Introduction

In United States v. Guinn, No. 24-5055 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 2025), a Tenth Circuit panel (Judges Phillips, Baldock, Rossman) affirmed a jury’s convictions for aggravated sexual abuse of a child under 12 and abusive sexual contact of a minor, and upheld a lifetime supervised release condition banning the possession or enjoyment of sexually explicit material. The case sits at the intersection of two recurring appellate themes: (1) sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges to child sexual abuse convictions where the proof turns primarily on a child’s testimony; and (2) First Amendment constraints on supervised release conditions that restrict adults’ access to lawful pornography, especially where the sentencing court’s on-the-record justification is sparse.

The court rejected Guinn’s sufficiency arguments, emphasizing deference to the jury’s credibility determinations, the permissibility of drawing commonsense inferences from childlike descriptions of anatomy and conduct, and the irrelevance of a negative SANE exam to the legal sufficiency of the proof. As to the supervised release condition, although the district court’s explanation was “likely” inadequate under circuit law requiring defendant-specific findings for restrictions burdening a fundamental right, the panel affirmed under plain-error review because the record contained a concrete, case-specific basis: testimony that Guinn groomed a younger sibling in childhood by forcing her to watch adult pornography.

While issued as an unpublished “Order and Judgment” (thus not binding precedent except under certain preclusion doctrines), Guinn may be cited for its persuasive value and offers a clear procedural lesson: the failure to object at sentencing sharply constrains appellate relief, even where the district court’s reasoning is thin, if the appellate record reveals any justification for the condition.

Summary of the Opinion

• Count One (18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)) – “Sexual act” with a child under 12: The panel held that K.L.’s testimony—describing Guinn putting his “balls” in her “no-no square,” digital penetration of her “butterfly,” and oral-genital contact—was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find the “sexual act” element beyond a reasonable doubt under 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). The court deferred to the jury’s credibility assessment, rejected the “coaching” argument, and noted corroboration by K.L.’s sister and the SANE nurse. The absence of physical findings on the SANE exam did not render the evidence insufficient.
• Count Three (18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)) – “Sexual contact” with a minor: The victim L.G. testified that Guinn pressed his “lower half” against her “bum” in a back-and-forth “humping” motion. The panel held that intentional touching through clothing of a listed body area with sexual intent satisfies § 2246(3)’s definition of “sexual contact,” and a jury could infer the requisite sexual intent from the inherently sexual nature of the conduct and context (including prior sexualized comments and requests by Guinn).
• Special Condition 1(4) – Ban on material “depicting or describing sexually explicit conduct”: Applying plain-error review (no objection below), the panel agreed the district court’s explanation was “likely” insufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and Tenth Circuit law requiring defendant-specific findings when burdening First Amendment rights. Even so, the court found no prejudice because the record supplied a defendant-specific basis: testimony that Guinn used adult pornography to groom his younger sister in childhood and consumed pornography at a young age. Under the circuit’s plain-error framework, the condition stands if the record reveals any basis for it.
• Disposition: Convictions and supervised release condition affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Burtrum, 21 F.4th 680 (10th Cir. 2021): The panel relied on Burtrum for two core propositions: (1) sufficiency review is de novo but “highly deferential,” with evidence viewed in the government’s favor and reasonable inferences drawn accordingly; and (2) the question is whether a rational trier of fact could find each element beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether alternative interpretations are conceivable. This undergirded the court’s refusal to disturb the jury’s verdict based on K.L.’s childlike descriptions and despite a negative SANE exam.
• United States v. Flechs, 98 F.4th 1235 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 310 (2024): Cited for the principle that appellate courts defer to the jury’s credibility assessments. This controlled the “coaching” argument: even if K.L. used sophisticated terms she did not understand, the jury could credit her concrete, age-appropriate descriptions of conduct that fit § 2246(2).
• United States v. Goldesberry, 128 F.4th 1183 (10th Cir. 2025): Emphasized looking at the “collective inferences” from all the evidence rather than examining proof “in bits and pieces.” This supported considering K.L.’s testimony together with corroboration from L.G. and the SANE nurse.
• United States v. Norman T., 129 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 1997): For § 2244(a)(3), the “gravamen” of the offense is contact; the statute does not require a particular body part of the perpetrator to do the touching.
• United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631 (3d Cir. 2004), and United States v. Gallardo, 970 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2020): Both confirm that touching “through clothing” satisfies “sexual contact.” Gallardo also supports inferring sexual intent where the contact is “so clearly sexual” that intent may be reasonably inferred—an apt description of “humping” in a back-and-forth motion against a child’s buttocks.
• United States v. Simpkins, 90 F.4th 1312 (10th Cir. 2024): Addresses preservation: a specific Rule 29 motion forfeits unraised grounds, but a general motion preserves sufficiency on all elements. The panel declined to resolve the standard-of-review dispute for Count Three because the evidence satisfied either de novo or plain-error review.
• United States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719 (10th Cir. 2020): The pivotal supervised-release case. It articulates the First Amendment baseline (adults have a fundamental right to possess adult pornography) and the requirement that courts make defendant-specific findings showing a compelling interest before imposing a pornography ban. Critically for plain-error review, Koch instructs that the appellate court will vacate only if “the record reveals no basis for the condition”; if the record offers a basis, there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome and thus no prejudice.
• United States v. Englehart, 22 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2022): Reinforces Koch’s need for on-the-record, defendant-specific justification under § 3583(d) when a condition burdens a fundamental right.
• United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011): Notes that pornography bans are commonly upheld in child pornography cases—used here as background support for the general reasonableness of such bans where there is a nexus to sexual offenses.
• United States v. Rosas, No. 23-2085, 2024 WL 3813215 (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024) (unpublished): Persuasive authority in which the Tenth Circuit sustained a similar condition based on the defendant’s use of adult pornography to groom child victims. Guinn extends that logic by holding that the nexus can be satisfied by record evidence of prior pornography-facilitated grooming even involving victims outside the instant offenses (here, a younger sister decades earlier), especially under plain-error review.
• United States v. Henry, 979 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2020), United States v. Chatwin, 60 F.4th 604 (10th Cir. 2023), United States v. Booker, 63 F.4th 1254 (10th Cir. 2023), United States v. Perez-Perez, 992 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Trujillo, 960 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2020): These cases supply the architecture for plain-error review—especially the prejudice requirement (a “reasonable probability” of a different result) and the principle that failure at step three moots step four.
• United States v. Garcia, 74 F.4th 1073, 1101 n.15 (10th Cir. 2023): Clarifies that unpublished Tenth Circuit decisions, while non-precedential, may be cited for their persuasive reasoning—justifying reliance on Rosas.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sufficiency for the “sexual act” count (K.L., § 2241(c))

