From FCHR “No Cause” to Federal Preclusion: Eleventh Circuit Bars § 1981 Claims and Reaffirms Strict Title VII Timeliness and Plausibility Requirements

Introduction

In Elias Makere v. Allstate Insurance Company (No. 24-11336, Oct. 29, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam decision, affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment rulings against a pro se plaintiff’s multi-theory employment case. The court addressed three core clusters of issues:

• Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) arising from Florida administrative and judicial review proceedings, and its application to later federal § 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims.
• Strict enforcement of Title VII’s EEOC charge-filing deadlines, including the inapplicability of “relation back” to save an untimely EEOC filing and the limits of the continuing violation doctrine.
• The Twombly/Iqbal plausibility threshold for post-termination § 1981 retaliation claims, particularly when the claimant alleges employer-directed harm by third parties without concrete factual linkage.

The panel—Judges Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, and Abudu—held that Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR)/Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) proceedings culminating in a state appellate affirmance can collaterally estop later § 1981 claims grounded in the same facts. It further held the plaintiff’s Title VII claims were time-barred under the 300-day charge deadline and that post-termination retaliation theories failed for want of plausible, non-speculative allegations connecting Allstate to the alleged harms.

Summary of the Opinion

• Collateral Estoppel: The court gave preclusive effect to Florida administrative proceedings (FCHR→DOAH→FCHR final order) that were affirmed by the Florida First District Court of Appeal, thereby barring § 1981 discrimination and pre-termination/termination retaliation claims. Florida’s and § 1981’s elements for such claims are equivalent.
• Post-Termination Retaliation (Pleading): The § 1981 retaliation claim premised on post-termination events failed because the complaint offered only speculation and conclusory assertions—insufficient under Twombly/Iqbal—to link Allstate to alleged third-party acts (a car collision, a former coworker’s police contact, and a different employer’s retirement-benefit reduction).
• Title VII Timeliness: The plaintiff’s EEOC charge (filed in 2019) was not filed within 300 days of the last possible actionable act (2016 termination notice). Relation-back could not cure the defect because the earlier state FCHR filing itself was beyond 300 days; the continuing violation doctrine did not convert discrete acts or a hostile environment ending at termination into timely claims.
• FCRA Bar: After an FCHR “no reasonable cause” determination, a claimant cannot sue under the FCRA in court; the proper course is to pursue administrative/judicial review, and only a favorable outcome (or the 180-day inaction path) unlocks a civil action. The court held the plaintiff’s FCRA claims were therefore barred.
• Sanctions: The court denied Allstate’s motion for appellate sanctions, noting it was a close question.

Factual and Procedural Background

Allstate hired Mr. Makere as an actuarial technician in 2013 under its actuarial career program, which required progress through actuarial exams. Allstate terminated him in August 2016 after a third failure of a single exam, consistent with its policy. Makere alleged discrimination (race, color, sex), harassment, and retaliation during employment and in his termination. He also alleged post-termination retaliation through three episodes: a 2018 bicycle-car collision, a former coworker’s police contact, and a different former employer’s reduction of his retirement benefits.

The litigation unfolded in several stages:

