Past Services Count: West Virginia High Court Clarifies “Reasonable Efforts” and Upholds Trial Court Discretion on Post‑Termination Visitation in In re D.G. and L.G.

Past Services Count: West Virginia High Court Clarifies “Reasonable Efforts” and Upholds Trial Court Discretion on Post‑Termination Visitation in In re D.G. and L.G.

Introduction

In a memorandum decision issued on September 30, 2025, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the Nicholas County Circuit Court’s order terminating the parental rights of Petitioner Father P.G. to D.G. and L.G. The decision addresses two principal appellate challenges: whether the Department of Human Services (DHS) made “reasonable efforts” to preserve and reunify the family, and whether the circuit court erred in denying post-termination visitation. The Court concluded that DHS’s efforts—consisting of psychological evaluations in the current case and extensive services in a prior, closely related proceeding—satisfied statutory obligations, and that the denial of post-termination visitation was supported by the record and the governing best-interests standard.

The case arises from a second abuse and neglect proceeding involving unsanitary and unsafe home conditions and a failure to secure appropriate medical treatment for D.G. following a significant leg laceration. The father previously completed an improvement period in a 2020 case based on similar conditions, and the children were reunified in 2021. Yet by late 2023, the home again deteriorated, and the untreated injury incident triggered DHS intervention. The circuit court found a “fundamental inability” to understand and remediate the conditions, determined there was “no reasonable likelihood” the conditions could be substantially corrected even with DHS assistance, and terminated parental rights. It also denied post-termination visitation, finding no bond and that lack of contact would not harm the children.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Supreme Court affirmed termination of parental rights, holding that DHS made “reasonable efforts” to preserve the family as required by West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(d) and § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iii)-(iv).
  • The Court emphasized that DHS’s efforts included arranging and paying for psychological evaluations in this case and providing approximately eight months of parenting and adult life skills services in the prior case addressing the same issues—services the father was still engaging in when the conditions again became deplorable.
  • The Court upheld the denial of post-termination visitation under the best-interests framework of Syllabus Point 5 of In re Christina L., noting the circuit court’s supported findings of no bond, the children’s ambivalence or opposition to contact, and a determination that no contact would not harm them.
  • The Court declined to reweigh conflicting testimony about emotional bonding (psychiatrist versus CPS worker and guardian ad litem), reiterating appellate deference to trial-level credibility determinations.
  • The Court noted that after entry of the circuit court’s order, Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings was provisionally amended to adopt standards for post-termination visitation; but it applied the pre-amendment standard operative when the circuit court ruled.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) (Syllabus Point 1): Establishes the standard of review—factual findings reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions de novo. This frames the Court’s restrained review posture and deference to the circuit court’s fact-finding.
  • In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995) (Syllabus Point 5): Governs post-termination visitation. Courts may consider continued contact if in the child’s best interests, focusing on the existence of a close emotional bond, the child’s wishes, and the absence of detriment to the child. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s application of this rubric.
  • State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995): Although a criminal case, frequently cited for the principle that appellate courts do not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility. Here, it underscores the appellate court’s refusal to choose between competing expert and lay accounts of bonding.
  • In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025): Reiterates that the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations in abuse and neglect appeals. It complements Guthrie in the child welfare context.
  • In re Z.D.-1, 251 W. Va. 743, 916 S.E.2d 375 (2025) (n.21): Notes the provisional amendment to Rule 15 of the Child Abuse and Neglect Rules, adopting “appropriate standards for consideration of post-termination visitation” beyond a purely case-by-case approach. The Court flagged the amendment but did not apply it retroactively.
  • Statutory Authorities:
    • W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(d): DHS must “provide supportive services in an effort to remedy circumstances detrimental to a child.”
    • W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iii)-(iv): Before terminating, courts must consider whether DHS made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family.
    • The decision also references the statutory “no reasonable likelihood” standard, including the phrase “even with the assistance of [DHS],” which aligns with the Code’s guidance for termination when parents cannot substantially correct conditions in the near future.
  • Procedural Rule:
    • W. Va. R. App. P. 21: Permits resolution by memorandum decision without oral argument when appropriate.

Legal Reasoning

1) Reasonable Efforts to Preserve and Reunify

The father’s principal argument was that DHS offered no services, undermining termination because § 49-4-604 requires consideration of reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify. The Supreme Court rejected this characterization and highlighted two categories of services:

  • Contemporaneous services: DHS arranged and paid for psychological evaluations of both parents in the current case, which yielded a guarded prognosis for the father due to minimization of concerns and a lack of attachment to the children.
  • Historical services addressing identical issues: In the 2020 case, DHS provided approximately eight months of parenting and adult life skills services, leading to reunification in 2021. Importantly, the father was still actively participating with a licensed clinical social worker when the same deplorable conditions re-emerged in 2023.

The Court reasoned that when a parent relapses into the same conditions while under services, and after extensive past services targeting those conditions, the agency’s reasonable-efforts obligation can be satisfied without ordering more of the same. The record supported the circuit court’s conclusion that “further services were not appropriate because the petitioner could not correct the issue ‘even with the assistance of the [DHS].’” That finding dovetails with the statutory predicate for termination—no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future despite assistance.

