Leon Carter v. Tegels: Constitutional Boundaries of Anders Review and Remmer Presumptions under AEDPA

Introduction

Leon Carter v. Tegels is a 2025 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that clarifies two important points in federal habeas corpus practice. First, it determines the scope of Anders v. California obligations—that is, the procedural rules governing an appellate “no‐merit” brief by appointed counsel on behalf of an indigent defendant. Second, it addresses how strict the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) must be in reviewing a defendant’s claim under Remmer v. United States—the Supreme Court’s 1954 case establishing a presumption of prejudice when extrinsic communications or tampering with jurors occur.

In this appeal, Leon Carter, convicted in state court of sexual assault, kidnapping, and strangulation, challenged (1) the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ handling of his Anders “no‐merit” appeal and (2) the trial court’s failure to hold a Remmer hearing after a bailiff answered a juror’s question during deliberations. The Seventh Circuit held that (a) the Constitution does not guarantee a right to exhaustive appellate analysis beyond what Anders requires, and (b) Carter’s Remmer claim cannot overcome AEDPA deference in the face of a state‐court adjudication on the merits.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. On the Anders claim, the court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals fulfilled its constitutional duties by independently reviewing an extensive trial record, a detailed no‐merit brief, a supplemental brief and Carter’s response. That procedure satisfied the Anders and Smith v. Robbins requirements: appointed counsel “conscientiously examined” the record and the court “independently determined” that no non‐frivolous issues existed. The Constitution does not mandate more.

On the Remmer claim, the panel concluded that AEDPA’s deferential standard controlled because the state court adjudicated the issue on the merits. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state‐court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” as determined by the Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit found no Supreme Court decision beyond Remmer itself (and its very limited progeny) to “clearly establish” that a bailiff’s clarifying instruction to a deadlocked jury is presumptively prejudicial. Moreover, the state court’s resolution of Carter’s claim was at least a “fair‐minded” application of the narrow rule set out in Remmer and in Seventh Circuit precedent such as Hall v. Zenk.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Anders v. California (386 U.S. 738 (1967)) – Established that appointed appellate counsel who finds no meritorious issues must file a brief explaining the examination of the record and the reasons no non‐frivolous arguments exist, and the court must independently determine frivolity.
Pennsylvania v. Finley (481 U.S. 551 (1987)) – Clarified that Anders is a prophylactic rule and not an independent constitutional command.
Smith v. Robbins (528 U.S. 259 (2000)) – Expanded on Anders to require “adequate and effective” procedures that reasonably ensure appellate review of arguable issues. It endorsed states requiring a finding that an appeal is “lacking in arguable issues,” i.e., frivolous.
Richter (562 U.S. 86 (2011)) – Held that state‐court decisions need not explain every ground when the outcome was reasonable under clearly established law, refining AEDPA review.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (AEDPA) – Imposes a deferential standard on federal habeas courts reviewing state‐court decisions “on the merits” of federal claims.
Remmer v. United States (347 U.S. 227 (1954)) – Held that extrinsic communications or tampering with a juror create a presumption of prejudice, requiring a post‐verdict hearing unless the government can show harmlessness.
Hall v. Zenk (692 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2012)) – Interpreted Remmer under AEDPA to require a “great impact” on juror deliberations before triggering the presumption of prejudice.

Legal Reasoning

Anders Review: Carter argued that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ summary footnote—stating it would not exhaustively analyze every no‐merit issue—violated his due‐process rights. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that federalism principles bar imposing additional opinion‐writing requirements on state courts. Under Anders and Robbins, the critical inquiry is whether counsel “conscientiously examined” the record and whether the reviewing court “independently decide[d]” the appeal was frivolous. The state appellate court had read over fifty pages of briefing, reviewed a voluminous record, cited Anders by name, and independently declared no arguable issues existed. That satisfied constitutional minimums.

Remmer Claim: Carter contended that because the bailiff answered a jury note—“you need to just work and reach a unanimous verdict”—the trial court was bound by Remmer to presume prejudice and hold an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit first concluded AEDPA applied, since the state appellate court adjudicated Carter’s Remmer argument on the merits. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), Carter had to show the state decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” a Supreme Court holding. The panel observed that Remmer itself arose out of an attempted bribe and FBI inquiry—facts critical to its “presumptive prejudice.” No subsequent Supreme Court case extended that presumption to routine procedural instructions given by a bailiff. At most, Smith v. Phillips recognized that a Remmer‐style hearing is an adequate remedy for juror misconduct, but did not require state courts to do more than federal courts. Finally, the secluded instruction here pales beside the “great impact” on juror deliberations that Hall required for a Remmer presumption. The state court’s decision was therefore at least reasonable under AEDPA.

Impact

This decision solidifies two important points:

Due Process and Anders Appeals: Indigent defendants have no constitutional right to exhaustive written opinions or footnoted explanations from state appellate courts beyond the Anders/Robbins baseline. As long as counsel conducts a conscientious review and the court independently decides frivolity, due process is satisfied.
Remmer under AEDPA: Federal habeas petitioners face a steep hurdle when invoking Remmer. They must show a state‐court decision unreasonably applied a Supreme Court holding that is itself narrowly tailored to bribes or extrinsic tampering. Routine procedural clarifications by court officers will almost never suffice.

Going forward, criminal defendants and habeas petitioners should temper Remmer‐based claims to egregious circumstances—bribes, investigations, or outside influence that clearly parallels Remmer. Likewise, Anders challenges must focus on procedural deficiencies in the court’s independent review, not on disagreements over the merits of the issues themselves.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Anders Brief (No‐Merit Brief): When court‐appointed counsel believes an appeal has no merit, they file a special brief summarizing the case, the arguments considered, and why each lacks legal force. The principle: ensure indigent defendants receive honest, independent appellate scrutiny of potential errors.
Remmer Presumption: If someone outside the jury tries to influence a juror (for example, by bribery or secret messages), the law automatically presumes the defendant was harmed. The judge must then hold a hearing to see if the government can prove the influence was harmless.
AEDPA Deference: Federal courts must give state‐court decisions great respect when reviewing habeas petitions. A petitioner wins only if the state court was “contrary to” or “unreasonably applied” a Supreme Court case.
Certiorari Denial and “Look‐Through”: If a state supreme court refuses a discretionary review (certiorari), federal courts “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision to see the basis of the ruling.
Exhaustion of State Remedies: A prisoner must raise each federal claim through all levels of state court to give states a full chance to correct errors before federal habeas review.

Conclusion

Leon Carter v. Tegels clarifies that the Fourteenth Amendment does not compel state appellate courts to provide more than an Anders‐compliant independent review of no‐merit appeals. It also underscores the narrow scope of Remmer claims on federal habeas review under AEDPA: absent facts closely mirroring bribery or extraneous jury tampering, courts will not find a presumption of prejudice. The ruling both reaffirms the integrity of state appellate practice and emphasizes the high bar habeas petitioners must clear to demonstrate a federal constitutional violation in jury‐intrusion cases.