The panel began with the settled sufficiency framework: de novo review that is nonetheless “highly deferential” to the verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences for the government. It stressed that credibility calls belong to the jury. Against that backdrop, it held that a rational jury could find a “sexual act” under § 2246(2) based on K.L.’s descriptions:

• Digital penetration (“put his fingers in her ‘butterfly’”).
• Oral-genital contact (“put his face between [her] no-no square,” “He licked it”).
• Penile-vaginal penetration (the child’s reference to “his balls” in her “no-no square” and “the part [she] pee[s] out of,” which—taken with her description of “what a man does with his ‘balls’”—supports an inference she meant the penis).

The court rejected the “coaching” theory, noting that use of sophisticated terms like “rape” that the child did not fully understand did not undermine her coherent, childlike accounts of specific conduct matching statutory definitions. The corroboration by L.G. and the SANE nurse fortified the overall evidentiary picture. Finally, the absence of physical findings from the SANE exam did not render the proof insufficient, given the deferential standard and the legal adequacy of victim testimony alone to establish the elements.

2) Sufficiency for the “sexual contact” count (L.G., § 2244(a)(3))

“Sexual contact” under § 2246(3) requires an intentional touching (directly or through clothing) of specified body parts with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse/gratify sexual desire. The court underscored that:

• Touching through clothing suffices (Hayward; Gallardo).
• The statute focuses on where the victim is touched, not which part of the defendant’s body does the touching (Norman T.).
• Sexual intent can be inferred from the nature and context of the act (Gallardo).

L.G.’s description—that Guinn “humped [her] backside,” pressing his “lower half” used for “going to the bathroom” against her “bum” in a “back and forth” motion—made the sexual nature of the contact self-evident. Additional testimony that Guinn had previously asked her to “have intercourse” and made sexual comments further supported the inference of sexual intent. The panel concluded a rational jury could find the contact and intent elements.

3) The adult pornography ban on supervised release (Special Condition 1(4))

The panel recognized the First Amendment protection for adult pornography possession (Koch) and the statutory requirement that restrictive supervised release conditions be supported by defendant-specific findings under § 3583(d) and circuit law (Koch; Englehart). The district court’s explanation—difficulty distinguishing adult from teen imagery and concerns about glorification of violence—was “likely” insufficient standing alone.

