Mandatory Judicial Interest from Date of Judicial Demand Prevails Over Erroneous Judgment Language: Commentary on Bilalis v. Drennan

I. Introduction

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Evangelia Bilalis v. Wallace Drennan and Zurich American Insurance Company, No. 2025-C-00453 (La. Dec. 18, 2025), squarely addresses a recurring but under-theorized problem: what happens when the written judgment in a tort case contains an erroneous date for the commencement of judicial interest?

The case sits at the junction of three foundational ideas in Louisiana civil procedure and obligations:

The mandatory and automatic nature of judicial (legal) interest in tort actions;
The principle that final judgments cannot be substantively amended once appellate delays have run; and
The interpretive requirement that judgments and statutes be read to avoid absurd and unlawful results.

The judgment here awarded damages “plus judicial interest thereon from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand, until paid.” In reality, November 17, 2023 was the date of the jury verdict, not the date of judicial demand, which was December 22, 2020, when the petition was filed. After defendants paid interest only from the verdict date, the plaintiff sought to enforce her statutory right to interest from the filing date of the suit.

In affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that:

Judicial interest in tort cases “attaches automatically” by operation of La. R.S. 13:4203 from the date of judicial demand, regardless of how (or whether) it is described in the judgment; and
Correctly enforcing this statutory entitlement through a motion to enforce judgment does not constitute a forbidden “substantive amendment” of a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1951, even where the written judgment contains an erroneous calendar date.

The dissent, by contrast, emphasizes the sanctity of final judgments and argues the majority “gives no effect” to the specific date written into the judgment, thereby impermissibly enlarging the plaintiff’s recovery after the judgment became final.

The decision therefore establishes an important precedent on the relative weight of statutory rights to interest versus the literal text of an unappealed final judgment, and it clarifies that mere drafting errors about dates will not strip tort plaintiffs of prejudgment interest mandated by law.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. The Underlying Tort Claim

On December 22, 2020, plaintiff Evangelia Bilalis filed a petition for damages in Orleans Parish Civil District Court. She alleged that her vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle owned and operated by defendant Wallace Drennan and insured by Zurich American Insurance Company, and that she sustained injuries as a result. Drennan and Zurich were named as defendants.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. On November 17, 2023, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Bilalis, finding Mr. Drennan 100% at fault and awarding:

Special damages: $376,871.62;
General damages: $360,000.00;
Total: $736,871.62.

B. The Written Judgment and the Erroneous Date

As the prevailing party, plaintiff’s counsel prepared the written judgment memorializing the jury’s verdict. On December 11, 2023, the trial court signed the judgment, which contained the following critical clause:

“The jury found that the Plaintiff was injured in the accident and awarded the Plaintiff special damages of $376,871.62 and general damages of $360,000.00, for a combined total of $736,871.62 plus judicial interest thereon from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand, until paid; and for all recoverable costs …” (emphasis added).

Two facts are undisputed:

November 17, 2023 was the date of the jury verdict, not the date of judicial demand; and
The actual date of judicial demand was December 22, 2020, when plaintiff filed her petition.

No motion for new trial or appeal was taken from the December 11, 2023 judgment. It therefore became final after expiration of appellate delays.

C. Payment by Defendants and Motion to Enforce Judgment

On January 8, 2024, defendants issued a check for $744,366.51. This sum included:

The principal damages award of $736,871.62; and
$7,494.89 in judicial interest, calculated by defendants from November 17, 2023 through January 9, 2024.

The check was negotiated. Subsequently, on March 19, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the judgment and to set a judgment debtor rule. She argued that:

Under La. R.S. 13:4203, judicial interest in tort cases attaches from the date of judicial demand by operation of law; and
She was therefore entitled to interest from December 22, 2020, not just from November 17, 2023.

Plaintiff asserted she had been underpaid $102,578.44 in judicial interest, plus additional accruing interest on that shortfall.

Defendants opposed, contending:

Plaintiff’s counsel drafted the judgment including the November 17, 2023 date;
No motion for new trial or appeal was filed within applicable delays; and
Because the judgment was final, any change to the operative date for interest would be a prohibited substantive amendment under La. C.C.P. art. 1951.

