Next Friend Standing Under Rule 17(c): Relationship Not Required, Identification Essential

Introduction

In Doe v. Hochul (2d Cir. 2025), Mary Doe, a social worker proceeding under a pseudonym, challenged New York’s 2019 Reproductive Health Act (“RHA”). The RHA decriminalized abortion at all gestational ages and repealed fetal homicide provisions. Doe sought to represent a class of viable fetuses (“Viable Fetus Class”) by moving under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) for appointment as “next friend” and by later seeking leave to amend her complaint to add a specific fetus (“Baby Nicholas”) as class representative. The district court denied her next-friend motion for failure to show a “significant relationship,” dismissed her claims for lack of Article III standing, and refused to vacate judgment or permit amendment in light of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health (2022). On appeal, Doe argued (1) that Rule 17(c) does not require a significant relationship and (2) that her proposed amended complaint brought a viable fetus with standing into the case.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit held that Rule 17(c) does not categorically require a next friend to have a “significant relationship” with the real party in interest.
Nevertheless, the court affirmed dismissal of Doe’s original claims because she failed to identify or describe any fetus in her putative class and thus lacked Article III standing.
The court also affirmed denial of Doe’s post-judgment motion to amend. It held that “Baby Nicholas” lacked standing because the alleged risks from third-party violence or abortion were neither imminent nor traceable to the RHA.
The appeals court reaffirmed that standing must be shown for each claim and each form of relief; mere statistical or speculative risks do not suffice.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Whitmore v. Arkansas (495 U.S. 149): Established the basic prerequisites for “next friend” standing, including dedication to the real party’s best interests.
Ad Hoc Committee of Concerned Teachers (2d Cir. 1989): Held that non-familial teachers could serve as next friend to schoolchildren under a flexible standard.
Summers v. Earth Island Institute (555 U.S. 488): Required organizations to identify at least one specifically aggrieved member to establish standing.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (578 U.S. 330) and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (504 U.S. 555): Clarified that plaintiffs must plead concrete, particularized injuries that are actual or imminent, traceable, and redressable.
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (594 U.S. 413) and Murthy v. Missouri (603 U.S. 43): Emphasized the need to demonstrate standing separately for each claim and for each remedy (damages vs. injunctive relief).
FASORP v. New York University (2d Cir. 2021): Reinforced that representative plaintiffs must describe their members’ concrete plans or circumstances to maintain jurisdiction.
J.D. v. Azar (D.C. Cir. 2019): Applied the “inherently transitory” exception to mootness for pregnancy-based claims.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court separated two distinct inquiries:

Rule 17(c) Interpretation: The text does not impose a “significant relationship” prerequisite. Instead, district courts retain discretion to appoint any “next friend” who demonstrates (a) why the real party cannot sue for themselves and (b) genuine dedication to that party’s best interests. A rigid relationship rule would bar some incompetent or minor parties from ever litigating.
Article III Standing: Appointment under Rule 17(c) does not confer jurisdiction. A next friend must still show that the real party in interest would have standing in his own right. That requires identification or description of a real party (here, a fetus) with an actual or imminent injury traceable to the defendants and redressable by the court. Speculative or statistical risks of future harm, without concrete allegations, fail this test.

When Doe later attempted to add “Baby Nicholas,” the court examined:

Damages Claims: A fetus injured only by a possible future abortion or third-party violence suffers at most a “risk” of harm. As a matter of law, unmaterialized risks cannot support retrospective damages.
Equitable Relief: To obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, the amended complaint had to allege (i) an imminent threat (not a mere possibility) and (ii) a chain of causation directly traceable to the RHA. Conjectural violence by a state-unrelated third party and unpledged plans to abort did not satisfy imminence or traceability.

3. Impact

Doe v. Hochul provides clear guardrails for future next friend and organizational standing cases:

Rule 17(c) appointments will no longer be automatically denied for lack of a close relationship. Courts must assess each candidate’s dedication and any disability of the real party.
Representative plaintiffs must identify or describe at least one real party in interest and allege that party’s concrete injury. Broad classes cannot rest on hypothetical or statistical risks alone.
Mootness exceptions remain available for “inherently transitory” harms, such as those tied to the duration of pregnancy.
The decision reaffirms that standing must be shown for each claim and each requested remedy, preserving separation-of-powers limits on federal‐court jurisdiction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Next Friend: A “next friend” is a stand-in to sue for a minor or someone incapacitated. Rule 17(c) lets courts pick any qualified, well-intentioned person—even without a blood tie—as long as the real party can’t represent themselves.
Article III Standing: To bring a federal lawsuit, you must show (1) you’ve been or will be hurt in a concrete way, (2) the government or defendant caused that harm, and (3) a court ruling can fix it. You can’t sue just because you disagree with a law.
Imminence: You need more than a “might happen someday” risk. The threat must be “certainly impending” or pose a “substantial risk” in the near term.
Traceability: Your injury must flow directly from the defendant’s actions—if some independent third party is the real cause, that breaks the link.
Inherently Transitory Harm: If the injury window is shorter than the time needed to certify a class—like a nine-month pregnancy—the court will consider the case live even if the named plaintiff’s personal stake ends first.

Conclusion

Doe v. Hochul stands as an important guidepost on two fronts. First, it rejects any categorical “significant relationship” barrier under Rule 17(c), endorsing a flexible, discretion-driven approach to next‐friend appointments. Second, it reinforces strict Article III standing rules for representative suits: a would-be next friend must identify a concrete real party of interest and plead that party’s actual or impending injury traceable to the defendant. Speculation, statistics, or broad class conjecture will no longer suffice. In the broader legal context, the decision ensures that federal courts only adjudicate real—rather than hypothetical—disputes, preserving the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement and clarifying the pathway for minors and other incapacitated individuals to access judicial relief.