• 2017 FCHR Charge: FCHR issued “no reasonable cause” in Dec. 2017. After a four-day DOAH hearing with 16 witnesses, the ALJ recommended dismissal; FCHR adopted the recommendation, and the Florida First DCA affirmed in 2020.
• 2019 FCHR/EEOC Charge: FCHR again found “no reasonable cause,” deeming it identical and untimely; DOAH dismissed on res judicata, collateral estoppel, and administrative finality. The EEOC adopted the state finding and issued a right-to-sue notice in Jan. 2020.
• Federal Suit (2020): The district court dismissed FCRA claims outright under Florida’s “no cause” bar; dismissed § 1981 claims as precluded (for pre-termination acts) and implausible (for post-termination retaliation); later granted summary judgment to Allstate on Title VII claims as untimely.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Collateral Estoppel/Preclusion:
  • Quinn v. Monroe County and Maniccia v. Brown: Set the framework for according preclusive effect to state administrative decisions that have undergone judicial review, provided due process was satisfied.
  • Taylor v. Sturgell: Describes collateral estoppel’s policy aims and scope.
  • Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale; Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers: Establish that FCRA discrimination/retaliation claims and § 1981 claims share the same elements, supporting the identity-of-issues requirement for preclusion.
  • Shields v. Bellsouth; Club Madonna v. City of Miami Beach: Confirm that adversarial administrative hearings followed by judicial review satisfy due process for preclusion purposes.
  • Gasperini v. Center for Humanities: Clarifies the Seventh Amendment jury-trial right does not apply to state proceedings; used to rebut the plaintiff’s due process challenge rooted in a claimed jury right.
• Pleading Standards and Plausibility:
  • Bell Atlantic v. Twombly; Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Require factual content permitting reasonable inference of liability rather than conclusory assertions.
  • Doe v. Samford University: Authorizes courts to weigh “obvious alternative explanations” and reject speculative inferences.
• Retaliation Scope:
  • CBOCS West v. Humphries: Recognizes retaliation claims under § 1981.
  • Burlington Northern v. White; Monaghan v. Worldpay: Define retaliatory actions broadly to include harm outside the workplace, but still require a credible causal connection.
  • Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator: Aligns standards for Title VII and § 1981 retaliation claims.
• Title VII Timeliness:
  • Wilkerson v. Grinnell: Requires filing a timely EEOC charge as a precondition to suit.
  • Thomas v. Florida Power & Light: Confirms the 300-day extended filing period when state agencies with remedial authority are first engaged.
  • Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Insurance: The limitations period begins upon unequivocal notice of the adverse decision.
  • Caron v. NCL and Bryant v. USDA: Limit relation-back to timely original filings, undermining attempts to retroactively cure untimeliness.
  • Doe ex rel. Doe #6 v. Swearingen; Jimenez v. U.S. Attorney General (2025): Cabin the continuing violation doctrine, distinguishing discrete acts from ongoing violations.
• FCRA Exhaustion and Bar:
  • Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network: FCRA imposes administrative exhaustion.
  • McElrath v. Burley; Sheridan v. State, Department of Health: After an FCHR “no cause” determination, claimants cannot file an FCRA civil action; the remedy is administrative/judicial review, and success there is a prerequisite to civil action.
  • Cisko v. Phoenix Medical Products: Recognizes the 180-day inaction pathway to court if FCHR fails to act.

Legal Reasoning

1) Collateral Estoppel from Florida Administrative Proceedings Bars Federal § 1981 Claims Based on the Same Events

The court applied a two-step approach: (a) whether Florida courts would give preclusive effect to the decision; and (b) whether the underlying proceedings satisfied due process. Both were met. The 2017 FCHR “no cause” determination was followed by a full DOAH evidentiary hearing (16 witnesses), a reasoned ALJ decision, FCHR adoption, and affirmance by the Florida First DCA. With identity of parties (Makere and Allstate) and identity of issues (discrimination, harassment, and retaliation tied to employment and termination), the court concluded that those determinations were fully and fairly litigated and essential to the judgment. Because FCRA and § 1981 claims share elements, the issues were the same for preclusion purposes. The due process element was satisfied by the adversarial DOAH hearing and judicial review. Accordingly, § 1981 claims predicated on pre-termination and termination events were precluded.

2) Post-Termination § 1981 Retaliation: Plausibility Requires Facts Linking the Employer to the Alleged Acts

Although § 1981 retaliation can reach conduct outside the workplace, the complaint must plausibly allege causation. Here, the allegations that Allstate orchestrated a car collision, directed a former coworker to make a police report, or induced a different employer to reduce retirement benefits were deemed conclusory and speculative. The court invoked Twombly/Iqbal and Doe v. Samford’s “obvious alternative explanations” rationale to hold that “bare assertions” do not render an employer’s responsibility plausible, so the post-termination retaliation claim failed to state a claim.

3) Title VII Claims: Untimely EEOC Charge and Limits on Relation-Back and Continuing Violation

The plaintiff’s termination notice on August 12, 2016 started the clock; he did not file with the EEOC until January 2020 (the agency’s determination date) and did not initiate a state FCHR charge until June 2017—beyond the 300-day window even under the extended period applicable when state proceedings are initiated. The court assumed arguendo that relation-back across agencies might be theoretically possible, but held it could not save the claim because the earlier FCHR filing was itself untimely. The continuing violation doctrine could not resuscitate either a discrete termination decision or a hostile environment that, by definition, ended no later than termination. Thus, summary judgment was proper on timeliness grounds.

4) FCRA Claims: “No Cause” Means No Civil Action

Under Florida law, an FCHR “no reasonable cause” finding requires dismissal of the administrative complaint and bars civil FCRA suits; the claimant’s path is administrative/judicial review. Because the plaintiff unsuccessfully pursued those avenues, he could not maintain an FCRA action in court. The court also noted that the second 2019 FCHR charge was untimely for almost all alleged acts (outside 365 days), and the sole within-window allegation (retirement benefits reduction) still failed because the complaint did not plausibly link Allstate to that action.

