Foreseeable Telephonic Contacts and the Limits of Acceptance-of-Responsibility Reductions: Commentary on United States v. Washington (2d Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Washington, No. 24‑3173 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2025), arises from the widely publicized scheme in which retired professional basketball players and others defrauded the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) Players’ Health and Welfare Benefit Plan (the “Plan”). The defendant-appellant, Dr. William James Washington, a licensed physician, was convicted after a jury trial in the Southern District of New York of:

Conspiracy to commit wire and health care fraud and to make false statements in health care matters, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 371;
Substantive health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347;
Substantive wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and
Aiding and abetting, under 18 U.S.C. § 2.

On appeal, Washington raised two principal categories of challenges:

Venue – arguing that the government failed to prove that venue was proper in the Southern District of New York for the charged conspiracy, wire fraud, and health care fraud offenses; and
Sentencing – attacking both:
- the procedural reasonableness of the sentence, contending that he was improperly denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), supposedly punishing him for going to trial; and
- the substantive reasonableness of his within‑Guidelines 60‑month sentence.

A panel consisting of Judges Chin, Sullivan, and Kahn unanimously affirmed. While the opinion is a summary order and explicitly “does not have precedential effect” under the Second Circuit’s Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and serves as a useful and detailed illustration of:

how foreseeable telephonic contacts into a district can establish venue for conspiracy, wire fraud, and health care fraud; and
the limits of the “trial penalty” argument in the context of acceptance-of-responsibility reductions under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

II. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence in all respects.

A. Venue

The court held that the government proved venue in the Southern District of New York by a preponderance of the evidence. The key facts:

Washington made multiple phone calls in furtherance of the scheme to an employee of the Plan’s administrator using a 917 number associated with New York City, and he acknowledged that number was “the Plan” he was trying to defraud.
The Plan was administered “in Manhattan,” i.e., in the Southern District of New York.
Washington also called a 212 number for a Manhattan law firm representing the NBA in its investigation, and during those calls (answered in Manhattan) he made false statements about invoices he had submitted.

Applying established venue principles for conspiracy, wire fraud, and health care fraud, the panel concluded it was at least reasonably foreseeable to Washington that these calls would be answered in Manhattan, and those calls constituted overt acts and acts in furtherance of the offenses sufficient to anchor venue in the Southern District.

B. Sentencing – Procedural Reasonableness

Washington argued that the district court erred in denying him a one‑level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), characterizing that denial as an unconstitutional penalty for his decision to go to trial.

The Second Circuit rejected this challenge, holding:

The one‑level reduction under § 3E1.1(b) is available only to defendants who first qualify for the two‑level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) (basic acceptance of responsibility).
Washington never claimed entitlement to the two‑level reduction under subsection (a), either in the district court or on appeal, and therefore could not complain about the absence of the additional one‑level reduction under subsection (b).
Even assuming arguendo that he had been eligible for both reductions, the district court explicitly stated that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of any acceptance-of-responsibility points.

Accordingly, there was no plain error, no unconstitutional “trial penalty,” and no procedural unreasonableness.

C. Sentencing – Substantive Reasonableness

The panel also rejected Washington’s challenge to the length of his 60‑month sentence, which fell within the advisory Guidelines range. The court:

Reaffirmed that substantive reasonableness review is “particularly deferential” and that a sentence is only reversible if “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.”
Found that the district court carefully addressed each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including mitigation (e.g., some repayment and claimed victimization by others), and reasonably concluded that a 60‑month term was appropriate.
Held that the district court was not required to equalize sentences among co‑defendants, especially given meaningful differences:
- other doctor co‑defendants accepted responsibility,
- Washington perjured himself at trial, and
- he persisted in the scheme rather than trying to extricate himself.

In sum, the panel found no procedural or substantive error and affirmed the judgment.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Venue: Foreseeable Telephonic Contacts as “Overt Acts” and “Acts in Furtherance”

1. Governing Standards and Key Precedents

Venue in criminal cases is rooted in the Constitution and implemented by statute, but it is not itself an element of the offense. As a result, the government’s burden and the standard of review differ from those applicable to substantive elements.

