North Shore Country v. BLNR, 150 Hawaiʻi 486, 506 P.3d 150 (2022), and State v. Castillon, 144 Hawaiʻi 406, 443 P.3d 98 (2019): Provided general statutes-and-rules interpretation canons.
Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989), and Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawaiʻi 1, 919 P.2d 263 (1996): Explained the three evidentiary standards—preponderance, clear and convincing, and beyond a reasonable doubt—and their policy rationales. The Court used these to situate the preponderance standard within administrative adjudication.
Paul v. Department of Transportation, 115 Hawaiʻi 416, 168 P.3d 546 (2007), and Survivors of Medeiros v. Maui Land & Pineapple Co., 66 Haw. 290, 660 P.2d 1316 (1983): Emphasized that appellate courts reverse for legal error only if the petitioner’s substantial rights were prejudiced. The heightened standard applied by the LUC prejudiced Honoipu.
Federal and sister-state authorities: Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 n.22 (1981); 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 316; Craven v. State Ethics Comm’n, 454 N.E.2d 471 (Mass. 1983); Seherr-Thoss v. Teton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 329 P.3d 936 (Wyo. 2014); and In re Black Hills Power, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 631 (S.D. 2016). These align with the general rule that preponderance of the evidence is the default standard in administrative hearings absent a statute or rule to the contrary.
LUC Declaratory Orders illustrating “uncertainty” corrections: In re Stengle (Dkt. DR99-21), In re Harold K.L. Castle Foundation (Dkt. DR96-19), and In re City and County of Honolulu (Dkt. DR99-22). Each reflects correction of maps to conform to the drafters’ intended boundary where manifest disparities existed.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Boundary interpretation is a narrow mechanism to resolve uncertainty. HAR § 15-15-22 authorizes the LUC to resolve uncertainties in district line location (e.g., midline of a stream, measured distances from fixed features, reliance on map scale), and—when those aids fail—to “determine” the line. The Court recognized that the LUC has reasonably treated “uncertainty” as including clear mapping errors. But where there is no uncertainty to resolve, any change must proceed through a district boundary amendment under HRS § 205-4, with its heightened safeguards (EIS/FONSI, Hawaiian customary rights analysis, and findings under HRS §§ 205-16 and -17).
Although a boundary-interpretation hearing is not a “contested case,” a burden of proof still applies. Declaratory order hearings are discretionary and therefore not “contested cases” under HRS § 91-1. HRS § 91-10’s preponderance provision for contested cases thus does not apply ex proprio vigore. Nevertheless, when the LUC sets a petition for hearing, HAR § 15-15-100 makes Subchapter 7’s procedures applicable, and HAR § 15-15-59 imposes a burden of proof—both production and persuasion—on the initiating party. Moreover, because declaratory orders are judicially reviewable under HRS § 91-14, there must be a burden of proof; otherwise, “clearly erroneous” review is unworkable.
The default standard is preponderance of the evidence absent rulemaking to the contrary. Drawing on Hawaiʻi precedent, the HAPA, and persuasive authorities, the Court held that administrative hearings are governed by the preponderance standard unless a statute or duly promulgated rule prescribes a higher threshold. The LUC has rulemaking authority (HRS §§ 205-1, -7, and HRS § 91-8) and could adopt a different standard in the future, including for conservation-land interpretations, but it has not done so.
The LUC applied an impermissibly heightened standard. The LUC’s written findings and a commissioner’s hearing remarks repeatedly demanded “conclusive” and “compelling” proof—language inconsistent with preponderance. Because this elevated standard could have altered the outcome, the error prejudiced Honoipu’s substantial rights, requiring vacatur and remand.

C. Impact and Implications

The decision is significant both for land use practice and for Hawaiʻi administrative law generally:

