Introduction

United States v. Martez Lamar Poe squarely addresses what a defendant must do to prevail on an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), in the wake of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024). In Williams, the court recognized that felons are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment but upheld § 922(g)(1) on its face, while leaving open the possibility of as-applied challenges for individuals who can show they are not “dangerous” under the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.

Poe, a felon found with a loaded rifle while on probation and with a history of repeated firearms offenses and flight from law enforcement, sought dismissal of his § 922(g)(1) indictment. After the district court denied his motion, he conditionally pleaded guilty and appealed, requesting a limited remand to develop a record on non-dangerousness under Williams. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the record already established Poe’s dangerousness and that no remand was necessary—particularly where Poe failed to identify what evidence he would offer to prove he is not dangerous, despite having an opportunity to do so after Williams was decided.

The opinion both applies and clarifies Williams: it emphasizes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate non-dangerousness, the permissibility of relying on the defendant’s entire criminal history (including how offenses were committed), and the appropriateness of affirming without remand when the uncontested record establishes dangerousness.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Sixth Circuit affirms denial of Poe’s motion to dismiss the § 922(g)(1) indictment, rejecting his as-applied Second Amendment challenge.
• The court acknowledges that the district court erred by reasoning that felons are categorically outside the Second Amendment’s protection, but it affirms on alternative grounds because Poe is dangerous under Williams.
• No remand is required to develop a “dangerousness” record where the existing, uncontested record (including the PSR) sufficiently shows dangerousness and the defendant fails to proffer what contrary evidence he would present.
• Applying Williams and subsequent Sixth Circuit cases, the court holds that Poe’s criminal history—marked by repeated firearm offenses, armed trespass, escape, evading arrest while armed, and possession of a loaded rifle—supports permanent disarmament as consistent with historical tradition.

Factual and Procedural Background

In June 2023, Jackson (Tennessee) police officers observed Poe, a felon on probation, carrying a rifle from a residence to a car. After confirming his status, officers followed Poe to an apartment complex. Poe entered a unit while leaving the loaded rifle (one round chambered, thirteen rounds in the magazine) on the front passenger seat. Officers recovered the rifle and arrested him.

In February 2024, a grand jury indicted Poe under § 922(g)(1). Poe moved to dismiss on Second Amendment grounds (facial and as-applied). The district court denied the motion, reasoning that felons are not protected by the Second Amendment. Poe then entered a conditional guilty plea and received a 30-month sentence (Guidelines range: 30–37 months based on offense level 12 and criminal-history category VI). He appealed, pressing only his as-applied challenge and requesting a limited remand to prove non-dangerousness under Williams.

Notably, Williams issued in August 2024, between the district court’s denial of the motion and Poe’s October 2024 sentencing. The panel observes that Poe did not invoke Williams at sentencing or attempt to create a record on non-dangerousness, despite having the opportunity to do so.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024). The cornerstone of the analysis. Williams held:
  • Felons are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment.
  • Based on the Nation’s history and tradition, legislatures may disarm those deemed dangerous; therefore, most applications of § 922(g)(1) are constitutional and the statute is facially valid.
  • As-applied challenges remain possible. The defendant bears the burden to prove he is not dangerous.
  • Courts must examine the individual’s entire criminal history and may consider how the offense was committed, not just the fact of conviction.
  • “Crimes that inherently pose a significant threat of danger”—even without direct violence—strongly suggest dangerousness.
• United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492 (6th Cir. 2024). Confirms that courts may look beyond the bare fact of conviction to the manner of the offense when evaluating dangerousness and that remand is unnecessary if the record already resolves the dangerousness question.
• United States v. Vaughn, No. 23-5790, 2024 WL 4615853 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2024). Recognizes Williams left open as-applied challenges but underscores the defendant’s burden; supports denying remand where the record suffices.
• United States v. Henson, No. 24-3494, 2025 WL 1009666 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025); United States v. Fordham, No. 24-1491, 2025 WL 318229 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025). Post-Williams unpublished decisions applying record-based affirmance without remand where criminal histories clearly establish dangerousness.
• United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2024). Repeated criminal conduct demonstrates likelihood of future dangerous acts—supporting disarmament as applied.
• United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Martin, 378 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2004). Eluding police in a motor vehicle nearly always poses substantial danger to others and can be treated as violent/aggressive, bolstering a finding of dangerousness.
• United States v. Morris, No. 98-4525, 2000 WL 1359627 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2000). Recognizes that even an unloaded firearm can be dangerous; a loaded firearm all the more so.
• Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994). Authorize affirmance on alternative grounds—relevant because the district court’s rationale (felons categorically outside the Second Amendment) was incorrect under Williams, yet affirmance remains proper on the as-applied ground.
• United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822, 824 (6th Cir. 2024). Confirms de novo review for constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1).

Legal Reasoning Applied to Poe

The court accepts Williams’s framework. Felons are protected by the Second Amendment, but longstanding historical tradition permits disarming individuals who are dangerous. In an as-applied challenge, the defendant bears the burden of showing he is not dangerous. Courts assess the entire criminal record and may consider how the offenses were committed.