The panel relies on several established Second Circuit and Supreme Court authorities:

United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 1999) – Venue need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a relatively modest standard: more likely than not.
United States v. Tzolov, 642 F.3d 314, 318 (2d Cir. 2011) – The sufficiency of venue evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the government, with every reasonable inference drawn in its favor. Venue challenges are reviewed count‑by‑count; where facts are undisputed, they raise questions of law reviewed de novo.
United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 483 (2d Cir. 2003) – In conspiracy cases, venue is proper “in any district in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the coconspirators.” Thus, the defendant need not personally act in the district so long as a co‑conspirator does.
United States v. Rutigliano, 790 F.3d 389, 396–97 (2d Cir. 2015)

For health care fraud, venue is proper in “all of the places that any part of [the health care fraud] took place,” echoing the Supreme Court’s “locus delicti” principle from Rodriguez‑Moreno.
For wire fraud, venue lies “where a wire in furtherance of a scheme begins its course, continues, or ends.” Thus, either end of the communication (and intermediate routing locations) can anchor venue.

United States v. Rodriguez‑Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 282 (1999) – The Supreme Court emphasized that venue lies in any district where the conduct elements of the offense occur; the “locus delicti” is determined by the nature of the crime and the conduct constituting it.
United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2012) – For venue, the government need not prove that the defendant knew specific acts would occur in a specific district. The proper question is whether the acts’ occurrence in the chosen venue district was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
United States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) – Telephone calls used to plan or cover up a crime can qualify as overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy and thus support venue where the calls are sent or received.

From these authorities, the court applies several core propositions:

Venue is established by a preponderance of evidence.
Telephone calls can be “overt acts” and “acts in furtherance” in conspiracy, wire fraud, and health care fraud cases.
Any district where the wire communications begin, pass through, or end is a proper venue for wire-based offenses.
Reasonable foreseeability, not actual knowledge, of the district where the acts will occur is sufficient.

2. Evidence Supporting Venue in the Southern District of New York

Applying those rules, the panel focuses on specific trial evidence:

Washington made “several calls in furtherance of the conspiracy” to a Plan administrator’s worker using a 917 area code number assigned to New York City cellular phones. On the stand, he admitted that he knew this number belonged to “the Plan.”
The Plan itself was administered “in Manhattan,” which lies within the Southern District of New York.
Washington also initiated telephone calls to an attorney at a New York law firm representing the NBA in investigating the fraud. Those calls went to the firm’s 212 number and were answered at its Manhattan offices.
During those Manhattan-answered calls, Washington made false statements about invoices he had submitted for medical services he had not performed—directly furthering the fraud and its cover-up.

Each of these acts bears on venue:

The 917 and 212 numbers are strongly associated with New York City, making it reasonably foreseeable that calls to those numbers would be answered in New York.
Because the Plan was “administered in Manhattan,” any fraud directed against the Plan was particularly likely to involve acts occurring within that district.
The misrepresentations during the calls to the NBA’s Manhattan counsel were plainly in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme, either to secure payments or to conceal prior fraudulent submissions.

Taken together, these facts easily satisfy the preponderance standard for:

Conspiracy venue – the calls are overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy occurring (or reasonably foreseen to occur) in the Southern District.
Wire fraud venue – the fraudulent calls “began, continued, or ended” in the Southern District.
Health care fraud venue – the fraud “took place” in, among other locations, Manhattan, where the Plan was administered and where fraudulent communications were received.

3. The Role of Reasonable Foreseeability and Modern Telecommunications

A notable feature of the opinion is the emphasis on reasonable foreseeability with respect to where telephone communications will be received. This is critical in an era of mobile phones and number portability, where area codes are less reliable indicators of physical location than in the past.