D. Trial Court and Court of Appeal Rulings

On May 21, 2024, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to enforce the judgment and set a judgment debtor rule, expressly finding that the judgment had not been fully satisfied because the full amount of judicial interest had not been paid.

On March 14, 2025, a divided panel of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. See Bilalis v. Drennan, 24-0527 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/25), 414 So.3d 824.

The appellate majority held:

Judicial interest in tort cases “attaches automatically” from the date of judicial demand, regardless of whether it is prayed for or correctly recited in the judgment;
December 22, 2020 was the date of judicial demand; November 17, 2023 was the verdict date;
The reference to November 17, 2023 as the date of judicial demand was a drafting (scribe) error; and
Enforcing interest from the correct judicial-demand date did not constitute a substantive amendment because it did not alter any substantive rights, but instead aligned the judgment with relief automatically provided by law.

Judge Atkins concurred, emphasizing the mandatory nature of judicial interest and criticizing defendants’ position as “an attempt to take advantage of a mistake” in the judgment.

Judge Ledet, joined by Judge Herman, dissented. The dissent would have held that altering the operative date for interest constituted an impermissible substantive amendment to a final judgment, relying in part on prior appellate decisions that had disallowed post-finality amendments to add or expand interest.

On defendants’ application, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari. See Bilalis v. Drennan, 25-00453 (La. 7/3/25), 414 So.3d 485.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. The Core Holding

Chief Justice Weimer, writing for the Court, framed the issue as whether legal interest in a tort case accrues from the date of judicial demand when a judgment recites some other date, here the verdict date, as “the date of judicial demand.”

The Court held:

Under La. R.S. 13:4203 and La. C.C.P. art. 1921, judicial interest in tort cases is mandatory and attaches automatically “from the date of judicial demand” until the judgment is paid, whether requested or mentioned in the judgment.
The incorrect insertion of “November 17, 2023” in the judgment as “the date of judicial demand” was a scribe error that could not override the statutory mandate.
Enforcing interest from the true date of judicial demand (December 22, 2020) through a motion to enforce judgment did not constitute a substantive amendment of a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1951.
The presence of the November 17, 2023 date in the judgment did not limit or truncate the plaintiff’s entitlement to interest; rather, the lawful interest period from the filing of the petition until payment necessarily encompasses that date.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rulings of both the district court and the court of appeal.

B. The Dissent

Justice Guidry dissented. In his view:

The December 11, 2023 judgment was final and unappealed; its language “must be given effect.”
The judgment specifically states that interest runs “from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand, until paid.”
By reading November 17, 2023 out of the judgment and substituting December 22, 2020 as the operative starting date, the courts below and the majority effectively amended the judgment to increase the interest owed, which is a substantive change barred by La. C.C.P. art. 1951.
Because plaintiff’s counsel drafted the judgment and failed to seek a timely new trial or appeal, plaintiff is bound by the judgment as written.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

1. Judicial Interest as “Mandatory” and Automatic in Tort Cases

La. C.C.P. art. 1921 provides:

“The court shall award interest in the judgment as prayed for or as provided by law.”

Comment (a) to article 1921 clarifies that “interest as provided by law” includes judicial (legal) interest in tort cases. The substantive rule for tort cases appears in La. R.S. 13:4203:

“Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.”

Several features are central:

The statute uses “shall,” which La. R.S. 1:3 defines as mandatory.
The statute specifies the start date: “from date of judicial demand.”
It applies to judgments “sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’” (i.e., tort claims).

The Court reinforced earlier jurisprudence that has treated this statutory interest as automatic:

Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 11-2132, p. 14 (La. 3/13/12), 85 So.3d 39, 49:
“[A]n award of judicial interest is not discretionary, insofar as it attaches automatically until the judgment is paid, whether prayed for in the petition or mentioned in the judgment.”
Smith v. Quarles Drilling Co., 04-0179, p. 5 (La. 10/29/04), 885 So.2d 562, 566 n.6 (same principle).

This line of cases, combined with the statutory text, underpins the majority’s insistence that judicial interest cannot be lost merely because of imperfect drafting or omission in the judgment.

2. “Date of Judicial Demand”

The Code of Civil Procedure defines “judicial demand” in La. C.C.P. art. 421:

“A civil action is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction.”