Impact and Practical Implications

A. Doctrinal Impact

• Preclusive Effect of FCHR/DOAH + State Appellate Review: The decision strengthens the message that Florida administrative determinations—following an adversarial DOAH hearing and affirmed by a state appellate court—will collaterally estop later federal § 1981 claims built on the same facts. Plaintiffs cannot relitigate these issues in federal court merely by switching statutes.
• Stringent Timeliness Enforcement in Title VII: The 300-day limit is strictly applied from the last actionable event. Attempted relation-back across agencies will not save an untimely EEOC filing when the originating state filing was itself outside the 300-day window. The continuing violation doctrine remains narrow—discrete acts like termination are independently time-barred if not timely charged, and a hostile work environment claim must be charged within 300 days of the last act in the hostile chain.
• Plausibility for Post-Termination Retaliation: The court underscores that allegations tying an employer to third-party harms require concrete facts, not speculation. This is particularly significant for novel or indirect retaliation theories.
• FCRA’s “No Cause” Bar in Federal Court: A Florida “no cause” determination forecloses a parallel FCRA lawsuit in federal court, absent the statutory 180-day inaction gateway or a successful administrative/judicial challenge.

B. Practical Guidance for Litigants

• For Employees/Plaintiffs:
  • Mark the clocks: FCRA complaint must be filed within 365 days of the violation; Title VII charge within 300 days (if a qualifying state agency is first involved). Do not assume later filings can “relate back.”
  • If FCHR issues “no cause,” understand you cannot immediately sue under the FCRA; you must pursue administrative/judicial review and win, or rely on the 180-day inaction provision if it applies.
  • For post-termination retaliation, gather and plead concrete facts showing the employer’s role—communications, directives, common actors, timing with detail—not just conclusions.
• For Employers/Defendants:
  • Assert preclusion defenses where the plaintiff previously litigated materially identical issues to a state “no cause” with DOAH hearing and state appellate affirmance.
  • Scrutinize Title VII timeliness; relation-back theories that cross agency boundaries are unlikely to rescue an untimely federal charge when the underlying state charge was already out of time.
  • On retaliation claims, challenge conclusory causation allegations at the pleading stage under Twombly/Iqbal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion): Once an issue (e.g., whether discrimination occurred) has been fully litigated and decided in a prior case, the losing party cannot relitigate that same issue in a new case—even under a different legal label—so long as due process was afforded and the prior decision is final.
• Due Process in Administrative Preclusion: An adversarial hearing (witnesses, evidence, cross-examination), agency review, and the opportunity for judicial review generally satisfy due process for preclusion purposes.
• Twombly/Iqbal Plausibility: Complaints must allege facts that make liability reasonably believable—not just conclusions or speculation. Courts can discount implausible inferences when obvious lawful explanations exist.
• Title VII 300-Day Deadline: In “deferral” states like Florida where a state agency can grant relief, employees have 300 days from the employment action to file with the EEOC. Untimely filings are typically fatal.
• Relation-Back (Rule 15): Lets an amended pleading in court relate back to the date of a timely original pleading if it arises from the same conduct. It does not rescue an EEOC charge that was late if the earlier agency filing was also late.
• Continuing Violation Doctrine: Applies to ongoing wrongs (like a hostile environment) where small acts add up; the clock runs from the last act. It does not convert discrete acts (e.g., termination) into timely claims when the charge is filed too late.
• FCRA “No Cause” Bar: If FCHR finds “no reasonable cause,” the statute channels you into administrative/judicial review; it does not permit immediately filing an FCRA lawsuit. Only a favorable administrative outcome (or 180-day agency inaction) opens the door to court.

Conclusion

Although unpublished and therefore non-binding, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning offers a crisp triad of reminders for employment litigants:

1. Preclusion is potent: Florida administrative outcomes—with DOAH hearings and state appellate affirmance—can collaterally estop later § 1981 actions premised on the same facts because FCRA and § 1981 share essential elements.
2. Timeliness is unforgiving under Title VII: The 300-day clock is strictly enforced; relation-back does not bridge untimely inter-agency filings, and the continuing violation doctrine remains narrow.
3. Plausibility matters for retaliation: Especially for post-termination theories involving third-party conduct, the pleading must concretely connect the employer to the alleged harm; speculation will not survive Rule 12(b)(6).

On the FCRA front, the court reiterates Florida’s distinct regime: a “no cause” determination forecloses civil suit absent statutory exceptions. Together, these rulings reinforce disciplined timing, careful pleading, and respect for the finality of state administrative adjudications. The opinion thus serves as a practical playbook: know your deadlines, pursue the proper administrative lanes, and build fact-driven allegations—without which even energetically pursued claims will fail.