Limits on Standing and Waiver under the Specialty Doctrine in Extradition Treaties

Introduction

Ricardo Alberto Martinelli Berrocal, a former President of the Republic of Panama, challenged his subsequent money‐laundering prosecutions in Panamanian courts by suing senior U.S. officials—the Attorney General of the United States, the U.S. Secretary of State, and Thomas B. Heinemann—alleging that their diplomatic correspondence had erred in declaring that the “Rule of Specialty” in the Panama–U.S. Extradition Treaty no longer protected him from additional charges. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Martinelli’s suit for lack of standing under both Article III of the Constitution and the treaty’s specialty doctrine. On May 7, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. This commentary examines the background, the court’s holdings, the precedents and reasoning it relied upon, and the broader impact on extradition law, international comity, and separation-of-powers doctrine.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit held that Martinelli lacked standing on two independent grounds:

Article III Standing:
- Traceability: The alleged injury—Panamanian prosecutions for unlisted offenses—was the result of Panamanian sovereign decisions, not the letters sent by U.S. officials.
- Redressability: Even if the U.S. court voided the diplomatic letters, Panamanian authorities would remain at liberty to decide whether to dismiss or continue the prosecutions. A U.S. declaratory judgment would not compel Panama to halt the trials.
Standing under the Rule of Specialty: Although an extradited individual may ordinarily invoke the treaty’s “specialty doctrine,” that right is derivative of—and exists only at the sufferance of—the surrendering state. The United States explicitly consented to Panama’s prosecution of Martinelli for the additional money-laundering offenses in diplomatic notes, thereby extinguishing his ability to object.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Martinelli’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (504 U.S. 555, 1992): Defined the three core elements of Article III standing—injury in fact, causation (traceability), and redressability.
Bennett v. Spear (520 U.S. 154, 1997): Clarified that indirect injuries caused by a defendant’s “determinative or coercive effect” on third‐party decision-makers can satisfy traceability—but only when the challenged action effectively binds the third party.
California v. Texas (593 U.S. 659, 2021): Emphasized that traceability is harder to establish when a third party’s discretionary conduct intervenes.
United States v. Puentes (50 F.3d 1567, 1995) and United States v. Diwan (864 F.2d 715, 1989): Recognized that extradited defendants can challenge post-extradition prosecutions under the rule of specialty, but only so long as the surrendering state has not consented to new charges.
United States v. Rauscher (119 U.S. 407, 1886) and United States v. Alvarez-Machain (504 U.S. 655, 1992): Early Supreme Court decisions establishing and interpreting the rule of specialty in U.S. extradition law.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Article III Standing Analysis
The court applied the well-settled three-part test from Lujan. Although Martinelli had a concrete injury (the prosecutions), he could not show that the injury was “fairly traceable” to the Office of the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, or Mr. Heinemann. The Panamanian authorities, as independent sovereign actors, made the prosecutorial decisions in their own discretion. Without an administrative scheme coercing Panama to follow the U.S. opinion—unlike the Fish & Wildlife advisory regime in Bennett v. Spear—there was no causal chain sufficient for standing.

On redressability, the court held that even a binding U.S. declaration that the U.S. opinions were invalid would not obligate Panama to vacate or dismiss its money-laundering charges. Under Panamanian law, Article 548 of its Penal Code permits, but does not compel, voiding an extradited-offender’s prosecution. Likewise, “pacta sunt servanda” requires only that treaties be honored in good faith, not that a foreign court overturn convictions at the behest of U.S. judicial pronouncements. The discretionary reaction of Panamanian courts and the political question of whether the State Department might re-waive or maintain its consent rendered redressability too speculative.

B. Rule of Specialty Standing
Under Article VIII of the 1904 Panama–U.S. Extradition Treaty, Panama could try Martinelli only for the four offenses it listed in its original request, unless he “publicly consent[ed]” to additional charges or unless Panama obtained a U.S. waiver. While an extradited person may assert the treaty’s protections, those rights remain “derivative of the rights of the requested nation” (Puentes). Here, diplomatic correspondence from the U.S. Embassy adopting Mr. Heinemann’s opinions constituted an express U.S. waiver of any specialty objection, leaving Martinelli with no treaty‐based grounds to challenge the prosecutions.

3. Impact

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision will shape future extradition and specialty-doctrine disputes in several ways:

Narrow Standing for Extradited Persons: Individuals extradited to foreign states will find it difficult to invoke U.S. judicial relief against foreign prosecutions, absent a direct, binding act by U.S. authorities ordering a stay or return.
Executive Deference Reinforced: The ruling underscores that decisions about consenting to or protesting post-extradition charges are quintessentially executive functions, insulated from judicial second-guessing under separation-of-powers and comity principles.
Treaty Rights Are Derivative: Even self-executing treaties cannot confer free-standing private causes of action once the surrendering state chooses to waive objections.
International Comity and Discretion: Foreign courts remain free to decide whether and how to honor specialty protections, without coercion from U.S. judicial pronouncements.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Standing: To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) a concrete injury; (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant’s own action; and (3) that a favorable ruling will remedy the harm.
Traceability vs. Proximate Cause: “Fairly traceable” means the defendant’s act must be a substantial factor in causing the harm, not that it was the immediate or sole cause.
Redressability: Even if a court rules for the plaintiff, remedies must lie within the court’s power. Speculative effects on unbound third parties do not suffice.
Rule of Specialty: An extradited person may be tried only for offenses listed in the surrender request unless the requesting state grants permission for additional charges.
Derivative Rights: Treaty protections for an individual exist only as long as the state that obtained his or her extradition maintains those rights; a state can waive them.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Martinelli Berrocal v. Attorney General of the United States delineates the outer bounds of both Article III standing and treaty‐based specialty rights in the extradition context. By rejecting traceability and redressability where foreign sovereign decisions, not U.S. officials, directly produced the harm, and by reaffirming that treaty rights are derivative and subject to executive waiver, the court has clarified that extradited individuals cannot skirt the separation of powers or impose U.S. judicial dictates on third-state prosecutions. This ruling will guide practitioners and scholars in extradition law, international comity, and standing doctrine for years to come.