Minimal Explanation Suffices for Compassionate Release Denials; Amendment 826 Is Not Retroactive Under § 3582(c)(2)

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Third Circuit’s per curiam disposition in United States v. Omelyan Botsvynyuk (Nos. 24-3253 & 24-3305, decided March 28, 2025), summarily affirming two district court orders that denied (1) a compassionate-release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and (2) a sentence-reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The case arises from Botsvynyuk’s 2011 jury conviction in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for racketeering conspiracy and interference with interstate commerce by threats of violence, tied to an extensive human-trafficking enterprise involving Ukrainian nationals. He is serving a life sentence plus 20 years.

On appeal, Botsvynyuk challenged the district court’s handling of both motions. He argued the court inadequately explained its denial of compassionate release, especially in light of Concepcion v. United States, and sought a sentence reduction invoking Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 826 (effective Nov. 1, 2024), which excludes acquitted conduct from relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c). The Government moved for summary affirmance under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, and the panel (Judges Bibas, Porter, and Montgomery-Reeves) granted that motion, concluding that the appeals presented no substantial question.

Key issues resolved:

What level of explanation must a district court provide when denying compassionate release after Concepcion v. United States?
How does U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (“unusually long sentences” with changes in law) apply, and what must a movant show?
Is Sentencing Commission Amendment 826 retroactive for purposes of § 3582(c)(2)?
Do equal-protection principles undermine the Commission’s decision not to make Amendment 826 retroactive?

Although designated “not precedential” under I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion offers a clear, practical roadmap for litigants in the Third Circuit on two frequently litigated post-conviction avenues: compassionate release and Guidelines-based sentence reductions.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s denials of both motions, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.

Compassionate release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)):
- The district court provided a sufficient, brief explanation consistent with Concepcion. It was not required to address every argument point-by-point.
- U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) did not help the movant because he failed to identify a relevant change in law that would render his sentence disproportionate to what would be imposed today.
- The district court appropriately considered the § 3553(a) factors, including the extraordinary seriousness of the offense, and noted the movant’s rehabilitation and health claims (with the important caveat that rehabilitation alone cannot be “extraordinary and compelling,” see 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).
Sentence reduction (§ 3582(c)(2)):
- Amendment 826 (excluding acquitted conduct from relevant conduct) is not retroactive because it is not listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). Under Dillon v. United States, a § 3582(c)(2) reduction must be consistent with the Commission’s retroactivity policy.
- The equal-protection challenge to the omission of Amendment 826 from the retroactivity list lacked support. Moreover, the movant did not show his original sentence depended on acquitted conduct at all, undercutting any claim of harm.

Having found no abuse of discretion and no substantial question, the panel granted the Government’s motions for summary affirmance.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pawlowski (967 F.3d 327, 3d Cir. 2020):
Pawlowski underscores the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard governing compassionate-release denials and emphasizes the pivotal role of § 3553(a) factors. It supports affirmance where the district court’s weighing of offense seriousness, deterrence, and public protection plausibly justifies denial, even if an “extraordinary and compelling” reason were assumed.
Thompson (825 F.3d 198, 3d Cir. 2016):
Thompson illustrates deferential review in the sentence-modification context, aligning with the idea that district courts have substantial discretion in assessing whether a reduction is warranted under statutory and Guidelines constraints.
Dillon (560 U.S. 817, 2010):
Dillon sets the framework for § 3582(c)(2): any reduction must be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, especially U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. Because Amendment 826 is not in § 1B1.10(d), Dillon makes clear that § 3582(c)(2) relief is unavailable.
Concepcion (597 U.S. 481, 2022):
Concepcion holds that district courts must consider parties’ non-frivolous arguments in sentence-modification proceedings and need only provide a brief statement of reasons—without a point-by-point rebuttal. The panel invoked Concepcion to reject the argument that the district court’s explanation was too terse.
United States v. Rutherford (120 F.4th 360, 3d Cir. 2024):
The district court also cited Rutherford, where the Third Circuit limited its holding to the First Step Act’s § 924(c) “stacking” changes, and suggested in a footnote that its rationale might reach other contexts. The panel here expressly did not need to reach whether reliance on Rutherford was error, because the compassionate-release motion failed at the threshold—no identified, relevant change in law under § 1B1.13(b)(6).
Murray v. Bledsoe (650 F.3d 246, 3d Cir. 2011):
Murray provides the posture for summary affirmance where an appeal presents no substantial question. The panel relied on this to affirm without full merits briefing.