Nonetheless, the panel had more than an area code to work with:

It was proven that the Plan was administered in Manhattan.
It was proven that the law firm’s calls were actually answered in its Manhattan offices.
Washington knew he was contacting the Plan and the NBA’s New York counsel.

The combination of:

the New York area codes,
the Manhattan administration of the Plan, and
the known New York location of the NBA’s law firm

made it at least reasonably foreseeable that the acts in furtherance would occur within the Southern District. Under Davis, this suffices. The government did not need to prove Washington’s actual awareness of the courthouse’s geographic boundaries or precise district lines.

Strategically, the opinion signals that defendants face an uphill battle in contesting venue where:

they intentionally target an institution based in a particular district, and
they repeatedly use telephonic or electronic communications directed into that district.

Even in a nonprecedential order, the court’s seamless application of longstanding venue doctrine to modern communications underscores the robustness of the “foreseeable telephonic contacts” theory for establishing venue in multi-district fraud and conspiracy prosecutions.

B. Sentencing: Acceptance of Responsibility and the “Trial Penalty” Argument

1. Standards of Review and Preservation

The panel opens its sentencing analysis with a straightforward recitation of the governing standards:

United States v. Vargas, 961 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2020) – Sentences are reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. This incorporates:
- De novo review of legal questions, including Guidelines interpretations; and
- Clear-error review of factual findings.
United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 2007) – Where the defendant properly objected below, sentencing errors are reviewed for harmless error; where no objection was made, review is for plain error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
United States v. Alvarado, 720 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2013) – A district court commits procedural error when it:
- fails to calculate, or incorrectly calculates, the Guidelines range;
- treats the Guidelines as mandatory;
- fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors;
- bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts; or
- fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.

Because Washington did not raise his “trial penalty”/acceptance-of-responsibility argument in the district court, the panel applies plain-error review, which is a demanding standard: he had to show an error that is clear or obvious, affects his substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

2. The Structure of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and Washington’s Claim

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides:

§ 3E1.1(a) – A defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility” may receive a two-level reduction in offense level.
§ 3E1.1(b) – If the defendant qualifies for the two-level reduction and has assisted authorities by timely notifying of an intention to plead guilty, thus permitting the government to avoid trial preparation and the court to allocate resources efficiently, the offense level may be decreased by one additional level.

Washington argued on appeal that the district court’s failure to grant him the one-point reduction under § 3E1.1(b) effectively punished him for exercising his right to trial, because that subsection is tied to early guilty pleas which spare the government the expense of trial preparation.

The panel characterizes this argument as “doomed from the start” for a simple structural reason:

By its plain text, § 3E1.1(b) only applies “[i]f the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a)” and meets other criteria.
Washington never claimed, in the district court or on appeal, that he met the criteria for the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a).

Because he never asserted, let alone demonstrated, basic acceptance of responsibility, he could not legitimately complain about the denial of the additional one-point reduction available only to those who have first qualified under subsection (a).

This is an important analytic point for practitioners: an appellate “trial penalty” argument premised on § 3E1.1(b) is untenable if the defendant has not:

first sought and claimed entitlement to the base two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a); and
created a record showing “clear” acceptance of responsibility.

3. “Lenience vs. Penalty”: A Longstanding Distinction

Even if Washington had qualified under § 3E1.1(a), the panel emphasizes that the denial of a § 3E1.1(b) reduction would still not necessarily constitute an unconstitutional penalty for going to trial.

The court invokes a line of Second Circuit cases reinforcing the distinction between:

Showing lenience to those who accept responsibility; and
Imposing a penalty on those who exercise their right to trial.