Thus, the “date of judicial demand” is, simply, the date the plaintiff files the petition (or other initiating pleading) seeking relief in a competent court.

The Court relied in particular on Burton v. Foret, 498 So.2d 706, 711–12 (La. 1986), which defined the date of judicial demand as “the day on which a party files a demand or claim for relief” and “the date of plaintiff’s first judicial claim against all parties responsible for a single tortious occurrence.”

3. Final Judgments and Amendments: La. C.C.P. art. 1951

La. C.C.P. art. 1951 governs amendments to final judgments:

“On motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation. … A final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance.”

The jurisprudence has long construed this as allowing only “clerical” or non-substantive changes. As the Court summarized defendants’ position, art. 1951 allows amendment only where “the amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment.” See Villaume v. Villaume, 363 So.2d 448, 450 (La. 1978).

Defense counsel’s argument (echoed by the dissent) was that moving the start date of interest from November 17, 2023 back to December 22, 2020 necessarily adds more than $100,000 in interest and is therefore substantive.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State – Interpreting “Shall”

In Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. State, 13-0120, p. 26 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 1033, 1051, the Court explained that:

“[U]nder well-established rules of interpretation, the word ‘shall’ excludes the possibility of being ‘optional’ or even subject to ‘discretion,’ but instead ‘shall’ means ‘imperative, of similar effect and import with the word “must.”’”

This supports the majority’s characterization of judicial interest as not merely permitted but compelled by statute in tort cases. It bolsters the conclusion that neither judicial discretion nor drafting errors can lawfully curtail it.

2. Oliver and Smith – Interest Attaches Automatically

As noted, Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic and Smith v. Quarles Drilling Co. stand for the proposition that judicial interest:

Attaches automatically;
Is not a matter of judicial discretion; and
Applies whether or not the plaintiff prays for it or the judgment references it.

The Court explicitly cites Oliver’s statement that “an award of judicial interest is not discretionary … whether prayed for in the petition or mentioned in the judgment.” That language sets the stage for the Court’s key move here: if interest attaches irrespective of its mention, then an erroneous mention of a date cannot divest the plaintiff of a statutory entitlement.

3. Burton v. Foret – Content of “Date of Judicial Demand”

Burton clarifies the meaning of “date of judicial demand” and confirms that this is a legal concept defined by law, not by whatever date someone happens to type into a judgment. The majority uses Burton to reject any suggestion that a judgment can redefine the judicial-demand date by label (e.g., calling the verdict date the “date of judicial demand”).

4. Caldwell and American Cyanamid – Nature and Purpose of Interest

The Court relies on older and federal jurisprudence to emphasize the substantive character and purpose of legal interest:

Caldwell v. City of Shreveport, 150 La. 465, 470, 90 So. 763, 764 (1922):
“The recovery of legal interest on the judgment from the date of judicial demand is therefore a matter of absolute right.”
Hall v. Brookshire Bros., 02-2404, p. 24 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 559, 574 n.7:
The interest mandated by La. R.S. 13:4203 “is designed to compensate a plaintiff for his loss of the use of money to which he is entitled, the use of which defendant had during the pendency of the litigation.”
American Cyanamid Co. v. Electrical Industries, Inc., 630 F.2d 1123, 1129 (5th Cir. 1980), recognizing that La. R.S. 13:4203 is an exception to the general rule in La. C.C. art. 1938 that legal interest runs from the due date of the obligation.

These authorities support the majority’s view that interest is part of the plaintiff’s substantive right to be made whole for the lost time value of money, and not a mere discretionary add-on that could be affected by drafting mishaps.

5. Suprun and Richman – Distinguishing Prior Appellate Cases on Amendment of Judgments

Defendants (and the dissent) relied heavily on two appellate decisions:

Suprun v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 09-1555 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/30/10), 40 So.3d 261; and
Richman v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 24-258 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/30/24), 412 So.3d 992.

In Suprun, the original judgment awarded interest “from the date of judicial demand until October 30, 2006,” the date of an offer of judgment. The trial court later amended the judgment to award interest “from the date of judicial demand until paid,” striking the end date. The First Circuit vacated this amendment as an impermissible substantive change under art. 1951.