Legal Reasoning

1) Compassionate Release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i))

Threshold showing under § 1B1.13(b)(6):
The 2023 revision to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 recognizes that an “unusually long sentence” may, in combination with a relevant change in law, support a finding of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. But the policy statement requires more than a bare assertion that the sentence is long; the movant must identify a pertinent change in law that creates a meaningful sentencing disparity today. The panel found Botsvynyuk did not identify such a change. That omission was dispositive, regardless of any additional debate over Rutherford’s scope.
Explanation requirement under Concepcion:
The movant argued the district court had to enumerate each argument and offer detailed rebuttals. Concepcion says otherwise: a brief statement showing consideration of non-frivolous arguments suffices. Here, the district court made explicit that it considered the offense’s nature and circumstances (extraordinarily serious), as well as the movant’s rehabilitation and health, satisfying Concepcion’s minimal-explanation standard.
Role of § 3553(a) factors:
Even if a defendant demonstrates “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the court must weigh the § 3553(a) factors. The panel highlighted the gravity of the racketeering and violence-laden human-trafficking scheme—long documented in the direct appeal—as a legitimate basis to prioritize punishment, deterrence, and public protection. The district court noted rehabilitation and health, but 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) clarifies that rehabilitation alone cannot carry a compassionate-release motion.
Medical assertions:
On appeal, the movant claimed pulmonary fibrosis, but his own appended medical records did not list it as a current condition. The panel flagged this mismatch, underscoring the need for clear, credible medical evidence to support health-based compassionate release.

2) Sentence Reduction (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)) and Amendment 826

Statutory and policy framework:
Section 3582(c)(2) allows a sentence reduction only when the Sentencing Commission has subsequently lowered the applicable guideline range and, crucially, when the Commission has designated the amendment as retroactive in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). Dillon cements the requirement that courts follow the Commission’s retroactivity determinations.
Amendment 826’s nonretroactivity:
Amendment 826, effective November 1, 2024, added § 1B1.3(c) to exclude acquitted conduct from relevant conduct calculations. The Commission did not include Amendment 826 in § 1B1.10(d)’s retroactive list. The district court therefore lacked authority to reduce the sentence under § 3582(c)(2). The panel affirmed on that straightforward ground.
No acquitted-conduct enhancement shown:
Separately, the panel noted the movant failed to show his sentence involved acquitted-conduct enhancements in the first place; an additional count was withdrawn during trial, not “acquitted.” This undercuts any claim that he is within the class of defendants whom Amendment 826 would materially affect.
Equal-protection claim:
The movant argued the Commission’s choice not to make Amendment 826 retroactive is discriminatory and irrational. The panel found no support for that claim and emphasized the threshold failure to show his own sentence was impacted by acquitted conduct, which undermines standing and prejudice. More broadly, the Commission’s line-drawing on retroactivity has traditionally been evaluated under deferential rational-basis review; the opinion signals no appetite to second-guess those institutional judgments in summary proceedings.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