Key authorities:

United States v. Araujo, 539 F.2d 287, 292 (2d Cir. 1976) – “A show of lenience to those who exhibit contrition by admitting guilt does not carry a corollary that the [j]udge indulges a policy of penalizing those who elect to stand trial.” It is impermissible only if the court augments a sentence because a defendant exercised the right to trial.
United States v. Duffy, 479 F.2d 1038, 1039 (2d Cir. 1973) – The court vacated a sentence where it was clear the magistrate imposed a “relatively heavy fine … as a consequence of [the defendant’s] refusal to plead guilty.” This is the archetypal “trial penalty” scenario.
United States v. DiMassa, 117 F.4th 477, 484 n.1 (2d Cir. 2024) – Reiterates that “withholding leniency for defendants who have declined to accept responsibility does not give rise to an impermissible punishment,” neatly restating the Araujo principle in the Guidelines era.
United States v. Arigbodi, 924 F.2d 462, 464 (2d Cir. 1991) – Holds that there is no plain error where a “defendant could have received exactly the same sentence in the absence of the alleged error.” This is crucial to the harmlessness and plain-error analysis.

Against this backdrop, the panel stresses the district court’s explicit statement at sentencing:

“Let me note that even if I gave you acceptance points and so that your guideline would be 23, I would still impose the same sentence.”

On this record:

The district court did not “augment” Washington’s sentence because he went to trial. It stated affirmatively that the same sentence would have been imposed even if acceptance-of-responsibility points had applied.
As Arigbodi underscores, when the record shows beyond doubt that the alleged error did not change the sentence, relief is unwarranted—particularly on plain-error review.

Thus, the panel concludes that:

There is no constitutionally cognizable “trial penalty.”
There is no procedural error in the refusal to award a § 3E1.1(b) reduction sua sponte.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the decision reinforces the longstanding Second Circuit view: leniency for accepting responsibility is not the same as a penalty for asserting innocence and going to trial, so long as the sentencing court does not increase a sentence based on the defendant’s choice to stand trial.

C. Substantive Reasonableness: Deference and Co‑Defendant Comparisons

1. The “Shockingly High or Low” Standard

In reviewing the length of the 60‑month sentence, the panel reiterates the very deferential standard applicable to substantive reasonableness:

United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009) – A sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.”
United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) – Highlights that appellate review for substantive reasonableness is “particularly deferential,” placing a “heavy burden” on defendants seeking to overturn a sentence on this basis.

These cases confirm that, absent truly extreme circumstances or a plainly unsupportable weighing of § 3553(a) factors, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing judge.

2. The District Court’s Consideration of Mitigating Factors

Washington argued that his sentence was too harsh because the district court:

allegedly undervalued mitigation such as his attempts to return some of the fraud proceeds; and
insufficiently accounted for his claim that he was “victimized” or manipulated by co‑defendants.

The panel’s response is straightforward:

The district court did consider these points, as the sentencing transcript reflects (App’x at 1561–64, 1605).
Under Second Circuit precedent, the weight assigned to aggravating and mitigating factors is “firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.”

The panel cites:

United States v. Martinez, 110 F.4th 160, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2024) – emphasizing that the particular weight given to § 3553(a) factors is for the district court, not the appellate court, to decide, so long as it is within the range of reasonable outcomes.

Further, the district court “walked through each of the objectives of sentencing set forth in section 3553(a)” and applied them to the trial and sentencing record, indicating a careful and individualized assessment.

3. Co‑Defendant Disparities and Individualized Sentencing

Washington also highlighted the shorter sentences imposed on other medical professional co‑defendants as evidence that his 60‑month term was excessive.

Again, the panel relies on established principles:

United States v. Johnson, 567 F.3d 40, 54 (2d Cir. 2009) – A district court “may – but is not required to – consider sentencing disparity among co‑defendants.” The focus of § 3553(a)(6) (“avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”) is primarily on national, not intra-case, disparities.

The district court nonetheless distinguished Washington from his co‑defendant medical professionals on several significant grounds:

Lack of acceptance of responsibility – Other doctor defendants accepted responsibility; Washington did not.
Perjury at trial – The district court found that Washington perjured himself, which legitimately bears on both his character and the need for deterrence and respect for the law.
Persistence in the conspiracy – Unlike a co‑defendant who attempted to extricate himself from the scheme, Washington “never tried to extricate himself” and instead sought ways to circumvent obstacles, including instructing his office manager to “annotate” false receipts.