But because Guinn did not object at sentencing, plain-error review governed. Under Koch’s plain-error framework, an appellate court may vacate only if the record reveals no basis for the condition. Here, the record did reveal a basis:

• Testimony from Guinn’s younger sister that, as children, Guinn abused her and forced her to watch adult pornography—evidence of pornography-facilitated grooming.
• Evidence that Guinn consumed pornography in adolescence, normalizing sexual behavior at an age proximate to the instant victims—an additional justification, consistent with Rosas.

Given this record, the panel held there was no reasonable probability that, had the district court articulated the proper analysis, it would have omitted the pornography ban. This defeated the third prong (prejudice) of plain-error review, making it unnecessary to reach the fourth prong (effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings).

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Preservation is pivotal: Guinn powerfully illustrates that failing to object to supervised release conditions at sentencing all but forecloses relief on appeal where the record supplies any defendant-specific basis, even if the district court’s oral explanation would not pass muster under de novo or abuse-of-discretion review.
• Record-building for supervised release conditions: Prosecutors and probation officers should ensure the record clearly ties an adult pornography restriction to the defendant’s history and characteristics, offense conduct, grooming patterns, treatment needs, and risk profile. Evidence of prior pornography-facilitated grooming—even outside the instant charges—can supply the necessary nexus.
• Defendants’ strategy at sentencing: Defense counsel should promptly object to porn bans that are not justified with defendant-specific findings under § 3583(d) and the First Amendment. Without an objection, appellate courts in the Tenth Circuit will uphold the condition if the record suggests any plausible basis.
• Clarifying sexual offense elements: The decision reiterates that:
  • Childlike anatomical descriptions can suffice to prove a “sexual act.”
  • “Sexual contact” includes touching through clothing and allows intent to be inferred from the inherently sexual character of the contact and context.
  • Physical injury or SANE findings are not required for legal sufficiency.
• Persuasive, not binding: While non-precedential, Guinn will likely be cited for its persuasive analysis of both sufficiency in child sex cases and the plain-error posture for supervised release conditions that implicate First Amendment rights.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Sexual act” vs. “sexual contact” (18 U.S.C. § 2246):
  • “Sexual act” includes, among other things, contact between the mouth and genitalia, penile-vaginal contact, or penetration (however slight) by hand or finger of the genital opening.
  • “Sexual contact” is broader: intentional touching (even through clothing) of certain body parts (genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, buttocks) with sexual or abusive intent; no penetration required.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: On appeal, courts ask whether a rational jury could have found each element beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and deferring to the jury’s credibility findings. The appellate court does not reweigh evidence.
• Plain-error review (four steps):
  1. Error occurred;
  2. The error is “plain” (clear under current law);
  3. The error affected substantial rights (a reasonable probability of a different outcome);
  4. The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
  If the appellant fails at step three, the court need not reach step four.
• Supervised release conditions restricting adult pornography: Adults have a First Amendment right to possess adult pornography. A court may restrict that right on supervised release only with defendant-specific findings showing a compelling interest, and the condition must be reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors, impose no greater deprivation than necessary, and align with Sentencing Commission policy statements (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). Under plain error, however, an appellate court will affirm if the record supplies any basis for the restriction.
• SANE exam: A Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner evaluation may or may not detect physical evidence of abuse. The absence of such evidence does not preclude conviction if testimony and other evidence otherwise establish the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Indian Country jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153): These statutes establish federal jurisdiction for certain major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. In Guinn, the defendant’s status and location elements were undisputed; the appeal focused on the substantive elements of the charged offenses.

Conclusion

United States v. Guinn reinforces two important strands of Tenth Circuit doctrine. First, in child sexual abuse prosecutions, a child victim’s age-appropriate, concrete descriptions—corroborated by contextual testimony and despite a negative SANE exam—can readily satisfy the stringent sufficiency standard. Second, on supervised release, while courts must ordinarily articulate defendant-specific reasons before restricting access to adult pornography, the failure to object at sentencing substantially narrows appellate remedies: if the record contains any plausible basis linking the defendant’s sexual misconduct to pornography (including historical pornography-facilitated grooming of others), a defendant will struggle to show prejudice under plain-error review.

Though non-precedential, Guinn will likely be persuasive in future cases involving: (a) the evidentiary weight of childlike testimony and the drawing of commonsense inferences by juries; and (b) the sustainability of adult pornography bans where the record demonstrates a nexus between pornography and the defendant’s sexual offending or treatment needs. The practical lessons are straightforward: build the sentencing record; tailor and explain supervised release conditions that burden fundamental rights; and, for defense counsel, preserve objections to those conditions to avoid the steep hurdles of plain-error review.