Practical bar set for § 1B1.13(b)(6):
Defendants invoking the “unusually long sentence” provision must identify a concrete, relevant change in law that would materially affect their sentence today. General assertions about sentence length, rehabilitation, or health—without a qualifying legal change and favorable § 3553(a) balance—are unlikely to succeed.
Concepcion’s “brief explanation” standard, reaffirmed:
The Third Circuit confirms that district courts need not provide granular, point-by-point responses when denying compassionate release; a succinct explanation reflecting consideration of non-frivolous arguments suffices. This supports streamlined resolution of high-volume compassionate-release dockets, particularly in summary proceedings.
Amendment 826: applicable prospectively, not through § 3582(c)(2):
The exclusion of acquitted conduct from relevant conduct is a major policy shift, but absent retroactivity designation in § 1B1.10(d), it does not open a backdoor for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2) for previously sentenced defendants. Its principal effect will be at original sentencings and any later resentencings occurring on or after November 1, 2024.
Limited viability of equal-protection challenges to retroactivity choices:
The panel’s summary rejection of the equal-protection argument reflects the longstanding deference afforded to the Sentencing Commission’s retroactivity decisions and the necessity of showing concrete injury (i.e., that the challenged rule actually affected the sentence).
Rutherford’s narrowing, still in the background:
Although not reached here, Rutherford’s limitation in the Third Circuit cautions litigants against relying on § 1B1.13(b)(6) to circumvent Congress’s explicit nonretroactivity choices (e.g., the First Step Act’s § 924(c) changes). The panel’s footnote reminds practitioners that Rutherford’s logic could reach beyond § 924(c), but that determination is case-specific and may be unnecessary where, as here, the defendant cannot even identify a qualifying change in law.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Compassionate release (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)):
A court may reduce a sentence if there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and the § 3553(a) factors support release. Since 2023, the Commission’s policy statement (§ 1B1.13) recognizes certain non-medical grounds (like changes in law creating unusual disparities), but rehabilitation alone is never enough (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).
“Unusually long sentence” with “change in law” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)):
This provision allows courts to consider a change in law that would likely lead to a shorter sentence today as a potential “extraordinary and compelling” reason—provided the defendant has served a substantial portion of the sentence and other criteria are met. It is not a free-standing resentencing; the change must be relevant and meaningful.
Sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2):
These are strictly limited to instances where the Sentencing Commission has lowered the pertinent guideline and declared the amendment retroactive in § 1B1.10(d). If an amendment is not on that list, courts lack authority to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2), per Dillon.
Amendment 826 and “acquitted conduct”:
“Acquitted conduct” refers to conduct underlying charges of which the defendant was acquitted, historically usable as “relevant conduct” to increase a guideline range. Amendment 826 bars that practice within the Guidelines by adding § 1B1.3(c). But the Commission did not make this change retroactive for § 3582(c)(2) purposes.
Concepcion’s minimal reasoning requirement:
Courts must consider non-frivolous arguments but may explain their rulings briefly. They are not required to provide detailed, point-by-point refutations of each argument to survive appellate review.
Abuse of discretion:
A deferential standard of review. The appellate court will not reverse unless left with a firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error in judgment after weighing relevant factors.
Summary affirmance (3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6):
The Third Circuit may affirm without full briefing when an appeal presents no substantial question—i.e., when the outcome is clear under settled law.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s nonprecedential disposition in United States v. Botsvynyuk provides two important clarifications for practitioners:

Compassionate release denials require only a brief explanation reflecting consideration of non-frivolous arguments; courts need not rebut each argument line-by-line. Invoking § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s “unusually long sentence” pathway demands identification of a specific, relevant change in law that would materially alter the sentence today, followed by a favorable § 3553(a) balancing.
Amendment 826’s prohibition on acquitted-conduct use is not retroactive for § 3582(c)(2) purposes, because it is not listed in § 1B1.10(d). Absent retroactivity, courts lack authority to reduce sentences on that basis under § 3582(c)(2), and generalized equal-protection attacks on the Commission’s retroactivity choices are unlikely to gain traction—especially where the defendant cannot show his sentence actually involved acquitted-conduct enhancements.

While not binding precedent, the opinion signals how the Third Circuit will treat common arguments in post-judgment sentencing litigation: district courts’ succinct rationales will be respected when they reflect engagement with the core statutory factors and governing policy statements; defendants must carefully tether compassionate-release claims to concrete, relevant legal changes; and § 3582(c)(2) remains a narrow avenue tied tightly to the Sentencing Commission’s retroactivity designations.