New Precedent: Enduring Judicial Relief Required for Prevailing Party Status under §1988(b): U.S.

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the case of GERALD F. LACKEY, in his official capacity as THE COMMISSIONER OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, PETITIONER v. DAMIAN STINNIE, et al., decided on February 25, 2025. The case involved Virginia drivers whose licenses had been suspended under a state statute for failure to pay court fines. These drivers challenged the statute on constitutional grounds by invoking Section 1983 and sought, among other reliefs, an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988(b).

The central legal issue was whether a party that obtained only a preliminary injunction — and thereby secured only temporary, interim relief before the underlying case became moot – can be considered a “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees under §1988(b). The case pitted the interests of civil rights litigants against established legal doctrines regarding the American Rule on fee shifting, and it involved a split in the lower courts with the en banc Fourth Circuit reversing an earlier panel decision. This case thus presents significant ramifications for civil rights litigation and fee awards.

Summary of the Judgment

In a closely considered opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiff drivers – having received only a preliminary injunction that preserved the legal status quo – do not qualify as “prevailing parties” under §1988(b). The Court reasoned that, to trigger fee awards under this statute, the court must conclusively resolve the dispute on the merits by granting enduring judicial relief that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship.

Although the Fourth Circuit en banc had determined that under some circumstances preliminary injunctions providing concrete, irreversible relief could establish prevailing party status, the Supreme Court ultimately clarified that temporary or preliminary relief, even if it provides benefits that continue until mootness, does not satisfy the statutory and doctrinal requirement for a conclusive judicial ruling.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court’s analysis relies heavily on established precedents and historical usage of the term “prevailing party.” Key precedents include:

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources: This case was crucial in establishing that the term “prevailing party” is a legal term of art. The Court emphasized that only a conclusive, judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship qualifies as a prevailing victory. The decision rejected any “catalyst theory” where a voluntary change in conduct by the defendant, even if beneficial, would trigger fee awards.
Sole v. Wyner: The Court referred to Sole v. Wyner to underscore the principle that merely securing a preliminary injunction—even after an abbreviated hearing—does not demonstrate success on the merits. Sole illustrated that temporary relief that does not culminate in a final, enduring change renders a plaintiff ineligible for fee awards.
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Cited for its explanation of the purpose and scope of preliminary injunctions, this case helped clarify that such injunctions are designed to preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits, rather than to conclusively adjudicate the underlying dispute.

These precedents reinforce the notion that for fee shifting under §1988(b), success on the merits must be judicially determined and enduring.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning begins with a textual analysis of §1988(b), which grants discretionary fee awards to the “prevailing party” in civil rights actions without explicitly defining the scope of “prevailing party.” In light of historical dictionary definitions and legal tradition, the Court affirmed that a prevailing party is one who has conclusively maintained its claim at the end of litigation.

The Court then distinguished preliminary injunctions from a final judgment on the merits by emphasizing two requirements:

Judicially Sanctioned Change: The change in the parties’ legal relationship must originate from a judicial order. Temporary orders that preserve the status quo pending further litigation merely indicate a likelihood of success, rather than a definitive victory.
Enduring Relief: The alteration must be lasting. Even when external events (such as legislative repeal) render the case moot, the absence of a conclusive judicial determination on the merits means that no enduring change has been granted.

Based on these factors, the Court held that the drivers – who only obtained a preliminary injunction that was never converted into final, material relief – do not meet the criteria for prevailing party status, and thus, are not entitled to fee awards.

Impact on Future Cases

This decision sets forth a bright-line rule that fee awards under §1988(b) should only be available where the judicial relief is both definitive and enduring. The ruling is likely to have significant implications in several areas:

Civil Rights Litigation: Plaintiffs seeking interim relief in civil rights cases must now be wary that a preliminary injunction—even one that provides immediate benefits—will not be considered a sufficient adjudication of the merits to trigger fee awards.
Fee-Shifting Strategies: Attorneys and litigants may opt to extend litigation to ensure that a final judgment is rendered, even when interim orders have provided concrete benefits, thereby potentially increasing litigation costs and judicial resource use.
Legislative Response: The decision leaves the door open for Congress to amend §1988(b) should it wish to broaden fee award eligibility. As the Court acknowledged, legislative intervention could tailor the provision to address scenarios where interim relief has had an enduring effect.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Two key concepts are critical to understanding the decision:

Preliminary Injunction: A court order intended to preserve the existing state of affairs until a full hearing on the merits can be conducted. It is inherently temporary and does not itself decide the legal issue.
Prevailing Party Under §1988(b): The term “prevailing party” refers to one who, at the conclusion of litigation, obtains a definitive judicial ruling that results in a material and enduring change in the legal relationship between the parties. The Court’s decision underscores that a transient victory does not satisfy this requirement.

By breaking down these concepts, the Court clarified that both the source (a judicial order) and the longevity of the relief are essential for a party to be deemed “prevailing.”

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case reinforces the traditional interpretation of “prevailing party” for the purposes of fee awards under §1988(b). By holding that only enduring judicial relief — which conclusively alters the relationship between the litigants — qualifies for fee awards, the Court has drawn a firm line between temporary protective measures and final adjudication on the merits.

This ruling not only provides greater predictability and promotes judicial economy by reducing potential fee disputes, but it also raises important practical concerns for civil rights litigants. Attorneys will now need to carefully weigh the benefits of obtaining preliminary relief against the risk of not receiving attorney’s fees unless a final, life-changing judicial order is secured.

In the broader legal context, the decision may prompt legislative action should Congress determine that the current limitation on fee awards undermines the very purpose of §1988(b)—to enhance access to justice for individuals whose civil rights are at stake.

New Precedent: Enduring Judicial Relief Required for Prevailing Party Status under §1988(b)