These individualized differences—especially perjury and ongoing, proactive participation—furnished a solid basis for imposing a longer sentence on Washington than on other similarly situated professionals. The panel thus concluded that the 60‑month within‑Guidelines sentence fell comfortably within the permissible range.

IV. Impact and Significance

Because this is a summary order, it does not create binding precedent in the Second Circuit. Nonetheless, United States v. Washington is instructive in several respects.

A. Venue in Multi‑District Fraud and Health Care Cases

The decision reinforces—and concretely illustrates—several points that are likely to influence how prosecutors charge venue and how defense counsel litigate it:

Telephonic and electronic communications remain potent venue anchors – Phone calls (and, by analogy, other electronic communications) directed into a district where the fraud is administered or investigated can suffice to establish venue for conspiracy, wire fraud, and health care fraud.
Reasonable foreseeability is the key – The government does not need to show that defendants learned the exact federal district boundaries. It is enough that, given the nature of the Plan, the known location of its administration, and the law firm’s New York identity, it was reasonably foreseeable that the calls would be answered within the Southern District of New York.
Venue is not defeated by the absence of physical presence – Washington did not need to be physically present in Manhattan. His telephonic participation in the fraud sufficed, consistent with modern understandings of locus delicti in digitally mediated crimes.

For prosecutors, Washington suggests that clear evidence of:

the locus of plan administration,
where investigative or remedial calls are received, and
the foreseeability that communications will be answered in that locus,

will usually be sufficient to carry the preponderance burden for venue.

For defense counsel, the case underscores:

the importance of developing a factual record challenging foreseeability (e.g., ambiguity of area codes, remote work, etc.), and
the need to separate arguments about whether an act occurred in the district from whether the defendant could foresee it, since the latter is all that is required under Second Circuit law.

B. Acceptance of Responsibility, Trial Rights, and Appellate Framing

The opinion also highlights practical considerations regarding:

how and when to seek acceptance-of-responsibility reductions, and
how to frame “trial penalty” arguments on appeal.

Key lessons:

Preservation and record-building are critical – A defendant who intends to argue that the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction penalized the exercise of trial rights must:
- explicitly seek § 3E1.1(a) in the district court and build a record of contrition; and
- secure a sentencing record that suggests the court aggravated the sentence due to the decision to go to trial.
The “lenience vs. penalty” distinction remains firmly entrenched – The Second Circuit will continue to distinguish between:
- withholding benefits (lenience) from those who go to trial; and
- increasing a sentence as punishment for going to trial.
The former is permissible; the latter is not.
Harmlessness and plain error can be dispositive – Where, as here, the sentencing judge states on the record that the same sentence would be imposed regardless of acceptance points, it is almost impossible to show that the alleged error affected substantial rights.

C. Co‑Defendant Disparities and Individualized Sentencing

The opinion also reiterates that sentencing remains an individualized endeavor. Even co‑defendants with broadly similar roles (e.g., multiple physician participants in the same fraud) may justifiably receive different sentences if:

they differ in acceptance of responsibility,
one commits perjury,
one attempts to withdraw from the conspiracy while another persists, or
their respective conduct or post-offense behavior differs materially.

Washington thus serves as a practical reminder that mere comparison with a co‑defendant’s lower sentence, without more, will rarely carry a substantive reasonableness challenge.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

For non‑specialist readers, several key legal concepts used in the opinion warrant clarification.

1. Venue

“Venue” refers to the geographic location where a criminal case may properly be tried. In federal criminal law:

The Constitution and statutes generally require trial in the district where the crime was committed.
In multi-district or multi‑step crimes (like wire fraud or conspiracy), the government can often choose among several districts where different parts of the offense occurred.

