Limitation of Title IX’s Implied Right of Action to Students: Employees Must Rely on Title VII

Introduction

In April 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered two consolidated appeals—Machelle Joseph v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (No. 23-11037) and Thomas Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (No. 23-12475). Ms. Joseph, a university employee, and Dr. Crowther, a faculty member, alleged sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. They contended that Title IX impliedly confers a private right of action for employees who experience discrimination in their terms and conditions of employment. The district court dismissed their claims. A panel of this Court affirmed, and at the request of one judge, the full court voted against rehearing the appeals en banc. Chief Judge Pryor, joined by Judge Luck, filed a respecting opinion upholding the panel’s reasoning. Judge Rosenbaum dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing that Cannon, Bell, and Jackson compel the recognition of an employee’s Title IX cause of action.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel held, by majority, that:

Title IX does not provide an implied private right of action for employees of federally funded educational institutions who suffer sex discrimination in their employment.
Employees may continue to pursue sex‐based employment claims only under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contains an express cause of action and administrative enforcement procedures.

On petition for rehearing en banc, a majority of active judges declined to rehear the case. Chief Judge Pryor’s respecting denial opinion emphasized that Spending Clause precedents (including Alexander v. Sandoval and Gonzaga University v. Doe) bar courts from implying redundant private remedies when Congress has provided an express enforcement scheme. He concluded that Title IX’s text and structure—coupled with Title VII’s parallel remedy—demonstrate that Congress did not intend Title IX to create a second private enforcement vehicle for employment discrimination.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Cannon v. University of Chicago (1979): Recognized an implied private right of action under Title IX for students denied admission on the basis of sex.
North Haven Board of Education v. Bell (1982): Held that Title IX covers and prohibits sex discrimination in employment of faculty and staff.
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (2005): Held that Title IX’s implied cause of action encompasses retaliation claims by employees who complain of sex discrimination against students.
Alexander v. Sandoval (2001) and Gonzaga University v. Doe (2002): Clarified that courts may imply a private right of action only when Congress has unambiguously done so in the statute’s language or structure.
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman (1981): Emphasized clear notice and voluntary acceptance of conditions under Spending Clause statutes.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District (1998): Required that Title IX’s implied private remedy mirror the notice‐and‐response framework of the statute’s funding‐termination provision.

Legal Reasoning

Chief Judge Pryor’s respecting denial opinion distilled the Court’s four–step framework for Spending Clause–based rights: (1) examine text for explicit rights or benefits conferred, (2) inspect legislative history for clear intent to create a private remedy, (3) consider consistency with statutory enforcement schemes, and (4) defer to Congress’s policy judgments where alternative remedies exist. Applying that framework, he concluded:

Although Title IX’s Section 901(a) bars “any person” from sex discrimination in programs receiving federal assistance, the statute’s express remedies operate at a program level (termination of funds), not at an individual employment level.
Congress enacted Title VII’s explicit private cause of action for employment discrimination in educational institutions just weeks before Title IX’s passage, signaling a design choice to channel employee claims through Title VII.
Cannon’s implied student remedy, and Bell’s recognition that employees are “persons” protected by Title IX, do not themselves create a separate employee enforcement mechanism when Congress provided Title VII for that purpose.
Spending Clause precedents (Sandoval, Gonzaga, Pennhurst) counsel against judicial creation of a second, redundant remedy for the same class of plaintiffs—in this case, employees—unless Congress clearly intended otherwise.

As a result, the Court held that Title IX’s implied right of action is confined to those discrimination harms—students’ exclusion from participation or denial of benefits—that lack alternative federal remedies, while employees must proceed under the alternative scheme Congress provided in Title VII.

Impact

The Court’s decision will shape litigation strategies in two principal ways:

Forum and Remedies. Employees alleging sex discrimination in educational settings can no longer invoke Title IX directly. They must exhaust administrative procedures under Title VII, face shorter filing deadlines (180 days), and may be limited in damages by Title VII’s caps.
Title IX Enforcement Focus. Title IX’s private right of action will remain the primary tool for students or others alleging discrimination in “program or activity” participation, while Title VII will govern employment claims in educational institutions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Spending Clause Statutes. When Congress conditions federal funding on compliance with civil‐rights rules, recipients must voluntarily accept those terms. Courts will infer private lawsuits only if the statute unambiguously creates them.
Implied Right of Action. A judicially created cause of action that arises when Congress’s statutory text and structure—though not explicitly granting a private remedy—clearly indicate an intent to protect a class of persons and allow them to sue.
Overlap with Title VII. Title VII expressly allows employees to sue for job‐related discrimination. Title IX focuses on program‐level harms. Where Congress has already provided Title VII, courts will not imply a redundant Title IX employee remedy.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s en banc denial of rehearing cements the principle that Title IX’s implied private right of action does not extend to employment discrimination by faculty or staff. Instead, employees of federally funded educational institutions must pursue sex‐based employment claims under Title VII. This decision clarifies the boundary between program‐level discrimination enforcement under Title IX and workplace discrimination relief under Title VII, reflecting the interplay of constitutional Spending Clause doctrine, statutory design choices, and Supreme Court precedents.