In Richman, the Third Circuit, relying on Suprun, reversed rulings that:

Allowed an amended petition seeking interest on previously awarded costs; and
Awarded interest on those costs from the date of judicial demand.

The Supreme Court distinguishes these cases:

In Suprun, the issue concerned the end date of interest, where the judgment expressly limited interest to a certain date. The court of appeal did not address the statutorily mandated start date in light of La. R.S. 13:4203.
In Richman, the interest at issue was not the automatic tort interest governed by La. R.S. 13:4203, but a separate form of interest on costs, which does not attach by the same automatic operation of law.

By contrast, in Bilalis:

The judgment explicitly refers to “the date of judicial demand”; and
The interest in dispute is precisely the kind of tort interest that attaches automatically under La. R.S. 13:4203.

Thus, the Supreme Court treats Suprun and Richman as dealing with different configurations and emphasizes that they neither control nor undermine the result here.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Interest from Judicial Demand Is Not Optional and Cannot Be Contracted Away by Mistake

Central to the opinion is the repeated emphasis on the mandatory nature of interest in tort cases:

La. R.S. 13:4203 states that “legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand” in “judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’.”
La. C.C.P. art. 1921 instructs courts to award interest as provided by law, again using “shall.”
La. R.S. 1:3 makes “shall” mandatory.
Prior cases (e.g., Oliver, Smith, Caldwell) further describe the right to interest as “automatic” and “a matter of absolute right.”

The combination leads to a strong rule: whenever a tort plaintiff obtains a money judgment, legal interest from the date of judicial demand is built into that judgment by operation of law, whether the parties mention it, whether the judgment recites it, and even if the recitation is defective.

The Court expressly notes that the record “lacks any indication that the inclusion of the November date in the judgment was anything more than a mere scribe error.” In other words, there was no conscious, negotiated judicial decision to displace the statutory regime; there was only an inaccurate date.

2. Characterizing the Error: Scribe Error vs. Substantive Limitation

The Court’s next step is interpretive: how to read a judgment that says both “from November 17, 2023” and “the date of judicial demand” when everyone agrees those two are not the same?

The Court reasons:

The judgment contains two pieces of information:
- a specific calendar date (November 17, 2023); and
- a legal descriptor (“the date of judicial demand”).
Statutory law (La. C.C.P. art. 421 and Burton) fixes the “date of judicial demand” as the date the petition was filed—December 22, 2020—not November 17, 2023.
Therefore, the judgment’s description of November 17, 2023 as “the date of judicial demand” is simply wrong as a matter of law and fact.

The Court insists that:

“The bracketed phrase ‘from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand,’ does not require the court to choose between two dates, and there is no justification for choosing the date that is not supported by the law.”

In other words, the clause is internally incoherent: it mislabels a non-judicial-demand date as though it were the date of judicial demand. The proper solution is not to rewrite the judgment but to construe it consistently with controlling law. Reading the judgment and statute together, the only lawful reading is that interest runs “from the date of judicial demand” as defined by law (December 22, 2020).

3. Avoiding Absurd and Unlawful Results

The Court implicitly invokes the civil-law canon against absurd results. It explains that defendants’ interpretation, which would limit interest to run only from November 17, 2023:

Would require the Court to pretend that November 17, 2023 is the date of judicial demand, contrary to the undisputed record;
Would “truncate” the statutory interest period in violation of La. R.S. 13:4203; and
Would produce an “absurd result” given the mandatory statutory scheme.

By contrast, the construction adopted by the trial court, the court of appeal, and the Supreme Court “produces no absurd result; it merely implements what the law requires.”

The Court also notes a fairness dimension, echoing Judge Atkins’ concurrence below: defendants are attempting to take advantage of an obvious mistake in the judgment’s wording, even though, had the mistake gone in the opposite direction (stating an interest start date earlier than the true judicial-demand date), they presumably would have argued that the statute limited interest to the proper judicial-demand date.