2) No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction and the Children’s Welfare

The circuit court found the father had a “fundamental inability to understand the conditions of abuse and neglect,” evidenced by two episodes of a dangerously deplorable home, and the failure to obtain medical care for a serious injury—apparently to avoid CPS involvement. The Supreme Court accepted those factual findings under the clear-error standard. On that basis, the statutory criteria for termination were met:

  • No reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected in the near future even with DHS assistance; and
  • Termination required for the welfare of the children, particularly given that repeated removals had been emotionally damaging and the circuit court’s explicit finding that non-return would “not be harmful to [the children] in any way.”

3) Post-Termination Visitation

Applying Christina L., the circuit court considered the core factors: emotional bond, the children’s wishes, and the absence of detriment. The Supreme Court emphasized the presence of extensive, albeit conflicting, testimony:

  • The children’s psychiatrist opined that the children had a bond with the father and that severance could be detrimental.
  • The CPS worker testified the children were doing well in placement, had not asked to return, and that D.G. became upset and stated he did not want to see his parents.
  • The guardian ad litem proffered that the children had no emotional attachment to the father.

The circuit court credited the latter evidence, expressly finding no bond, children’s ambivalence about returning home, and no harm from lack of contact. The Supreme Court refused to reweigh these competing narratives, citing Guthrie and In re D.S., and affirmed the denial of post-termination visitation.

Although the Court noted a subsequent provisional amendment to Rule 15 adopting standards for post-termination visitation, it applied Christina L. because the circuit court ruled before that amendment. The takeaway is twofold: (1) trial courts retain wide discretion in bond and best-interests determinations, and (2) on appeal, credibility assessments are insulated from reweighing.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Clarification of “Reasonable Efforts” in Repeat-Condition Cases

The decision clarifies that DHS can satisfy the statutory reasonable-efforts requirement by pointing to:

  • Targeted, contemporaneous services (e.g., psychological evaluations), and
  • Robust historical services addressing the same conditions, especially where the parent relapses while still engaged in services.

This is significant for cases involving recurring environmental neglect (e.g., chronic deplorable home conditions) or medical neglect. It underscores that the law does not require DHS to offer endless, repetitive services when the record supports a conclusion that additional efforts are unlikely to effect meaningful, sustainable change.

B. Post-Termination Visitation: Deference and Record-Building

The Court’s adherence to Christina L. and its deference to the circuit court’s credibility determinations highlight the importance of careful record-building at disposition:

  • Guardians and DHS should document children’s expressed wishes and observable reactions to parental contact, especially where children demonstrate distress.
  • Parents seeking contact should marshal evidence of an actual, current bond and demonstrate that contact would not be detrimental, ideally with corroboration from neutral therapeutic providers and child-specific treatment teams.

The Court’s footnote about amended Rule 15 signals evolving statewide standards for post-termination visitation. Counsel should be attentive to those amendments going forward, even though this decision applies pre-amendment law.

C. Focus on Insight and Sustainability, Not Compliance Alone

The father’s ongoing “compliance” with services and prior completion of an improvement period did not carry the day. The Court’s acceptance of the circuit court’s finding of a “fundamental inability” reflects a core theme in abuse-and-neglect jurisprudence: sustainable parental change turns on insight and demonstrated remedial capacity, not mere attendance or short-term compliance.

D. Children’s Special Needs and Best Interests

Both children had significant diagnoses and therapeutic needs, and the circuit court found that repeated removals had been emotionally damaging. The appellate affirmation of termination and denial of contact aligns with the statutory imperative to prioritize stability and well-being, particularly for children with heightened vulnerabilities. The permanency plan—adoption for L.G. and therapeutic placement then foster care for D.G.—reflects individualized best-interest analysis.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable Efforts: The statutory requirement that DHS attempt to prevent removal or facilitate reunification by offering services aimed at fixing the problems harming the child. Reasonable efforts are context-specific; they do not require futile or repetitive services where the parent cannot or will not internalize change.
  • No Reasonable Likelihood of Correction: A termination ground satisfied when evidence shows the parent cannot substantially fix the problems in the near future, even with agency help. Courts look for persistent patterns, lack of insight, minimization, and relapse despite services.
  • Post-Termination Visitation: Not automatic. Under Christina L., courts assess whether a genuine bond exists, what the child wants, whether contact would harm the child, and whether it serves the child’s best interests overall.
  • Appellate Deference to Credibility Findings: The Supreme Court does not reweigh evidence or decide which witness to believe. If the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, they stand unless clearly erroneous.
  • Memorandum Decision: A streamlined appellate disposition used when full opinion is unnecessary. While typically narrower in precedential force than published opinions, memorandum decisions provide persuasive guidance on applying settled law.

Conclusion

In re D.G. and L.G. reinforces two central principles in West Virginia child welfare law: (1) DHS’s “reasonable efforts” obligation can be satisfied through a combination of contemporaneous interventions and robust historical services—particularly where the parent regresses into the same harmful conditions while actively in services—and (2) trial courts possess broad discretion to deny post-termination visitation when the record supports findings of no meaningful bond, a lack of child interest in contact, and potential detriment, with appellate courts declining to reweigh conflicting testimony.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the premium placed on evidentiary depth and clarity at the dispositional stage. Parents must demonstrate insight-driven, sustainable change rather than formal compliance, and any request for post-termination contact must be anchored in credible, child-specific evidence of benefit and absence of harm. DHS and guardians, for their part, should thoroughly document services provided, the child’s expressed wishes, and behavioral indicators relevant to bond and well-being. Finally, while the Court applied Christina L. here, the reference to amended Rule 15 signals that standards for post-termination visitation are evolving; stakeholders should adjust litigation strategies accordingly.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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