Poe sought a limited remand to develop evidence that he is not dangerous. The panel rejects this request for two reasons:

• Opportunity Lost: Williams issued two months before Poe’s October 2024 sentencing, yet he did not ask the district court to apply Williams, request an evidentiary process, or proffer any evidence of non-dangerousness.
• No Proffer on Appeal: On appeal, Poe still did not identify what evidence he would present to demonstrate non-dangerousness. The court notes it is “not opining” on precisely what evidence might suffice in other cases, only that Poe offered none.

With remand unwarranted, the court proceeds to the merits of Poe’s as-applied claim and holds that the uncontested record—specifically, the PSR (to which Poe did not object)—establishes dangerousness. Key facts include:

• Repeated firearms offenses: Two 2018 convictions for possession of a firearm with intent to go armed; 2020 and 2020 convictions for unlawful firearm possession.
• Armed criminal trespass while evading police (May 2020): After a shots-fired call, Poe matched the description of an armed man, refused to stop, ran into an occupied apartment without permission, and tried to hide his gun in a trash can.
• Flight and noncompliance: 2019 escape (left trash-crew duty while incarcerated); 2023 felony evading arrest (fled in a vehicle, then on foot, dropping a weapon).
• Current conduct: Possession of a loaded rifle (chambered round, 13 more in the magazine) placed within immediate reach on the passenger seat while on probation.
• Criminal history category VI: Accumulated within six years, reflecting recidivism and elevated risk.

Taken together, these facts “leave no doubt,” the court concludes, that Poe persistently possesses firearms, resists law enforcement, and escalates risk to others—conduct that “inherently poses a significant threat of danger.” Under Williams, such a record justifies permanent disarmament. The court therefore holds § 922(g)(1) constitutional as applied to Poe.

Finally, although the district court’s categorical reasoning was incorrect after Williams (felons are indeed “the people”), the Sixth Circuit affirms on alternative grounds because the outcome is correct: Poe is dangerous and failed to establish otherwise.

Impact and Prospective Significance

This decision deepens and operationalizes Williams in several respects:

• No automatic remand for “dangerousness” development: Defendants cannot secure a remand merely by invoking Williams. Where the existing record (including an uncontested PSR) shows dangerousness, the Sixth Circuit will affirm without sending the case back.
• Defendant’s burden is real and immediate: Post-Williams, defendants must proactively identify and present evidence of non-dangerousness—ideally in the district court. Failure to do so, especially when there was an opportunity (as here, between Williams and sentencing), is likely fatal on appeal.
• Scope of relevant evidence: Courts may consider the defendant’s full criminal history, including the factual circumstances of prior convictions (e.g., armed trespass while evading police), not just the statutory elements.
• Non-violent labels are not dispositive: Even convictions not formally labeled “violent” can demonstrate dangerousness when the conduct “inherently poses a significant threat of danger” (e.g., vehicle flight from police, armed intrusion into an occupied dwelling, repeated unlawful firearm possession).
• Unpublished but persuasive: Although not precedential, this opinion coheres with—and reinforces—the Sixth Circuit’s post-Williams line (Morton, Vaughn, Henson, Fordham), signaling a stable approach across panels.

Practically, district courts in the Sixth Circuit can adjudicate as-applied § 922(g)(1) claims on the existing record when it is robust—particularly where defendants do not dispute PSR facts. Defendants contemplating as-applied challenges should develop a concrete, record-supported showing of non-dangerousness at the earliest opportunity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial vs. as-applied challenge: A facial challenge claims a law is unconstitutional in all applications; an as-applied challenge concedes the law’s general validity but argues it is unconstitutional for a specific individual in specific circumstances.
• “Dangerousness” in the Second Amendment context (per Williams): The historical tradition allows disarming those who are dangerous. Courts look at the full criminal history and how prior offenses were committed. Repeated unlawful gun possession, armed entries into occupied dwellings, and evading police—especially while armed—are strong indicators of dangerousness even if particular offenses did not involve direct violence against a specific victim.
• Burden on the defendant: In an as-applied § 922(g)(1) challenge, the defendant must demonstrate he is not dangerous. Simply alleging non-dangerousness or asking for a remand without a proffer is insufficient.
• Use of PSR and uncontested facts: Courts may rely on the Presentence Report when its factual recitations are not objected to; these facts can be used to assess dangerousness as applied.
• Affirmance on alternative grounds: An appellate court can affirm a correct judgment even if the lower court’s reasoning was wrong. Here, although the district court erred by excluding felons from the Second Amendment, the Sixth Circuit affirmed because Poe’s record made the statute constitutional as applied to him.
• “Not recommended for publication”: Such opinions are generally non-precedential in the Sixth Circuit, though they may be cited as persuasive authority consistent with local rules.

Conclusion

United States v. Poe fortifies the Sixth Circuit’s post-Williams framework for as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). It confirms that:

• Felons are protected by the Second Amendment, but a state may disarm those who are dangerous under the historical tradition.
• Defendants bear the burden to prove non-dangerousness; courts may examine the entire criminal record and the manner of prior offenses.
• No remand is required when the record already demonstrates dangerousness and the defendant offers no concrete proffer of contrary evidence.

On these principles, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Poe’s conviction, concluding that his pattern of firearm offenses, evasion and escape, and armed intrusion into an occupied residence, coupled with possession of a loaded rifle while on probation, firmly establish dangerousness and justify permanent disarmament under § 922(g)(1). The decision provides clear guidance to practitioners: as-applied challenges after Williams demand a timely, evidence-driven showing of non-dangerousness, not merely an invitation to reopen the record on appeal.