4. Why This Is Not a Substantive Amendment Under Article 1951

Defendants cast the issue as one of substantively amending a final judgment. The Court rejects this characterization on several grounds:

No motion to amend the judgment was before the trial court. Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the judgment and to set a judgment debtor rule; she did not seek to alter the judgment’s text.
The court did not delete any language or add interest to the judgment. The interest clause was part of the original judgment; the courts simply interpreted it in light of the statutory mandate.
Plaintiff sought only to collect what was “legally owed” under La. R.S. 13:4203. That is, she invoked the automatic operation of statute, not the discretionary amendment power under art. 1951.
The magnitude of additional interest owed is irrelevant to whether the change is substantive. The Court states:
“The amount of interest owed does not change the fact that this matter involves a scribe error. A substantive amendment changes the judgment’s outcome irrespective of the amount at issue.”

In the majority’s view, enforcing statutory interest from the true date of judicial demand does not “change” the judgment’s substance; it simply gives effect to what the law already, and always, attached to that judgment. Article 1951 comes into play only when the judgment itself is being altered, not when a party insists on collecting a mandatory statutory accessory that the judgment cannot lawfully negate.

The Court crystallizes this conclusion as follows:

“[W]e find no merit in the argument that any substantive amendment of the trial judgment occurred and reject the argument that enforcing the payment of interest mandated by La. R.S. 13:4203 requires a substantive amendment of the trial judgment.”

5. The “Lesser Includes the Greater” Reasoning

The Court adds a conceptual argument about the temporal scope of interest:

“Moreover, of the dates referenced in the judgment—the date of judicial demand and November 17, 2023—the lesser includes the greater. Stated another way, November 17, 2023, is contained within the period between the date of judicial demand until paid. It follows that judicial interest accrues from the date of judicial demand and continues to run from November 17, 2023, and from all dates that follow until paid.”

This reasoning underscores that awarding interest “from the date of judicial demand until paid” necessarily covers any later date, including the verdict date, and thus no “second” interest period is being created. Plaintiff is not seeking double interest or a new class of recovery, only the statutorily mandated period.

D. The Dissent’s Approach: Sanctity of the Final Judgment

Justice Guidry’s dissent rests on a different starting point: the binding effect of a final judgment as written. Key points include:

The December 11, 2023 judgment is final and unappealed; under La. C.C.P. arts. 2088 and 2123, all appeal delays have expired.
A “plain reading” of the judgment indicates that it sets November 17, 2023 as the “date of judicial demand” for purposes of interest.
By later enforcing interest from December 22, 2020 instead, the trial court and majority effectively:
- “amended” the judgment to remove the specific reference to November 17, 2023; and
- increased the amount of interest defendants are obliged to pay beyond what the judgment expressly states.
This, in the dissent’s view, is more than “simply enforce[ing] the judgment”; it is a substantive change squarely prohibited by art. 1951.
Because the plaintiff drafted the judgment and failed to timely challenge the error via new trial or appeal, she is bound by the language of that final judgment.

For the dissent, the majority’s approach “gives no effect” to the critical language “from November 17, 2023, the date of judicial demand,” and effectively treats the judgment text as “immaterial” whenever it conflicts with statutory law—an outcome the dissent finds incompatible with the principles of finality and res judicata.

E. Reconciling (or Exposing) the Tension: Statutory Rights vs. Finality

The case exposes a structural tension in Louisiana civil procedure:

On one hand, judicial interest in tort cases is a mandatory, statutory entitlement, attaching by operation of law and meant to compensate plaintiffs for loss of use of money; and
On the other, final judgments are supposed to be conclusive and not subject to substantive alteration after appellate delays run.

The majority resolves this tension by conceptualizing judicial interest under La. R.S. 13:4203 as:

An accessory legal consequence of a tort judgment, which the court cannot contract away or omit; and
Something that travels with the judgment regardless of the wording, so long as the judgment awards damages in a tort action.

Thus, enforcing interest from the correct start date is not a modification of the judgment’s substance but a recognition of a non-derogable statutory supplement. The judgment’s misstatement of date is treated as a non-controlling scribe error that cannot override the statute.

The dissent, in contrast, privileges finality and party responsibility for drafting:

Whatever statutory rights existed before judgment, the parties’ and court’s failure to implement them correctly yields a final judgment that controls; and
Once final, that judgment cannot be enlarged to add additional money (here, more than $100,000 in interest), even if the enlargement merely brings the result in line with what the statute originally required.