In this case, the question was whether enough of the fraudulent activity—specifically, telephonic conduct—took place in or was foreseeably directed to the Southern District of New York to justify trying Washington there.

2. Preponderance of the Evidence

Unlike the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard that applies to guilt, venue need only be proved by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means:

the evidence shows it is more likely than not that venue is proper; or
that the probability is greater than 50% that an essential venue fact—such as whether an act occurred in a given district—is true.

3. Conspiracy and Overt Acts

A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime. Many conspiracy statutes require proof of at least one “overt act” in furtherance of the agreement.

An “overt act” need not itself be illegal; it need only be a step that furthers the conspiracy’s objectives. A phone call, email, or document can qualify. Venue for conspiracy can lie in any district where any conspirator commits such an overt act.

4. Wire Fraud and Health Care Fraud

Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) – Involves a scheme to defraud using interstate wire communications (e.g., phone calls, emails, electronic transfers). Venue is proper where a wire communication in furtherance of the scheme begins, passes, or ends.
Health care fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347) – Involves executing a scheme to defraud a health care benefit program or obtaining funds under false pretenses in connection with such a program. Venue is proper in any district where part of that scheme occurs.

5. Acceptance of Responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1)

The federal Sentencing Guidelines permit reduced offense levels—and thus lower advisory sentencing ranges—for defendants who “accept responsibility”:

Subsection (a): generally a two-level reduction for clearly demonstrating acceptance (often by pleading guilty and expressing genuine remorse, though not exclusively).
Subsection (b): one additional level reduction, awarded on a government motion, when the defendant has both accepted responsibility and timely notified authorities of an intention to plead guilty, conserving government and court resources.

Crucially, denial of these reductions—especially when a defendant maintains innocence and goes to trial—is usually viewed as withholding lenience, not as imposing a penalty for exercising the right to trial, absent evidence to the contrary.

6. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

Procedural reasonableness asks whether the sentencing process was fair and legally correct. Did the judge:
- properly calculate the Guidelines range?
- treat the Guidelines as advisory (not mandatory)?
- consider the statutory sentencing factors?
- base the sentence on accurate facts?
- adequately explain the chosen sentence?
Substantive reasonableness asks whether, in light of all circumstances, the length and type of sentence is within the range of permissible outcomes. The appellate court asks whether the sentence is “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.”

7. Plain Error

“Plain error” is a strict standard of review applied when an issue was not properly preserved (e.g., no objection in the district court). To obtain relief, a defendant must show:

There was an error;
The error is clear or obvious under current law;
The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (usually, that it affected the outcome); and
The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

VI. Conclusion

Although issued as a nonprecedential summary order, United States v. Washington provides a clear and instructive application of established Second Circuit and Supreme Court doctrines to contemporary fraud litigation.

On the venue front, the decision underscores that:

telephonic and similar electronic communications can be sufficient “overt acts” and acts in furtherance to anchor venue;
the government need only prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence; and
reasonable foreseeability that communications will be answered in a particular district is enough, especially when the defendant is targeting entities known to be based or administered there.

On the sentencing front, the order:

reaffirms the structure and limits of acceptance-of-responsibility reductions under § 3E1.1;
distinguishes between impermissible punishment for going to trial and permissible withholding of lenience for lack of contrition;
illustrates the difficulty of mounting “trial penalty” arguments absent clear record support; and
demonstrates the breadth of deference given to district courts in weighing mitigation and co‑defendant disparities under § 3553(a).

In a broader sense, Washington confirms the Second Circuit’s continued adherence to:

a flexible, foreseeability-based approach to venue in multi-district fraud schemes involving telephonic and electronic communications; and
a robust, deferential framework for appellate review of sentencing, both procedurally and substantively.

For litigants and practitioners, the decision is a practical guide on how the Second Circuit is likely to treat similar venue disputes and sentencing challenges in complex fraud and health care cases, even if it does not formally bind future panels as precedent.