Uniform evidentiary baseline: Petitioners in LUC declaratory orders—including boundary interpretations—now have a clearly articulated evidentiary threshold: more likely than not. Agencies and practitioners should avoid “conclusive” or “compelling” rhetoric absent a rule that expressly requires it.
Boundary interpretation remains limited: The Court reaffirmed that interpretation is available only where there is genuine uncertainty or clear map error. Property owners cannot use declaratory orders to sidestep the rigorous district boundary amendment process for reclassifications.
Potential agency rulemaking: The Court invited, but did not require, the LUC to consider rulemaking if it believes conservation-land interpretations warrant a higher burden (consistent with HRS §§ 205-1, -7, and 91-8). Any such rule must be adopted via chapter 91 procedures.
Administrative-law ripple effects: Though the case centers on the LUC, the Court’s broader statement—that preponderance is the default in administrative hearings absent law to the contrary—will guide other Hawaiʻi agencies managing discretionary hearings on declaratory orders or analogous proceedings.
Practical litigation consequences: On remand, Honoipu need only show it is more probable than not that the 1974 map mislocated the boundary given the drafters’ intent (e.g., to follow a road at the edge of agricultural use or to adhere to the 300-foot setback). The LUC must make new findings under the correct burden and confine interpretation to resolving uncertainty.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preponderance of the evidence: The factfinder must be persuaded that a fact is more likely true than not. Think “tipping the scales” just over 50%.
Clear and convincing evidence: A higher standard requiring a firm belief in the truth of the facts; used in select civil contexts. Not required here.
Beyond a reasonable doubt: The highest standard used in criminal cases; not applicable in administrative hearings like this.
Declaratory order—boundary interpretation: A limited LUC process for resolving uncertainties in the exact location of a district line on the ground relative to the official map. It corrects manifest mapping errors but does not reclassify land.
District boundary amendment: The formal reclassification process under HRS § 205-4. It triggers rigorous procedural requirements, environmental review, and substantive criteria, including consistency with the Hawaiʻi State Plan and resource protection factors.
Contested case vs. discretionary hearing: A contested case is a proceeding required by law to be determined after an opportunity for an agency hearing (HRS § 91-1). A discretionary hearing, like the LUC’s hearing on a declaratory order, is not required by law and therefore not a contested case. Even so, a burden of proof still applies to enable judicial review.
Mauka and makai: Hawaiian directional terms meaning toward the mountain (mauka) and toward the sea (makai), respectively.

Practical Guidance for Stakeholders

For Property Owners and Practitioners

Use boundary interpretation only when you can show legitimate “uncertainty” (e.g., ambiguous map placement, known map drafting conventions, fixed-feature misalignment, or evident drafting error).
Assemble layered proof to meet the preponderance standard: historic aerials, certified surveys, map overlays, road relocation records, shoreline surveys, and contemporaneous planning documents like the 1969 Review specifying mapping conventions (e.g., road at the edge of agriculture; vegetation lines; top of pali; 300-foot setback).
If your objective is a policy-driven reclassification without demonstrable uncertainty or error, pursue a district boundary amendment under HRS § 205-4; be prepared for EIS/FONSI requirements and analysis of Hawaiian customary and traditional rights, consistency with the Hawaiʻi State Plan, and resource-protection factors under HRS § 205-17.

For the LUC and Other Agencies

Train commissioners and staff to apply the preponderance standard in declaratory order hearings and to avoid conflating interpretation with amendment.
Consider formal rulemaking if a different burden of proof is warranted for specific declaratory-order contexts (e.g., conservation-land boundary interpretations), ensuring compliance with HRS ch. 91.
In orders, avoid terminology like “conclusive,” “compelling,” or “overwhelmingly compelling” unless a rule expressly adopts a heightened burden; such language risks reversible error.
In staff reports, explicitly address whether an asserted misalignment reflects an “uncertainty” resolvable under HAR § 15-15-22(e)-(f) versus a policy choice requiring a boundary amendment.

What Remains Open

Defining “uncertainty” boundaries: The Court acknowledged LUC practice that “uncertainty” can include clear mapping mistakes, but did not comprehensively define the category. Future decisions may further delineate the line between correctable uncertainty and substantive reclassification.
Potential higher burdens via rulemaking: The LUC could adopt a higher evidentiary standard for certain declaratory orders, especially involving conservation lands, provided it follows chapter 91 rulemaking. The policy rationale and scope of any such rule will likely be tested in future litigation.
Application on remand: The LUC must now reassess the evidence under a preponderance standard. Key questions include whether the 1974 boundary was intended to follow the road at the edge of agricultural use or to adhere to the 300-foot coastal setback, in light of the 1969 Review’s mapping conventions and the record evidence.

Conclusion

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court’s opinion in Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State establishes a clear and administrable rule: the preponderance of the evidence standard governs LUC boundary-interpretation declaratory orders, unless the LUC adopts a different burden by rulemaking. This brings Hawaiʻi practice into alignment with general administrative law and safeguards meaningful judicial review under HRS § 91-14. At the same time, the Court preserves the structural distinction between boundary interpretation (a targeted tool to remedy uncertainty or map error) and district boundary amendment (a robust, policy-driven reclassification process).

On remand, the LUC must determine, under the preponderance standard, whether Honoipu has shown that the 1974 map more likely than not mislocated the conservation boundary in light of the drafters’ intent and mapping conventions. More broadly, the decision clarifies evidentiary expectations across Hawaiʻi administrative proceedings and invites agencies to use rulemaking, not ad hoc adjudication, to adjust burdens when public policy so warrants.