The majority’s approach arguably softens the rigidity of finality in the narrow context of mandatory interest in tort cases. It leaves open, however, how far this reasoning extends. For example, the opinion does not decide what happens where:

A judgment explicitly and unambiguously denies prejudgment interest; or
The parties expressly compromise or waive interest as part of a settlement embodied in a consent judgment.

What the decision clearly does is reject the proposition that a mistaken dating of the “date of judicial demand” in a standard litigated judgment, unaccompanied by any clear indication of intent to abrogate the statute, can curtail the operation of La. R.S. 13:4203.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Tort Litigants and Their Counsel

Judicial interest from the filing date is effectively non-negotiable by mistake.
Plaintiffs and defendants alike should understand that, absent a clear and legally valid waiver or different statutory regime, interest in Louisiana tort cases runs from the filing date of the lawsuit. Mere errors or omissions in the judgment’s wording will not defeat that right.
Drafting errors in judgments are less catastrophic for plaintiffs than previously feared.
If plaintiff’s counsel inadvertently inserts the wrong date as the supposed “date of judicial demand” but also references “the date of judicial demand,” Bilalis indicates the statute will correct the date as a matter of law. The plaintiff’s failure to appeal that drafting error will not necessarily forfeit tens of thousands of dollars in interest.
Defense attempts to leverage obvious scribe errors are disfavored.
The Court explicitly characterizes defendants’ position as an attempt to “take advantage of a mistake.” Future litigants can expect courts to look skeptically at similar arguments where one side seeks a windfall from a manifest drafting misdescription that contradicts statutory mandates.
Motion practice: enforcement vs. amendment.
Plaintiffs underpaid on interest may proceed via a motion to enforce judgment and judgment debtor rule, rather than moving to “amend” the judgment under art. 1951. Bilalis affirms that this is an appropriate procedural vehicle where the plaintiff is seeking to collect statutory interest that attaches automatically.

B. For Trial Courts

Interpret judgments to conform to law.
Where judgment language concerning interest appears inconsistent with mandatory statutes such as La. R.S. 13:4203, trial courts should interpret and enforce the judgment in a manner that conforms to those statutes rather than mechanically applying erroneous dates.
Distinguish between clerical misdescription and substantive limitation.
Bilalis instructs that mislabeling a non-judicial-demand date as “the date of judicial demand” is a scribe error, not a substantive limitation. Courts must, however, carefully distinguish such scenarios from cases in which the judgment intentionally sets a different interest regime (e.g., “interest shall run only from the date of judgment” with no reference to judicial demand).

C. For Appellate Courts

Bilalis narrows the reach of prior appellate cases like Suprun and Richman. Courts reviewing post-finality disputes about interest should:

Ask whether the interest at issue is the automatic tort interest of La. R.S. 13:4203 or some other form (e.g., interest on costs, contractual interest);
Determine whether the judgment’s language is inconsistent with, or merely imperfectly reflective of, the statutory mandate; and
Recognize that enforcing statutory interest from the correct start date may not constitute a substantive amendment under art. 1951.

D. For Insurers and Adjusters

Insurers handling Louisiana tort claims must be especially careful in calculating and tendering interest:

They should calculate judicial interest from the actual filing date of the petition (date of judicial demand), not from verdict or judgment dates, unless a clear, legally valid exception applies.
Payment of interest only from a later date based on a mistaken judgment recital may expose them to additional liability, including further interest on the unpaid interest.

E. Doctrinal Significance

At a more general level, Bilalis:

Reinforces the idea that certain statutory incidents of judgments (here, prejudgment interest in tort) are so mandatory that they effectively override contrary or inconsistent judgment language where that language is attributable to error;
Signals a willingness to treat some judgment-language flaws as interpretive questions, not amendment questions, thereby softening the rigidity of finality in a narrow category of cases; and
Will likely be cited in future disputes involving the interplay between statutory entitlements and the text of judgments, especially where drafting errors create apparent conflicts.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Judicial Interest” / “Legal Interest”

In Louisiana, “judicial interest” (often called “legal interest”) is the statutory interest that accrues on money judgments. In tort cases, La. R.S. 13:4203 requires that this interest start on the date the lawsuit is filed (“date of judicial demand”) and continue until the judgment is paid.

The core idea: if a defendant owes damages for a tort, the plaintiff should also be compensated for the time value of that money from the moment the plaintiff formally demands it in court, not just from the date of the verdict or judgment.

2. “Ex Delicto”

“Ex delicto” is Latin for “from a wrong (delict).” In Louisiana, it refers to obligations arising from wrongful acts—torts—rather than from contracts (“ex contractu”). La. R.S. 13:4203 applies to judgments “sounding in damages, ex delicto,” i.e., tort damage awards.

3. “Judicial Demand”

“Judicial demand” simply means the point in time when a civil action is started by filing a petition in a court with jurisdiction. Under La. C.C.P. art. 421, this is when you file your lawsuit. For purposes of La. R.S. 13:4203, interest in tort cases starts running on that date.

4. “Prejudgment” vs. “Postjudgment” Interest

Both are encompassed within “judicial interest” in Louisiana:

Prejudgment interest is interest that accrues between:
- the filing of the lawsuit (judicial demand) and
- the date of judgment.
Postjudgment interest is interest that accrues after judgment, until the judgment is fully paid.

In tort cases, La. R.S. 13:4203 effectively merges these concepts: “legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand … on all judgments … ex delicto.” That covers both pre- and postjudgment periods.

5. “Scribe Error” (Clerical Error)

A “scribe error” is a mistake in writing or typing—like mis-typing a date—that does not reflect a true substantive decision or agreement. Courts often treat such errors differently from substantive choices:

If the error is plainly clerical and conflicts with clear statutory law, courts tend to correct or ignore it without treating that as altering substantive rights.

In Bilalis, calling November 17, 2023 “the date of judicial demand” is treated as such a scribe error.

6. “Substantive Amendment” of a Judgment

Under La. C.C.P. art. 1951, once a judgment is final (appeal delays have passed), a court may:

Correct phraseology;
Fix deficiencies in “decretal language” (the parts stating who owes what to whom); or
Correct errors of calculation.

But it may not “change its substance.” A “substantive amendment” is one that changes the actual rights and obligations created by the judgment, e.g., increasing the principal award or adding a new category of damages.

The debate in Bilalis is whether moving the interest start date from verdict to filing is substantive (dissent’s view) or just enforcement of existing statutory obligations inherent in the judgment (majority’s view).

7. “Final Judgment”

A final judgment is one that resolves all issues as to all parties. Once appeal delays expire and no appeal is taken, it becomes final and ordinarily cannot be changed in any substantive way. That principle undergirds the dissent; the majority distinguishes between changing the judgment and enforcing statutory consequences that attach to it.

VII. Conclusion

Bilalis v. Drennan establishes and clarifies several important points in Louisiana law:

In tort actions, judicial interest is mandatory, automatic, and attaches from the date of judicial demand (the filing date of the petition) until the judgment is paid, regardless of whether it is prayed for or accurately stated in the judgment.
An incorrect recital of a calendar date in a judgment as “the date of judicial demand” is a scribe error that does not override the statutory mandate of La. R.S. 13:4203.
Enforcing statutory interest from the actual date of judicial demand through a motion to enforce judgment does not constitute a substantive amendment of a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1951, even if it results in a substantial additional interest payment.
Judgments must be interpreted in harmony with controlling statutes and in a manner that avoids absurd and unlawful results; defendants cannot obtain a windfall by exploiting obvious drafting mistakes that conflict with mandatory law.

The decision strengthens the position of tort plaintiffs by shielding their statutory interest entitlements from inadvertent loss through drafting error, while also providing clearer guidance to trial and appellate courts on the treatment of erroneous interest clauses in judgments. At the same time, the dissent highlights the ongoing tension between protecting statutory rights and maintaining the finality of judgments, a tension that will likely continue to surface in other contexts.

For practitioners, the operative lesson is straightforward: in Louisiana tort practice, the safe and controlling anchor for judicial interest is the filing date of the petition. Judgment language should reflect that, but even when it does not, Bilalis makes clear that the statute—not a stray date in the judgment—ultimately governs.